Opinion
BROWN, J.
In this case we consider whether the same analysis used to determine if multiple punishment is permitted under Penal Code1 section 6542 should be used to determine if consecutive sentencing is required by section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6) and (7) (subdivision (a)(6) and (7)).3 We conclude these analyses are not coextensive, and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
[589]*589I. Facts and Procedural Background
On November 26, 1995, at approximately 4 p.m., defendant David Deloza and an unidentified armed companion entered the Arroyo Furniture store in Highland Park. The gunman pointed the weapon at one of the salespersons, Rafael Gil, and defendant asked him where the money was. Gil pointed toward the assistant manager, Linda Gutierrez. Gutierrez stood up, opened the cash register, and stepped back. Defendant removed approximately $1,200 in cash. Defendant then unsuccessfully searched for additional money in several drawers. He approached another salesperson, Juan Lucataro, and demanded his wallet; defendant removed $200, and tossed the wallet to the ground. During all of this time, the gunman was pointing his weapon at Gil. Gil was then asked for and gave the gunman $10 from his wallet. A customer, Joyce Stinson, approached defendant, who she thought was a salesperson. Defendant demanded her purse. When she failed to immediately comply, he yanked the purse from her shoulder, and he and the gunman fled. The crime was captured on videotape, and defendant was positively identified by the four victims.
Defendant was convicted of four counts of second degree robbery (§ 211), and the allegation that he was armed with a firearm was found true on each count (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury also found true the allegations that defendant had suffered two prior serious felony convictions. The trial court sentenced him to state prison for four consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)), consecutive to a determinate term of one year for the arming enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)), and a determinate term of ten years for the prior serious felony conviction enhancements (§ 667, subd. (a)).
The Court .of Appeal affirmed, rejecting defendant’s argument that the trial court did not understand the scope of its discretion to impose concurrent sentences. The court stated, “A defendant who is punished under the three strikes law must generally be given consecutive sentences for each current serious felony conviction. [Citations.] The exceptions to the rule of mandatory consecutive sentences are when the current felonies were ‘committed on the same occasion’ or if they arose ‘from the same set of operative facts[.]’ ” The court concluded that because section 654’s proscription against multiple punishment is not applicable to crimes of violence (such as robbery) against [590]*590multiple victims, these exceptions to mandatory consecutive sentencing were inapplicable.
We granted defendant’s petition for review, and deferred further action pending consideration and disposition of related issues in People v. Hendrix, review granted September 25, 1996 (S055275), and People v. Nelson (Cal.App.). People v. Hendrix (1997) 16 Cal.4th 508 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 431, 941 P.2d 64] (Hendrix) was filed on August 18, 1997. We subsequently designated this case as the lead case in which to determine whether the same analysis used to determine if multiple punishment is permissible under section 654 should be used to determine if subdivision (a)(6) and (7) requires consecutive sentencing.
II. Discussion
A. Background
1. People v. Hendrix
In Hendrix, supra, 16 Cal.4th 508, the defendant pointed a gun at four people seated at a shopping mall table and demanded their money. Two complied. The defendant was subsequently convicted of two counts of robbery, and two counts of attempted robbery, and the allegations that the defendant personally used a firearm in committing each of these crimes were found true. (Id. at pp. 510-511.) “Defendant subsequently admitted three prior serious felony convictions.” (Id. at p. 511.) We held that consecutive sentences were not mandatory under the three strikes law. (Id. at p. 515.)
We first noted section 667, subdivision (c), provides that, “ ‘Notwithstanding any other law, if a defendant has been convicted of a felony and it has been pled and proved that, the defendant has one or more prior felony convictions as defined in subdivision (d), the court shall adhere to each of the following,’ ” including section 667, subdivision (c)(6) and (7). (Hendrix, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 512.) Subdivision (c), (c)(6) and (7), is virtually identical to section 1170.12, subdivision (a), (a)(6) and (7), at issue in this case.
Section 667, subdivision (c)(6), provides: “If there is a current conviction for more than one felony count not committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the same set of operative facts, the court shall sentence the defendant consecutively on each count pursuant to subdivision (e).” We concluded that section 667, subdivision (c)(6), applies to any current felony conviction. (Hendrix, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 512.) Moreover, subdivision [591]*591(c)(6) “provides that consecutive sentencing is mandatory for any current felony convictions ‘not committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the same set of operative facts.’ ” (16 Cal.4th at p. 512.) “By implication, consecutive sentences are not mandatory under subdivision (c)(6) if the multiple current felony convictions are ‘committed on the same occasion’ or ‘aris[e] from the same set of operative facts.’ ” (Id. at pp. 512-513.)
