OPINION
MACY, Justice.
Appellant Thomas Cardenas appeals from his convictions for attempted first-degree sexual assault and aggravated assault and battery.
We affirm.
Appellant raises the following issues:
I.Whether due process, confrontation of witnesses, underlying values of the hearsay rule and fundamental fairness are violated by the admission at trial of prior testimony of the victim given at a preliminary hearing where:
1) Prior case law has restricted the motive and opportunity for cross-examination at a preliminary hearing.
2) Applicable law has limited the time and the opportunity for investigation and discovery before the preliminary hearing.
3) There was no indication that the witness would be unavailable for trial removing any incentive for a th[o]rough cross-examination.
4) Counsel for defendant at trial was not counsel at the preliminary.
5) The defendant is effectively prevented from testifying by the admissibility of a prior conviction?
II. Did the trial court err in failing to grant a continuance upon motion of defense counsel where:
1) Jury trial was set for Monday and counsel was advised the previous Wednesday that the victim had died and was not available to testify or for cross-examination;
2) The defense counsel immediately (on Thursday) filed for such a continuance, and the trial court set the matter for hearing on Friday afternoon and summarily denied said continuance; and
3) The defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel, because of a lack of a reasonable time to prepare for the defense of a very serious case?
III. Did the court below err in not granting a directed verdict on the issue of abandonment and in instructing the jury on that defense?
IV. Is the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault reversible under a plain error analysis where the evidence is conflicting and the jury was not properly instructed on the elements of the crime?
On the evening of April 12, 1989, the victim and Dorothy Tripp arrived at the victim’s apartment to find Appellant in her kitchen. Appellant lived across the hall in another apartment, and he and the victim had been friends for several months. The victim and Appellant began to argue vehemently, and the victim asked Appellant to leave her apartment. After Appellant refused to leave, the victim attempted to call the police. Appellant retrieved a knife from the kitchen and tried to cut the telephone cord. The victim dropped the telephone, and Appellant grabbed her and placed the knife on her throat. At that point, Tripp ran out of the apartment and called the police. The police arrived at the victim’s apartment and knocked on the door. When they did not get a response, they went into the apartment, which appeared to be the scene of a struggle, and found the victim and Appellant in the bathroom. The victim was sitting on the floor in her underwear. Appellant was strad[991]*991dling the victim’s legs, and his pants were unfastened and partially pulled down.
At Appellant’s preliminary hearing, the victim testified, inter alia, about the following events which occurred after Tripp left the apartment. Appellant continued to hold the knife to the victim’s throat and told her that he was going to kill her. Next, he locked the back door to the apartment, and he threw the victim against the wall. The two struggled for several minutes as Appellant pulled the victim around the apartment by her hair and struck her with his fists. Appellant demanded that the victim take off her clothes, and he hit her and threatened to kill her when she refused. Finally, the victim disrobed, except for her underwear, and Appellant began to pull her into a bedroom. The victim broke free and locked herself in the bathroom. Appellant kicked in the bathroom door and pulled down his pants and underwear. The victim stated that Appellant grabbed her head, pushed it towards his penis, and said, “[D]o it or else.” After the victim resisted, Appellant pulled up his pants, hugged the victim, and apologized to her. At that point, the door burst open, and the police apprehended Appellant.
The police arrested Appellant and charged him with attempted first-degree sexual assault in violation of Wyo.Stat. §§ 6-1-301 and 6-2-302 (1988), aggravated assault and battery in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-502 (1988)1 and interference with a police officer in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 6-5-204 (1988).2 Appellant pleaded not guilty to all four charges. On July 6, 1989, the district court granted Appellant's counsel’s motion to withdraw. Appellant’s new counsel entered appearances on July 13, 1989, and the court set the trial for August 7, 1989.
On July 28, 1989, the victim died from injuries which she suffered in an automobile accident. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to bar the use at trial of the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony and a motion for a continuance. After the district court held a motion hearing, it denied both of Appellant’s motions.
A jury convicted Appellant for committing attempted first-degree sexual assault, aggravated assault and battery, and interference with a police officer. The district court sentenced him to confinement in the Wyoming State Penitentiary for a minimum of forty-five years and a maximum of fifty years for attempted first-degree sexual assault, a minimum of eight years and a maximum of ten years for aggravated assault and battery, and a minimum of five years and a maximum of six years for interference with a police officer. The court ordered the sentences for attempted first-degree sexual assault and aggravated assault and battery to run concurrently and the sentence for interference with a police officer to run consecutively to the other two sentences.
