QUINN, Justice.
This appeal, which is brought by the People pursuant to section 16-12-102, C.R. S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), raises the single question of whether the trial court, when the jury has been deliberating on the charge of first degree murder and lesser included offenses and there is no indication either that a unanimous verdict is unlikely if deliberations continue or that the jury is deadlocked solely on the issue of the defendant’s guilt as to a greater or lesser offense, should instruct the jury that, if it is satisfied of the defendant’s guilt of at least one of the offenses but has a reasonable doubt as to which offense, it has the duty to find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense only. Because we conclude that under the particular circumstances of this case the instruction was coercive and incompatible with the requirement of a unanimous verdict, we disapprove the judgment.
I.
The facts are undisputed. The defendant, Patricia J. Lewis, was charged with first degree murder by intentionally and after deliberation causing the death of her husband, Tom Lewis, Sr., on November 1, 1981.1 After a trial resulting in a sanity [685]*685verdict, trial on the merits commenced to a jury on September 8, 1982. Upon completion of the evidence, the trial court on September 14, 1982, submitted the case to the jury on the original charge of deliberated murder in the first degree and the lesser included offenses of murder in the second degree,2 heat of passion manslaughter,3 and criminally negligent homicide.4
During the second day of its deliberations the jury wrote a note informing the court that nine jurors had agreed on one verdict and three jurors on another verdict and requesting directions as to the appropriate procedure. The court met with counsel and, after much discussion on whether additional instructions should be given, excused the jury from further deliberations until the following morning.
On the next day the court met with counsel and decided to give two additional instructions to the jury. One of the instructions, to which the People did not object, directed the jurors, if not satisfied of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to murder in the first degree, to then consider her guilt as to the lesser offenses of murder in the second degree, heat of passion manslaughter, and criminally negligent homicide, in that order. The other instruction, No. 20, stated as follows;
“You are instructed that if you find that the Defendant Patricia Lewis is guilty of an offense that has been charged within the information, including the lesser included offenses, but entertain a reasonable doubt as to which offense she has committed, then you have the duty to find the Defendant Patricia Lewis guilty only of the lesser offense.”
The prosecution objected to Instruction No. 20 as premature and potentially coercive, but the objection was overruled. The jury, after receiving the additional instructions, resumed deliberations and eventually returned a guilty verdict to heat of passion manslaughter. A judgment of conviction entered on the verdict and, after the imposition of sentence the People filed this appeal.5
The People, as they did before the trial court, argue that Instruction No. 20 was [686]*686both premature and coercive. It was premature, according to the People, because the trial court never determined whether further deliberations might be productive of a unanimous verdict and whether the jury impasse related to the issue of guilt or innocence or the level of offense. Also, in the People’s view, the instruction was coercive because it required the jury to return a non-unanimous verdict on the lesser offense as long as all jurors were in agreement on the defendant’s guilt to any one of the offenses submitted to them for their consideration. We agree with the People’s arguments.
II.
We recognize that in these days of increasing litigation judicial proceedings must necessarily be conducted in a manner that achieves maximum efficiency. However, as has been cogently observed, “while there is need to expedite the work of the courts, this cannot be done at the expense of the call of conscience.” United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1184 (D.C.Cir.1971) (en banc). In Colorado, a verdict in a criminal trial must be unanimous. Crim.P. 23(a)(8) and 31(a)(3); section 18-1-406, C.R. S.1973 (1978 Repl.VoI. 8). Unanimity requires a free and untrammeled deliberative process that expresses the conscientious conviction of each individual juror. E.g., Lowe v. People, 175 Colo. 491, 488 P.2d 559 (1971); In re Allison, 13 Colo. 525, 22 P. 820 (1889). Any judicial effort to avert a deadlocked jury must be approached with a sensitive regard for a juror’s right to hold to his or her honestly held beliefs about the particular case. An instruction that constrains an individual juror to surrender these beliefs merely for the sake of returning a verdict is, to that extent, antithetical to the unanimity requirement.
Because of' the coercive effect of the so-called “Allen charge” or “third degree instruction,” 6 the Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court in 1971 issued a directive 7 proscribing the use of the Allen charge in all trials in this state and authorizing in its stead an instruction similar to Standard 5.4 of the ABA Standards Relating to Trial by Jury (1968).8 For much the same reason we disapproved the so-called “time fuse” instruction, which told the jury that a mistrial would be declared in the [687]*687event a verdict was not reached within a prescribed time limit. Allen v. People, 660 P.2d 896 (Colo.1983). Even in the case of a prolonged and unproductive deliberative process, we have cautioned that any additional instruction directed towards averting a deadlocked jury should be preceded by an inquiry “as to whether any progress has been made toward reaching an agreement and what the likelihood is for such future progress.” Lowe v. People, supra at 495-96, 488 P.2d at 561.
