JUSTICE RIZZI
delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendants James Curtis and Andrew Ryder were found guilty of armed robbery in a bench trial. We reverse the convictions and remand for a new trial because of the violation of defendants’ sixth amendment right to counsel after adversarial judicial proceedings had been initiated against them and because of the exploitation of the results of that constitutional violation at trial.
On July 18, 1979, two men entered a liquor store at about 10 p.m., near closing time. They pretended to be customers and then wielded guns and removed a gun from a part-time security guard, Fred Kennie. They also took money and checks from the store manager, Thomas Buckle, a cashier, Rosalind Harris, and another employee, Gregory Webb. The entire incident lasted from 15 minutes to a half hour. After the robbery, the police were called and Buckle related that the robbers were a white man and a black man. Buckle also gave a general description of the robbers to the police.
Nineteen months later, in early February of 1981, Kennie informed the police that he was a participant in the robbery and that his accomplices were defendants Ryder and Curtis. On February 10, 1981, two arrays of five photographs were shown to Buckle. One array included a photograph of Ryder, and the other array included a photograph of Curtis. According to the testimony of a police officer, Buckle made a tentative identification of Ryder from the first array. The same police officer testified, however, that Buckle was not sure and that, in effect, he wanted to see the man in the photograph in person before he made a positive identification. After looking at the second array of five photographs Buckle said, “this one here resembled” Curtis.
On February 11, 1981, an array of five photographs, which included a photograph of Ryder, was shown to Harris. She stated that the photograph of Ryder “looked like the guy” she saw in the store. After being shown another array of five photographs, which included a photograph of Curtis, she stated, “I thought this was the picture of the black guy.”
On February 17, 1981, felony complaints were prepared and submitted before a judge of the circuit court, naming Ryder and Curtis as defendants. The complaints charged defendants with armed robbery. After conducting a hearing, the judge determined that there was probable cause for filing the complaints. He gave the assistant State’s Attorney leave to file the complaints, and he issued arrest warrants.
At about 5 p.m. on the same day, Ryder was arrested pursuant to the warrant and taken to the area police station. He requested an attorney and declined to give a statement until he talked to his attorney. He telephoned his attorney, and he was told not to give any statements. Also, Ryder’s attorney testified that he told a police officer on the telephone that he was in the process of working on another matter, but that he would appear at the police station and represent Ryder and he would attend a proposed lineup involving Ryder. About an hour and 15 minutes later, around 8:30 p.m., before the attorney arrived at the police station and without a waiver from Ryder, a lineup which included Ryder was conducted at the police station. Ryder’s attorney appeared at the police station at 11 p.m., but the lineup had already taken place.
At the lineup, Buckle identified Ryder as one of the robbers. Ryder was the only person in the lineup who was in the array of five photographs that had been shown to Buckle seven days earlier on February 10,1981.
Curtis was also arrested on February 17, 1981. After his arrest, he was taken to the same area police station but he did not arrive there until about 6:45 p.m. At the police station, when he was read his Miranda warnings and asked if he wanted to give a statement, he said: “I told them no, until I see my attorney.” When he was asked if he wanted to call an attorney, he said: “I told them I had three attorneys and I didn’t know which one to call at that time of night, whether they’d be in the office or not.” Later, he attempted to call two of the lawyers but he was not able to reach them because no one answered the phone calls. About one-half hour to one hour later, Curtis was taken to a room where he was told, “[Y]ou’re going to have to be in a lineup and *** to stand where I wanted to.” Curtis did not voluntarily participate in the lineup. He was told he “had to stand the lineup.”
At the lineup, Buckle told the police that Curtis “resembled the man.” At no time did Curtis tell anyone that he did not want an attorney or that he waived his right to an attorney. An assistant State’s Attorney was present during the lineup involving Curtis, as well as during the lineup involving Ryder.
The police officer who arrested Curtis testified that after he read Curtis the Miranda warnings in an interview room at the police station, the following occurred:
“A. I told him there is going to be a lineup in about an hour or two and that there’d be several people viewing the lineup and he had the right to contact an attorney.