Admissibility of the Preliminary Hearing Testimony
Appellant’s first issue challenges the admissibility of the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony. W.R.E. 804(b)(1) provides:
Hearsay exceptions. — The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former Testimony. — Testimony given as a witness at another hearing [992]*992of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination [.]
(Emphasis added.) Three requirements must be satisfied pursuant to W.R.E. 804(b)(1) before a court can allow the admission of former testimony:
First, the declarant must be unavailable at trial. * * * Second, the former testimony sought to be admitted must have been given by the witness while testifying in another hearing or deposition.
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OPINION
MACY, Justice.
Appellant Thomas Cardenas appeals from his convictions for attempted first-degree sexual assault and aggravated assault and battery.
We affirm.
Appellant raises the following issues:
I.Whether due process, confrontation of witnesses, underlying values of the hearsay rule and fundamental fairness are violated by the admission at trial of prior testimony of the victim given at a preliminary hearing where:
1) Prior case law has restricted the motive and opportunity for cross-examination at a preliminary hearing.
2) Applicable law has limited the time and the opportunity for investigation and discovery before the preliminary hearing.
3) There was no indication that the witness would be unavailable for trial removing any incentive for a th[o]rough cross-examination.
4) Counsel for defendant at trial was not counsel at the preliminary.
5) The defendant is effectively prevented from testifying by the admissibility of a prior conviction?
II. Did the trial court err in failing to grant a continuance upon motion of defense counsel where:
1) Jury trial was set for Monday and counsel was advised the previous Wednesday that the victim had died and was not available to testify or for cross-examination;
2) The defense counsel immediately (on Thursday) filed for such a continuance, and the trial court set the matter for hearing on Friday afternoon and summarily denied said continuance; and
3) The defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel, because of a lack of a reasonable time to prepare for the defense of a very serious case?
III. Did the court below err in not granting a directed verdict on the issue of abandonment and in instructing the jury on that defense?
IV. Is the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault reversible under a plain error analysis where the evidence is conflicting and the jury was not properly instructed on the elements of the crime?
On the evening of April 12, 1989, the victim and Dorothy Tripp arrived at the victim’s apartment to find Appellant in her kitchen. Appellant lived across the hall in another apartment, and he and the victim had been friends for several months. The victim and Appellant began to argue vehemently, and the victim asked Appellant to leave her apartment. After Appellant refused to leave, the victim attempted to call the police. Appellant retrieved a knife from the kitchen and tried to cut the telephone cord. The victim dropped the telephone, and Appellant grabbed her and placed the knife on her throat. At that point, Tripp ran out of the apartment and called the police. The police arrived at the victim’s apartment and knocked on the door. When they did not get a response, they went into the apartment, which appeared to be the scene of a struggle, and found the victim and Appellant in the bathroom. The victim was sitting on the floor in her underwear. Appellant was strad[991]*991dling the victim’s legs, and his pants were unfastened and partially pulled down.
At Appellant’s preliminary hearing, the victim testified, inter alia, about the following events which occurred after Tripp left the apartment. Appellant continued to hold the knife to the victim’s throat and told her that he was going to kill her. Next, he locked the back door to the apartment, and he threw the victim against the wall. The two struggled for several minutes as Appellant pulled the victim around the apartment by her hair and struck her with his fists. Appellant demanded that the victim take off her clothes, and he hit her and threatened to kill her when she refused. Finally, the victim disrobed, except for her underwear, and Appellant began to pull her into a bedroom. The victim broke free and locked herself in the bathroom. Appellant kicked in the bathroom door and pulled down his pants and underwear. The victim stated that Appellant grabbed her head, pushed it towards his penis, and said, “[D]o it or else.” After the victim resisted, Appellant pulled up his pants, hugged the victim, and apologized to her. At that point, the door burst open, and the police apprehended Appellant.
The police arrested Appellant and charged him with attempted first-degree sexual assault in violation of Wyo.Stat. §§ 6-1-301 and 6-2-302 (1988), aggravated assault and battery in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-502 (1988)1 and interference with a police officer in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 6-5-204 (1988).2 Appellant pleaded not guilty to all four charges. On July 6, 1989, the district court granted Appellant's counsel’s motion to withdraw. Appellant’s new counsel entered appearances on July 13, 1989, and the court set the trial for August 7, 1989.
On July 28, 1989, the victim died from injuries which she suffered in an automobile accident. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to bar the use at trial of the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony and a motion for a continuance. After the district court held a motion hearing, it denied both of Appellant’s motions.
