Opinion
KAUS, J.
Defendant Lavell Frierson appeals from a judgment imposing the death penalty following his conviction of first degree murder with special circumstances and other offenses. In People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142 [158 Cal.Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587] (Frierson I), we reversed defendant’s conviction of these same offenses at an earlier trial on the ground that defense counsel at that trial had provided constitutionally inadequate representation by failing properly to investigate or present a diminished capacity defense. On remand, defendant requested his new appointed counsel to present evidence of his diminished capacity as a defense at the guilt/special circumstances phase of the trial, but counsel declined to do so, apparently believing that it was wiser to withhold such evidence until the penalty phase. When the conflict between defendant and his attorney was brought to the trial court’s attention, the court ruled that the decision whether to present a defense was for counsel, not defendant, to make. On this appeal, defendant claims, inter alia, that the court erred in concluding that defense counsel had the authority to refuse, over defendant’s express objection, to present any defense to the charged special circumstances. We conclude that, under the facts of this case, the claim is well-founded and requires reversal of the special circumstance findings and penalty judgment. At the same time, we affirm defendant’s convictions of first degree murder and the other substantive offenses and enhancements.
[806]*806I
The prosecution’s case-in-chief at the retrial revealed the same basic facts that were disclosed at the initial trial and were summarized in Frierson 1. We review them briefly.
On January 3, 1978, Edgardo Kramer and Guillermo Bulnes, two Peruvian airline employees and the ultimate victims in this matter, drove to the Holly Aire Motel in Inglewood to visit a woman named Chris. Bulnes knocked on the door to room 18 and told the young woman who responded—later identified as Zondre Wooley—that he was looking for Chris. Wooley said that Chris was not there, offered Bulnes a “date” for $100, and, when he declined, said that she would call Chris for him.
While Wooley walked to a nearby telephone booth, Bulnes parked his car across the street from the motel driveway. He and Kramer then went to the phone booth and Wooley told them that Chris would arrive shortly. They thanked her and returned to their car.
Soon thereafter, defendant approached the car and asked if they were waiting for Chris. When Bulnes said that they were, defendant drew a gun from his pocket, pointed it at Bulnes and cocked the hammer. He then entered the back seat of the car behind the two men, and ordered Bulnes to lock the door, start the car and begin driving in the direction indicated by defendant.
During the ride, defendant demanded and obtained the victims’ wallets and watches. Although defendant told Bulnes not to look at him, Bulnes repeatedly turned and glanced at defendant’s face. After traveling a few blocks to a somewhat less populated area, defendant ordered Bulnes to park the car. He then shot both Bulnes and Kramer in the backs of their heads. Although Kramer apparently died instantly, the bullet directed at Bulnes did not penetrate his skull and he was able to grapple with defendant and disarm him. Bulnes pointed the gun at defendant and left the car.
After running a few steps, however, Bulnes fell to the ground. Defendant then grabbed him around the neck and tried to retrieve the weapon. During the ensuing struggle, Bulnes emptied the gun’s chamber by firing shots into the ground and threw the gun away. When defendant released his grip on Bulnes, Bulnes ran to a nearby street, flagged down a passing motorist, and was driven to a hospital. As Bulnes entered the car, he saw defendant walking in the general direction of the Holly Aire Motel.
At the hospital, Bulnes reported the events to the police. A few hours later, defendant and Wooley were arrested in room 18 at the Holly Aire [807]*807Motel. Distinctive watches owned by the victims, along with other incriminating evidence, were found in the motel room.
Thereafter, defendant and Wooley were charged with murder (Pen. Code, § 187),1 robbery (§ 211), kidnaping for purposes of robbery (§ 209), and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)). The amended information also alleged that the offenses were aggravated by firearm use (§§ 12022.5, 1203.06, subd. (a)(1)) and great bodily injury (§ 12022.7). Finally, the information charged defendant with two special circumstances under the applicable 1977 death penalty law, alleging that the murder was wilful, deliberate and premeditated and was physically committed by defendant during the course of a robbery and a kidnaping. (Former § 190.2, subds. (c)(3)(i), (c)(3)(ii).)
