Per Curiam.
We address the scope of the examining magistrate’s function and appellate review of that function when an appellant alleges error in the decision of the examining magistrate, because our reading of the Court of Appeals opinion in this case and People v Oster, 67 Mich App 490; 241 NW2d 260 (1976), suggests a need to clarify our decisions.
I
The defendant was charged with first-degree murder for shooting Rick Stroble to death on December 30, 1978. The evidence at the preliminary examination showed that the defendant and his wife were separated and in the process of obtaining a divorce. The decedent was living with the defendant’s wife and children. From midafternoon on December 29, until the early morning hours of December 30, the defendant consumed a considerable quantity of intoxicants. Around 6:30 a.m. on December 30, the defendant telephoned his wife’s residence, spoke with the decedent, and made a threatening comment. The decedent /taunted the defendant. Armed with a .22-caliber pistol, the defendant appeared at the door of the house 30 minutes later. The decedent attempted to block the defendant’s entry into the house by leaning against the door. The defendant shot through the door, killing the decedent.
Barbara King, the defendant’s daughter, stated that she had never heard the defendant threaten the decedent and had never seen any problem between them. Ms. King said that the defendant was drunk and stumbling and that his talk was slurred. James King, the defendant’s son, testified [149]*149that while his father had threatened the deceased before, he had never taken any action; and he had never seen' his father violent with the decedent. James King also acknowledged that defendant’s speech was slurred. and. that he staggered. Larry Rushton testified that he drank with the defendant from 2 p.m. December 29 until 5:30 a.m. December 30. The defendant was driving erratically on the road and had smoked marijuana at a party.
The Kings testified that when the defendant came to the house he was acting "crazy”, "weird”; no one answered the door for two or three minutes when he came; he would not have known who was holding the door, or who was behind it when he shot. Defendant’s friend, Dixie Pearce, to whose home he went after the shooting, testified concerning the defendant’s statements that he had gone home to get his keys to the Duck Club to which he belonged; they would not let him in; he shot through the door; and the decedent was in the way.
The examining magistrate bound the defendant over for trial on the charge of manslaughter:
"It is my obligation as a district judge to determine whether or not a crime has been committed and what crime and whether or not there is reasonable or probable cause to believe the respondent did perpetrate that crime.- We’re dealing with statutory offenses for purposes of the record and for enumeration, [MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548] indicates that all murder which shall be perpetrated by any means of poison, lying in wait, or any kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate arson, et cetera, shall be first-degree murder.
"Intoxication, in order to constitute defense to specific intent crimes, in this case only, first-degree murder, [150]*150must be so complete that defendant didn’t know what he was doing, or if he knew what he was doing, he didn’t know why or didn’t know that what he was doing was naturally culpable or — ah—causing harm alleged to be intended. That’s a — ah—Court of Appeals case cited [People v Berryhill, 8 Mich App 497; 154 NW2d 593 (1967)]. Evidence of intoxication can—ah—negate requisite specific intent necessary to sustain defendant’s conviction for a crime which requires proof of specific intent. In this case it would be only relative to the first-degree murder charge. There is no error in the court’s refiisal to instruct on a defense of intoxication where the defendant was charged with second-degree murder, which is not a specific intent crime. That comes from the case previously cited. To entirely eliminate voluntary intoxication as a defense to a specific intent crime defendant must while sober have formed the specific intent requisite to commission of the particular crime he is charged with — ah—committing, that, to-wit: is the crime charged of first-degree murder, not speaking yet to second-degree murder.
"It is my opinion, after listening to the facts of this case that I do not find sufficient evidence to warrant the charge of first-degree murder.
"Therefore, we’re talking about second-degree murder and we’re talking about manslaughter. What degree of crime has this court found? Speaking to that, there is a specific reference to that exact point in [People v Lilley, 43 Mich 521; 5 NW 982 (1880)]. It says, when reflection and deliberation are present and it appears that the assault was made with the intent to take a life, under circumstances where the killing would — killing would not be lawful—ah—or excusable then if the death should ensue the assaulter would be guilty of assault with intent to commit murder.