A jury convicted Appellant for committing attempted first-degree sexual assault, aggravated assault and battery, and interference with a police officer. The district court sentenced him to confinement in the Wyoming State Penitentiary for a minimum of forty-five years and a maximum of fifty years for attempted first-degree sexual assault, a minimum of eight years and a maximum of ten years for aggravated assault and battery, and a minimum of five years and a maximum of six years for interference with a police officer. The court ordered the sentences for attempted first-degree sexual assault and aggravated assault and battery to run concurrently and the sentence for interference with a police officer to run consecutively to the other two sentences.
Admissibility of the Preliminary Hearing Testimony
Appellant’s first issue challenges the admissibility of the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony. W.R.E. 804(b)(1) provides:
Hearsay exceptions. — The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former Testimony. — Testimony given as a witness at another hearing [992]*992of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination [.]
(Emphasis added.) Three requirements must be satisfied pursuant to W.R.E. 804(b)(1) before a court can allow the admission of former testimony:
First, the declarant must be unavailable at trial. * * * Second, the former testimony sought to be admitted must have been given by the witness while testifying in another hearing or deposition. * * * Third, the party against whom the statement is offered must have had “an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination” at the prior hearing.
Rodriguez v. State, 711 P.2d 410, 413 (Wyo.1985) (quoting W.R.E. 804(b)(1)). Appellant contends that he did not have an opportunity and similar motive to develop the victim’s cross-examination at the preliminary hearing.
In Rodriguez, this Court held that the admissibility of preliminary hearing testimony at trial would depend upon a case-by-case analysis. In that case, the defendant was accused of breaking into the home of a seventy-nine-year-old woman, tying her to a chair, and robbing her at knife point. When the police took her statement and when the police showed her a photo array, the victim identified the defendant as the man who robbed her. The victim again identified the defendant at the preliminary hearing as being the man who had robbed her. Her preliminary hearing testimony was challenged in a fairly extensive cross-examination. The victim died five days before the trial, at which her preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury. Id. at 412. We held that the district court did not err under W.R.E. 804(b)(1) by allowing the admission of the preliminary hearing testimony because the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the victim, because the motive of discrediting the victim’s identification was the same in both the preliminary hearing and the trial, and because the defendant subjected the victim to a fairly extensive cross-examination on the issue of her identification. Id. at 414.
In this case, Appellant had the opportunity to cross-examine the victim. After a direct examination by the prosecuting attorney, Appellant’s counsel asked the victim about her relationship with Appellant, about the events leading up to the alleged assaults, about the amount of alcohol she drank before the alleged assaults, about the possibility that she had sold drugs, and about the kind of clothes she wore when she was around Appellant. The district court did not limit the cross-examination.
Next, we must determine if Appellant’s motive to cross-examine the victim at the preliminary hearing was similar to his motive to cross-examine her at the trial. Appellant’s cross-examination of the victim at the preliminary hearing indicates that he was attempting to analyze and discount her version of the alleged assaults and her credibility in general. From his appellate brief, we discern that Appellant’s primary motive to cross-examine the victim at trial was to test her credibility in front of the jury. Despite the apparent similarity, Appellant contends that his motives were different because the purpose of a preliminary hearing (the determination of probable cause) is different than the purpose of a trial (the determination of guilt). He asserts that, during the preliminary hearing, his counsel was not motivated to go beyond attempting to rebut a finding of probable cause since a more extensive cross-examination would have forced him to reveal his theory of defense. That argument demonstrates that Appellant’s cross-examination of the victim at the preliminary hearing may have been limited by a tactical decision, but it does not indicate that his motive to cross-examine the victim at the preliminary hearing was not similar to his motive to cross-examine her at trial. As in Rodriguez, where the defendant’s motive in both proceedings was to discredit the witness’ [993]*993testimony, Appellant’s motives were sufficiently similar to warrant the admissibility of the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony under W.R.E. 804(b)(1).
In Rodriguez and in King v. State, 780 P.2d 943 (Wyo.1989), we also discussed whether the district court’s admission of preliminary hearing testimony violated the confrontation clauses of the United States Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution. We said:
Former testimony is admissible under the confrontation clauses of both the constitutions of the United States and Wyoming if the witness who gave the former testimony is unavailable to testify at trial and if the prior testimony bore an “indi-cia of reliability” sufficient to “ ‘afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.’ ” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66-67, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 214, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 2313, 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972); Grable v. State, Wyo., 649 P.2d 663, 673 (1982); Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 837 (Wyo.1980).
Rodriguez, 711 P.2d at 415. We also articulated the test adopted in Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831 (Wyo.1980), which we use to determine if former testimony is reliable:
Prior testimony bears an adequate indi-cia of reliability when the prior testimony was given under oath, when it was given while the defendant was represented by counsel, when the defendant’s counsel should and did cross-examine the witness, and when cross-examination which would be conducted at trial would not touch upon any new and significantly material line of inquiry.
