2025 IL App (1st) 231568-U No. 1-23-1568 Order filed September 30, 2025 Third Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 97 CR 11558 ) DANTE HANDY, ) Honorable ) James B. Linn, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Rochford and Reyes concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s judgment dismissing defendant’s successive petition for postconviction relief at the second stage is affirmed.
¶2 In 1998, defendant Dante 1 Handy was found guilty of three counts of aggravated criminal
sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, home invasion, two counts of armed robbery, aggravated
1 The record contains instances of defendant’s first name being spelled as both “Dante” and “Donte.” We have opted to use the spelling used by the parties and our prior decisions. No. 1-23-1568
battery, residential burglary, and possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Defendant received a
discretionary sentence of four consecutive thirty-year terms of imprisonment to be served at 85%,
but after a portion of the sentencing code was found to be unconstitutional, defendant was
resentenced to the same term of imprisonment to be served at 50%. Defendant now appeals the
dismissal of his third successive petition for postconviction relief under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act (Act) 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)).
¶3 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 2
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 In 1998, a jury found defendant guilty of three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault,
aggravated kidnapping, home invasion, two counts of armed robbery, aggravated battery,
residential burglary, and possession of a stolen motor vehicle. On March 11, 2002, following
defendant’s conviction, we affirmed the trial court’s judgment on direct appeal in an unpublished
Rule 23 order. People v. Handy, No. 1-98-3010 (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 23). Defendant has since raised multiple collateral attacks against his conviction, and we
recite the facts from the underlying offense and procedural history that are necessary for an
understanding of this appeal.
¶6 On February 23, 1997, defendant and his three codefendants, Sammy Lowery, Derrick
Harris, and Erskine DeLoach, all carrying firearms, invaded a family’s home at 4 a.m. They robbed
the occupants, threatened and hit them at gunpoint, and repeatedly sexually assaulted a 15-year-
old girl.
2 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.
-2- No. 1-23-1568
¶7 One of the victims, K.W., was sitting in his van waiting for the engine to warm up when
all four defendants surrounded his van, ordered him to exit the vehicle at gunpoint, and robbed
him of $7 and cigarettes. They compelled him to let them inside and followed him down a hallway
with their guns trained on his head to the bedroom where K.W.’s 74-year-old mother, L.W., and
his twin 6-year-old daughters were asleep. K.W. turned on the light and told L.W. to wake up.
Defendant held a gun to K.W.’s head and forced him to lie down on the hallway floor. The
assailants cursed at the twins, threatened to kill K.W., and repeated gang slogans. While defendant
held K.W. at gunpoint, Lowery robbed L.W. of $12.
¶8 Defendant and one of the other men forced their way into the bedroom of K.W.’s 15-year-
old daughter, M.W. The other man pulled her from her bed and brought her into the hallway.
Lowery grabbed M.W. and took her into K.W.’s bedroom while defendant returned to holding
K.W. at gunpoint. Lowery removed M.W.’s shorts and underwear, exposed his penis, and
demanded that she “suck his d***.” L.W. forced her way into the bedroom and pulled at Lowery’s
arms and hands, but Lowery shoved her, causing her to hit the wall, door, and furniture. L.W.
continued to struggle with Lowery, who knocked her down, which fractured her finger and bruised
her shoulder.
¶9 Lowery took M.W. back to her bedroom and attempted to sexually assault her again. L.W.
followed and continued to struggle with Lowery, who then dragged M.W. to the kitchen.
Defendant, who was still pointing a gun at K.W.’s head, said “I should kill your motherf*** son.”
While that was occurring, DeLoach and Harris stole the home’s VCR and television. Defendant,
DeLoach, and Harris eventually urged Lowery that it was time to go, but Lowery insisted that they
had to “take the b*** with them.” Lowery yanked the family’s home phone from the wall and told
-3- No. 1-23-1568
the family not to call the police. Lowery then grabbed M.W. and dragged her outside. L.W.
followed and Lowery struck L.W. with the hand holding his gun, knocking her into the snow. All
four defendants entered K.W.’s van and drove away with M.W.
