Bashara, J.
Defendant appeals from a jury conviction of first-degree murder.1 At trial the prosecution sought to prove that defendant2 killed the victim during the course of robbing him after forcibly gaining entry into the victim’s house.
I
During the course of the trial the prosecution was allowed, over defendant’s objection, to admit into evidence a photograph of the victim’s face taken at the morgue. Defendant argues that the photograph was irrelevant and that its only purpose was to inflame the passion of the jury and prejudice his right to a fair trial.
We must determine whether in admitting the photograph the trial judge erred by allowing irrelevant, prejudicial material into evidence or, if relevant, an abuse of discretion is presented because the probative value of the photograph is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Our conclusion is that neither form of error was committed.
As proof of the cause of the victim’s injuries, the prosecution offered the testimony of three examining physicians. On direct examination each concurred that the injuries were caused by a beating and that the victim died as a result of those injuries. Defense counsel’s cross-examination elicited testimony conceding the possibility that the victim’s injuries could be sustained from falling down a flight of stairs. An issue of fact was therefore raised as to the cause of the victim’s injuries. It [20]*20was on that issue that the trial judge admitted the photograph, since the evidence presented also showed that the victim was knocked down a flight of stairs by the forced entry of the perpetrators.
Where photographic evidence is relevant to a material issue, it is admissible at the discretion of the trial court, notwithstanding its shocking or gruesome character. People v Eddington, 387 Mich 551, 562-563; 198 NW2d 297, 301 (1972), People v Becker, 300 Mich 562; 2 NW2d 503 (1942). We cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in permitting the jury to consider the photograph, with the possibly conflicting testimony of the examining physicians, in determining the fact of the injury causation.
II
Prior to instructing the jury, a codefendant requested that a special instruction be given concerning the credibility of accomplice testimony, since the prosecution’s only substantial evidence connecting the defendant with the crime was the testimony of an accomplice. Not only was the accomplice implicated in this crime, but he was apparently involved in a number of other crimes for which he received immunity from prosecution or acceptance of a plea to a lesser offense,3 all in [21]*21consideration for his testimonial cooperation. No instruction was requested by defendant, nor did he object to its omission or raise it as error in his motion for new trial. Nevertheless, defendant contends that deletion of the instruction was error.
We find it unnecessary to decide whether a codefendant’s request for an instruction is operative as to all defendants. Rather, it is our conclusion that even if requested, under the circumstances in this case the trial judge properly denied the request.
Our Supreme Court recently considered the trial court’s obligation to give an instruction on accomplice testimony in People v McCoy, 392 Mich 231; 220 NW2d 456 (1974), and People v Atkins, 397 Mich 163; 243 NW2d 292 (1976). The circumstances presented and emphasized by the Court in McCoy disclose the policy and application of its principles.
As in the case under review, in McCoy the prosecution offered the testimony of an accomplice. This was the only substantive evidence linking the defendant with the crime. In response, the defendant offered the testimony of an alibi witness as a defense. At the conclusion of the case, the trial judge in his instructions tended to disparage the value of the alibi defense while omitting any cautionary instruction concerning the credibility of the accomplice. Although no special instruction was requested, the McCoy Court reversed the defendant’s conviction, concluding that the imbalance in the instructions deprived defendant of a fair trial.
The Supreme Court applied the McCoy rule under similar circumstances in Atkins. However, Atkins resulted in affirmance of the defendant’s [22]*22conviction. The Court emphasized that McCoy was based primarily upon the imbalance in jury instructions, stating:
"In McCoy, error was found in the trial court’s failure to balance care and caution language actually used in the instruction on alibi with similar language relating to the accomplice who testified against the defendant. Third, the jury in the case at bar was fully apprised of the criminal past, and possible motivation of witness Nero [the accomplice]. It would not be an unfair assessment of the record herein to say that as much testimony was elicited on the issue of Nero’s credibility as on that of defendant’s guilt or innocence.” 397 Mich at 171; 243 NW2d at 295.
We cannot conclude that the McCoy decision was intended to preclude all discretion of the trial judge in assessing the necessity of giving a special instruction on accomplice credibility. Although in both McCoy and Atkins no request was made for an instruction, that factor is not of itself determinative, as indicated in the opening paragraph of the Court’s conclusion in McCoy:
"The combination of an erroneous alibi instruction, failure to balance the defendant-denigrating alibi instruction with an appropriate instruction on the credibility of an accomplice’s testimony, plus improper closing remarks of the prosecutor are convincing that the defendant did not receive a fair and balanced trial.” 392 Mich at 240; 220 NW2d at 460.