Q. What did he say to that?
A. He stated he had three attorneys and didn’t know which one he wanted to call, and I offered him the phone to call all three if he wished.
Q. What did he say to that?
A. He stated he wanted to wait and see what happened. Meaning, I assume, he meant after the lineup. I don’t know.
Q. Okay. So did he make any calls at that time?
A. He did make some phone calls.
Q. Do you know who to?
A. No.
Q. Did he tell you anything after that?
A. No.
Q. Okay. By the way, did he indicate whether he wanted to give any statement when you advised him of his Miranda warnings?
A. Right after he was advised of his rights he declined to give any statement at all.”
Curtis was then taken to another room. While he was in that room, a second police officer stepped inside the room and began conversing with Curtis. As to what occurred, the police officer testified:
“Q. What, if anything, did he say to you, what, if anything did you say to him?
A. I believe, first, I remarked about not looking like his picture. And, I told him who I was. And, I was working on the case. And, I asked him if he had been advised of his rights.
He said he had. And, he had already been advised of his rights. And, I told him that Mr. Ryder had been arrested. And also that Mr. [Kennie] had been arrested in this matter. And that he would have to stand a line-up. And, I asked him if he had an Attorney. And, advised him that Mr. Ryder had an Attorney. And he said that he had three Attorneys.
Now, on the three Attorneys he had, he used them, apparently, in some business deals or what have you, before. But, he informed me that he did not want to make a phone call. And, did not want to talk to one of the Attorneys, because — as he said — he was “gonna play it by ear” at that time. And, he didn’t know who he was going to use as an Attorney. Because he had three of them that he had dealt -with in the past.
Q. So, did he make any phone calls, at all, in your presence?
A. He made no phone calls. At that time, I asked him did he want one and he did not.”
On February 19, 1981, Harris, who had not attended the lineups, saw a picture of Ryder and Curtis in a newspaper which reported that they had been arrested for the robbery. On February 23, 1981, police officers visited Harris and showed her photographs of the lineups that had been taken on February 17, 1981. She viewed the lineup photographs and stated that Curtis and Ryder were the “guys that [were] at the store.”
The trial took place more than four years after the robbery. Except as stated, neither Buckle nor Harris had seen or viewed defendants in the interim period. At trial, defendants filed motions to suppress the lineup identifications that had been made by Buckle. The court allowed the motion to suppress as to Ryder on the basis that the lineup identification had occurred without assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment. However, the court denied the motion to suppress as to Curtis on the basis that he had waived his right to assistance of counsel at the lineup.
At trial, over the objections of defendants, the court allowed Buckle and Harris to make in-court identifications of defendants. Defendants objected on the basis that the in-court identifications were the result of the unconstitutionally obtained lineup identifications and that, therefore, they should have been suppressed. In addition, over the objections of defendants, the prosecutor showed Harris the lineup photographs at trial, and Harris testified that she had seen the lineup photographs on February 23, 1981, and that she had identified defendants at that time. The lineup photographs were then admitted into evidence.
A critical issue in this case involves an accused’s sixth amendment right “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” (U.S. Const., amend. VI.) Specifically, defendants argue that their constitutional right to counsel at the lineups was violated and, therefore, the lineup evidence and the in-court identifications of defendants at trial should have been suppressed. The State counters that the lineup evidence and the in-court identifications were proper “as no right to counsel had attached at the time of the lineup[s] since no adversarial [judicial] proceedings had been initiated.”1
In addressing the issue, we first observe what the United States Supreme Court said in Gilbert v. California: “We there held [in United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S. Ct. 1926] that a post-indictment pretrial lineup at which the accused is exhibited to identifying witnesses is a critical stage of the criminal prosecution; that police conduct of such a lineup without notice to and in the absence of his counsel denies the accused his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and calls in question the admissibility at trial of the in-court identifications of the accused by witnesses who attended the lineup.” Gilbert v. California (1967), 388 U.S. 263, 272, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178, 1186, 87 S. Ct. 1951,1956.
