White, J.
The people appeal by leave granted the circuit court’s order affirming the district court’s dismissal of the district court’s charge against defendant of violating the criminal abortion statute, MCL 750.14; MSA 28.204. The district and circuit courts concluded that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. We reverse and remand for reinstatement of the charge against defendant.
[432]*432i
The statute, which on its face purports to criminalize all abortions performed at any time during pregnancy, except when necessary to preserve the life of the mother,1 appears to be in direct contravention of Roe v Wade, 410 US 113; 93 S Ct 705; 35 L Ed 2d 147 (1973).2 We cannot, however, evaluate the constitutionality of this statute on its face. Rather, we are obliged to read the statute in light of the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in People v Bricker, 389 [433]*433Mich 524; 208 NW2d 172 (1973). Nor are we presented with a broad challenge, in an action for declaratory relief, to the constitutionality of the statute. The question presented is, rather, whether a particular criminal prosecution under the statute would be constitutionally infirm. Under these circumstances, we are constrained to conclude that the circuit court erred in affirming the district court’s dismissal of the charge.
n
Defendant, a medical doctor specializing in obstetrics and gynecology, was charged with violating the criminal abortion statute, MCL 750.14; MSA 28.204, for allegedly inducing the abortion of a fetus of approximately twenty-eight weeks, and altering a patient’s medical records in violation of MCL 750.492a(l)(a); MSA 28.760(l)(l)(a). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge that alleged violation of MCL 750.14; MSA 28.204, arguing that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, is unconstitutional on its face, and has been repealed by implication, and that the complaint is defective for failing to allege viability of the fetus or lack of necessity to preserve the health of the mother.
The district court determined that the complaint was not defective and that the statute was not unconstitutional on its face, but dismissed the charge on the ground that the statute had been repealed by implication and was void for vagueness. On the people’s appeal, the circuit court concluded that the district court erred in finding that the statute had been repealed by implication, but agreed with the district court that the statute was void for vagueness. This [434]*434Court granted the people’s application for leave to appeal.
m
Shortly after the United States Supreme Court decided Roe, supra, the Michigan Supreme Court, in Bricker, supra, addressed the constitutionality of the statute at issue in the instant case. Rather than declare the Michigan statute unconstitutional as irreconcilable with Roe, the Bricker Court construed this criminal abortion statute to conform to the dictates of Roe and Doe v Bolton, 410 US 179; 93 S Ct 739; 35 L Ed 2d 201 (1973). The Court said:
Now that the United States Supreme Court has spoken concerning the constitutionality of state abortion laws, we seek to save what we can of the Michigan statutes.
The central purpose of this legislation is clear enough— to prohibit all abortions except those required to preserve the health of the mother. The Supreme Court now requires other exceptions. They can properly be read into the statutes to preserve their constitutionality.
In light of the declared public policy of this state and the' changed circumstances resulting from the Federal constitu- ■ tional doctrine elucidated in Roe and Doe, we construe § 14 of the penal code to mean that the prohibition of this section shall not apply to “miscarriages” authorized by a pregnant woman’s attending physician in the exercise of his medical judgment; the effectuation of the decision to abort is also left to the physician’s judgment; however, a physician may not cause a miscarriage after viability except where necessary, in his medical judgment, to preserve the life or health of the mother.
[435]*435. . . We hold that, except as to those cases defined and exempted under Roe v Wade and Doe v Bolton, supra, criminal responsibility attaches. [BHcker, supra at 529-531.]
See also Larkin v Wayne Prosecutor, 389 Mich 533, 537; 208 NW2d 176 (1973), in which the Court stated that the constitutionality of MCL 750.14; MSA 28.204 “is discussed and decided in [Bricker], decided this day.”
IV
Defendant argues that MCL 750.14; MSA 28.204, which by its express terms prohibits all abortions except those necessary to save the mother’s life, was impliedly repealed by the Legislature’s subsequent enactment of legislation that regulated, rather than prohibited, abortions. Defendant argues that the district court properly held that there is a clear conflict because the subsequent statutes purport to regulate conduct that MCL 750.14; MSA 28.204 makes criminal. We disagree.