The instant case presents no instructional imbalance. No alibi defense was offered by the defendants. During the accomplice’s testimony, the trial [23]*23judge interjected a special instruction to the jury that the accomplice’s involvement in other crimes and the consideration given for his testimony were to be considered by the jury in assessing credibility. As in Atkins, the jury was fully apprised of the accomplice’s criminal background. Again, in the jury instructions, the trial judge gave a general instruction on factors to be considered in evaluating the witnesses’ credibility.
Under the circumstances, it is our conclusion that it was within the trial judge’s discretion to deny a request for a further instruction aimed at the accomplice’s credibility. A contrary conclusion would be tantamount to ruling that, in the face of a request for a special instruction, the trial court has no discretion to deny the request, notwithstanding the trial circumstances. Such a rule would create a substantial risk of an imbalance diametric to that in McCoy, destroying the balanced trial presentation that was the objective of that decision.
Ill
Defendant also contends that the trial court’s instruction on felony murder was erroneous. It is argued that error was committed by instructing the jury that any killing, even if accidental, attributable to the act or acts of the defendant occurring during the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, a felony enumerated by statute,4
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Bashara, J.
Defendant appeals from a jury conviction of first-degree murder.1 At trial the prosecution sought to prove that defendant2 killed the victim during the course of robbing him after forcibly gaining entry into the victim’s house.
I
During the course of the trial the prosecution was allowed, over defendant’s objection, to admit into evidence a photograph of the victim’s face taken at the morgue. Defendant argues that the photograph was irrelevant and that its only purpose was to inflame the passion of the jury and prejudice his right to a fair trial.
We must determine whether in admitting the photograph the trial judge erred by allowing irrelevant, prejudicial material into evidence or, if relevant, an abuse of discretion is presented because the probative value of the photograph is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Our conclusion is that neither form of error was committed.
As proof of the cause of the victim’s injuries, the prosecution offered the testimony of three examining physicians. On direct examination each concurred that the injuries were caused by a beating and that the victim died as a result of those injuries. Defense counsel’s cross-examination elicited testimony conceding the possibility that the victim’s injuries could be sustained from falling down a flight of stairs. An issue of fact was therefore raised as to the cause of the victim’s injuries. It [20]*20was on that issue that the trial judge admitted the photograph, since the evidence presented also showed that the victim was knocked down a flight of stairs by the forced entry of the perpetrators.
Where photographic evidence is relevant to a material issue, it is admissible at the discretion of the trial court, notwithstanding its shocking or gruesome character. People v Eddington, 387 Mich 551, 562-563; 198 NW2d 297, 301 (1972), People v Becker, 300 Mich 562; 2 NW2d 503 (1942). We cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in permitting the jury to consider the photograph, with the possibly conflicting testimony of the examining physicians, in determining the fact of the injury causation.
II
Prior to instructing the jury, a codefendant requested that a special instruction be given concerning the credibility of accomplice testimony, since the prosecution’s only substantial evidence connecting the defendant with the crime was the testimony of an accomplice. Not only was the accomplice implicated in this crime, but he was apparently involved in a number of other crimes for which he received immunity from prosecution or acceptance of a plea to a lesser offense,3 all in [21]*21consideration for his testimonial cooperation. No instruction was requested by defendant, nor did he object to its omission or raise it as error in his motion for new trial. Nevertheless, defendant contends that deletion of the instruction was error.
We find it unnecessary to decide whether a codefendant’s request for an instruction is operative as to all defendants. Rather, it is our conclusion that even if requested, under the circumstances in this case the trial judge properly denied the request.
Our Supreme Court recently considered the trial court’s obligation to give an instruction on accomplice testimony in People v McCoy, 392 Mich 231; 220 NW2d 456 (1974), and People v Atkins, 397 Mich 163; 243 NW2d 292 (1976). The circumstances presented and emphasized by the Court in McCoy disclose the policy and application of its principles.
As in the case under review, in McCoy the prosecution offered the testimony of an accomplice. This was the only substantive evidence linking the defendant with the crime. In response, the defendant offered the testimony of an alibi witness as a defense. At the conclusion of the case, the trial judge in his instructions tended to disparage the value of the alibi defense while omitting any cautionary instruction concerning the credibility of the accomplice. Although no special instruction was requested, the McCoy Court reversed the defendant’s conviction, concluding that the imbalance in the instructions deprived defendant of a fair trial.
