People v. Krogol

185 N.W.2d 408, 29 Mich. App. 406, 1971 Mich. App. LEXIS 1978
CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 18, 1971
DocketDocket 7057
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 185 N.W.2d 408 (People v. Krogol) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Krogol, 185 N.W.2d 408, 29 Mich. App. 406, 1971 Mich. App. LEXIS 1978 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).

Opinion

Y. J. Brennan, P. J.

Defendant, David Allen Krogol, was convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree contrary to MCLA § 750.316 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.548) and sentenced to life imprisonment.

On February 17, 1967, Anthony Volente, a supermarket manager, closed his store in Wyandotte and started for home. Just as he pulled into his driveway, he was abducted by someone in a black Mercury who had been seen following him. He was forced *409 to return to the store and open the safe, which contained $2,600. Yolente was not seen again until his decomposed body was found in the Detroit Biver on July 2, 1967. The victim had been shot several times, weighted down with a cement block, and dumped into the river. A search for a black Mercury convertible with a taillight missing léd to Krogol’s arrest.

Defendant makes four assignments of error, none of which requires reversal.

Defendant first contends that it was error for the trial court to admit into evidence the photographs 1 of the decomposed corpse of the victim, because they were not material to any point in issue and they were so gruesome as to inflame the minds of the jurors. People v. Turner (1969), 17 Mich App 123.

The photographs in question were taken immediately after the corpse was recovered. The photograph before us is a 3-1/2" x 5" black and white picture of the victim lying beside the cement block which was attached to the body. It appears that the picture was taken at a distance of approximately ten feet and that the features of the face are not distinguishable.

The admission of photographs, like the admission of any other demonstrative evidence, lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. People v. Rogers (1968), 14 Mich App 207. Guidelines to aid the trial judge in the exercise of his discretion were laid down by this Court in People v. Brannon (1968), 14 Mich App 690, 693, as follows:

“The admission of photographs may be objected to: 1) because they are not material to any point *410 in issue, see People v. Becker, supra; 2 2) because they do not adequately represent the person, place or thing photographed, see People v. Herrell (1965), 1 Mich App 666; or 3) because they are calculated to inflame the minds of the jurors.”

Applying these criteria to the case at bar, we do not agree that the evidence was inadmissible under the first or third ground.

The case of People v. Eddington (1970), 23 Mich App 210, is practically on all fours with the case at bar. There, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder also. When the prosecution attempted to introduce five color photographs of the victims as found by the police, the defendant not only interposed the identical objections urged here but also relied on the same case, namely, People v. Turner, supra. The Court’s discussion of those issues is dispositive of the defendant’s contention:

“We hold that the photographs were admissible. The scenes depicted were helpful in throwing light on a material issue — namely, the malice with which the crimes were committed. The people had charged that defendant feloniously, wilfully, and with malice aforethought did kill and murder Carl and Gertrude Middledorf. The photographs, detailing the nature and extent of the wounds inflicted, were admissible for purposes of clarifying and illustrating testimony relating to the victims’ appearance and condition, and particularly for purposes of substantiating the people’s theory concerning the atrociousness of the crimes, or the malice with which they were committed. See Annotation, 73 ALR2d 769, 831. Cf. People v. Bergin (1969), 16 Mich App 443.

“People v. Turner, supra, upon which defendant relies, is distinguishable from the present case. The photographs there involved depicted ‘the corpse as it is left, not by its assailant, but by the probing iri *411 struments and procedures of the medical examiner.’ 17 Mich App at 132. Moreover, ‘photographs taken during an autopsy however, must be subjected to more careful scrutiny.’ Id. In the present case, the gruesome nature of the photographs is not the product of an intervening medical examiner. The photographs depict the bodies of the victims as left at the scene by the assailant.

“The question of the admissibility of photographs objected to as prejudicial and inflammatory is within the discretion of the trial judge. People v. Brannon (1968), 14 Mich App 690; People v. Bergin, supra; People v. Turner, supra. Finding no clear abuse of this discretion under the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude that the photographs in question were properly admitted”. People v. Eddington, supra, 227, 228.

Likewise, the photographs in this case served both to illustrate the medical examiner’s testimony and to shed light on the malice with which the crime was committed. Nor do we feel that the black and white photographs of the decomposed body were so gruesome as to inflame the minds of the jury. It was, thus, no abuse of discretion to allow them to be placed before the jury.

Defendant next alleges that the court erred in permitting the prosecutor to elicit from a witness that he had met David Krogol in the Detroit Youth Home. It is contended that the reference to the youth home violates MCLA § 712A.23 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27.3178 [598.23]) which provides:

“Sec. 23. A disposition of any child under this chapter, or any evidence given in such case, shall not in any civil, criminal or any other cause or proceeding whatever in any court, be lawful or proper evidence against such child for any purpose whatever, except in subsequent cases against the same child under this chapter.”

*412 The people in their brief correctly point ont that one who is in a yonth home is not necessarily there as a result of a disposition in a juvenile proceeding; he may be there because his parents have neglected or abandoned him. Furthermore, the defendant failed to object to the statement. In the absence of a showing of a clear injustice, this Court will not entertain issues raised for the first time on appeal. People v. Ray Clifton Smith (1969), 20 Mich App 243. We do not feel that the mere mention of defendant’s being in a youth home demonstrates such injustice in view of the fact that defendant’s extensive, criminal record was already before the jury.

Defendant’s third assignment of error is that the prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument were so prejudicial that defendant was deprived of a fair trial. We do not agree.

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Bluebook (online)
185 N.W.2d 408, 29 Mich. App. 406, 1971 Mich. App. LEXIS 1978, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-krogol-michctapp-1971.