"In this particular case, I have difficulty finding that the respondent acted with the intent to take a life. I’ll indicate that there is sufficient evidence upon this record to indicate that he did not.
"It is not necessary, as the Court so aptly points out in [People v Raher, 92 Mich 165; 52 NW 625 (1892)], it is not necessary for the prosecution to show that the assaulter extended, entertained a specific intent to kill [151]*151the person who was injured where it appears that he committed an assault under such circumstances that the natural and usual consequences would be to take a human life.
"I find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to find that the natural and unusual [sic] consequence of firing that gun through that door in that situation which I listened to testimony for six hours constitutes a natural and usual consequence which could be found in the respondent.
"Therefore, it is my opinion that the prosecution has established the burden of proof to show that the crime of manslaughter has been committed and that there is reasonable or probable cause to believe the respondent committed that offense.”
II
The prosecutor sought review of the district judge’s decision on binding over. The circuit court identified its task as a review for abuse of discretion under People v Doss, 406 Mich 90; 276 NW2d 9 (1979), and People v Dellabonda, 265 Mich 486; 251 NW 594 (1933), and affirmed. The prosecutor pursued the issue to the Court of Appeals, and that Court reversed in an unpublished per curiam opinion of May 8, 1980:
"As the magistrate noted, there was evidence tending to negate deliberation, premeditation and the specific intent to kill. Such evidence suggested defendant might have been drunk at the time, that hé was angry, jealous and possibly provoked by the decedent. Yet, it seems clear that, on the magistrate’s inquiry as to whether a crime had been committed, there was evidence of first-degree murder. The magistrate’s inquiry should have ended at that point and the defendant should have been bound over on the ñrst-degree murder charge. By weighing defenses and analyzing conflicting evidence, the magistrate exceeded the scope of his responsibilities. This is best illustrated by a [quotation] from People [152]*152v
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Per Curiam.
We address the scope of the examining magistrate’s function and appellate review of that function when an appellant alleges error in the decision of the examining magistrate, because our reading of the Court of Appeals opinion in this case and People v Oster, 67 Mich App 490; 241 NW2d 260 (1976), suggests a need to clarify our decisions.
I
The defendant was charged with first-degree murder for shooting Rick Stroble to death on December 30, 1978. The evidence at the preliminary examination showed that the defendant and his wife were separated and in the process of obtaining a divorce. The decedent was living with the defendant’s wife and children. From midafternoon on December 29, until the early morning hours of December 30, the defendant consumed a considerable quantity of intoxicants. Around 6:30 a.m. on December 30, the defendant telephoned his wife’s residence, spoke with the decedent, and made a threatening comment. The decedent /taunted the defendant. Armed with a .22-caliber pistol, the defendant appeared at the door of the house 30 minutes later. The decedent attempted to block the defendant’s entry into the house by leaning against the door. The defendant shot through the door, killing the decedent.
Barbara King, the defendant’s daughter, stated that she had never heard the defendant threaten the decedent and had never seen any problem between them. Ms. King said that the defendant was drunk and stumbling and that his talk was slurred. James King, the defendant’s son, testified [149]*149that while his father had threatened the deceased before, he had never taken any action; and he had never seen' his father violent with the decedent. James King also acknowledged that defendant’s speech was slurred. and. that he staggered. Larry Rushton testified that he drank with the defendant from 2 p.m. December 29 until 5:30 a.m. December 30. The defendant was driving erratically on the road and had smoked marijuana at a party.
The Kings testified that when the defendant came to the house he was acting "crazy”, "weird”; no one answered the door for two or three minutes when he came; he would not have known who was holding the door, or who was behind it when he shot. Defendant’s friend, Dixie Pearce, to whose home he went after the shooting, testified concerning the defendant’s statements that he had gone home to get his keys to the Duck Club to which he belonged; they would not let him in; he shot through the door; and the decedent was in the way.
The examining magistrate bound the defendant over for trial on the charge of manslaughter:
"It is my obligation as a district judge to determine whether or not a crime has been committed and what crime and whether or not there is reasonable or probable cause to believe the respondent did perpetrate that crime.- We’re dealing with statutory offenses for purposes of the record and for enumeration, [MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548] indicates that all murder which shall be perpetrated by any means of poison, lying in wait, or any kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate arson, et cetera, shall be first-degree murder.