Although these principles were formulated in the context of jury deadlocks on the issue of guilt or innocence, they should not be disregarded merely because the impasse centers on the particular degree of offense. In the latter instance, while there undoubtedly will be agreement on the guilt of the defendant to some offense, a judge must be careful not to preempt further deliberations by directing the jury to return a guilty verdict on the lesser offense when further deliberations might well be productive of a verdict truly reflective of the personal judgment of each individual juror. Care must also be taken that, in the event an additional instruction is given to avert a mistrial due to a jury deadlock, some jurors are not forced to join in a guilty verdict to a lesser offense that involves elements not necessarily included in a greater offense when these jurors are not satisfied of the existence of these additional elements.
III.
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QUINN, Justice.
This appeal, which is brought by the People pursuant to section 16-12-102, C.R. S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), raises the single question of whether the trial court, when the jury has been deliberating on the charge of first degree murder and lesser included offenses and there is no indication either that a unanimous verdict is unlikely if deliberations continue or that the jury is deadlocked solely on the issue of the defendant’s guilt as to a greater or lesser offense, should instruct the jury that, if it is satisfied of the defendant’s guilt of at least one of the offenses but has a reasonable doubt as to which offense, it has the duty to find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense only. Because we conclude that under the particular circumstances of this case the instruction was coercive and incompatible with the requirement of a unanimous verdict, we disapprove the judgment.
I.
The facts are undisputed. The defendant, Patricia J. Lewis, was charged with first degree murder by intentionally and after deliberation causing the death of her husband, Tom Lewis, Sr., on November 1, 1981.1 After a trial resulting in a sanity [685]*685verdict, trial on the merits commenced to a jury on September 8, 1982. Upon completion of the evidence, the trial court on September 14, 1982, submitted the case to the jury on the original charge of deliberated murder in the first degree and the lesser included offenses of murder in the second degree,2 heat of passion manslaughter,3 and criminally negligent homicide.4
During the second day of its deliberations the jury wrote a note informing the court that nine jurors had agreed on one verdict and three jurors on another verdict and requesting directions as to the appropriate procedure. The court met with counsel and, after much discussion on whether additional instructions should be given, excused the jury from further deliberations until the following morning.
On the next day the court met with counsel and decided to give two additional instructions to the jury. One of the instructions, to which the People did not object, directed the jurors, if not satisfied of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to murder in the first degree, to then consider her guilt as to the lesser offenses of murder in the second degree, heat of passion manslaughter, and criminally negligent homicide, in that order. The other instruction, No. 20, stated as follows;
“You are instructed that if you find that the Defendant Patricia Lewis is guilty of an offense that has been charged within the information, including the lesser included offenses, but entertain a reasonable doubt as to which offense she has committed, then you have the duty to find the Defendant Patricia Lewis guilty only of the lesser offense.”
The prosecution objected to Instruction No. 20 as premature and potentially coercive, but the objection was overruled. The jury, after receiving the additional instructions, resumed deliberations and eventually returned a guilty verdict to heat of passion manslaughter. A judgment of conviction entered on the verdict and, after the imposition of sentence the People filed this appeal.5
The People, as they did before the trial court, argue that Instruction No. 20 was [686]*686both premature and coercive. It was premature, according to the People, because the trial court never determined whether further deliberations might be productive of a unanimous verdict and whether the jury impasse related to the issue of guilt or innocence or the level of offense. Also, in the People’s view, the instruction was coercive because it required the jury to return a non-unanimous verdict on the lesser offense as long as all jurors were in agreement on the defendant’s guilt to any one of the offenses submitted to them for their consideration. We agree with the People’s arguments.
II.
We recognize that in these days of increasing litigation judicial proceedings must necessarily be conducted in a manner that achieves maximum efficiency. However, as has been cogently observed, “while there is need to expedite the work of the courts, this cannot be done at the expense of the call of conscience.” United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1184 (D.C.Cir.1971) (en banc). In Colorado, a verdict in a criminal trial must be unanimous. Crim.P. 23(a)(8) and 31(a)(3); section 18-1-406, C.R. S.1973 (1978 Repl.VoI. 8). Unanimity requires a free and untrammeled deliberative process that expresses the conscientious conviction of each individual juror. E.g., Lowe v. People, 175 Colo. 491, 488 P.2d 559 (1971); In re Allison, 13 Colo. 525, 22 P. 820 (1889). Any judicial effort to avert a deadlocked jury must be approached with a sensitive regard for a juror’s right to hold to his or her honestly held beliefs about the particular case. An instruction that constrains an individual juror to surrender these beliefs merely for the sake of returning a verdict is, to that extent, antithetical to the unanimity requirement.