At the retrial, Bulnes, who was seriously injured but survived the shooting, gave the foregoing account of the incident and positively identified defendant as the assailant. The investigating police officers testified to the circumstances of the arrest and the discovery of incriminating evidence-including the victims’ distinctive watches and defendant’s bloody clothing— in the motel room. Finally, an inmate who had been at the county jail when defendant was initially apprehended testified that defendant had recounted the entire crime to him, admitting that he had robbed and shot the two victims.
After the prosecution had completed its case-in-chief, defense counsel rested without calling any witnesses or presenting any defense. Immediately thereafter, a discussion was held, outside the presence of the jury, in which the conflict between defendant and defense counsel as to whether any defense should be presented on defendant’s behalf was explicitly brought to the court’s attention. We describe that discussion, as well as the events leading up to it and an additional in-chambers conference held shortly thereafter, in some detail below. After considering the conflict, the trial court ruled that the decision whether to present a defense was for counsel, not defendant, to make. Accordingly, the case went to the jury without any evidence having been presented by the defense.
The jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of all the charged offenses and enhancements and also finding true the two charged special circumstances.
At the penalty phase, the prosecution presented evidence of other criminal conduct that defendant had committed in the past, including two armed robberies and a shooting in which the victim was killed.
[808]*808The defense called a number of witnesses whose testimony suggested that at the time defendant shot Kramer and Bulnes, his mental state had been affected by his use of the drug phencyclidine, more commonly known as PCP or “angel dust.” Several lay witnesses, friends of defendant, testified (1) to his long-term use of a variety of drugs, including PCP, (2) to his use of PCP, as well as alcohol, on the day of the offense, and (3) to his intoxicated state shortly before the crime. Two expert witnesses, who had had considerable experience working with users of PCP, also testified on defendant’s behalf. Dr. Marvin Gillick, a forensic psychiatrist, testified that in his opinion defendant had a “mental abnormality brought about by voluntary intoxication” of PCP, and that, at the time of the incident, although defendant had the mental capacity to form the specific intent to rob and kidnap the victims, his mental abnormality “substantially impaired [his] capacity to form and harbor the criminal intents necessary for first degree murder,” i.e., deliberation and premeditation. Dr. Ronald Siegal, a psychopharmacologist and psychologist, also testified that defendant “was severely intoxicated with PCP [at the time of the offense] as a result of both an acute ingestion on that day as well as chronic use over a long period of time.” In rebuttal, both Bulnes and the police officer who arrested defendant testified that from their observations they did not believe that defendant was suffering from any drug-induced intoxication at the time of the crimes.
In his closing argument at the penalty phase, the prosecutor—in discussing the diminished capacity evidence presented by the defense—pointed out that that evidence, relating to the defendant’s ability to premeditate and deliberate, actually concerned matters that had been at issue at the guilt/special circumstance phase of the case. He told the jury: “It’s very interesting that the defense should offer evidence bearing on the defendant’s mental state in regards to premeditation and deliberation at this phase of the trial. Now premeditation and deliberation was an important element in the guilt phase. If the defendant had not been found guilty of premeditating and deliberating, then we wouldn’t be facing this phase of the trial. Now, why wasn’t it offered at the first phase of the trial? Well, I submit to you there’s a very reasonable explanation of that. I submit to you that it’s a matter of clever trial tactics and probably something [defense counsel] had to do because he knew that evidence wasn’t going to convince anybody at the guilt phase. He knew that no one was going to buy the skimpy evidence, the ambiguous evidence that was offered in this particular phase of the hearings, and that once that guilty phase was over, and those theories were not—didn’t carry the day for him, that he could not use them at the penalty phase and they would have no impact. But the hope is now that this type of evidence will influence someone among you who might feel faint about imposition of the death penalty, that will hold onto that as some kind of hook.”
[809]*809After a day of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict sentencing defendant to death. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial. The case is now before us on automatic appeal.
II
The prosecution’s evidence at the guilt phase clearly established that defendant was guilty of first degree murder—under the felony-murder raleas well as robbery, kidnaping and assault with a deadly weapon. Defendant does not challenge his conviction of those offenses, He maintains, however, that the trial court erred in concluding that his trial counsel had the authority, in the face of defendant’s express demand, to refuse to present any defense to the special circumstance charges and instead to withhold evidence supporting such a defense until the penalty phase. To place the claim in perspective, it is necessary to consider a number of additional facts and circumstances disclosed by the record.