"Intoxication, in order to constitute defense to specific intent crimes, in this case only, first-degree murder, [150]*150must be so complete that defendant didn’t know what he was doing, or if he knew what he was doing, he didn’t know why or didn’t know that what he was doing was naturally culpable or — ah—causing harm alleged to be intended. That’s a — ah—Court of Appeals case cited [People v Berryhill, 8 Mich App 497; 154 NW2d 593 (1967)]. Evidence of intoxication can—ah—negate requisite specific intent necessary to sustain defendant’s conviction for a crime which requires proof of specific intent. In this case it would be only relative to the first-degree murder charge. There is no error in the court’s refiisal to instruct on a defense of intoxication where the defendant was charged with second-degree murder, which is not a specific intent crime. That comes from the case previously cited. To entirely eliminate voluntary intoxication as a defense to a specific intent crime defendant must while sober have formed the specific intent requisite to commission of the particular crime he is charged with — ah—committing, that, to-wit: is the crime charged of first-degree murder, not speaking yet to second-degree murder.
"It is my opinion, after listening to the facts of this case that I do not find sufficient evidence to warrant the charge of first-degree murder.
"Therefore, we’re talking about second-degree murder and we’re talking about manslaughter. What degree of crime has this court found? Speaking to that, there is a specific reference to that exact point in [People v Lilley, 43 Mich 521; 5 NW 982 (1880)]. It says, when reflection and deliberation are present and it appears that the assault was made with the intent to take a life, under circumstances where the killing would — killing would not be lawful—ah—or excusable then if the death should ensue the assaulter would be guilty of assault with intent to commit murder.
"In this particular case, I have difficulty finding that the respondent acted with the intent to take a life. I’ll indicate that there is sufficient evidence upon this record to indicate that he did not.
"It is not necessary, as the Court so aptly points out in [People v Raher, 92 Mich 165; 52 NW 625 (1892)], it is not necessary for the prosecution to show that the assaulter extended, entertained a specific intent to kill [151]*151the person who was injured where it appears that he committed an assault under such circumstances that the natural and usual consequences would be to take a human life.
"I find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to find that the natural and unusual [sic] consequence of firing that gun through that door in that situation which I listened to testimony for six hours constitutes a natural and usual consequence which could be found in the respondent.
"Therefore, it is my opinion that the prosecution has established the burden of proof to show that the crime of manslaughter has been committed and that there is reasonable or probable cause to believe the respondent committed that offense.”
II
The prosecutor sought review of the district judge’s decision on binding over. The circuit court identified its task as a review for abuse of discretion under People v Doss, 406 Mich 90; 276 NW2d 9 (1979), and People v Dellabonda, 265 Mich 486; 251 NW 594 (1933), and affirmed. The prosecutor pursued the issue to the Court of Appeals, and that Court reversed in an unpublished per curiam opinion of May 8, 1980:
"As the magistrate noted, there was evidence tending to negate deliberation, premeditation and the specific intent to kill. Such evidence suggested defendant might have been drunk at the time, that hé was angry, jealous and possibly provoked by the decedent. Yet, it seems clear that, on the magistrate’s inquiry as to whether a crime had been committed, there was evidence of first-degree murder. The magistrate’s inquiry should have ended at that point and the defendant should have been bound over on the ñrst-degree murder charge. By weighing defenses and analyzing conflicting evidence, the magistrate exceeded the scope of his responsibilities. This is best illustrated by a [quotation] from People [152]*152v Oster, 67 Mich App 490, 496; 241 NW2d 260 (1976). There, in response to defendant’s contention that the element of malice was negated by provocation, we upheld that magistrate’s bindover upon an open murder charge, stating:
" 'It must be remembered that it is not the function of the examining magistrate to carefully weigh the evidence and discharge the accused when the evidence conflicts or raises a reasonable doubt of his guilt; such questions should be left for the jury. People v Medley, 339 Mich 486; 64 NW2d 708 (1954). The evidence presented at the examination showed that defendant stabbed Goodman with a knife and that Goodman died as a result. This clearly is sufficient to bind defendant over on a second-degree murder charge, as the malice necessary for that charge may be presumed from the use of a deadly weapon to perpetrate the killing. People v Juniel [62 Mich App 529; 233 NW2d 635 (1975)], People v Wright, 25 Mich App 499; 181 NW2d 649 (1970), lv den 384 Mich 804 (1971).
