People v. Langston

273 N.W.2d 99, 86 Mich. App. 656, 1978 Mich. App. LEXIS 2626

• Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 6, 1978
• Docket: Docket 31327
• Status: Published

Opinions

Danhof, C.J.

Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree felony murder under MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548, and sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment. Claiming several errors in the proceedings below, he appeals as of right.

Defendant mainly objects to the trial court’s instructions on mens rea. By our disposition of this issue, we eliminate the need to discuss other alleged grounds for reversal.

At trial, the prosecution claimed defendant had intentionally aided Ronald Wilson in the armed robbery of a store, and that Ronald Wilson, in committing that robbery, shot and killed Arretta Lou Ingraham. The people proceeded on a felony-murder theory that any killing committed in the course of a robbery is first-degree murder under MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548, and that an accomplice to the underlying felony is liable as a principal for the murder. Citing People v Fountain, 71 Mich App 491; 248 NW2d 589 (1976), defendant argues that MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548 is not a true felony-murder statute as it only applies after murder has been found, and then only to establish the degree of the offense. Under Michigan common law, malice is still an independent, necessary element of murder which may be inferred by the jury from the commission of an underlying felony, but may not be imputed by the court.

We agree with defendant and the panel in People v Fountain, supra, that there is no felony-murder doctrine in Michigan. The statutory and common law foundations for this ruling are well set out in the Fountain opinion. We add here that the ruling also is in line with the basic premise that a criminal state of mind is the essence of crime. See LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, § 65, pp 515-17. In addition, by requiring an independent finding of malice, the rule does not substantially thwart the goal of deterring crime, as the punishment of negligent conduct only has a marginal deterrent effect, nor does it overburden the state in prosecuting criminals, as malice may often be inferred from the nature of the underlying felony and the circumstances surrounding its commission. People v Fountain, .supra.

From this view of felony murder it follows that an accomplice to robbery cannot be liable for a murder committed in the course of that robbery unless he acted with malice. While a majority of state courts hold an accomplice liable for all the foreseeable consequences of the criminal scheme he advances, LaFave & Scott, supra, we find that accomplice liability predicated on negligence, even when the crime involves a more serious state of mind, is as obnoxious as felony murder to the basic precepts and purposes of our criminal law. Logically, we cannot accept the former doctrine while rejecting the latter. Indeed, as Professors LaFave and Scott point out, the negligence standard for accomplice liability only makes sense in the context of felony murder — when a principal can be convicted for homicide without any showing of recklessness or intent, it is no less objectionable to hold the accomplice liable without showing he acted with a guilty mind. We find that it makes little sense to convict either the principal or accomplice under such circumstances.

Michigan case law also provides some support for this conclusion. Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court in People v Knapp, 26 Mich 112 (1872), broadly held that an accomplice is liable for any acts fairly within the common enterprise that might have been expected to happen. Later, it narrowed that decision in People v Foley, 59 Mich 553; 26 NW 699 (1886), by holding that an accomplice to an assault cannot be found liable for a robbery that was within the responsibility of all the assailants, but not shown as a matter of fact to be within the defendant’s specific intent. The inference is that foreseeability is a necessary but not a sufficient element of accomplice liability for unintended consequences. See also People v Koharski, 177 Mich 194; 142 NW 1097 (1913); People v Belton, 160 Mich 416; 125 NW 386 (1910); People v Cleveland, 107 Mich 367; 65 NW 216 (1895).

We hold, therefore, that to be liable for murder an accomplice to robbery must have acted with the intent to kill or in reckless disregard of a known and high degree of risk that death or serious bodily harm might occur.

In the instant case, the only instruction that indicated a need to find some mens rea beyond the intent to aid and abet robbery was the judge’s charge that the murder must have been found to be "fairly within the scope of a criminal enterprise and it might have been expected to happen in the course of committing this robbery with a pistol”. That charge does not satisfy the test we have laid out in this opinion as it fails to inform the jury that malice entails a more than foreseeable risk of death and is based on defendant’s subjective awareness of the risks and consequences of his acts. LaFave & Scott, supra, §71, p 554; CJI, 16:2:03 and commentary, pp 16-90-16-99. Although the record contains facts from which an inference of malice might have been drawn (i.e., aiding an armed robbery itself creates a risk of death), the issue must be retried and put before the jury. People v Fountain, supra.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

R. H. Campbell, J., concurred.