The Supreme Court applied the McCoy rule under similar circumstances in Atkins. However, Atkins resulted in affirmance of the defendant’s [22]*22conviction. The Court emphasized that McCoy was based primarily upon the imbalance in jury instructions, stating:
"In McCoy, error was found in the trial court’s failure to balance care and caution language actually used in the instruction on alibi with similar language relating to the accomplice who testified against the defendant. Third, the jury in the case at bar was fully apprised of the criminal past, and possible motivation of witness Nero [the accomplice]. It would not be an unfair assessment of the record herein to say that as much testimony was elicited on the issue of Nero’s credibility as on that of defendant’s guilt or innocence.” 397 Mich at 171; 243 NW2d at 295.
We cannot conclude that the McCoy decision was intended to preclude all discretion of the trial judge in assessing the necessity of giving a special instruction on accomplice credibility. Although in both McCoy and Atkins no request was made for an instruction, that factor is not of itself determinative, as indicated in the opening paragraph of the Court’s conclusion in McCoy:
"The combination of an erroneous alibi instruction, failure to balance the defendant-denigrating alibi instruction with an appropriate instruction on the credibility of an accomplice’s testimony, plus improper closing remarks of the prosecutor are convincing that the defendant did not receive a fair and balanced trial.” 392 Mich at 240; 220 NW2d at 460.
The instant case presents no instructional imbalance. No alibi defense was offered by the defendants. During the accomplice’s testimony, the trial [23]*23judge interjected a special instruction to the jury that the accomplice’s involvement in other crimes and the consideration given for his testimony were to be considered by the jury in assessing credibility. As in Atkins, the jury was fully apprised of the accomplice’s criminal background. Again, in the jury instructions, the trial judge gave a general instruction on factors to be considered in evaluating the witnesses’ credibility.
Under the circumstances, it is our conclusion that it was within the trial judge’s discretion to deny a request for a further instruction aimed at the accomplice’s credibility. A contrary conclusion would be tantamount to ruling that, in the face of a request for a special instruction, the trial court has no discretion to deny the request, notwithstanding the trial circumstances. Such a rule would create a substantial risk of an imbalance diametric to that in McCoy, destroying the balanced trial presentation that was the objective of that decision.
Ill
Defendant also contends that the trial court’s instruction on felony murder was erroneous. It is argued that error was committed by instructing the jury that any killing, even if accidental, attributable to the act or acts of the defendant occurring during the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, a felony enumerated by statute,4 constitutes first-degree murder. This instruction, according to defendant, eliminated the element of malice from [24]*24the jury’s consideration,5 citing People v Fountain, [25]*2571 Mich App 491; 248 NW2d 589 (1976).
In Fountain, another panel of this Court concluded that Michigan has neither a statutory nor common law felony-murder rule. Therefore, it was opined that malice must be found, as to a killing occurring during the course of a felony, as a separate element from the malice associated with the felony itself. Were that decision controlling, we would be compelled to accede to defendant’s claim. However, we decline, with due deference to that panel, to follow the Fountain decision.
As the Fountain Court correctly noted, the Michigan statute is a verbatim duplicate of the Pennsylvania provision. In that regard, the Pennsylvania caselaw becomes illustrative of the statute’s intended application. See, e.g., Commonwealth v Martin, 465 Pa 134; 348 A2d 391 (1975), cert den, 428 US 923; 96 S Ct 3234; 49 L Ed 2d 1226 (1976), Commonwealth v Yuknavich, 448 Pa 502; 295 A2d 290 (1972), Commonwealth v Redline, 391 Pa 486; 137 A2d 472 (1958). See also, Morris, The Felon’s Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U Pa L Rev 50 (1956).
In Redline the defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder for the death of his co-felon caused by police gunfire occurring during their efforts to apprehend the felons. The defendant’s conviction was reversed. Reversal was based not upon the absence of an intent to kill, for clearly the facts disclosed the absence of defendant’s intent to kill his accomplice, but because the killing was justifiable and therefore not murder at common law.