¶ 10 As one codefendant drove, defendant, Lowery, and a third codefendant took turns
repeatedly sexually assaulting M.W., often two at a time. At one point, Lowery penetrated M.W.’s
vagina with his penis while defendant forced his penis into her mouth. Defendant then argued with
Lowery because he wanted to switch places, repeatedly insisting “I want some too.” Lowery and
defendant then switched, and Lowery penetrated M.W.’s mouth with his penis and defendant
penetrated M.W.’s vagina until he moaned and said he was “coming.” Defendant then took over
driving while the other three continued sexually assaulting M.W.
¶ 11 M.W. could not recall how many times each of the defendants sexually assaulted her,
saying, “It was too many times.” Defendant eventually told Lowery to kick M.W. out of the van.
When Lowery refused, defendant pointed his gun at M.W. and threatened to shoot her. Lowery
asked M.W. multiple times if she wanted to be his girlfriend.
¶ 12 When the van stopped, all four defendants exited the vehicle and M.W. unsuccessfully tried
to start the van. Lowery and another codefendant returned to the van and, while the codefendant
drove, Lowery sexually assaulted her again. Lowery threatened to kill M.W.’s family if she told
anyone what happened. Then he gave her directions home, both men exited the van, and M.W.
drove home.
¶ 13 Shoshana Strader lived across the hall from defendant. She returned from a party at 4 or 5
a.m. on February 23, 1997. As she walked up the stairs to her apartment, she saw defendant with
a revolver. She asked him where Harris was, but he did not answer. She went into her apartment,
-4- No. 1-23-1568
and defendant went into his apartment. Five minutes later, Harris knocked at the front door and
came in carrying a television set. Five minutes after that, DeLoach and Lowery came in the back
door. Lowery’s penis was hanging out of his pants and he said they just finished “f*** this b***.”
At some point, Strader heard defendant talking through the walls and overheard him say that he
had never done anything like that and that he was going to kill himself.
¶ 14 Latrice Riley, DeLoach’s then-girlfriend, was staying in Strader’s apartment as of February
23, 1997. She asked the codefendants who they had “f***.” While pointing a gun at Riley’s head,
DeLoach denied having “f***” anyone. She asked Lowery, “Why you got your nasty-ass d***
hanging out?” and he replied that he had just “got through f*** the s*** out of some b***.” When
Riley asked him who he meant, Lowery specified that he meant himself, Harris, and defendant.
¶ 15 Two days later, according to Strader, DeLoach returned to Strader’s apartment and Riley
accused him of having raped “the girl in the paper.” DeLoach replied, “How did you hear about
this? You not telling anybody about this are you?”
¶ 16 M.W., K.W., and L.W. eventually viewed photo arrays and all three identified another man
other than the four defendants as one of the perpetrators. At later lineups, all three identified
Lowery, DeLoach, Harris, and defendant. The fifth individual was never charged.
¶ 17 Defendant was arrested on March 13, 1997, in Texas. Once in custody, defendant agreed
to give a statement and have that statement reduced to writing. According to that statement,
defendant was drinking and smoking marijuana while driving around with his three codefendants.
Codefendants forced K.W. out of his van at gunpoint and went into the house. Defendant followed
them and held K.W. at gunpoint while codefendants robbed, threatened, and attacked the family.
Defendant wanted to leave and exited the home, using the van’s horn to summon the codefendants.
-5- No. 1-23-1568
He claimed that he drove while the three other men sexually assaulted M.W. One of the
codefendants took over driving and told defendant to “go back there and get you some.” While no
one else was sexually assaulting M.W., defendant penetrated her vagina with his penis. When
Lowery returned and put his penis in M.W.’s mouth, defendant stopped and resumed driving the
van. The three codefendants continued to sexually assault M.W., but eventually defendant parked
the van and said, “F*** this, I’m out of here.” When the codefendants said they should kill the
victim, defendant insisted they should let her go. Defendant left the group and ran home and told
his girlfriend what happened. A few days later, he fled to Texas.
