VALLÉE, J.
By information defendant was accused of the murder of Raymond Whiteside. In a non jury trial the court found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced him to state prison. He appeals from the judgment.
Defendant’s contention is that the finding of guilt of manslaughter is unsupported by the evidence and is contrary to law. He asserts the evidence, as a matter of fact and law, is insufficient to prove manslaughter; to the contrary, the evidence establishes a justifiable homicide under Penal Code, section 197. Since we have concluded that defendant’s contention is well taken, it is necessary to state all the pertinent evidence.
Raymond Whiteside at the time of his death was living in a room at the Eugene Hotel, 560 Stanford Avenue, Los Angeles. The hotel was owned by Katsuske Shishima. Joseph Poirier lived across the hall from the deceased. Between 6 and 6 :30 p. m. on February 24, 1960, a Wednesday, Mr. Poirier saw defendant and Whiteside at the latter’s door. Whiteside “was carrying something like a bundle under his arm wrapped in brown paper.” Defendant “was carrying a bag. It looked like a jumbo bottle of beer.” About 9 a. m. on February 26 Mr. Shishima went to Whiteside’s room to clean it. Whiteside was lying on his back, partly across the side of the bed; his feet were on the floor. He was nude below the waist, except his socks were on. His genital organs were exposed. There was blood around his mouth. There were two empty bottles on the bed, one on each side of Whiteside; one of them appeared to be a broken catsup bottle; the other appeared to be an empty jumbo beer bottle. There was another bottle on the floor.
Mr. Poirier, called by the People, testified: The morning of the 26th Mr. Shishima called him and he went into White-side’s room. He felt Whiteside’s wrist; there was no pulse; the body was “real cold.”
Donavan Cullings of the Los Angeles Police Department, called by the People, testified: On March 1, 1960, with his partner Officer Hanson present, he had a conversation with defendant. The statements made by defendant were free and voluntary. “I asked the defendant if he knew Raymond Whiteside. He said yes. I asked him if he had a fight with Raymond and he said no. I asked him how Raymond looked when he left after visiting with him Wednesday night, February 24, and he said he was sitting on the bed. That is about the substance of the first conversation.” On March 2 he had a second conversation with defendant. The same persons were present. The statements made by defendant were free and voluntary. The conversation, as testified to by Officer Cullings, was as follows: “I asked the defendant if he knew Raymond Whiteside and he said yes. He said, ‘I might as well tell you what happened on Wednesday night.’ He said, ‘I met Raymond on East Fifth Street and told him I was hungry.’ Raymond wanted to buy the defendant a drink and defendant said no, he was hungry. Raymond said, ‘If you will come up to my room I’ll give you something to eat.’ They stopped at a liquor store and bought a bottle of wine and a bottle of beer. Raymond carried the bottle of wine and the defendant carried
the bottle of beer. They went to Raymond's room at the Eugene Hotel and the defendant said he didn’t have anything to drink, but Raymond drank some wine. The defendant told me that Raymond got undressed, took his pants and shoes off, and then grabbed Mr. Collins, the defendant, and attempted to molest him. Mr. Collins got frightened—he said he was frightened. He grabbed a wine bottle off of the night stand and hit Raymond in the face five or six times; he didn’t remember how many times. Mr. Collins said that when Raymond quit struggling he got up off the bed, pulled his pants up, which Raymond had almost pulled off. He got his jacket off of a chair, went out of the room, closing the door. That is about the substance of the second conversation. Q. Did you ask the defendant if he had ever had similar sexual experiences, or any sexual experiences with the deceased in the past ? A. Yes, sir, I did. Q. What did he tell you? A. He admitted having sexual relations with Mr. Whiteside on two prior occasions. Q. Was that the gist of your conversation, Officer? A. That is about all of it, sir.”