" 'Defendant’s argument that the inference of malice was negated by provocation is inapposite. That is not a question for the examining magistrate. Defendant would expand the function of magistrate to trial judge and jury.’
"In accord: People v Goodchild, 68 Mich App 226; 242 NW2d 465 (1976), People v [Bruce] Ramsey, 89 Mich App 468; 280 NW2d 565 (1979), and People v Doss, supra.
"In view of the foregoing, we find that the magistrate exceeded the scope of his powers and thereby abused his discretion. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this cause for trial upon the charge of first-degree murder.” (Emphasis added.)
The defendant is now before this Court with an application for leave to appeal.
Ill
The examining magistrate’s function is to determine whether a crime has been committed and [153]*153whether there is probable cause for charging the defendant with that crime. MCL 766.13; MSA 28.931.
"The magistrate, before whom any person is brought upon the charge of having committed an offense not cognizable by a justice of the peace, shall proceed to examine the complainant and the witnesses in support of the prosecution, on oath, in the presence of the prisoner, in regard to the offense charged, and in regard to any other matters connected with such charge, which he may deem pertinent. — [1871 CL 7855]. And it is only when it shall appear from such examination that an offense not cognizable by a justice of the peace has been committed, and that there is probable cause to believe the prisoner guilty thereof, that he can be held for trial. —[1871 CL 7859, 7860]. The clear evident intent of this statute was, that the magistrate should exercise his best judgment in the matter; that he should from the testimony determine whether the crime charged in the warrant had been committed, or where, as in this case, the offense charged includes one or more of lesser degree, the magistrate should determine which offense, if any, had been committed, so that the accused might not be placed upon trial in the circuit to answer to a charge different or greater than the one upon which he had been examined, and to answer which he had been held for trial.” (Emphasis changed.) Yaner v People, 34 Mich 286, 288-289 (1876).
The magistrate "must have * * * good reason to believe appellant guilty of the crime charged”.1 The magistrate has "the duty to pass judgment not only on the weight and competency of the evidence, but also the credibility of the witnesses”2 and may consider evidence in defense.3 He or she [154]*154should not, however, discharge "when evidence conflicts or raises reasonable doubt of [the defendant’s] guilt”,4 since that presents the classic issue for the trier of fact.
Without regard to the defense’s evidence of intoxication and provocation, the Court of Appeals found the prosecution had presented evidence on each element of first-degree murder and therefore found an abuse of discretion in the magistrate’s failure to bind over on that charge. In so doing, the Court of Appeals too narrowly conceived the scope of the inquiry. The inquiry is not limited to whether the prosecution has presented evidence on each element of the offense. The magistrate is required to make his determination "after an examination of the whole matter”.5 Although the prosecution has presented some evidence on each element, if upon an examination of the whole matter the evidence is insufficient to satisfy the magistrate that the offense charged has been committed and that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it, then he should not bind the defendant over on the offense charged but may bind him over on a lesser offense as to which he is so satisfied.
In the instant case, the magistrate, upon an examination of the whole matter, found that there was sufficient evidence to indicate that the defendant did not intend to take a life and that he had not committed an assault under such circumstances that the natural and usual consequences would be to take a life. He found insufficient reason to believe that the offense of first- or second-degree murder had been committed because, [155]*155based on the evidence presented, malice and premeditation were lacking. He found that the offense of manslaughter had been committed and probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed it. Our review discloses no abuse of discretion in the magistrate’s refusal to bind over on first- or second-degree murder.
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, pursuant to GCR 1963, 853.2(4), we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to Genesee Circuit Court for further proceedings on the charge of manslaughter. The people’s motion to direct the Genesee Circuit Court to arraign the defendant and determine the matter of bond thus becomes moot and is denied.
Kavanagh, Levin, Fitzgerald, and Ryan, JJ., concurred.