¶ 18 During trial, however, defendant denied sexually assaulting M.W. and claimed that he did
not know of the plan to commit the robbery until it was happening and he did not have a gun during
the offense. Defendant claimed he stood in the house, took no part in the offense, and was ready
to leave because he did not “want things to go that far as they were going.” He claimed that as he
drove, he heard a noise and discovered that his codefendants were sexually assaulting M.W.
Defendant told Lowery to let her go, but Lowery ordered him to keep driving. After defendant
struck some parked cars, Lowery ordered another codefendant to drive. From the front passenger
seat, defendant observed Lowery continuing to sexually assault the victim. Defendant insisted that
a detective had threatened him, shoved him, and pulled his hair during his interrogation.
¶ 19 M.W. presented to the hospital after the incident due to the pain she was experiencing. An
examination revealed that she had a freshly torn hymen, bloodstained mucus inside her vaginal
vault, and a swollen labium.
¶ 20 Tracy Gallagher, a forensic scientist, performed DNA testing using the Restriction
Fragment Length Polymorphism method on several samples taken from M.W.’s shirt, mouth,
-6- No. 1-23-1568
vagina, and rectum. One of the profiles present was a match for Lowery. Another sample matched
Harris. For those profiles, the pattern she found would be expected to occur in 1 in 4.2 billion black
people and 1 in 14 billion black people, respectively. For other samples, she obtained incomplete
results that could have come from Lowery, Harris, and Handy, but the statistical significance of
those samples was much lower.
¶ 21 Karla Cluck, a forensic scientist, performed DNA testing on the same samples using the
polymerase chain reaction method. The oral and rectal swabs did not exclude defendant, though
the statistical significance of the results was low, as Cluck testified that the DNA profile in the oral
and rectal swabs would be expected to appear as often as 1 in 4 or 1 in 20 black people,
respectively. Cluck also identified another unknown profile that did not match M.W. or any of the
defendants.
¶ 22 During the presentence investigation, defendant reported that his childhood was “easy,”
that his mother took good care of him, and that no one in his immediate family had any substance
abuse problems. We affirmed defendant’s conviction on direct appeal. People v. Handy, No. 1-98-
3010 (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 23 On February 20, 2003, defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. The trial
court dismissed it and we affirmed. People v. Handy, No. 1-03-1817 (2004) (unpublished order
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 24 On March 2, 2011, defendant sought leave to file a successive petition, which was denied
and we affirmed. People v. Handy, 2012 IL App (1st) 111067-U.
¶ 25 On November 21, 2016, defendant once again sought leave to file a successive petition,
which claimed that his sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
-7- No. 1-23-1568
States Constitution under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48 (2012). The trial court denied defendant leave to file, and we affirmed as defendant was
18 years old at the time of the offense and therefore could not establish prejudice. People v. Handy,
2019 IL App (1st) 170213.
¶ 26 On September 27, 2021, defendant filed the motion for leave to file a successive petition
and accompanying successive petition that are now the subject of this appeal. He claimed that
changes in the law regarding the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution since
his last petition now precluded his de facto life sentence.
¶ 27 On October 29, 2021, although the trial court did not make an explicit ruling on defendant’s
motion for leave to file a successive petition, it ordered defendant’s petition docketed. The trial
court stated it could “glean enough” from recent caselaw that it would docket defendant’s petition
“just to keep [the] issue available.”
¶ 28 On August 8, 2022, the State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that defendant failed to
raise a proportionate penalties challenge at trial and that, in any event, defendant failed to
demonstrate that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause. The State also argued
that defendant’s claim was barred by res judicata.