Rodriguez, 711 P.2d at 415. We held that the district court’s allowance of the admission of the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony did not violate the defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him because the four parts of the reliability test were satisfied.
We continue to follow the analysis we delineated in Rodriguez, and we hold that the district court did not err by allowing the jury to hear the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony. First, the victim gave her preliminary hearing testimony while she was under an oath to tell the truth. Second; an attorney represented Appellant and was present when the victim gave her preliminary hearing testimony. Third, Appellant’s attorney cross-examined the victim. Fourth, Appellant has failed to indicate that his cross-examination of the victim at trial would touch on a new line of inquiry. Appellant has indicated only that the victim’s credibility, which was the focus of his cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, would have been the primary target of his cross-examination at trial. In addition, the corroborating testimony given by Tripp and the police officers who arrested Appellant provided the jury with a sufficient basis upon which to evaluate the truth of the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony. The district court’s allowance of the admission of the victim’s former testimony did not violate Appellant’s right to confront witnesses against him.
Appellant’s Motion for a Continuance
Appellant argues that the district court erred by not granting the motion for a continuance which he filed after he discovered that the victim had died. The victim died on July 28, 1989, and on August 3, 1989, Appellant filed a motion to continue his trial which was scheduled to begin four days later. The district court held a motion hearing and stated:
As I recall we set the August 7th trial date upon agreement of all of the attorneys, and I don’t see anything from [the victim’s] death that would affect the investigation in the case, so I will deny the motion[.]
Appellant contends that the district court’s decision was an abuse of its discretion because his entire defense depended upon his opportunity to attack the victim’s credibility through cross-examination. Appellant argues that, therefore, he needed additional time to “explore other modes of defense and to investigate other avenues of defense including the identification and interviewing of other witnesses.”
[994]*994“This Court has consistently held that the granting of a motion for continuance is within the discretion of the trial court. The standard for review, therefore, is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the continuance. Our definition of abuse of discretion, as articulated in Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831 (1980), is well established. We also recognize that review of a court’s discretionary ruling on a continuance motion is highly dependent upon individual facts and circumstances. The party who is attacking the court’s ruling bears the burden of establishing the abuse of discretion. Appellant must show that the trial court’s error affected his substantial rights.” (Citations omitted.)
Roose v. State, 753 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting Gentry v. State, 724 P.2d 450, 451 (Wyo.1986)). Appellant’s trial counsel entered appearances on July 13, 1989, and agreed to the August 7, 1989, trial date. Appellant and his new counsel had more than three weeks to produce favorable evidence and to develop alternative theories of defense. In addition, Appellant failed to specify material evidence which he could have produced if the district court had granted his motion for a continuance. See Stogner v. State, 674 P.2d 1298 (Wyo. 1984). We hold that Appellant failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a continuance.
Abandonment
Appellant claims that he abandoned his attempt to commit first-degree sexual assault and that, therefore, the district court erred by not granting him a judgment of acquittal on that charge. Appellant bases his argument upon the testimony given by the victim at the preliminary hearing. During that hearing, the following colloquy occurred:
Q: Umm, what exactly did he say then once he had his pants down[?]
A: He told me to do it or else.
Q: Al[l] right.
A: And, I kept telling him no.
Q: What did he do next?
A: He pushed my head towards it.
Q: Towards what?
A: Towards his penis.
Q: How did he push your head towards his penis?
A: He just had the back of my head and was pulling me towards him.
Q: Did you fight? Did you struggle?
A: I tried. He kept pushing my head back.
Q: Al[l] right, umm, did he ever place his penis in your mouth?
A: No.
Q: What happened next?
A: Well, then I was crying and then all of a sudden he put his clothes back up and then he sat down beside me and started hugging me and telling me he was sorry and that everything was going to be all right.
Q: Did, umm, did you hear anything right before he pulled his pants back up[?]
A: No.
Q: You didn’t hear anything?
A: (inaudible)
Q: What happened next after he sat down beside you and was hugging you?
A: Umm, he kept telling me everything was going to be all right and I kept telling him to go get my clothes and he said just a minute and that he would and then the door got kicked open and then I got out and ran to my closet.
W.R.Cr.P. 30(a) prescribes the criteria for granting a judgment of acquittal.
Under Rule 30(a), Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal upon motion if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The trial court must assume that the State’s evidence is true and must give the State the benefit of all legitimate inferences. A reviewing court can only overrule the denial of a motion for acquittal when there is no substantial evidence from which reasonable persons could say that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
[995]*995“ ‘Our responsibility in considering the propriety of a ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal is the same as that of the trial court. * * * It is proper to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal only if there is no substantial evidence to sustain the material allegations relating to the offense that is charged.’ ” Haight v. State, Wyo., 654 P.2d 1232, 1236 (1982) [(quoting Aragon v. State, 627 P.2d 599, 602 (Wyo.1981)) ].