However, in its reassessment of the felony-mur[26]*26der doctrine the Pennsylvania Court spoke at length about the interrelationship of the act of killing, malice, and the perpetration of an enumerated felony, stating:
"All felony-murder in Pennsylvania other than such as is committed in the perpetration of one of the common law felonies specified in our degree statute is murder of the second degree by virtue of the express terms of that statute respecting 'All other kinds of murder’. It is plain enough that neither the Act of 1794, supra, nor any of its subsequent re-enactments made all homicides occurring in the perpetration of felonies murder of the first degree. Logically, therefore, the basic determination of the fact of murder is to be made according to the rules of the common law, including the felony-murder theory of imputed malice, and, upon a finding of guilt, the degree statute automatically raises the murder to first degree if it happened, inter alia, to have been committed in the perpetration of arson, rape, robbery, burglary or kidnapping.
"In adjudging a felony-murder, it is to be remembered at all times that the thing which is imputed to a felon for a killing incidental to his felony is malice and not the act of killing. The mere coincidence of homicide and felony is not enough to satisfy the requirements of the felony-murder doctrine. 'It is necessary * * * to show that the conduct causing death was done in furtherance of the design to commit the felony. Death must be a consequence of the felony * * * and not merely coincidence’.
* * *
"' * * * if a person killed another in doing or attempting to do another act, and if the act done or attempted to be done was a felony, the killing was murder. There was thus supplied the state of mind called malice which was essential to constitute murder. The malice of the initial offense attaches to whatever else the criminal may do in connection therewith.’ ” Id. [27]*27at 495; 137 A2d at 476. (Emphasis in original, citations omitted.)
Accordingly, insofar as the element of malice is concerned, a finding by the jury that the killing was a result of the felony constitutes common-law murder, and the statute elevates it to first-degree murder. That the killing was accidental or unintended does not alter the degree of criminal responsibility, since the malice necessary for murder is implied from the perpetration of the initial felony. See also Yuknavich, supra at 292.
While the Pennsylvania decisions are enlightening as to that state’s application of the statute, they are not necessarily binding upon the courts of this state. See In re Cameron’s Estate, 170 Mich 578; 136 NW 451 (1912). A common-law felony-murder doctrine must exist in Michigan to obtain a result congruent to that of Pennsylvania. See Bliss v Caille Brothers Co, 149 Mich 601; 113 NW 317 (1907).
In Fountain it was posited that the cases of People v Utter,6 217 Mich 74; 185 NW 830 (1921), [28]*28People v Treichel,7 229 Mich 303; 200 NW 950 (1924), and People v Andrus,8 331 Mich 535; 50 NW2d 310 (1951), led inexorably to the conclusion that Michigan has no felony-murder rule and that malice is a question for the jury. Although we agree that the existence of malice is a jury ques[29]*29tion, in contradistinction to Fountain, our conclusion is that a finding that the killing was a consequence of the felony is a sufficient finding of malice to sustain a conviction of murder.
Our divergence from the Fountain rationale derives from two sources. First, we do not agree that the trilogy of cases considered in Fountain compels the conclusion that Michigan has no common law felony-murder doctrine. Second, while we agree that malice may be defined as an "intent to kill either express or implied”,9 our conclusion is that the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a dangerous felony is equivalent to malice.
The cases alluded to in Fountain establish that it is for the jury to determine whether a killing results from the commission of a felony so as to form the essential link between the killing and the malice associated with the commission of the felony. A finding of malice may be made without finding an intention to kill. Malice is a state of mind that, while encompassing an intent to kill, may also exist absent such an intent. It may exist where one engages in the commission of an act dangerous to human life in wanton and wilful disregard of the unreasonable risk that death or serious bodily harm may result. People v Hansen, 368 Mich 344, 350; 118 NW2d 422, 425 (1962). As stated by Professor Perkins:
[30]*30"Any intent to kill under other circumstances [other than justification, excuse, or mitigation] is malicious. The more difficult aspect of the problem is that there may be malice aforethought without an actual intent to kill. The older authorities assumed the necessity of an intent to kill and then resorted to an 'implied intent’ of this nature when none in fact existed. But now the courts speak more factually and say frankly that murder may be committed under some circumstances without an intent to kill (unless such intent is required by statute in the particular jurisdiction).” Perkins on Criminal Law, 35-36 (2d ed, 1969).
An indication that the Utter, Treichel, and Andrus cases do not abolish the common law felony-murder doctrine may be found in People v Podolski, 332 Mich 508; 52 NW2d 201 (1952). There the defendant was charged with first-degree murder for the death of a police officer who was shot by a fellow officer in the effort to apprehend defendant. Defendant and his co-felon were, at the time, about to escape after robbing a bank. The Court affirmed defendant’s conviction. In an opinion issued three months after the Andrus case the Court quoted at length from the Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v Moyer, 357 Pa 181; 53 A2d 736 (1947), approving its reasoning.