¶ 29 At a hearing on February 22, 2023, the trial court denied the State’s motion to dismiss. The
State subsequently filed a motion to reconsider on August 4, 2023, which argued that our supreme
court’s decision in People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, foreclosed defendant’s ability to demonstrate
cause for his failure to raise his proportionate penalties claim in a previous postconviction
proceeding. However, on August 14, 2023, the parties appeared for a hearing at which defendant
-8- No. 1-23-1568
planned to present witnesses. The trial court took the State’s motion under advisement, but insisted
on proceeding with the hearing “in the interest of fairness and justice.”
¶ 30 At the hearing, Dr. James Garbarino, a developmental psychologist, testified that he
prepared a report about defendant’s developmental issues. Dr. Garbarino based that report on
defendant’s prison disciplinary records, written correspondence with defendant, and defendant’s
completion of an instrument known as the Adverse Childhood Experience Scale.
¶ 31 Dr. Garbarino testified that it is “settled science now that the human brain cannot be
presumed to be mature until the mid 20s, certainly past age 18 into the early 20s.” He described
that the immature adolescent brain struggles in two areas. One is executive function, or the brain’s
ability to make decisions, contemplate consequences, and weigh short-term and long-term
benefits. The second is affective relation, which refers to our ability to understand one’s own
emotions and the emotions of others. He further explained that youth have a particularly difficult
time making decisions in emotionally charged situations such as when they are sexually aroused,
angry, or afraid.
¶ 32 Dr. Garbarino also explained that adversity and negative experience can adversely affect
one’s emotional development. In the case of defendant’s Adult Childhood Experience Scale,
defendant reported a childhood history of emotional abuse, physical abuse, sexual abuse, and
emotional neglect, as well as living with parental separation and substance abuse. Statistically,
only 3 out of every 100 individuals report a history of six or more items on the questionnaire.
¶ 33 These adverse childhood experiences, according to Dr. Garbarino, would have slowed the
process of maturation such that at age 18 defendant would behave more immaturely than a typical
18-year-old, and make him more prone to substance abuse, violent delinquent behavior, and
-9- No. 1-23-1568
suicidal thoughts. They would also make him prone to negative social influences including peer
pressure.
¶ 34 Dr. Garbarino likened these childhood experiences to walking around with a backpack
filled with the stones, where the greater the adversity, the more stones are contained in the pack.
He described that the process of recovery or rehabilitation involves removing the stones and
processing them. He was aware of defendant’s participation in prison programs which included
stress training, victim impact, trauma management, and various mental health groups. He
described defendant as having “devoted many years to this process” and that defendant has
“emerged from it a much more complete, positive person who’s capable of being released safely
in the community and rejoining the community in a positive way.” He also believed that
defendant’s correspondence with him reflected sincere, significant remorse for his crimes.
¶ 35 On cross-examination, he admitted he had never spoken with defendant and had no way of
knowing if defendant had assistance drafting his written responses.
¶ 36 Defendant also presented testimony from multiple witnesses who knew defendant in his
youth. Cassandra Greer testified that she went to high school with defendant in Englewood and
that the area was “infested with gangs” and that defendant joined the Gangster Disciples to fit in.
She said defendant never had a stable home and she described him as “very immature” and a
“follower.” She maintained contact over the years and believed that defendant had matured and
taken accountability for his actions.
¶ 37 Kathy Handy, defendant’s mother, testified that defendant never knew his father and had
been sexually abused by a relative as a child. She also admitted to kicking defendant out of the
house during high school after he began using drugs, which forced him to live on the streets.
- 10 - No. 1-23-1568
¶ 38 Defendant testified that he knew of his biological father, but “might have seen him once.”
Growing up, he lived with his grandmother and two uncles, Carlos and Charles. Carlos hit
defendant often, and if defendant cried, he would hit defendant harder. Defendant recounted an
instance when he was 12 where he ran home after being chased by other kids in the neighborhood.
In response, Carlos made defendant go back outside and fight every kid outside. Defendant
described his other uncle, Charles, as a good uncle until Charles began using cocaine. He insisted
that he was now focused on making the right choice rather than the popular choice, and that he
believed he would not return to the same lifestyle if released.