Subsequent to the Gilbert decision, the United States Supreme Court decided Kirby v. Illinois (1972), 406 U.S. 682, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 92 S. Ct. 1877. In Kirby, the court held that an accused’s sixth amendment right to counsel attaches at or after the time that adversarial judicial proceedings have been initiated against him “by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” Kirby v. Illinois (1972), 406 U.S. 682, 689, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 417, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 1882, quoted in Moore v. Illinois (1977), 434 U.S. 220, 226, 54 L. Ed. 2d 424, 432, 98 S. Ct. 458, 464. See also United States v. Gouveia (1984), 467 U.S. 180, 187-88, 81 L. Ed. 2d 146, 153-54, 104 S. Ct. 2292, 2297; People v. Martin (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 412, 419, 466 N.E.2d 228, 231.
With this background, we focus on the question of whether at the time of the lineups in the present case, adversarial judicial proceedings had already been initiated against defendants “by way of formal charge.” We believe that the answer lies in an examination of the standard criminal procedures that are followed in Illinois and which were followed in this case.
Prosecutions are commenced by a complaint, an information, or an indictment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 111 — 1.) When an arrest warrant is sought in a felony case, a felony complaint is presented by an assistant State’s Attorney to a judge in the circuit court. In addition to naming the State as the plaintiff, the felony complaint names the accused as a defendant and charges that he has committed a specified felony offense. The judge must examine under oath the complainant and any witnesses presented by the assistant State’s Attorney. If it appears to the judge, from his examination of the complainant and witnesses presented by the assistant State’s Attorney and the contents of the complaint, that the person charged committed the offense, the judge will approve the filing of the complaint naming the person charged as the defendant, and the judge will issue a warrant for the defendant’s arrest.2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 107-9.
Plainly, after the complaint is filed, the person charged has ceased being merely an accused, and he has, in fact, in every respect become a formal defendant in need of an attorney to protect his interests as a citizen at any subsequent critical stage of the criminal proceedings that are brought against him by the State. Here, we must also bear in mind that it is after this stage that the defendant may file motions to suppress or to quash the formal charges that are made against him in the complaint.3 Also, we note that “a complaint” is expressly included in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 under sections entitled “Form of charge” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 111 — 3), and “Formal defects in a charge” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 111 — 5). Thus, it would be incongruous to conclude that after a felony complaint is judicially approved and filed in the circuit court, adversarial judicial proceedings have not been commenced against a defendant “by way of formal charge.” See Moore v. Illinois (1977), 434 U.S. 220, 226, 54 L. Ed. 2d 424, 432, 98 S. Ct. 458, 464, quoting Kirby v. Illinois (1972), 406 U.S. 682, 689, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 417, 92 S. Ct. 1877,1882.
Accordingly, we believe that adversarial judicial proceedings by way of formal charge in felony cases commence after the filing of a felony complaint in the circuit court.4 If it were otherwise, the use of the pertinent term “formal charge” in Kirby to designate when adversarial judicial proceedings have been initiated would be meaningless, for the term would not be distinguished from “preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” Moore v. Illinois (1977), 434 U.S. 220, 226, 54 L. Ed. 2d 424, 432, 98 S. Ct. 458, 464, quoting Kirby v. Illinois (1972), 406 U.S. 682, 689, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 417, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 1882.
Under the circumstances, since we believe that adversarial judicial proceedings had already been initiated against defendants before the lineups took place, we conclude that their sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel had already attached at the time of the lineups. This being so, defendants had a constitutional entitlement to the presence of counsel at the lineups because it is firmly established that a lineup is a critical stage of the criminal proceedings against a defendant. United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218, 227-37, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 1157-63, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1932-38; Gilbert v. California (1967), 388 U.S. 263, 272, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178, 1186, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 1956; Moore v. Illinois (1977), 434 U.S. 220, 229-32, 54 L. Ed. 2d 424, 434-36, 98 S. Ct. 458, 465-66.
As to Ryder, he was placed in a lineup without having counsel present to protect his interests at the lineup. Thus, the trial court properly suppressed the pretrial lineup identification of him that was made by Buckle.