Section 667, subdivision (c)(7), provides: “If there is a current conviction for more than one serious or violent felony as described in paragraph (6), the court shall impose the sentence for each conviction consecutive to the sentence for any other conviction for which the defendant may be consecutively sentenced in the manner prescribed by law.” We concluded that section 667, subdivision (c)(7), “applies when there is more than one current serious or violent felony,” and that the reference to “paragraph (6)” in subdivision (c)(7) is to subdivision (c)(6). (Hendrix, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 513.) “So construed, ‘more than one serious or violent felony as described in paragraph (6)’ refers to multiple current convictions for serious or violent felonies ‘not committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the same set of operative facts.’ ” (Ibid.; see § 667, subd. (c)(6).) “Thus, when a defendant is convicted of two or more current serious or violent felonies ‘not committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the same set of operative facts,’ not only must the court impose the sentences for these serious or violent offenses consecutive to each other, it must also impose these sentences ‘consecutive to the sentence for any other conviction for which the defendant may be consecutively sentenced in the manner prescribed by law.’ By implication, consecutive sentences are not mandated under subdivision (c)(7) if all of the serious or violent current felony convictions are ‘committed on the same occasion’ or ‘aris[e] from the same set of operative facts.’ ” (Ibid., see § 667, subd. (c)(7).)
In Hendrix, the parties conceded that “all of the current serious and violent felony convictions were ‘committed on the same occasion.’ ” Hendrix, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 514; id. at p. 516 (cone. opn. of George, C. J.); id. at p. 519, fn. 2 (cone. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Therefore, section 667, subdivision (c)(7) did not mandate that the trial court impose consecutive sentences. Rather, we held the trial court retained discretion to impose either concurrent or consecutive sentences. (Hendrix, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 514.)
2. Section 654
Section 654 precludes multiple punishment for a single act or omission, or an indivisible course of conduct. (§ 654; People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873, 885 [135 Cal.Rptr. 654, 558 P.2d 552].) If, for example, a [592]*592defendant suffers two convictions, punishment for one of which is precluded by section 654, that section requires the sentence for one conviction to be imposed, and the other imposed and then stayed. (People v. Miller, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 886.) Section 654 does not allow any multiple punishment, including either concurrent or consecutive sentences. (In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 652-655 [56 Cal.Rptr. 110, 422 P.2d 998] [trial court erred in imposing concurrent sentences for two convictions for which section 654 prohibited multiple punishment].)
Section 654 does not, however, preclude multiple punishment when the defendant’s violent act injures different victims. (People v. Miller, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 885 [Even if “defendant entertained but a single principal objective during an indivisible course of conduct, he may nevertheless be punished for multiple convictions if during the course of that conduct he committed crimes of violence against different victims.”]; Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 20 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839] [“A defendant who commits an act of violence with the intent to harm more than one person or by a means likely to cause harm to several persons is more culpable than a defendant who harms only one person.”].) “Robbery is violent conduct warranting separate punishment for the injury inflicted on each robbery victim.” (People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 935 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93]; People v. Miller, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 886 [“robbery of a victim at gunpoint has been held to be an act of violence such as to preclude application of section 654 in the case of multiple convictions involving multiple victims”].)
B. Analysis
In Hendrix, we did not expressly discuss whether the analysis for determining if subdivision (a)(6) and (l)4 requires consecutive sentencing is coextensive with the analysis for determining if section 654 permits multiple punishment. This issue, to which we now turn, has divided the Courts of Appeal. On the one hand, certain courts have expressly concluded that the analyses are not coextensive; others have reached the same result without specifically focusing on the precise role of section 654. (People v. Bell (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 282, 285-286 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 415]; id. at p. 294 [simultaneous attempted robbery and robbery of two victims on the “same occasion”]; People v. Newsome (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 902, 912 [67 [593]*593Cal.Rptr.2d 438] [“We do not read section 667, subdivision (c)(7) to require consecutive sentences, unless section 654 bars multiple punishment, for all current serious felony convictions regardless of when they were committed.”]; People v. Cartwright (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1130-1131, 1140-1141 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 351] [trial court had discretion to impose consecutive sentences when current offenses committed at the same time against different victims].) •
On the other hand, some courts have held that the analysis for determining if subdivision (a)(6) and (7) requires consecutive sentencing is coextensive with the analysis for determining if section 654 permits multiple punishment, or have reached results that appear consistent with this approach. (People v. Ayon (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 385, 393 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 853] [“three strikes law contemplates consecutive sentencing for each of the current strikes except for situations that call for a section 654 analysis”]; People v. Carter (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 683, 685, 689 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 726] [Defendant “convicted of the premeditated attempted murders of three victims on a single occasion” could be consecutively sentenced under section 654 for each count; under “section 667, subdivision (c), he must be consecutively sentenced.”]; People v. McKee (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 540, 546 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 707] [“We believe that a traditional section 654 analysis is apposite in deciding whether multiple new felonies arise from the same set of ‘operative facts’ within the meaning of the ‘three strikes’ law.”]; People v. Martin (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 656, 664 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 776] [“same set of operative facts” provision “applies the principle of section 654 to multiple current crimes”]; id. at p. 663 [Defendant “concedes, as he must, that the same occasion prong does not apply in this case, since [defendant] committed separate shoplifts at separate stores on separate dates.”].)5
As noted above, here the Court of Appeal concluded that if section 654 did not preclude multiple punishment for defendant’s current convictions, [594]*594these convictions were not “committed on the same occasion,” and did “not aris[e] from the same set of operative facts.” The Attorney General urges us to adopt this reasoning. Defendant argues that the language “same occasion” should be given its ordinary meaning, that is, to refer to the temporal proximity between the defendant’s current crimes.