As already noted, in Frierson I—decided in August 1979—we reversed defendant’s initial conviction on the ground that defense counsel at the first trial had provided incompetent representation in failing properly to investigate, prepare and present a diminished capacity defense. In that trial, counsel had made an attempt to raise the diminished capacity issue at the guilt/ special circumstance phase by presenting a few lay witnesses who testified in general terms to defendant’s drag use, but had failed to consult any expert witnesses who might have aided in presenting a viable defense. In emphasizing the seriousness of trial counsel’s failure, we noted that “the defense of diminished capacity was certainly crucial, for it represented defendant’s sole defense to the serious, indeed ultimate, crimes with which he was charged.” (Orig. italics.) (Frierson I, supra, 25 Cal.3d 142, 163.)
When the case was remanded to the trial court after the reversal, a new attorney, Martin Blake, was appointed to represent defendant on retrial. On January 9, 1980, during a pretrial conference, Blake told the court that another attorney may have solicited defendant’s representation the previous month, causing some delay in Blake’s trial preparation. Defendant confirmed that he had been contacted by another attorney, but told the court that he retained good relations with Blake. The court advised defendant to inform it if he became dissatisfied with Blake.
Two months later, on March 7, 1980, defendant personally filed a motion requesting the appointment of a second attorney to assist Blake; the court permitted Blake to withdraw the motion. On March 28, 1980, defendant wrote a letter to the court, stating that he had a serious conflict with Blake and wanted a new attorney. Defendant explained that at the outset of his [810]*810representation Blake had said that his defense would be diminished capacity, but that when he had spoken to Blake that day “the understanding that I got was that I really don’t have a defense.” Defendant complained that Blake had not properly investigated the diminished capacity defense and requested the court to appoint a new attorney of defendant’s choice.
On April 10, 1980, the court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to substitute counsel. Blake filed a declaration at the outset of the hearing confirming that there had been a breakdown in the relationship, but attributing the breakdown to what he felt was the continued interference of another attorney. He told the court that he was not ready to go to trial on the scheduled April 14 trial date and that if the court decided to appoint a second attorney he would be willing to work either as primary or supporting counsel.
In response to the court’s inquiry as to which attorney “of choice” defendant had in mind, defendant named a specific attorney, whom defendant had never met but who he had heard was a “pretty good attorney” who handled only murder cases and took appointments. The trial court denied the request to appoint the named attorney in place of Blake, and indicated that he did not think defendant’s claim of conflict was sufficient to warrant substitution of new counsel.
Blake, however, was still unsure that he could overcome the breakdown in relations with defendant and asked for a few minutes to discuss the matter with him. After that discussion, Blake informed the court that defendant had decided that he wanted Blake to continue to represent him. At the same time, Blake stated: “I will also represent to the court that I want to make a little more detailed inquiry into this—initial inquiry into this by use of the experts so that we can have a really true representation to the court that Mr. Frierson wishes to continue with me. [1] That won’t be necessary to have a return on that, that will just be my problem.” (Italics added.) The court then asked defendant whether he was agreeing to have Blake continue, and defendant said “Yes.”
The record reveals nothing further about the attorney-client conflict until Blake indicated, at the conclusion of the People’s case at trial, that the defense was resting without putting on any evidence. Immediately thereafter, at Blake’s request, an in-chambers conference was held. Blake stated: “After my investigation and my consultation with the doctors and Mr. Frierson, my opinion was that there should not be a defense presented, especially the defense of diminished capacity as to the guilt phase. Mr. Frierson strongly disagrees with that position. He’s advised me several times he wishes to present that defense. I took the precaution of advising [811]*811the court informally a couple of days ago about this problem. And that’s where it stands. We’ve discussed—Mr. Frierson and myself—have discussed this up until probably 20 minutes ago. And he’s still of a strong, very strong position—state of mind that he would like to present a diminished capacity defense.”