The subsequent legislative enactments defendant relies on are statutes requiring parental consent,3 informed consent,4 and record keeping,5 providing immunity for those who refuse to perform abortions,6 prohibiting partial-birth abortions,7 and prohibiting Medicaid funding for abortions.8
[436]*436Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be indulged in if there is any other reasonable construction. Wayne Co Prosecutor v Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich 569, 576; 548 NW2d 900 (1996). The intent to repeal must very clearly appear, and courts will not hold to a repeal if they can find reasonable ground to hold the contrary. Id. The presumption is always against the intention to repeal where express terms are not used, and the implication, in order to be operative, must be necessary. House Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 562; 495 NW2d 539 (1993), quoting Attorney General ex rel Owen v Joyce, 233 Mich 619, 621; 207 NW 863 (1926) (citation omitted). The Legislature is presumed to act with knowledge of appellate court statutory interpretations, Gordon Sel-Way, Inc v Spence Bros, Inc, 438 Mich 488, 505; 475 NW2d 704 (1991), and silence by the Legislature for many years following judicial construction of a statute suggests consent to that construction. Baks v Moroun, 227 Mich App 472, 489; 576 NW2d 413 (1998); Craig v Larson, 432 Mich 346, 353; 439 NW2d 899 (1989).
After Bricker was decided in 1973, the Legislature enacted various statutes regulating the performance of abortions, see ns 3-8, supra, but did not revise MCL 750.14; MSA 28.204. The Legislature is presumed to be aware of the Bricker Court’s inteipretation of MCL 750.14; MSA 28.204, which construction permits abortions to be performed in accordance with Roe. Gordon Sel-Way, supra at 505; Craig, supra at 353. We think it clear that in enacting those statutes after Bricker, the Legislature intended to regulate those abortions permitted by Roe and Doe, and
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White, J.
The people appeal by leave granted the circuit court’s order affirming the district court’s dismissal of the district court’s charge against defendant of violating the criminal abortion statute, MCL 750.14; MSA 28.204. The district and circuit courts concluded that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. We reverse and remand for reinstatement of the charge against defendant.
[432]*432i
The statute, which on its face purports to criminalize all abortions performed at any time during pregnancy, except when necessary to preserve the life of the mother,1 appears to be in direct contravention of Roe v Wade, 410 US 113; 93 S Ct 705; 35 L Ed 2d 147 (1973).2 We cannot, however, evaluate the constitutionality of this statute on its face. Rather, we are obliged to read the statute in light of the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in People v Bricker, 389 [433]*433Mich 524; 208 NW2d 172 (1973). Nor are we presented with a broad challenge, in an action for declaratory relief, to the constitutionality of the statute. The question presented is, rather, whether a particular criminal prosecution under the statute would be constitutionally infirm. Under these circumstances, we are constrained to conclude that the circuit court erred in affirming the district court’s dismissal of the charge.
n
Defendant, a medical doctor specializing in obstetrics and gynecology, was charged with violating the criminal abortion statute, MCL 750.14; MSA 28.204, for allegedly inducing the abortion of a fetus of approximately twenty-eight weeks, and altering a patient’s medical records in violation of MCL 750.492a(l)(a); MSA 28.760(l)(l)(a). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge that alleged violation of MCL 750.14; MSA 28.204, arguing that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, is unconstitutional on its face, and has been repealed by implication, and that the complaint is defective for failing to allege viability of the fetus or lack of necessity to preserve the health of the mother.
The district court determined that the complaint was not defective and that the statute was not unconstitutional on its face, but dismissed the charge on the ground that the statute had been repealed by implication and was void for vagueness. On the people’s appeal, the circuit court concluded that the district court erred in finding that the statute had been repealed by implication, but agreed with the district court that the statute was void for vagueness. This [434]*434Court granted the people’s application for leave to appeal.
m
Shortly after the United States Supreme Court decided Roe, supra, the Michigan Supreme Court, in Bricker, supra, addressed the constitutionality of the statute at issue in the instant case. Rather than declare the Michigan statute unconstitutional as irreconcilable with Roe, the Bricker Court construed this criminal abortion statute to conform to the dictates of Roe and Doe v Bolton, 410 US 179; 93 S Ct 739; 35 L Ed 2d 201 (1973). The Court said:
Now that the United States Supreme Court has spoken concerning the constitutionality of state abortion laws, we seek to save what we can of the Michigan statutes.
The central purpose of this legislation is clear enough— to prohibit all abortions except those required to preserve the health of the mother. The Supreme Court now requires other exceptions. They can properly be read into the statutes to preserve their constitutionality.