On cross-examination Officer Cullings testified: “Q. Did he tell you whether or not on the occasion of the 24th he had been drinking, that is, whether the defendant had been drinking? A. He said he hadn’t anything to drink Wednesday night. Q. Did he tell you that he did, however, generally speaking, do considerable drinking? A. Yes. Q. And did he indicate to you that on these prior occasions when he had been with Whiteside whether he had been drinking? A. I don’t remember asking him that, sir. Q. You don’t remember whether he made a statement clarifying that or not ? A. No, sir. Q. When he told you about the prior act or acts, did he indicate to you that the deceased, Whiteside, had orally copulated the defendant’s penis? A. No, sir. Q. Did he make it clear to you just what he had done? A. Yes. Q. What did he say he had done? A. He said Raymond made Mr. Collins play the part of the woman and had approached him from the rear, sir. Q. In other words, a violation of Section 286 of the Penal Code, that being the one which denounces sodomy? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did the defendant tell you that he knew how many blows he struck against Whiteside? A. No, sir. Q. Did he tell you that he struck at Whiteside until the hands of Whiteside let go? A. No. He struck at Whiteside until Whiteside’s legs relaxed. Whiteside had a scissors grip around his waist with his legs. Q. Did he tell you that he then ceased to strike him ?
A. Yes, sir. Q. And that he immediately left the room? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you ask him why he struck these blows ? A. Yes. He said he was afraid of what was going to happen. Q. Did he tell you he was afraid that Whiteside was going to either sodomize him or commit fellatio on him? A. Pardon? Q. Is there a problem about the language I used ? A. No. He said he just was afraid of Whiteside. He didn’t go into detail. Q. He did not specify? A. No, sir. Q. I’d like to call your attention to your testimony regarding the meeting of the defendant and Whiteside on the street, and as to their conversation regarding possibly feeding the defendant. At the preliminary hearing did you testify to this effect? I’m going to page 38 of the transcript, lines 13 to 16. At the preliminary hearing did you say this—and let me show you the transcript first, Officer. I will ask you to look at page 38 and read lines 11 through 20, if you would, please. A. Out loud? Q. No, just to yourself. A. (Witness reads to himself the portion indicated.) Q. At the time of the preliminary, did you testify as follows: ‘I met Eay Wednesday night on Fifth Street and he asked me if I wanted a beer. I told him no, I was hungry, and he said, “Come on up to my room anyway.” ’ Was that your testimony at that time? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you feel that that is at all different from your testimony today regarding the conversation on the street? A. No, sir. Q. At the present time, do you recall the defendant telling you that Eay said, ‘Come on up to my room anyway’? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did the defendant tell you that from time to time he would borrow small sums of money from his sister, and also that she would give him food? A. Yes, sir. Q. That is in the period before and after February 24? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you ask the defendant whether he remembered seeing any blood about the body of the deceased ? A. I don’t recall asking him, no. Q. Do you remember whether he made a statement that he did or didn’t recall seeing the blood ? A. No. I showed him a picture and he said, ‘That is the way Eaymond looked when I left.’ Q. Did the defendant tell you that he returned to the hotel the following Saturday ? A. Yes, sir. Q. And did he tell you that he returned there to tell Mr. Whiteside he was sorry he hit him? A. Yes. Q. Did you arrest the defendant yourself ? A. No, sir. Q. To your knowledge, did the defendant leave his name and address with the room clerk at the hotel there on request ? A. Yes, sir. . . . The Witness : I have a slip of paper on which he wrote the name and address. Q. By Mb. Kilbbide You have the very slip of paper he wrote his name
and address on? A. Yes. . . . Q. Did you yourself ever go to that address? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you ascertain that it was Collins’ address? A. Yes, sir. Q. Would you describe the defendant from your own physical observation of him as a strong, powerful man ? A. No, sir. . . . The Court : On the day in question when you interviewed him, approximately how much did he weigh? The Witness: Oh, 125 pounds. . . . Q. By Mr. Kilbride: Does he appear to be about the same height today as he was when you interviewed him on the 24th ? A. Yes, sir. Q. Could you tell us what his height was on the 24th, approximately? A. Oh, five foot five, or so.” “Q. Officer Cullings, since you were last on the stand, have you had an opportunity to listen to a portion of the tape? A. Yes. Q. That was the terminal portion of the tape? A. Yes. Q. And do you recall either you or Officer Hanson asking the defendant if he wanted to say anything or ask anything? A. Yes, sir. Q. Then, what did the defendant ask or say at that time? A. He asked us if we thought he was right in defending himself against Mr. Whiteside.”