At the outset, we note that subdivision (a)(6) and (7) does not refer to section 654. Nor does the phrase “same occasion” in subdivision (a)(6) and (7) parallel either the language of section 654, which refers to an “act or omission,” or the language of cases interpreting section 654, which refer to an indivisible course of conduct and the defendant’s intent and objective. (People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1207-1208 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 144, 858 P.2d 611]; People v. Newsome, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 912.)
Indeed, section 654 is irrelevant to the question of whether multiple current convictions are sentenced concurrently or consecutively. Rather, if a defendant commits two crimes, punishment for one of which is precluded by section 654, that section requires the sentence for one conviction to be imposed, and the other imposed and then stayed. (People v. Miller, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 886.) Section 654 does not allow any multiple punishment, whether concurrent or consecutive. (In re Wright, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 655 [“multiple sentences [are] forbidden by section 654, whether consecutive or concurrent”].) Thus, the question of whether sentences should be concurrent or consecutive is separate from the question of whether section 654 prohibits multiple punishment. (People v. Norrell (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1, 14 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 429, 913 P.2d 458] (cone, and dis. opn. of Arabian, J.) superseded by statute [“Section 654, by its language, prohibits multiple punishment. That is all. It does not address the question of sentencing discretion. . . .”].)
Moreover, the legislative and initiative versions of the three strikes law are the only Penal Code sections that use the term ‘same occasion.” Nothing in either the language of subdivision (a)(6) and (7) or its legislative history suggests the electorate intended these words to have a special or peculiar import different from their ordinary, generally understood meaning. The phrase “committed on the same occasion” is commonly understood to refer to at least a close temporal and spatial proximity between two events, although it may involve other factors as well. Making mandatory consecutive sentences for those current crimes committed on different occasions is consistent with the focus of the three strikes law, which is recidivism. (Ballot Pamp., text of Prop. 184, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) p. 64 [The voters’ stated intent in enacting section 1170.12 was “to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have [595]*595been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses.”]; § 667, subd. (b); People v. Newsome, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 913.)
Accordingly, we conclude there are certain crimes that are “committed on the same occasion,” such as committing a violent crime against multiple victims, for which subdivision (a)(6) and (7) does not mandate consecutive sentencing, even though section 654 does not preclude multiple punishment.
The result in Hendrix is consistent with the conclusion that the analysis for determining if subdivision (a)(6) and (7) requires consecutive sentencing is not coextensive with the analysis for determining if section 654 permits multiple punishment. That is because section 654 does not apply to robbery and attempted robbery convictions involving multiple victims, the crimes at issue in Hendrix. Thus, if crimes “not committed on the same occasion” were crimes to which section 654 did not apply, and crimes committed on the “same occasion” were crimes to which section 654 did apply, consecutive sentences would have been mandatory in Hendrix because section 654 did not apply to the defendant’s crimes. We concluded, however, albeit based on the parties’ concession, that consecutive sentences were not mandatory.
The Attorney General further argues that “subdivision[] (a)(6) and (a)(7), applying to both second- and third-strike cases, should be read in conjunction with [section 1170.12] subdivision (c)(2)(B),6 which applies expressly to third-strike cases and refers to ‘any other term,’ thereby mandating consecutive sentences in third-strike cases as long as consecutive sentencing is permissible.” As he acknowledges, we rejected a similar argument in Hendrix, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pages 514-515. We see no reason to do otherwise here.