In light of the declared public policy of this state and the' changed circumstances resulting from the Federal constitu- ■ tional doctrine elucidated in Roe and Doe, we construe § 14 of the penal code to mean that the prohibition of this section shall not apply to “miscarriages” authorized by a pregnant woman’s attending physician in the exercise of his medical judgment; the effectuation of the decision to abort is also left to the physician’s judgment; however, a physician may not cause a miscarriage after viability except where necessary, in his medical judgment, to preserve the life or health of the mother.
[435]*435. . . We hold that, except as to those cases defined and exempted under Roe v Wade and Doe v Bolton, supra, criminal responsibility attaches. [BHcker, supra at 529-531.]
See also Larkin v Wayne Prosecutor, 389 Mich 533, 537; 208 NW2d 176 (1973), in which the Court stated that the constitutionality of MCL 750.14; MSA 28.204 “is discussed and decided in [Bricker], decided this day.”
IV
Defendant argues that MCL 750.14; MSA 28.204, which by its express terms prohibits all abortions except those necessary to save the mother’s life, was impliedly repealed by the Legislature’s subsequent enactment of legislation that regulated, rather than prohibited, abortions. Defendant argues that the district court properly held that there is a clear conflict because the subsequent statutes purport to regulate conduct that MCL 750.14; MSA 28.204 makes criminal. We disagree.
The subsequent legislative enactments defendant relies on are statutes requiring parental consent,3 informed consent,4 and record keeping,5 providing immunity for those who refuse to perform abortions,6 prohibiting partial-birth abortions,7 and prohibiting Medicaid funding for abortions.8
[436]*436Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be indulged in if there is any other reasonable construction. Wayne Co Prosecutor v Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich 569, 576; 548 NW2d 900 (1996). The intent to repeal must very clearly appear, and courts will not hold to a repeal if they can find reasonable ground to hold the contrary. Id. The presumption is always against the intention to repeal where express terms are not used, and the implication, in order to be operative, must be necessary. House Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 562; 495 NW2d 539 (1993), quoting Attorney General ex rel Owen v Joyce, 233 Mich 619, 621; 207 NW 863 (1926) (citation omitted). The Legislature is presumed to act with knowledge of appellate court statutory interpretations, Gordon Sel-Way, Inc v Spence Bros, Inc, 438 Mich 488, 505; 475 NW2d 704 (1991), and silence by the Legislature for many years following judicial construction of a statute suggests consent to that construction. Baks v Moroun, 227 Mich App 472, 489; 576 NW2d 413 (1998); Craig v Larson, 432 Mich 346, 353; 439 NW2d 899 (1989).
After Bricker was decided in 1973, the Legislature enacted various statutes regulating the performance of abortions, see ns 3-8, supra, but did not revise MCL 750.14; MSA 28.204. The Legislature is presumed to be aware of the Bricker Court’s inteipretation of MCL 750.14; MSA 28.204, which construction permits abortions to be performed in accordance with Roe. Gordon Sel-Way, supra at 505; Craig, supra at 353. We think it clear that in enacting those statutes after Bricker, the Legislature intended to regulate those abortions permitted by Roe and Doe, and Bricker, and did not intend to repeal the general prohibition of [437]*437abortions to the extent permitted by the federal constitution, as construed by the United States Supreme Court. We thus must reject defendant’s argument that MCL 750.14; MSA 28.204 has been repealed by implication.
v
We also must reject defendant’s argument that the Bricker Court’s discussion of the constitutionality of the criminal abortion statute was mere dictum because Bricker was not a physician and therefore none of the constitutional underpinnings of Roe applied.
Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed) defines obiter dictum as “[a] judicial comment made during the course of delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (though it may be considered persuasive).” The Michigan Supreme Court has declared, however, that “ ‘[w]hen a court of last resort intentionally takes up, discusses and decides a question germane to, though not necessarily decisive of, the controversy, such decision is not a dictum but is a judicial act of the court which it will thereafter recognize as a binding decision.’ ” Detroit v Michigan Public Utilities Comm, 288 Mich 267, 299-300; 286 NW 368 (1939), quoting Chase v American Cartage Co, Inc, 176 Wis 235, 238; 186 NW 598 (1922). A decision of the Supreme Court is authoritative with regard to any point decided if the Court’s opinion demonstrates “application of the judicial mind to the precise question adjudged, regardless of whether it was necessary to decide the question to decide the case.” People v [438]*438Bonoite, 112 Mich App 167, 171; 315 NW2d 884 (1982).