On redirect examination Officer Cullings testified: “Q. In your conversations with the defendant regarding the alleged attack upon him by the deceased Whiteside, the attack was one of sodomy, and that is what he was scared of at that time ? A. As I believe, yes, sir. Q. Did you talk to him about their prior relations and what type of relations those were in the past? A. Yes, sir. Q. Were they sodomy or were they oral copulation? A. Sodomy. Q. All sodomy? A. Yes, sir. Q. No oral copulation involved? A. We didn’t use those words. He said, ‘Whiteside made me play the part of a woman,’ and that was what I took that to mean. Q. In other words, he never said ‘sodomy’? A. No. He was ashamed- Q. Did he ever describe their acts, what they were doing ? A. No, sir. Q. All he told you was that Whiteside made him take the part of the woman, and then you made this determination of what they were doing from your own conjecture ? A. Yes, sir. ’ ’
On recross-examination Officer Cullings testified: “Q. Just this: He was reluctant to gp into details? A. Yes, he was ashamed. We didn’t draw it out of him. Q. He never did specify which one it was, whether it was oral copulation or sodomy? A. No, sir.”
The report of the autopsy surgeon was received in evidence in lieu of his testimony. The cause of death was tracheobronchial aspiration of blood, due to traumatic injuries of face and nose, with fractures and hemorrhage. The report stated
in pertinent part: “Head: 1. Lacerations of face. 2. Multiple fractures of right side of face and nose. Respiratory System : 1. Tracheobronchial aspiration of blood, severe. 2. Pulmonary congestion and edema. . . . The body is that of a well-developed, well-nourished, middle aged Negro male which appears consistent with the stated age of 41 years. The body has not been embalmed. It measures 72% inches in length and weighs 158 pounds. ... No evidence of intrinsic injury is found. . . . The nails are essentially intact except for the left little finger which exhibits a nail growth of 3/32 of an inch and an almost complete recent tear of this nail through % of its width. There is no evidence of surrounding hemorrhage. . . . Except for several old sears found, the only evidence of recent injury is a vertical reddish scratch abrasion on the anteromedial aspect of the left upper arm.”
It was stipulated “that there was an amount of blood removed from the deceased’s body and that was submitted to the Toxicology Laboratory for the purpose of determining its ethanol content. That the blood sample was examined by R. J. Abernathy of that laboratory, and that as a result of his scientific examination he returned the opinion that the blood contained 0.21 per cent ethanol content.”
Geraldine Lambert was called by the People. It was stipulated she “is an expert regarding blood alcohol examinations and their meanings.” She was shown the report of the Toxicology Laboratory and referred to “the words Blood Ethanol: 0.21 per cent.” Mrs. Lambert testified that ethanol is the chemical name for ethyl alcohol, which is grain alcohol, and it is grain alcohol that is found in alcoholic beverages such as beer, wine, whiskey, and so on; “Q. A .21 per cent in the body of a 41-year-old man, who measures 72% inches in length, and weighs approximately 158 pounds, and who drinks liquor or alcoholic beverages generally on the order of at least some a day, what would that represent ? A. A .21 per cent in approximately a man weighing 150 pounds—you said the weight was 158 pounds? Q. Yes. [A.] That means that to have this blood alcohol there had been accumulated at the time the sample was taken between 8 and 9 ounces of 100 per cent proof alcohol, or its alcoholic equivalent. There would be between 8 and 9 ounces accumulated at the time the sample was taken, or at the time of death, if death was a factor. Q. What would you determine his state of intoxication to be ? A. The same as I have stated before, at least under the influence. Possible intoxication.”
The foregoing was all the evidence of the People.
Prior to the trial, on motion of defendant’s counsel, the court appointed Dr. Thomas L. Gore to examine defendant under section 1871 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Dr. Gore examined defendant and made his written report to the court. The defense introduced the report in evidence. The report in toto is copied in the footnote.
Dr. Gore found that defendant
was legally sane at the time of the examination on June 8, I960; that he “was suffering from a panic reaction at the time of the commission of the offense, and his only desire was to escape from the immediate vicinity of the aggressor”; at
the time he was mentally ill, hut he was not legally insane; with his escape from the aggressor, he recovered from his
panic;
he “has developed an amnesia for the actual fight due
to pangs of his conscience since being informed of Ms crime.” No other evidence was introduced by defendant.
The matter of the sufficiency of the evidence suggests two questions: First, on the facts as shown by the statement made by defendant to Officer Cullings, was defendant shown to
have been justified in the killing of Whiteside as an act of self-defense? Second, if the conclusion on that proposition is in the affirmative, were any other facts shown (and we have given the gist of all of them) which would furnish ground for the finding of guilt?