We conclude the analysis for determining whether subdivision (a)(6) and (7) requires consecutive sentencing is not coextensive with the analysis for determining whether section 654 permits multiple punishment. Rather, the term “same occasion” refers at least to a close temporal and spatial proximity between the acts underlying the current convictions. Here, defendant entered a furniture store, robbed four victims, and left. His robberies were committed in one location, and were apparently brief in duration. They were committed essentially simultaneously against the same group of victims, i.e., [596]*596persons in the furniture store. While Stinson approached defendant, his criminal activity was not thereby interrupted, but merely continued with her as an additional victim. Nor was there any other event that could be considered to separate one “occasion” of robbery from another. Given the close temporal and spatial proximity of defendant’s crimes against the same group of victims, they were clearly committed on the “same occasion,” regardless of what additional factors may be found relevant in defining the precise parameters of this phrase in future cases.7 Thus, even though section 654 would permit multiple punishment here, consecutive sentences were not mandated by subdivision (a)(6) and (7). Assuming consecutive sentences were not required under a statute other than the three strikes law, a point not addressed by the Attorney General, the trial court therefore retained discretion to impose either concurrent or consecutive sentences.8
In the alternative, the Attorney General argues that even assuming the phrase “same occasion” does not incorporate the principles embodied in section 654, defendant’s robberies still did not occur on the “same occasion.” In particular, the Attorney General argues that the language “not committed on the same occasion” should be interpreted to have the same meaning as the phrase “separate occasions” in section 667.6, subdivision (d).
At the time séction 1170.12 was enacted in 1994, section 667.6, subdivision (d), provided (and continues to provide) in relevant part, “A full, separate, and consecutive term shall be served for each violation of [certain sex offenses] if the crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions. HD In determining whether crimes against a single victim were committed on separate occasions under this subdivision, the court shall consider whether, between the commission of one sex crime and another, the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to reflect upon his [597]*597or her actions and nevertheless resumed sexually assaultive behavior. Neither the duration of time between crimes, nor whether or not the defendant lost or abandoned his or her opportunity to attack, shall be, in and of itself, determinative on the issue of whether the crimes in question occurred on separate occasions.” As the Attorney General notes, section 667.6, subdivision (d), was amended to add the test for determining whether crimes were committed on “separate occasions” in response to this court’s decision in People v. Craft (1986) 41 Cal.3d 554 [224 Cal.Rptr. 626, 715 P.2d 585]. Craft held that crimes are “committed on separate occasions only when they are separated by a period in which the defendant has lost or abandoned his opportunity to continue his attack.” (Id. at p. 562; Stats. 1986, ch. 1431, § 2, p. 5129 [“It is the intent of the Legislature ... to abrogate the decision in People v. Craft [citation], and to establish an objective test for determining whether sex crimes against a single victim occurred on separate occasions.”].)
The Attorney General asserts that since both section 667.6, subdivision (d), and subdivision (a)(6) and (7) “share similar language, their meanings should be consistent. . . . Accordingly, ... the analysis becomes whether the defendant had ‘a reasonable opportunity to reflect’ between the committed offenses. . . . [I]t becomes a factual finding as to the intent and objectives of'the defendant. . . .” “Thus, the appropriate analysis is still very similar to the principles appropriate for a finding of separate intents or objectives under section 654.” Here, the Attorney General argues, “the present offenses were not legally committed on the same occasion. . . . Clearly, [defendant] had a reasonable opportunity to reflect upon his actions between the robberies and nevertheless pursued additional victims.”
At the outset, we note that the language of section 667.6, subdivision (d), which requires “A full, separate, and consecutive term ... for each violation of [certain sex offenses] if the crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions,” demonstrates that the Legislature, and presumably the electorate, knew how to mandate consecutive sentences when there are, as in this case, separate victims to a crime. (People v. Newsome, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 912.)
Moreover, it is not clear how helpful the term “separate occasions,” as defined in section 667.6, subdivision (d), is in interpreting the phrase “not committed on the same occasion” in subdivision (a)(6) and (7). In addition to section 667.6, subdivision (d), at the time section 1170.12 was enacted, the Legislature had used the term “separate occasions” in numerous other [598]*598statutes in the Penal and other codes.9 It is apparent that these statutes do not consistently use the term “separate occasions” to refer to either the intent and objective of the defendant or the temporal proximity between the relevant events. Thus, even if the electorate intended the term “not committed on the same occasion” to have the same meaning as the phrase “separate occasions,” it is not clear “separate occasions” has a consistent meaning. In particular, it is not at all clear the electorate was focusing on the meaning of that term as used in section 667.6, subdivision (d). Nothing in the ballot pamphlet or even the legislative history of the Legislature’s version of the three strikes law supports such a conclusion.