As to Curtis, the trial court ruled that he waived his constitutional right to assistance of counsel at the lineup. We disagree. A waiver is an intentional abandonment of a known right. Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. 2d 1461, 1466, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023; People v. Swift (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 361, 364, 414 N.E.2d 895, 898.) This precept must be applied here with utmost scrutiny, for fundamental constitutional rights, such as the right to assistance of counsel, were paid for too dearly to be lost unwittingly by any citizen. Thus, before we can conclude that Curtis intelligently waived his constitutional right to assistance of counsel at the lineup, we must determine whether he knew of the existence of that right in a very real sense. Accordingly, we must determine whether he knew under the circumstances in which he found himself that the police could not demand that he appear at the lineup without assistance of counsel.
The circumstances under which Curtis found himself are not common to the average citizen.5 He was under arrest and at a police station between the hours of 7 and 8 p.m. When he was given Miranda warnings, he responded by saying that he did not want to give a statement until “I see my attorney.” A police officer testified that after Curtis was advised of his rights, “he declined to give any statement at all.” Curtis had three lawyers who had represented him in business matters in the past, but he did not know which one to call at that time of night because they probably would not be in their offices. The police officer told Curtis that he was going to have to be part of a lineup and that “he had the right to contact an attorney.” The police officer stated that when he offered Curtis the phone to call his attorneys, Curtis said that he wanted to wait and see what happened. Curtis then called two of the lawyers that had represented him in the past, but no one answered the phone calls. Later, Curtis was taken to another interview room, where a second police officer told him “that he would have to stand a line-up.” It is unrebutted that all of this happened after Curtis had unequivocally told the police that he did not want to give any statement until he saw his lawyer.6 The second police officer then asked Curtis if he had an attorney, and Curtis told him that he had three attorneys, but did not know which one he was going to use and he would “play it by ear” at that time. This response by Curtis was made after he had already phoned two attorneys but was not able to reach them because it was nighttime, and they were not in their offices.
In its argument to establish a waiver of counsel, the State relies upon the first police officer’s statement that when he offered Curtis the phone to call his attorneys, Curtis said that he wanted to wait and see. The State also relies upon the second police officer’s statement that Curtis said he was “gonna play it by ear.” However, the crucible for determining whether there was a waiver of one’s constitutional right to counsel is plainly not solely the words attributed to a defendant by a police officer. (See People v. Dailey (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 239, 241, 282 N.E.2d 129, 130.) Here, Curtis’ words were not uttered in a vacuum, and we should not view them in that manner. Rather, we must look to the facts and circumstances surrounding his words to determine whether he uttered them as an intentional abandonment of a constitutional right that was known to him.
In this regard, since the right to assistance of counsel is a fundamental constitutional right, we must indulge in every reasonable presumption that Curtis did not waive the right, and we cannot presume acquiescence in the loss of the right.7 (Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 1466, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023.) Moreover, although the trial court need not be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt when considering the issue of waiver, we must bear in mind that the State has the burden of proof on the issue. (People v. Swift (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 361, 364, 414 N.E.2d 895, 898.) The State’s burden to establish a waiver of the right to counsel has been described as a “heavy burden.” People v. Taylor (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 289, 310-11, 391 N.E.2d 366, 375-76.
In the present case, we believe the facts plainly manifest that under the circumstances in which he found himself, Curtis did not know that the police could not demand that he appear at the lineup without assistance of counsel. Rather, it was made to appear as if his participation in the lineup that night, with or without counsel, was inevitable. We also believe that the facts and circumstances surrounding Curtis’ answers to the police officers strongly militate against the conclusion that Curtis intentionally abandoned a constitutional right that was known to him. (Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019; People v. Swift (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 361, 414 N.E.2d 895; People v. Taylor (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 289, 391 N.E.2d 366.) 8 Thus, applying the waiver principles to the facts before us, we conclude that the trial court’s ruling that Curtis waived his constitutional right to counsel at the lineup is against the manifest weight of the evidence. See People v. Martin (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 412, 426, 466 N.E.2d 228, 234.