The trial court confirmed that Blake had brought the problem to its attention some time earlier, but explained that it had not wished to get into specific details at that time for fear of infringing the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination. The court then ruled that under its understanding of the law, “the final judgment and decision has to be that of the attorney as to how to proceed in a case.” Accordingly, it concluded that defense counsel had the authority to decline to present a defense, despite defendant’s contrary wishes.
The next day, after closing arguments had been presented and the case had been submitted to the jury, Blake informed the court that defendant wished to make a statement. Another in-chambers conference was convened and Frierson stated; “Well, I been housed in the county jail for about eight months. And I seen Mr. Blake on different occasions. And he was telling me I was going to present a defense all along. Then until yesterday, I didn’t know that we wasn’t going to put a defense. He told me that he was going to call a psychiatrist. He said he was going to have the psychiatrists testify, but he was going to call witnesses. But the witnesses got the subpoenas yesterday. And you know this surprised me when he just rested the case after the district attorney did. And I wanted a defense. I feel that I had a right to present a defense. And I feel that Mr. Blake didn’t want to put a defense up for me. And [he] should have told you, the judge, and disqualified or get hisself off the case, you know. And I feel that the court was wrong for denying me a defense.”
The court rejected the claim that it had denied defendant a defense, and reiterated its view that his counsel “was in control of the lawsuit.”
From this review of the record, it is evident that from the outset of his representation by Blake, defendant made it clear that he wanted to present a diminished capacity defense at the guilt/special circumstance phase. It is also clear that there was at least some evidence—of which counsel was aware—to support such a defense. As noted, at the penalty phase counsel presented not only a number of lay witnesses who testified to defendant’s long-term drug usage and his use of PCP on the day of the offense, but also two expert witnesses who testified to defendant’s history of drug abuse and to the effects of chronic use of PCP on an abuser’s behavior. In addition, one of the experts specifically concluded that defendant’s PCP use had sub[812]*812stantially impaired his capacity to form and harbor the criminal state of mind—premeditation and deliberation—necessary for a finding of special circumstances under the applicable 1977 death penalty law.
The principal issue presented is whether a defense counsel’s traditional power to control the conduct of a case includes the authority to withhold the presentation of any defense at the guilt/special circumstance stage of a capital case, in the face of a defendant’s openly expressed desire to present a defense at that stage and despite the existence of some credible evidence to support the defense. As defendant accurately points out, this issue is quite distinct from the question whether trial counsel provided competent representation in choosing to withhold the evidence until the penalty phase of the trial. Although defendant also maintains in a separate argument that trial counsel was not competent in following that course of action, in analyzing the present contention we may assume that counsel’s decision to withhold the evidence from the guilt/special circumstance phase fell within the range of conduct that competent defense counsel might reasonably employ. Defendant’s claim is that even if that is so, the decision whether to present any defense at all at the guilt/special circumstance phase of a capital case is so fundamental, and has such serious consequences for a defendant, that it is one that cannot properly be taken from him by his counsel. In support of this contention, defendant relies on a series of cases—decided by the United States Supreme Court as well as by this court—which have recognized that, with respect to certain fundamental decisions in the course of a criminal action, a counsel’s control over the proceedings must give way to the defendant’s wishes.
In Brookhart v. Janis (1966) 384 U.S. 1 [16 L.Ed.2d 314, 86 S.Ct. 1245], one of the early federal decisions in this line, defense counsel, over the defendant’s apparent objection, agreed that the criminal proceeding would be conducted as a “prima facie trial,” in which the prosecution was required only to present a prima facie showing of guilt and the defense would neither present evidence on defendant’s behalf nor cross-examine the prosecution witnesses. Concluding that such a “prima facie” proceeding was “the practical equivalent of a plea of guilty” (384 U.S. at p. 7 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 319]), the Brookhart court emphatically rejected the contention “that counsel for defendant can override his client’s desire expressed in open court to plead not guilty, and enter in the name of his client another plea—whatever the label—which would shut off the defendant’s constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him which he would have had an opportunity to do under a plea of not guilty.” (Id., at pp. 7-8 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 319].) Accordingly, the court reversed the defendant’s conviction. (See also People v. Wheeler (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 522 [67 Cal.Rptr. 246].)
