People v. McGuire

1 Cal. App. 4th 281, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 91 Daily Journal DAR 14506, 1991 Cal. App. LEXIS 1354

• Court: California Court of Appeal
• Decided: November 25, 1991
• Docket: A052808
• Status: Published

Opinions

Opinion

PERLEY, J.

Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant and appellant Dennis V. McGuire (appellant) pleaded guilty in the municipal court to being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12021). Two other charges and an allegation of a prior felony conviction were dismissed. A condition of the plea was that appellant would be sentenced to state prison for the lower term of 16 months. The superior court sentenced appellant to 16 months in accordance with the negotiated disposition.

Appellant contends that his motion to withdraw the guilty plea should have been granted because the municipal court failed to comply with the provisions of Penal Code section 1192.5 relating to the factual basis for the plea. This contention lacks merit.

The relevant portions of section 1192.5 are as follows: “Upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to an accusatory pleading charging a felony .... [(j[] The court shall also cause an inquiry to be made of the defendant to satisfy itself that the plea is freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for such plea.”

Herein the record reveals that before the municipal court accepted appellant’s plea, he was advised of the constitutional rights he would waive by so pleading. Appellant indicated he understood those rights and expressly waived them. He was also advised of the consequences of his plea.

Regarding the subject in issue, the municipal court asked the attorneys, “[w]ill you stipulate that there is a factual basis for this plea?” Both counsel answered, “[s]o stipulated.”

It appears that People v. Watts (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 173 [136 Cal.Rptr. 496], was the first case to construe the above statutory language, because the court therein declared: “We find no California case which defines the nature and scope of the inquiry to be made by the trial court as to the factual basis for the plea under Penal Code section 1192.5.” (Id. at p. 178.)

Various authorities cited with approval in the Watts case state: “The revision of Federal Rule 11 does not require a particular kind of inquiry, and the committee note thereto observes that the court may satisfy itself ‘by inquiry of the defendant or the attorney for the government . . . .’ ” (People v. Watts, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d at p. 179, some quotation marks omitted.) The “court may satisfy itself by statements and admissions made by the defendant, his counsel, and the prosecutor . . . .” (Id. at p. 180, internal quotation marks omitted.) However, the Watts court concluded that a statement by defense counsel that he discussed the facts and law of the case with the defendant did not meet the requirements of section 1192.5. (67 Cal. App.3d at p. 180.)

People v. Enright (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 631, 634-635 [183 Cal.Rptr. 249], held that the requirements of section 1192.5 were met by a stipulation of the parties that the police reports could be considered as the factual basis for the plea.

People v. Tigner (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 430, 434 [184 Cal.Rptr. 61], reaffirmed the holding in Watts that “a court could satisfy the factual basis inquiry by statements and admissions made by the defendant, his counsel, and the prosecutor . . . .” It further held that the statutory requirements are not met by a mere recitation by the trial court that “ ‘[t]here’s a factual basis for the plea’ without any further inquiry of appellant, his counsel, or the district attorney.” (Id. at pp. 433, 435.)

On the basis of the above authorities we conclude that the requirements of the statute were met herein because the record discloses that the municipal court obtained an admission from the defense attorney and the prosecutor.

The judgment is affirmed.

Anderson, P. J., concurred.