¶ 39 The trial court issued its ruling on August 21, 2023. During its ruling, the trial court said
that “at the second stage, I allowed the presentation of some evidence.” The trial court then
concluded that defendant’s sentence was lawful and stated, “So the State’s motion to dismiss at
second stage is sustained.”
¶ 40 This appeal followed.
¶ 41 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 42 There is no denying the procedural oddities of this case that have muddled the otherwise
straightforward stages of the Act. On the record before us, the trial court held an evidentiary
hearing while also ultimately granting the State’s motion to dismiss. This is procedurally
impossible. An evidentiary hearing only occurs once a defendant has made a substantial showing
of a constitutional violation at the second stage. People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 34. The
denial of a motion to dismiss precedes the filing of an answer and the evidentiary hearing. 725
ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2020).
- 11 - No. 1-23-1568
¶ 43 It appears from the record that the trial court granted defendant’s motion for leave to file a
successive petition and docketed defendant’s petition for second-stage proceedings without
explicitly ruling on the question of cause and prejudice. People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶¶ 25,
28 (when the requirements for leave to file are met, the successive petition is docketed directly for
second-stage proceedings); 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020). And as the State is entitled to do, it
sought dismissal on cause-and-prejudice grounds at the second stage. See People v. Bailey, 2017
IL 121450, ¶ 26.
¶ 44 In the face of the baffling procedural history of this case, defendant argues that he
established cause and prejudice to be granted leave to file a successive petition and that he carried
his burden at a third-stage hearing to be granted a new sentencing hearing.
¶ 45 We need not wade into the procedural strangeness of this case or reach the issue of whether
defendant successfully proved that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because we hold that
defendant failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice and that the trial court’s decision to dismiss
defendant’s petition at the second stage was therefore proper. Accordingly, this matter should
never have proceeded to an evidentiary hearing.
¶ 46 The Act provides a procedural mechanism through which a defendant may assert a
substantial denial of his constitutional rights under the United States Constitution or the Illinois
Constitution or both. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 378-79 (1998); 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West
2020). A defendant may raise a constitutional challenge to both his conviction and his sentence.
People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 13. The Act, however, contemplates the filing of a single
petition as a matter of right. People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 456 (2002); 725 ILCS 5/122-
1(f) (West 2020).
- 12 - No. 1-23-1568
¶ 47 Successive petitions are highly disfavored, and the statutory bar will be relaxed only when
fundamental fairness requires it. People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 25 (overruled on other
grounds by People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666). A successive filing requires leave of court. People
v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 27; 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020). For leave to be granted, a
defendant must make a prima facie showing of both “cause” and “prejudice” by submitting
sufficient pleadings and documentation to permit the trial court to make an independent
determination on the legal question raised. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24. The “cause and
prejudice” test for successive postconviction pleadings is a higher burden than the “frivolous or
patently without merit” standard for initial pleadings. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶¶ 24-
29.
¶ 48 The cause-and-prejudice test is a procedural prerequisite to obtaining further review of a
defendant’s claim. People v. Bland, 2020 IL App (3d) 170705, ¶ 9. To show cause, a defendant
must identify an objective factor that impeded his ability to raise the claim in his initial petition.
Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 14. To show prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate that the claim so
infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process. Id.
¶ 49 We review de novo both the question of whether a defendant demonstrated cause and
prejudice and the propriety of a trial court’s decision to dismiss a petition at the second stage.
Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 13; People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473 (2006). Under the de novo
standard, a reviewing court performs the same analysis that the trial court would perform, making
the question on review whether the trial court’s decision was correct as a matter of law. People v.
McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 32. In answering this question, we take as true all well-pled
allegations in the petition that are not positively rebutted by the trial record and reject those
- 13 - No. 1-23-1568
allegations that are positively rejected by the trial record. People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849,
¶ 45.
¶ 50 The proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution provides that “[a]ll penalties
shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of
restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, § 11. A sentence violates the
proportionate penalties clause if “the punishment for the offense is cruel, degrading, or so wholly
disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.” People v. Leon
Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002). The proportionate penalties clause provides broader protections
than those provided in the eighth amendment. People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶¶ 69-
78; People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 36.