In addition, before the conversations on which the State relies to establish a waiver took place, Curtis had already told the police that he did not want to give any statements until he saw his lawyer. In our view, once Curtis asserted his right to counsel, the police were obligated not to initiate any conversation with him concerning a critical stage of the criminal proceedings against him until he had a reasonable time to make contact with his counsel, or at the very least, until he was furnished with substitute counsel. (See United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218, 237, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 1163, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1937-38.) Instead, after Curtis had asserted his right to counsel, the police readied him for the lineups and initiated the conversations with him on which the State relies to establish a waiver of assistance of counsel. We believe that the conversations were improperly initiated by the police. By way of comparison, in a fifth amendment right to counsel setting, the United States Supreme Court held that once a suspect in custody asserts his right to counsel, he “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” (Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1884-85; see also Smith v. Illinois (1984), 469 U.S. 91, 83 L. Ed. 2d 488, 105 S. Ct. 490.) If the authorities initiate further communications, exchanges, or conversations with the defendant, any information or waiver resulting therefrom would be unconstitutionally obtained. (People v. Hammock (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 874, 879-80, 460 N.E.2d 378, 382.) We see no reason why the pertinent rationale and holdings in Edwards and Smith should not apply in a sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel setting in regard to communications, exchanges, or conduct involving a critical stage of the criminal proceedings against the defendant. Rights and guarantees afforded by the Bill of Rights cannot be made the subject of an endurance test. (See People v. Smith (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 365, 378, 466 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Simon, J., dissenting), majority rev’d sub nom. Smith v. Illinois (1984), 469 U.S. 91, 83 L. Ed. 2d 488, 105 S. Ct. 490; People v. Hammock (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 874, 879-80, 460 N.E.2d 378, 382-83.) This fact can be stated judicially without reservation, for it is plainly ingrained in our American ideals.
Accordingly, not only do we conclude that the trial court’s ruling that Curtis waived his constitutional right to assistance of counsel at the lineup is against the manifest weight of the evidence, but we also conclude that under the circumstances any waiver of that right would have been unconstitutionally obtained. Cf. Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386-87, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1884-85; People v. Hammock (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 874, 879-80, 460 N.E.2d 378, 382-83.
Next, the State, relying upon Wade, takes the position that even if defendants’ constitutional right to counsel was violated at the lineup and there was no waiver, no error occurred at trial because there was an independent basis for the in-court identifications made by Buckle and Harris. In Wade, the court held that if the prosecution established by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification is based upon observations of the suspect other than from the lineup identification, then the in-court identification is permissible, (United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218, 239-42, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 1164-66, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1939-40.) However, in Wade, unlike the present case, the prosecution did not elicit from the witnesses the fact that they had identified the defendant at the lineup, and there was no evidence of the lineup itself introduced at trial. See Moore v. Illinois (1977), 434 U.S. 220, 225-26, 54 L. Ed. 2d 424, 431-32, 98 S. Ct. 458, 463.
Here, the prosecutor opportunistically elicited testimony from Buckle that he had identified defendants at the lineups, which were held in violation of defendants’ constitutional rights. Moreover, the prosecutor showed Harris the lineup photographs at trial and elicited testimony from Harris that she had seen the lineup photographs on February 23, 1981, and identified defendants at that time from the lineup photographs. The lineup photographs were then admitted into evidence. Plainly, this testimony and evidence were the direct results of the unconstitutional lineups, obtained by the prosecutor’s exploitation of the primary illegality. The testimony and evidence should therefore have been prohibited without regard to whether the prosecution was able to prove that the pretrial identifications or the in-court identifications had an independent source.
Moreover, only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony and evidence can be an efficacious sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will respect an accused’s constitutional right to assistance of counsel at all critical stages after adversarial judicial proceedings have been commenced against him. (Moore v. Illinois (1977), 434 U.S. 220, 231-32, 54 L. Ed. 2d 424, 435-36, 98 S. Ct. 458, 466; Gilbert v. California (1967), 388 U.S. 263, 272-74, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178, 1186-87, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 1956-57.) Thus, in the present case, the State was not entitled to show that the testimony and other evidence of the pretrial identifications, or the in-court identifications, had an independent source.