Moyer is a felony-murder case in which the following enlightening observation was made:
"The numerous states which have copied this Pennsylvania statute, (including the states of Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, New Jersey and Michigan) all use in their respective statutes the word 'murder’ instead of the word 'homicide’ for the reason that a killer in the malicious perpetration of one of the specified felonies has committed common law murder. The felon obviously possesses that 'wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, and recklessness of consequences and [31]*31a mind regardless of social duty’ which constituted malice.” Id. at 189; 53 A2d at 741. (Citations omitted.)
Indeed, the existence of a common law felony-murder rule is the only ratio decedendi upon which the Podolski opinion could be founded. Similarly, other Michigan decisional authority mandates an opposite conclusion to that reached in Fountain. See, e.g., People v Page, 198 Mich 524; 165 NW 755 (1917), People v Crandell, 270 Mich 124; 258 NW 224 (1935) [an accidental killing during the course of a robbery constitutes first-degree murder], and People v Carter, 387 Mich 397; 197 NW2d 57 (1972). See also Comment, Homicide Under the Michigan Revised Criminal Code, 14 Wayne L Rev 904, 913-922 (1968).
The apparent import of Fountain is that unless an intent to kill, either express or implied, can be found from the act causing death, a conviction of murder would omit the essential element of malice. Thus, if a killing occurs as a consequence of an enumerated felony, but is unintentional, e.g., accidental, and the felon is convicted under the felony-murder rule, this amounts to a conviction of murder without a finding of malice. We do not agree.
As stated by Professor Perkins:
"Confusion results from the assumption sometimes entertained that the felony-murder rule results in conviction of murder where the killing has been without malice. Nothing could be farther from the common-law concept which is that one perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate a dangerous felony 'possesses a malevolent state of mind which the law calls "malice”; * * *.’ In other words the intent to engage in such a felony is malice aforethought.” Perkins, supra, at 45. (Emphasis in original, footnotes omitted.)
However, the malice derived from the felony must [32]*32be connected with the act of killing. This is a question for resolution by the trier of fact in finding that the death was a consequence of the felony and not a mere coincidence. The following statements elucidate this aspect of the felony-murder doctrine:
"The felony-murder rule does not apply unless the killing occurs during the commission of or the attempt to commit the felony.
"For the felony-murder rule to apply, it is necessary that the homicide be a natural and probable consequence of the commission or attempt to commit the felony; that the homicide be so closely connected with such other crime as to be within the res gestae thereof; or the natural or necessary result of the unlawful act; or that it be one of the causes. It is not necessary that the defendant believed or foresaw that death would result from his act.
"Something more than a mere coincidence of time and place between the wrongful act and the death is necessary. It must appear that there was such actual legal relation between the killing and the crime committed or attempted that the killing can be said to have occurred as a part of the perpetration of the crime, or in furtherance of an attempt Or purpose to commit it.” (Footnotes omitted.) 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure, 540-541, 543-545 (1957).
Apparently, the impetus for the Fountain rationale stems from an overly-accentuated concern for the distinction in meaning between the terms "murder”, used in the statute, and "killing”, used in the trial court’s jury instruction. That distinction does not, however, gainsay the existence of a felony-murder doctrine nor require a finding that the death was intentional. Noting specially the use [33]*33of the term murder, Professor Perkins makes the following observation:
"The remaining type of homicide made murder in the first degree by such a statute, is any murder committed in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary (or perhaps one or more additional felonies). In discussing the general subject of malice aforethought it was pointed out that homicide resulting from the commission of a dangerous felony, such as one of these, is murder at common law. This reference, however, suggests a matter entitled to attention. While homicide by poison might not be first-degree murder under the statute, because for example it was the result of an innocent accident;10 and while a wilful, deliberate and premeditated homicide might be justifiable, as the act of the officer in executing the sentence of death; any homicide resulting from one of these felonies is first-degree murder under the statute, because it is murder as a matter of the common law regardless of the attending circumstances. Such is the proper interpretation of the typical first-degree murder statute. In Missouri the language of the statute reaches this result with peculiar precision:
" 'Every murder which shall be committed by means of poison or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, and every homicide which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or mayhem, shall be deemed murder in the [34]*34first degree.’ ” Perkins, supra at 94. (Emphasis in original, original footnotes omitted.)