¶ 51 Defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive petition cited new, evolving case law on
the subject of the proportionate penalties clause as it relates to emerging adults as the reason why
defendant failed to raise his claims in an earlier postconviction proceeding. However, by the time
the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss on August 21, 2023, the law on this subject
had continued to evolve. It will thus be useful to briefly summarize the progression of our
proportionate penalties jurisprudence—a topic our supreme court has addressed multiple times in
recent years beginning with People v. Thompson and People v. Harris.
¶ 52 Thompson and Harris “opened the door for a young-adult offender to demonstrate, through
an adequate factual record, that his or her own specific characteristics were so like those of a
juvenile that imposition of a life sentence absent the safeguards in Miller was cruel, degrading, or
so wholly disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the moral sense of the community.” People
- 14 - No. 1-23-1568
v. Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶ 25; see People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151 and People
v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932.
¶ 53 Thompson and Harris were followed by People v. House, which reaffirmed that Thompson
and Harris “paved the way for young adults to make as-applied challenges to their life sentences
using the proportionate penalties clause and the principles contained within Miller.” People v.
Horshaw, 2024 IL App (1st) 182047-B, ¶ 50 (citing People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶¶ 21-31).
¶ 54 However, since 2021, our supreme court has narrowed the availability of proportionate
penalties clause relief in the context of successive petitions. In 2021, Dorsey announced for the
first time that “Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment does
not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” People
v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74. To support that proposition, it reasoned that “Illinois courts have
long recognized the differences between persons of mature age and those who are minors for
purposes of sentencing.” Id. Thus, Dorsey concluded that Miller’s unavailability prior to 2012 only
deprived the defendant of “some helpful support.” Id.
¶ 55 In 2023, People v. Clark held that Miller did not present new proportionate penalties clause
principles with respect to discretionary sentencing of young adult offenders, and that the defendant
“had the essential legal tools” to raise his claim in his initial petition. People v. Clark, 2023 IL
127273, ¶ 93. The supreme court clarified that Thompson and Harris “addressed the possibility of
a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial
postconviction petitions.” (Emphases in original.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 (citing Thompson,
2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 1, 44, and Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 1, 48).
- 15 - No. 1-23-1568
¶ 56 People v. Moore followed, in which the supreme court reiterated that “Miller does not
present new proportionate penalties clause principles with respect to discretionary sentencing of
young adult offenders.” People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42. Moore reasoned that, “As Miller
does not directly apply to young adults, it also does not provide cause for a young adult offender
to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” Id. ¶ 40.
¶ 57 Lastly, People v. Hilliard repeated the supreme court’s narrow view of Thompson and
Harris by stating, “those cases addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based
challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphases
in original.) People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 27 (quoting Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88).
¶ 58 We recently had occasion to confront the scope of these cases in People v. Horshaw, 2024
IL App (1st) 182047-B, and our thorough analysis there is equally applicable here. As we noted
there, the First District has adopted a broad interpretation of the above-quoted language used by
our supreme court. Id. ¶¶ 58-59. Ultimately, we concluded that Dorsey, Clark, Moore, and Hilliard
all indicate that proportionate penalties claims like the one being raised by defendant here “should
be viewed as nothing more than an extension of proportionate penalties claims that have existed
all along and that defendant did not need Miller or Miller-related proportionate penalties precedent
to raise the claim now at issue.” Id. ¶ 62. Furthermore, we reasoned Clark and Hilliard “reinforced
this interpretation by clarifying that Thompson and Harris opened the door only wide enough to
accommodate claims involving mandatory life sentences that were raised in initial postconviction
petitions.” Id.
¶ 59 In Horshaw, we expressed our concerns about some of the potential ramifications of the
supreme court’s decisions, but concluded that we were nevertheless bound by those decisions. Id.