Under the circumstances, a question arises as to whether we are able to declare a belief that the violation of defendants’ sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 24, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710-11, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828; Moore v. Illinois (1977), 434 U.S. 220, 232, 54 L. Ed. 2d 424, 436, 98 S. Ct. 458, 466; Gilbert v. California (1967), 388 U.S. 263, 274, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1168, 1187, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 1957.) We conclude that we cannot make such a declaration.
In this regard, we first observe that Webb, who was present throughout the robbery and presumably could have made an identification of the robbers, was not called as a witness by the State. In addition, while Webb witnessed lineups which included defendants right after the lineup witnessed by Buckle on the night of February 18, 1981, the record is silent as to whether Webb identified either of the defendants at those lineups. Here, we note that although an assistant State’s Attorney was present at the lineups, defendants did not have counsel present to observe or perhaps memorialize Webb’s responses or reactions at the lineups.
Since the State did not call Webb as a witness, the only witness to identify defendants besides Buckle and Harris was Kennie. However, while Kennie’s testimony may be true, it is subject to reasonable doubt. In February 1981, 19 months after the robbery, Kennie first named defendants as the robbers. At the time, in addition to his part-time security job at the liquor store, he was working full-time for the Chicago fire department as an emergency medical technician. He had worked for the Chicago fire department for 10 or 12 years. Kennie testified that in February 1981, Ryder was a captain in the Chicago fire department assigned to the Internal Affairs Division. Kennie also testified that in February 1981, he knew that Ryder and the IAD were investigating him for stealing money from dead people and sick people in fire department ambulances. Kennie testified that he knew that if the charges against him which Ryder was investigating at the time were proved, then he would lose his job with the Chicago fire department.
There are other aspects of Kennie’s testimony that are worth noting. According to Kennie’s own testimony, he had “an agreement with the People of the State of Illinois” relative to his testimony at trial. The agreement was that the State would recommend that he receive minimum concurrent sentences for an armed robbery charge and a forgery charge then pending against him. In addition, Kennie had a possession-of-controlled-substance charge pending, which, under Kennie’s agreement with the State in the present case, the State would nol-pros or dismiss. Kennie’s agreement with the State in the present case also included a disposition of two counts of deceptive practice charges pending against him for cashing worthless checks.
We believe that Kennie’s agreements with the State relative to his testimony at trial, his history of criminality and the circumstances under which his “cooperation” with the State arose seriously impugn his testimony and subject it to reasonable doubt.9 Thus, in reality, this case may have hinged on the weight that was given to the identifications that were made by Buckle and Harris. As to these two witnesses, not only did the prosecutor expediently buttress their in-court identifications with the unlawful lineup identifications and the pretrial identifications that had been made with the use of the lineup photographs, but he also put into evidence the unlawful lineup photographs themselves. The prosecutor’s wrongful enhancement of the identifications made by Buckle and Harris is clearly significant, because (1) neither Buckle nor Harris had ever seen defendants before the robbery, (2) more than 19 months had elapsed from the time of the robbery until Buckle and Harris first saw photographs of defendants, (3) Buckle and Harris’ initial identifications from the photographs were not absolutely certain, according to the police officer, (4) Harris had seen photographs of defendants in a newspaper account of defendants’ arrest for the robbery only four days before she identified defendants in the lineup photographs, and (5) except for the unlawful lineup identifications by Buckle 19 months after the robbery, neither Buckle nor Harris had seen defendants in person for more than four years, from the time of the robbery until the trial.
We conclude that for all of the reasons that we have stated, we cannot declare a belief that the violation of defendants’ sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel at the lineups and the exploitation of that violation by the prosecutor were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the convictions must be reversed.
One other issue is raised by defendants. They contend that the State failed in its burden to prove that the robbers were armed with dangerous weapons as required by the armed robbery statute. We find this contention to be totally without merit, and it does not warrant any discussion.
Accordingly, we reverse the convictions and remand the case for a new trial because of the violation of defendants’ sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel after adversarial judicial proceedings had been initiated against them and because of the exploitation of the results of that constitutional violation at trial.
Reversed and remanded.