Because of' the coercive effect of the so-called “Allen charge” or “third degree instruction,” 6 the Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court in 1971 issued a directive 7 proscribing the use of the Allen charge in all trials in this state and authorizing in its stead an instruction similar to Standard 5.4 of the ABA Standards Relating to Trial by Jury (1968).8 For much the same reason we disapproved the so-called “time fuse” instruction, which told the jury that a mistrial would be declared in the [687]*687event a verdict was not reached within a prescribed time limit. Allen v. People, 660 P.2d 896 (Colo.1983). Even in the case of a prolonged and unproductive deliberative process, we have cautioned that any additional instruction directed towards averting a deadlocked jury should be preceded by an inquiry “as to whether any progress has been made toward reaching an agreement and what the likelihood is for such future progress.” Lowe v. People, supra at 495-96, 488 P.2d at 561.
Although these principles were formulated in the context of jury deadlocks on the issue of guilt or innocence, they should not be disregarded merely because the impasse centers on the particular degree of offense. In the latter instance, while there undoubtedly will be agreement on the guilt of the defendant to some offense, a judge must be careful not to preempt further deliberations by directing the jury to return a guilty verdict on the lesser offense when further deliberations might well be productive of a verdict truly reflective of the personal judgment of each individual juror. Care must also be taken that, in the event an additional instruction is given to avert a mistrial due to a jury deadlock, some jurors are not forced to join in a guilty verdict to a lesser offense that involves elements not necessarily included in a greater offense when these jurors are not satisfied of the existence of these additional elements.
III.
In this case the trial court unduly interfered with the deliberative process of the jurors when it submitted to them Instruction No. 20. The jury note that prompted this instruction merely stated that nine jurors agreed on one verdict and three on another verdict and requested some guidance from the court as to the appropriate procedure to follow in this situation. The court did not determine whether further deliberations might be productive of a verdict, nor did it inquire of the jury about the general nature of the impasse. Before considering any additional instruction, the court should first have asked whether any progress was being made towards reaching a unanimous verdict, what the likelihood was of a verdict being returned upon further deliberations, and whether the deadlock centered on the issue of guilt or innocence or the particular degree of guilt. Only if the jury indicated that further deliberations would be unavailing and that the deadlock related to the level of offense should the court have considered some additional instruction, but not the one given here.
The effect of the challenged instruction was to require those jurors favoring a guilty verdict on a greater inclusive offense to return a guilty verdict on the least serious offense on which one or more jurors agreed, as long as all jurors agreed on the defendant’s guilt as to some crime, notwithstanding the fact that further deliberations might well have resolved the nine-three impasse in a manner satisfactory to all the jurors. Instruction No. 20, to this extent, required those jurors favoring a guilty verdict on a greater inclusive offense to surrender their honest convictions solely in the interest of reaching a verdict.
The defendant, in urging us to approve Instruction No. 20, argues that, because heat of passion manslaughter is a lesser included offense of first and second degree murder, all jurors favoring a guilty verdict on a greater inclusive offense would necessarily have determined the defendant’s guilt on the lesser offense of manslaughter. Thus, the argument concludes, Instruction No. 20 did not undermine jury unanimity by coercing a compromise verdict. We find this argument unpersuasive.
As previously noted, the giving of Instruction No. 20 was itself an undue intrusion on the right of the jurors to deliberate without constraining pressures from the court because it was given without the court first determining whether there was some prospect of a unanimous verdict being reached, and, if not, whether the general nature of the deadlock centered on the level of offense rather than the issue of guilt or innocence. Moreover, although a [688]*688defendant charged with first or second degree murder is entitled to an instruction on manslaughter as long as there is some evidence, however slight, tending to establish the lesser offense, e.g., People v. Shaw, 646 P.2d 375 (Colo.1982); Crawford v. People, 12 Colo. 290, 20 P. 769 (1888), heat of passion manslaughter is not a pure lesser included offense of either first or second degree murder. This is so because the greater inclusive offenses of first and second degree murder do not necessarily establish every essential element of this form of manslaughter. See generally People v. Rivera, 186 Colo. 24, 27, 525 P.2d 431, 433 (1974) (statutory lesser included offense “mandates that the greater offense must establish every essential element of the lesser included offense”); section 18-1-408(5)(a), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8) (offense is lesser included when “established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged”).