[813]*813In People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205 [85 Cal.Rptr. 166, 466 P.2d 710], we recognized another fundamental decision over which the defendant, rather than his counsel, must properly have ultimate control. In Robles, a capital case, the defendant had insisted, over his attorneys’ objection, on testifying in his own behalf; on appeal, appellate counsel claimed that the trial court had erred in permitting such testimony on the ground that the decision whether to call defendant as a witness was a tactical decision within the province of trial counsel’s authority. In rejecting that contention, we explained: “Although ... an attorney representing a criminal defendant has the power to control the court proceedings [citations], that power may not be exercised to deprive a defendant of certain fundamental rights [citations]. [f] We are satisfied that the right to testify in one’s own behalf is of such fundamental importance that a defendant who timely demands to take the stand contrary to the advice given by his counsel has the right to give an exposition of his defense before a jury. [Citation.] The defendant’s insistence upon testifying may in the final analysis be harmful to his case, but the right is of such fundamental importance that every defendant should have it in a criminal case. Although normally the decision whether a defendant should testify is within the competence of the trial attorney [citation], where, as here, a defendant insists that he wants to testify, he cannot be deprived of that opportunity.” (2 Cal.3d at pp. 214-215.)
The Attorney General, noting that the facts here do not fall directly within the parameters of Brookhart, Robles, or any of the other decisions which have identified specific rights as within a defendant’s, rather than counsel’s, ultimate control (see, e.g., People v. Holmes (1960) 54 Cal.2d 442 [5 Cal.Rptr. 871, 353 P.2d 583] [right to jury trial]; Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 774, 781 [126 Cal.Rptr. 251, 543 P.2d 619] [right to speedy trial]; People v. Gauze (1975) 15 Cal.3d 709, 717 [125 Cal.Rptr. 773, 542 P.2d 1365] [right of competent defendant to refuse to enter insanity plea]), suggests that this case is analogous to the many decisions which have upheld an attorney’s control over matters of ordinary trial strategy, such as whether a particular witness should be called (see, e.g., People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 458 [99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1]), whether certain evidence should be introduced (see, e.g., People v. Murphy (1972) 8 Cal.3d 349, 366-367 [105 Cal.Rptr. 138, 503 P.2d 594]), whether an evidentiary objection should be interposed (People v. Lamphear (1980) 26 Cal.3d 814, 828 [163 Cal.Rptr. 601, 608 P.2d 689]), or whether a particular trial judge should be challenged. (People v. Jackson (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 307 [8 Cal.Rptr. 849].) In this regard, the Attorney General stresses that defense counsel’s decision to withhold any evidence of diminished capacity until the penalty phase was quite clearly based on counsel’s assessment of the best trial tactics to pursue.
[814]*814Although we have little doubt that trial counsel’s actions reflected his judgment as to the most promising trial strategy, the relevant precedents demonstrate that that factor alone does not defeat defendant’s claim. The decision whether or not a defendant should take the stand is often steeped in tactical considerations, yet Robles clearly establishes that counsel cannot override a defendant’s decision to testify in his own behalf. Similarly, the decision whether to plead guilty to a lesser offense also frequently reflects strategic concerns, but a defendant nonetheless retains personal control over such a plea. (See, e.g., People v. Rogers (1961) 56 Cal.2d 301, 305 [14 Cal.Rptr. 660, 363 P.2d 892].) Thus, although it is sometimes stated, as a rule of thumb, that matters of trial strategy and tactics rest exclusively within the discretion of counsel, the fact that the trial attorney’s action in this case was motivated by strategic considerations does not foreclose inquiry into whether the decision in question here was “of such fundamental importance” (Robles, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 215) that defendant’s wishes should have been respected.
Several considerations lead us to conclude that this case is qualitatively different from the bulk of decisions which have properly confirmed counsel’s broad control over “trial tactics,” and is instead analogous to those cases which have recognized the need to respect the defendant’s personal choice on the most “fundamental” decisions in a criminal case.