Dover v. State, 664 P.2d 536, 537 (Wyo. 1983). We must determine if the record is void of substantial evidence which sustains the State’s allegation that Appellant committed attempted first-degree sexual assault.
The elements of first-degree sexual assault are set out in § 6-2-302. That section provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first degree if:
(i) The actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application, reasonably calculated to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or forcible confinement;
(ii) The actor causes submission of the victim by threat of death, serious bodily injury, extreme physical pain or kidnapping to be inflicted on anyone and the victim reasonably believes that the actor has the present ability to execute these threats[.]
Wyo.Stat. § 6-2-301(a)(vii) (1988) states:
(a) As used in this article:
******
(vii) “Sexual intrusion” means:
(A) Any intrusion, however slight, by any object or any part of a person’s body, except the mouth, tongue or penis, into the genital or anal opening of another person’s body if that sexual intrusion can reasonably be construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse; or
(B) Sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, an[i]lingus or anal intercourse with or without emission.
Section 6-1-301 states:
(a) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if:
(i) With the intent to commit the crime, he does any act which is a substantial step towards commission of the crime. A “substantial step” is conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the person’s intention to complete the commission of the crime; or
(ii) He intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime had the attendant circumstances been as the person believes them to be.
(b) A person is not liable under this section if, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal intention, he avoided the commission of the crime attempted by abandoning his criminal effort. Within the meaning of this subsection, renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of the person’s course of conduct, which increase the probability of detection or apprehension or which make more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal intention. Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim.
In Haight v. State, 654 P.2d 1232 (Wyo. 1982), we stated that a defendant could not abandon an attempt to commit a crime if his cessation of criminal activity was motivated, at least in part, by the belief that a circumstance existed which made the consummation of the crime more difficult. In that case, the evidence supported the inference that the defendant, who knew that the victim had not consented to a sexual intrusion, stopped his attempt to commit first-degree sexual assault because the victim refused to open her mouth. We held that the jury could infer that there “were no [996]*996‘circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal intention.’ ” Id. at 1242.
Giving all legitimate inferences to the State, we hold that the record is not void of substantial evidence from which reasonable persons could say Appellant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. A jury could infer that the victim had not consented to a sexual intrusion and that Appellant abandoned his attempt to commit first-degree sexual assault because the victim refused to open her mouth or because he heard the police entering the apartment. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.
Appellant also argues that the district court gave an erroneous instruction to the jury on the issue of abandonment. After the court presented three abandonment instructions to the jury which primarily quoted § 6-1-301, it gave the following instruction:
Abandonment is a defense if the attempt to commit a crime is freely and voluntarily abandoned before the act is put in process of final execution and where there is no outside cause prompting such abandonment.
At trial, Appellant did not object to the instruction. In fact, Appellant used the instruction to argue that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal. Therefore, we must examine his claim under our plain error doctrine. W.R.Cr.P. 49(b); W.R.A.P. 7.05; W.R.E. 103(d); Ramos v. State, 806 P.2d 822 (Wyo.1991); Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161 (Wyo.1981); Leeper v. State, 589 P.2d 379 (Wyo.1979). Our determination of whether plain error exists is subject to the following three-part test:
First, the record must be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error. Second, the party claiming that the error amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated. Finally, that party must prove that a substantial right has been denied him and as a result he has been materially prejudiced.
Bradley, 635 P.2d at 1164. Appellant has failed to demonstrate the existence of plain error because he has not shown that the record clearly establishes the breach of an unequivocal rule of law. See Bland v. State, 803 P.2d 856 (Wyo.1990).
The Jury Instruction for Aggravated Assault and Battery
With his final issue, Appellant asserts that the district court committed reversible error under the plain error doctrine when it instructed the jury on the elements of aggravated assault and battery. Specifically, Appellant contends that the district court erred by not instructing the jury on the definition of a threat.
The district court has the duty to instruct the jury on the general principles applicable to the case. Sanchez v. State, 751 P.2d 1300 (Wyo.1988). The court is not required to define a term unless it has a “definite, technical meaning under the law different from the ordinary meaning and which the jury might therefore not understand.” Durham v. State, 422 P.2d 691, 692 (Wyo.1967). The term “threat” is not such a term, and the instructions provided by the court adequately informed the jury of the elements of aggravated assault and battery. Plain error does not exist.
Affirmed.