In Carter, supra, construed in Fountain as rejecting the felony-murder doctrine, the Court reaffirmed the existence of the felony-murder rule as it applies to the statutorily enumerated felonies and also provided insight into the purpose of using the term murder in the statute. Quoting from Carter:
"Both murder and manslaughter deal with the wrongful killing of another person. If there has been a killing during the commission of one of the felonies enumerated under ñrst-degree murder, this establishes the degree. If the killing occurs during the commission of some other felony, malice may be implied but the nature of the felonious act must be considered. Many felonies are not inherently dangerous to human life. To hold that in all cases it is murder if a killing occurs in the commission of any felony would take from the jury the essential question of malice.
"Finally, to constitute murder, even though malice may be implied from felonious acts, the killing must be attributable to the accused. So, in People v Austin, 370 Mich 12; [120 NW2d 766] (1963), the killing of one of three robbers by the victim of the attempted robbery was held to be justiñable homicide. It was not a killing committed by felons.” Id., at 422; 197 NW2d 69. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, not every killing will be attributed to the felon, only those caused by his own acts in furtherance of the felonious purpose. But if the killing is attributed to those acts and occurs during an enumerated felony, it will constitute first-degree murder, even if, absent the felony, it would constitute manslaughter (an unjustifiable homicide com[35]*35mitted without malice aforethought).11 See also, People v Austin, supra. Accordingly, the use of the term "murder” is to require that the killing be attributable to the felon’s acts, not those of others, before it will come within the purview of the statute.
Further affirmation that a felony-murder rule obtains in this state may be found in the recent case of People v Allensworth, 401 Mich 67; 257 NW2d 81 (1977). There the trial judge instructed the jury that the litigants agreed that the killing occurred as a result of a robbery and, therefore, first-degree murder had been proven as a matter of law. In reversing the conviction our Supreme Court stated:
"The instant trial judge’s instruction removed the element of the felony and the element of death from the jury’s consideration. She said there was an 'agree[36]*36ment’ that a robbery or attempted robbery had occurred and Thigpen had been killed as a result of it. There was no agreement.” Allensworth, supra, at 71. (Emphasis added.)
Regarding the felony-murder rule Justice Coleman, in a dissenting opinion in which Justices Ryan and Moody concurred, stated:
"Here we have a felony-murder. A killing in the course of the commission of a felony is all that need be found to establish the offense of murder in the ñrstdegree (no premeditation, no intent need be found).” Allensworth, supra, at 75. (Dissenting opinion, emphasis added.)
The foregoing statements are well-nigh impossible to reconcile with the Fountain edict that "Michigan has neither a statutory felony-murder doctrine nor a common-law felony-murder doctrine.” 71 Mich App at 505; 248 NW2d at 596. Rather, the diametric conclusion is inescapable.
The legislative policy underlying the felony-murder rule persists: to discourage those who would commit, or attempt to commit, felonies inherently dangerous to human life12 by imposing a greater penalty than would otherwise obtain for deaths attributable to their acts in furtherance of the felonious purpose. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court’s instruction on felony-murder was proper.13
[37]*37While we have attempted to carefully and logically reach this conclusion, the trial bench should be advised that doubt as to the existence of a common law or statutory felony-murder rule may continue until the Legislature or the Supreme Court speaks definitively to the issue. We would therefore advise trial judges to instruct on malice as applied to the killing.
IV
Closely related to the foregoing claim is defendant’s contention that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses of first-degree murder.
Undeniably, our Supreme Court has firmly established that there are lesser included offenses in first-degree felony murder. People v Carter, 395 Mich 434, 437; 236 NW2d 500, 502 (1975). Further, that Court has modified pre-Carter convictions by remanding the cases for resentencing of defendants on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. People v Crawl, 401 Mich 1; 257 NW2d 86 (1977). Such action was taken where the issue was preserved by a request for instruction or objection to its omission.
Defense counsel for a codefendant requested an instruction on the lesser included offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. That request was denied by the trial judge. The denial applied equally to defendant Till, and it was not necessary to have his counsel repeat the request, under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the substance of the proceedings, not its [38]*38form, requires we follow the decisions of the Supreme Court. Therefore, the defendant’s conviction is reduced to one of second-degree murder, and the case is remanded for resentencing. If the prosecutor determines that justice shall be better served by a retrial, then upon notice to the trial court prior to resentencing, the defendant’s conviction shall be vacated and a new trial shall be ordered on the charge of first-degree murder.
Remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
P. R. Mahinske, J., concurred.