For example, as noted above, former section 186.22, subdivision (e), provided that a “ ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’ ” means the commission, attempted commission, or solicitation of certain offenses, “provided ... the offenses are committed on separate occasions, or by two or more persons.” We have recently interpreted this language to mean that there must be “evidence of ‘two or more’ predicate offenses committed ‘on separate occasions’ or by evidence of such offenses committed ‘by two or more persons’ on the same occasion.’ ” (People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 10 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776, 947 P.2d 1313], fn. omitted, last italics added.) In Loeun, we concluded that “when the prosecution chooses to establish the requisite ‘pattern’ by evidence of ‘two or more’ predicate offenses committed on a single occasion by ‘two or more persons,’ it can . . . rely on evidence of the defendant’s commission of the charged offense and the contemporaneous commission of a second predicate offense by a fellow gang member.” (Ibid., italics added.) In so doing, we observed that “the [599]*599commission of two acts violating the same penal provision (for example, two robberies) would satisfy the statutory requirement of ‘two or more’ predicate offenses so long as the robberies satisfied the further statutory requirement of having been committed ‘on separate occasions, or by two or more persons.’ ” {Id. at p. 10, fn. 4.) While we were not addressing in Loeun the precise question of whether the language “separate occasions” in former section 186.22 referred to the meaning of “separate occasions” in section 667.6, subdivision (d), nothing in Loeun suggests such an interpretation. Rather, we appeared to make a distinction between crimes occurring seconds apart and involving two assailants, as in Loeun, and crimes not in close temporal and spatial proximity to one another. {People v. Loeun, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 6,10, 14.) We did not examine whether the “defendant had a reasonable opportunity to reflect upon his or her actions.” (§ 667.6, subd. (d); see In re Elodio O. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1180 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 95] [“prosecution adequately established a pattern of criminal activity by proving the commission of both the robbery and the assault with a deadly weapon . . . during a single incident involving multiple participants”]; In re Nathaniel C. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 990, 1003 [279 Cal.Rptr. 236] [“The use of the disjunctive in defining ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’ means a pattern can be established by two or more incidents, each with a single perpetrator, or by a single incident with multiple participants committing one or more of the specified offenses.”]; but see In re Jose T. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1455, 1462 [282 Cal.Rptr. 75] [“Although ‘separate occasions’ is not defined in section 186.22, subdivision (e). . . we may look to section 667.6, subdivision (d), for guidance.”].)
Of course, we need not definitively construe the meaning of the language “separate occasions” in former section 186.22 in this case. We discuss cases interpreting that statute merely to illustrate that reference to the term “separate occasions,” and in particular section 667.6, subdivision (d)’s definition of that term, is of only marginal assistance under these circumstances in construing the meaning of the phrase “not committed on the same occasion.” Here, the crimes were so closely related in time and space, and committed against the same group of victims, that these factors alone compel us to conclude they occurred on the “same occasion.” Hence, consecutive sentences were not mandatory under subdivision (a)(6) and (7).
We now turn to the issue of whether the trial court understood the scope of its discretion to impose either concurrent or consecutive sentences. The trial court imposed four consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life for the robbery convictions, stating, “I have very little discretion here. We have discretion in Romero . . . to do away with the prior when that would be an injustice [szc] to do so. Here it would neither be in the interest of justice to [600]*600strike a so-called strike and it would be abusive of the court’s discretion, in my opinion .... In short, Mr. Deloza, unfortunately, you are the fellow that they had in mind when they passed this law. You have committed crime unabated since your youth. You are still fairly young . . . . You would not stop and did not stop and you kept on, kept on, kept on, regardless of what they did to you. You have been up to the joint twice, and that did not do you good. This is the one. It will be a crushing sentence, but it would be unlawful for me to proceed in any other fashion. As to count 1, the sentence of the court is as follows: He is sentenced, as prescribed by law[,] 25[] to life . . . In addition to and consecutive to that term, as to counts 2, 3 and 4, the sentences are 25 to life. They must run consecutive to the term imposed on count 1 ... T
It is clear that the trial court recognized it had discretion to strike a prior felony conviction pursuant to section 1385, and expressly declined to do so. The italicized language indicates, however, that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion to impose concurrent sentences for defendant’s current convictions, and erroneously believed consecutive sentences were mandatory. Therefore, the case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
Conclusion
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the court directed to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.10
George, C. J., Mosk, J., Kennard, J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., and Chin, J., concurred.