- 16 - No. 1-23-1568
¶¶ 60-62. Those concerns have not abated, nor has the legal landscape changed. Defendant’s
motion, which posits that changes in our proportionate penalties jurisprudence establish cause, is
undone by the conclusion that “a proportionate penalties claim was always available to him in
some form.” Horshaw, 2024 IL App (1st) 182047-B, ¶ 63 (citing Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶¶ 40-
42). The cases that defendant cited in his motion, which were Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738;
People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145; People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541; and
People v. Ross, 2020 IL App (1st) 171202, all predate the recent shift we have outlined above. In
fact, Hilliard specifically criticized Ruiz and Minniefield as they are “contrary to subsequent
supreme court decisions and fail to recognize that [the supreme court’s] cases were directing the
possibility of as-applied proportionate penalties clause postconviction challenges to young adults
who received mandatory life sentences.” Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 28. Defendant’s discretionary
sentence places him squarely within Moore’s holding that “Miller does not present new
proportionate penalties clause principles with respect to discretionary sentencing of young adult
offenders.” Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42. The pathway to relief that defendant identified in his
motion has since been closed off by our supreme court for the purposes of successive petitions.
¶ 60 In his brief, defendant insists that his case is distinguishable from Moore because he did
not rely solely on Miller, but also new facts. See People v. Blalock, 2022 IL 126682, ¶¶ 42-46
(new factual discoveries can provide cause for a claim in a successive postconviction petition).
Defendant’s brief points to the testimony of Dr. Garbarino, but the cause and prejudice
determination is to be made based on the pleadings. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 23. Defendant’s
motion for leave to file his successive petition is silent as to the discovery of new facts or how they
provide cause for his failure to raise his claim in an earlier postconviction proceeding. His motion,
- 17 - No. 1-23-1568
instead, focused entirely on the development of new caselaw. Moreover, defendant’s pleading
makes no allegations about how the facts contained in Dr. Garbarino’s report were previously
unavailable or what objective factors prevented him from obtaining that evidence earlier.
¶ 61 While Dr. Garbarino’s testimony was informative, that is separate and distinct from the
legal question of whether defendant’s pleading set out the requisite objective factor that prevented
him from raising his claims in an initial petition. It did not. Defendant’s allegations about legal
cause have been foreclosed by our supreme court, and his motion for leave to file his successive
petition contained no allegations about factual cause. Because defendant cannot demonstrate
cause, we need not reach his remaining arguments that he demonstrated prejudice, or that he
carried his burden at the evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision to dismiss
defendant’s petition at the second stage was proper.
¶ 62 Defendant also asks that, if we do not afford him the relief he requests, we remand this case
to the trial court to allow the trial court to make a clear ruling on the question of cause and
prejudice. Undoubtedly, the course taken by the trial court and, accordingly, the exact nature of its
ruling, were perplexing, to say the least. We do not condone the manner in which the trial court
handled these proceedings for multiple reasons, the least of which is the fact that it failed to make
an explicit cause-and-prejudice ruling. See People v. Thames, 2021 IL App (1st) 180071, ¶ 85 (the
trial court erred when it advanced a petition to the second stage without making a cause-and-
prejudice determination). However, such a remand is unnecessary.
¶ 63 Whether the trial court dismissed defendant’s petition on the basis of the State’s original
motion to dismiss, or the State’s motion to reconsider invoking Moore and the cause-and-prejudice
analysis, our review is de novo and we need not base our disposition solely on the trial court’s
- 18 - No. 1-23-1568
reasoning. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 13; Mullins v. Evans, 2021 IL App (1st) 191962, ¶ 25 (we
may affirm on any basis in the record). The State raised its cause-and-prejudice objection in the
trial court, and both parties have argued this legal issue in the instant appeal. Our determination
that defendant failed to establish cause for his successive petition is a sufficient basis to affirm the
trial court’s dismissal at the second stage, regardless of the trial court’s specific reasoning.
¶ 64 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 65 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of defendant’s successive
postconviction petition at the second stage.
¶ 66 Affirmed.
- 19 -