In deciding whether Bricker’s pre-Noe conviction under MCL 750.14; MSA 28.204 for conspiracy to commit an abortion was lawful, the Bricker Court found it necessary to determine Roe’s effect on Michigan’s criminal abortion statute. Rather than simply declare that Roe was inapplicable because Bricker was not a physician,9 the Court squarely addressed the issue whether Roe and Doe required that Michigan’s criminal abortion statute be declared completely void because it is incapable of constitutional construction, or whether the statute, in accordance with the dictates of Roe, could be construed to render it constitutional. The Bricker Court, thus, intentionally discussed and decided a question germane to the controversy — the constitutionality and scope of the criminal abortion statute after Roe — and this Court must accord that decision binding effect under Detroit, supra at 299-300, and Bonoite, supra at 171.
Defendant further argues that Roe v Wade, supra, held that “abortion statutes, as a unit, must fall,” and that in every case involving a statute containing lan[439]*439guage similar to that considered in Roe, federal courts have struck down the entire statute and have not remanded the case to a state court for interpretation and limitation. None of the cases relied on,10 however, [440]*440involved the state’s highest court’s construction of the abortion statute at issue as coextensive with Roe v Wade, supra. We must accept the Bricker Court’s construction of the statute as our starting point.11 For this reason, defendant’s argument must fail.
VI
Defendant argues that MCL 750.14; MSA 28.204 is unconstitutionally vague because the threat of prosecution against physicians is an undue burden on the rights of women seeking lawful elective and therapeutic abortions, that the statute fails to provide reasonable notice of which abortions are prohibited because it defines the prohibited conduct by reference to unclear and ever-changing constitutional principles, and that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as construed in Bricker, supra, because it fails to recognize the attending physician’s constitutionally conclusive medical judgment regarding viability or maternal health, fails to specify whether an objective or subjective standard governs, and fails to include mens rea requirements on these issues.
As is evident from the dissent’s discussion of the merits, defendant raises substantial constitutional issues. We must conclude, however, that these arguments cannot insulate defendant from prosecution in the instant case.
[441]*441The invariable practice of the courts is not to consider the constitutionality of legislation unless it is imperatively required, essential to the disposition of the case, and unavoidable. Thus, a court will inquire into the constitutionality of a statute only when and to the extent that a case before it requires entry upon that duty, and only to the extent that it is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. [16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, § 117, p 512-513.]
Due regard for principles of standing, and recognition that declaring a statute -unconstitutional is “ ‘the gravest and' most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform,’ ” mandate that, outside the context of the First Amendment, “one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.” [People v Lynch, 410 Mich 343, 352; 301 NW2d 796 (1981), quoting United States v Raines, 362 US 17, 20-21; 80 S Ct 519; 4 L Ed 2d 524 (1960), quoting Blodgett v Holden, 275 US 142-148; 48 S Ct 105; 72 L Ed 206 (1927) (Holmes, J.).
The repeated declarations by the United States Supreme Court that the determination of viability is a matter for medical judgment, Colautti v Franklin, [442]*442439 US 379, 386-389; 99 S Ct 675; 58 L Ed 2d 596 (1979), overruled in part in Webster v Reproductive Health Services, 492 US 490; 109 S Ct 3040; 106 L Ed 2d 410 (1989), and the fact that fetuses may now become viable long before a pregnancy reaches twenty-eight weeks, may, indeed, raise issues regarding the application and constitutionality of the statute as construed in Bricker, in a case where it is charged that the defendant intervened to abort a pregnancy of less than twenty-eight weeks’ gestation.13 These issues are not presented, however, in the instant prosecution because MCL 750.14; MSA 28.204 as construed in Bricker, supra, clearly reaches the conduct the prosecution contends is involved in this criminal prosecution.
A
We are unable to agree with the dissent that defendant may resist this prosecution on constitutional grounds because of deficiencies in the criminal complaint.
Grounded in a defendant’s constitutional right of due process of law is the principle that “[a]n accused shall not be called upon to defend himself against a charge of which he was not sufficiently apprised.” [443]*443People v Mast, 126 Mich App 658, 661; 337 NW2d 619 (1983), (On Rehearing), 128 Mich App 613; 341 NW2d 117 (1983).
We first note that because the district court dismissed the abortion charge against defendant before the preliminary examination, no criminal information was issued pertinent to that charge. See MCR 6.112(B), which provides that no information may be filed against a defendant until a preliminary examination has been held or has been waived, unless the defendant is a fugitive from justice.