The crime of first degree murder after deliberation requires a specific intent to cause death, acting “after deliberation,” and causing the death of another person. Section 18-3-102(l)(a), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). Murder in the second degree consists of causing the death of a person “knowingly,” but not after deliberation. Section 18-3-103(l)(a), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). Heat of passion manslaughter, like second degree murder, also requires knowingly causing the death of another not after deliberation but, in contrast to second degree murder, requires that the death causing act be committed “upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a serious and highly provoking act of the intended victim, affecting the person killing sufficiently to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person.” Section 18-3-104(l)(c), C.R.S.1973 (1983 Supp.). Thus, contrary to the defendant’s argument, a determination by some jurors that the defendant committed first or second degree murder would not necessarily mean that these same jurors were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the added elements necessary for heat of passion manslaughter. Instruction No. 20, by imposing on the jury the duty to return a guilty verdict to the lesser offense, as long as all jurors were satisfied of the defendant’s guilt as to one of the crimes submitted to them, compelled those jurors unconvinced of the provocation elements of manslaughter to nonetheless return a guilty verdict to that offense.9
IV.
In order to provide trial courts with some guidance in the matter of in-[689]*689strueting a deadlocked jury deliberating a charge involving lesser offenses, we offer the following guidelines. Before giving any additional instruction calculated to avert a mistrial due to jury disagreement over the level of offense, the court should make certain inquiries of the jury. In making these inquiries care must be taken to avoid asking the jury how it is numerically divided and also to avoid disclosure by the jury as to the particular offenses about which a deadlock might exist. Also, any additional instruction ultimately given to the jury should be in typewritten form, should be read by the judge to the jury in open court, and then taken by the jury when it again resumes its deliberations.
The court should first ask the jury whether there is a likelihood of progress towards a unanimous verdict upon further deliberation. An affirmative response should require further deliberation without any additional instruction. If the jury indicates that the deadlock is such that progress towards a unanimous verdict is unlikely, the court should then inquire whether the jury is divided over guilt as to any one of the offenses and nonguilt as to all offenses, or instead, whether the division centers only on the particular degree of guilt. In the event the jury impasse relates solely to the issue of guilt as to any one of the offenses and nonguilt as to all offenses, the court in its discretion may give Colo.J.l. (Crim.) 38:14 (1983), which is patterned after ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 15-4.4 (2d ed. 1980) and the 1971 directive of the Chief Justice.10 If, however, the jury deadlock centers solely on a particular degree of guilt, rather than on the issue of guilt or nonguilt, then the court should consider an additional instruction charging the jury to return a guilty verdict on the lesser offense as long as every essential element of the lesser offense is necessarily included in the greater offense and all jurors unanimously agree on the defendant’s guilt as to either the lesser or greater offenses submitted to them for their consideration.11 When, as here, a lesser offense involves elements that are not necessarily included in a greater offense, the additional instruction should set forth these non-included elements and, further, should advise the jury that before the defendant can be found guilty of this particular lesser offense each of the jurors must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in such a manner so as to satisfy all the non-included elements. Such an instruction will avoid the constraining effects of a charge requiring all jurors, as long as unanimity exists on the defendant’s guilt as to some offense, to join in a guilty verdict to a lesser offense [690]*690that involves elements not necessarily included in a greater offense, when some jurors are unconvinced of the existence of these added elements.
V.
Instruction No. 20 was given in this case without any determination by the trial court that progress towards a unanimous verdict was unlikely and that the jury was deadlocked over the particular offense as to which a guilty verdict should be returned. The instruction, in this respect, unduly interfered with the deliberative process of the jurors by depriving them of a meaningful opportunity to reach a unanimous verdict free of the constraining influence of the court. Further, Instruction No. 20 directed the jury to return a guilty verdict on a lesser offense, some elements of which were not necessarily established by proof of the defendant’s guilt as to the greater offense, so long as all the jurors were satisfied of the defendant’s guilt as to the lesser or some greater offense. The instruction, in this particular, undermined the requirement of a unanimous verdict by compelling some jurors to surrender their honest convictions solely in the interest of reaching a verdict.
The judgment is accordingly disapproved.
NEIGHBORS, J., concurs and specially concurs.
LOHR, J., joins in the concurrence and special concurrence.