To begin with, as we recognized in Frierson I (25 Cal.3d at p. 163), the diminished capacity defense which defendant wanted his counsel to present was defendant’s sole defense to the special circumstance allegations. Although defense counsel cross-examined the prosecution witnesses and urged the jury in closing argument to return only a second degree murder conviction, the uncontradicted evidence before it virtually compelled a first degree felony-murder conviction. Furthermore, while the special circumstance charges required the People to prove the additional elements of premeditation and deliberation, in the absence of any defense evidence relating to defendant’s state of mind the jury was left without any evidentiary basis or legal theory to reject the special circumstances.2 Thus, while defense counsel never expressly conceded the case at the guilt/special circumstance stage, his decision not to present any defense at that stage virtually assured that the jury would find in favor of the prosecution on all issues.
Of course, trial counsel may well have had sound reasons to believe that defendant’s best chance of escaping the death penalty was to forego any attempt at defending the special circumstance allegations, since, if the de[815]*815fense had not succeeded, the evidence of diminished capacity—having failed to impress the jury once—might well have had less potency at the penalty phase. As a practical matter, however, the adoption of counsel’s strategy guaranteed that, at a minimum, defendant would face a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Although counsel may have felt that it was wisest to attempt to avoid the death penalty at all costs, defendant—whose fate was on the line—evidently had a different perspective, perhaps because he felt that a sentence of life without possibility of parole was not much preferable to a death sentence. Thus, defendant steadfastly maintained that he wanted to present a defense to the special circumstance charges, preserving his only hope of avoiding life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
Given the magnitude of the consequences that flowed from the decision whether or not to present any defense at the guilt/special circumstance phase, we do not think counsel could properly refuse to honor defendant’s clearly expressed desire to present a defense at that stage.3 Just as a defendant in an ordinary criminal case retains the right to refuse to plead guilty to a lesser offense even if his counsel is convinced that such a plea will lead to a lesser penalty, a defendant in a capital trial must also retain the right to have his only viable defense to the guilt or special circumstance charges presented at the initial stage of the trial.4 To paraphrase Robles, “[ajlthough [816]*816the defendant’s insistence [on the presentation of a defense at the guilt/ special circumstance stage] may in the final analysis be harmful to his case ... the right is of such importance that every defendant should have it . . . .” (2 Cal.3d at p. 215.)5
We recognize, of course, that a defendant’s right to insist that a defense be presented at the initial phase of the trial will inevitably impinge on defense counsel’s handling of the case. Such impingement on defense counsel’s actions, however, results any time a defendant chooses to exercise a personal right—such as the right to testify or the right to trial by jury-over counsel’s contrary advice. Numerous decisions explain that, in such a [817]*817situation, the attorney’s obligation is simply to provide the best representation that he can under the circumstances. (See, e.g., Robles, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 215; People v. McKenzie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616, 631 [194 Cal.Rptr. 462, 668 P.2d 769].)6 Further, the authorities also establish that when a defendant insists on a course of action despite his counsel’s contrary warning and advice, he may not later complain that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by complying with his wishes. (See, e.g., People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 852-853 [180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776]; People v. Gauze, supra, 15 Cal.3d 709, 718; Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 834-835, fn. 46 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 581]; cf. People v. Mozingo (1983) 34 Cal.3d 926, 934 [196 Cal.Rptr. 212, 671 P.2d 363] [defendant’s hostility to presentation of “mental defenses” did not relieve counsel of obligation to investigate such defenses so as to enable him to make an informed recommendation to defendant].)7
In light of the above conclusion, it is clear that in this case both defense counsel and the trial court misjudged the scope of the attorney’s authority to override defendant’s express wishes on a matter of fundamental [818]*818importance.8 As a consequence, defendant was deprived of the opportunity to present his only viable defense to the special circumstance allegations. Under these circumstances, the special circumstance findings and the subsequent penalty judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. Since defendant makes no claim that the evidence of diminished capacity which was withheld until the penalty phase could possibly have affected any matter other than the special circumstance findings, defendant’s convictions of first degree murder, assault with a deadly weapon, robbery and kidnaping, together with the accompanying enhancements, may stand.
The special circumstance findings and the penalty judgment are reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
Broussard, J., and Reynoso, J., concurred.