The requirements for a criminal complaint are not the same as for an indictment or information. MCR 6.101 provides in pertinent part:
(A) Definition and Form. A complaint is a written accusation that a named or described person has committed a specified criminal offense. The complaint must include the substance of the accusation against the accused and the name and statutory citation of the offense.
(B) Signature and Oath. The complaint must be signed and sworn to before a judicial officer or court clerk.
“The primary function of a complaint is to move the magistrate to determine whether a warrant shall issue.” Wayne Co Prosecutor v Recorder's Court Judge, 119 Mich App 159, 162; 326 NW2d 825 (1982); see also MCL 764.1a(l); MSA 28.860(1)(1).
The requirements for an information are set forth in MCL 767.45(1); MSA 28.985(1), which provides in pertinent part:
The indictment or information shall contain all of the following:
[444]*444(a) The nature of the offense stated in language which will fairly apprise the accused and the court of the offense charged.
(b) The time of the offense as near as may be. No variance as to time shall be fatal unless time is of the essence of the offense.
(c) That the offense was committed in the county or within the jurisdiction of the court.
The test for sufficiency of an indictment is:
“ ‘Does it identify the charge against the defendant so that his conviction or acquittal will bar a subsequent charge for the same offense; does it notify him of the nature and character of the crime with which he is charged so as to enable him to prepare his defense and to permit the court to pronounce judgment according to the right of the case?’ ” [People v Weathersby, 204 Mich App 98, 101; 514 NW2d 493 (1994), quoting People v Adams, 389 Mich 222, 243; 205 NW2d 415 (1973), quoting People v Weiss, 252 AD 463, 467-468; 300 NYS 249 (1937), rev’d on other grounds 276 NY 384; 12 NE2d 514 (1938).]
An information may be amended at any time before, during, or after trial to cure any defect, imperfection, or omission in form or substance, including a variance between the information and the proofs, as long as the accused is not prejudiced by the amendment and the amendment does not charge a new crime. MCL 767.76; MSA 28.1016; People v Stricklin, 162 Mich App 623, 633; 413 NW2d 457 (1987).
We conclude that the factual allegations in the instant complaint14 were sufficient under the above [447]*447standards because they adequately inform of the substance of the accusations. In addition, the factual allegations provide the basis from which commission of the legal elements of the charge can be inferred. Any deficiencies in the allegations of the actual charge, such as the failure to specifically allege that defen[448]*448dant believed that the fetus was viable and that he did not believe that the procedure was necessary to preserve the health of the mother, can be cured by amendment.15
B
It is, of course, evident that the statute does not state a mens rea requirement or set forth an objective or subjective standard for evaluating such a requirement.16 However, Bricker construed the statute as [449]*449encompassing all the constitutional requirements and safeguards demanded by Roe and Doe, including the need to accord adequate deference to the physician’s exercise of his medical judgment. The statute, as interpreted in Bricker, contemplates deference to the subjective good-faith medical judgment of the physician. Thus, in the instant case, the information must allege, and, to convict, the prosecution must prove, that the fetus was twenty-eight weeks old and viable, that defendant himself subjectively believed that the fetus was twenty-eight weeks old and viable, and that defendant, in his own mind, did not hold the subjective belief or medical judgment that the procedure was necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
In light of Bricker, we reverse the lower courts’ dismissal of the charge and remand for reinstatement of [450]*450the charge and further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
M. J. Kelly, P.J., concurred.
12 See People v Cavaiani, 172 Mich App 706, 714; 432 NW2d 409 (1988) (noting that a defendant has standing to raise vagueness challenges to a statute only if the statute is vague as applied to his conduct; that “[e]ven though a statute may be susceptible to impermissible interpretations, reversal is not required where the statute can be narrowly construed so as to render it sufficiently definite to avoid vagueness and where defendant’s conduct falls within that prescribed by the properly construed statute”; and that a person generally lacks standing to challenge overbreadth where his own conduct is clearly within contemplation of the statute); People v Williams, 142 Mich App 611, 612; 370 NW2d 7 (1985) (noting that vagueness challenges to statutes that do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand, and that for a defendant to have standing to challenge a statute as overbroad, the statute must be “ ‘ “overbroad in relation to defendant’s conduct.” ’ ” [Citations omitted].)