Penal Code, section 192, provides: “Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice. It is of three kinds:
“1. Voluntary—upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.”
A homicide is justifiable when committed by any person when resisting any attempt to commit a felony upon any person ; or, when committed in defense of person against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony; or, when committed in the lawful defense of such person when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony and imminent danger of such design being accomplished. (Pen. Code, § 197;
People
v.
Hatchett,
63 Cal.App.2d 144, 164 [146 P.2d 469];
People
v.
Ranson,
119 Cal.App.2d 380, 388 [259 P.2d 910].) “A bare fear of the commission of any of the offenses mentioned in subdivisions two and three of the preceding section, to prevent which homicide may be lawfully committed, is not sufficient to justify it. But the circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person, and the party killing must have acted under the influence of such fears alone.” (Pen. Code, § 198.)
Lawful resistance to the commission of a public offense may be made by the party about to be injured. (Pen. Code, § 692.) Resistance sufficient to prevent the offense may be made by the party about to be injured to prevent an offense against his person. (Pen. Code, § 693.) “Any necessary force may be used to protect from wrongful injury the person . . of oneself. (Civ. Code, §50.) Where from the nature of the attack a person, as a reasonable man, is justified in believing that his assailant intends to commit a felony upon him, he has a right in defense of his person to use all force necessary to repel the assault; he is not bound to retreat but may stand his ground; and he has a right in defense of his person to repel the assault upon him even to taking the life of his adversary.
(People
v.
Zuckerman,
56 Cal.App.2d 366, 372-374 [132 P.2d 545] ;
People
v.
Hatchett,
56 Cal.App.2d 20, 22 [132 P.2d 51].)
Justification does not depend on the existence of actual danger but on appearances.
(People
v.
Miles,
55 Cal. 207, 209-210;
People
v.
Hatchett, supra,
63 Cal.App.2d 144, 164.) In order that a person avail himself of his right of self-defense, it is sufficient that appearances on the part of his assailant were such as to arouse in his mind, as a reasonable man, that his assailant was about to commit a felony. He may act upon such appearances with safety; and if without fault or carelessness he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he supposes the facts to be, his act is justifiable, though the facts were in truth otherwise, and though he was mistaken in his judgment as to such actual necessity at such time and really had no occasion for the use of extreme measures.
(People
v.
Thomson,
145 Cal. 717, 721 [79 P. 435];
People
v.
Hatchett, supra,
63 Cal.App.2d 144,156-157.) A person who without fault on his part is exposed to a sudden felonious attack need not retreat. In the exercise of his right of self-defense he may stand his ground and defend himself by the use of all force and means apparently necessary and which would appear to be necessary to a reasonable person in the same situation and with the same knowledge; and he may pursue his assailant until he has secured himself from danger if that course likewise appears reasonably necessary. This rule applies even though the assailed person might more easily have gained safety by flight or by withdrawing from the scene.
(People
v.
Holt,
25 Cal.2d 59, 63 [153 P.2d 21];
People
v.
Carson,
43
Cal.App.2d 40, 45 [110 P.2d 98] ;
People
v.
Ranson, supra,
119 Cal.App.2d 380, 388.)
Where the peril is swift and imminent and the necessity for action immediate, the law does not weigh in too nice scales the conduct of the assailed and say he shall not be justified in killing because he might have resorted to other means to secure his safety.
(People
v.
Hecker,
109 Cal. 451, 467 [42 P. 307, 30 L.R.A. 403].)
If the evidence introduced by the People tended to show justification, defendant was not required to introduce again the same evidence in order that he benefit by it.
(People
v.
Wells,
10 Cal.2d 610, 618 [76 P.2d 493].) If the proof on the part of the prosecution tended to show that the homicide was justifiable, there was no duty on defendant to justify it. (Pen. Code, § 1105;
People
v.
Bannon,
59 Cal.App. 50, 62 [209 P. 1029]. See
People
v.
Deloney,
41 Cal.2d 832, 841 [264 P.2d 532].) “The homicide appearing to be justifiable or excusable, the person indicted must, upon his trial, be fully acquitted and discharged.” (Pen. Code, § 199.)
Defendant’s statement that they bought a bottle of wine and a bottle of beer and that Whiteside carried the wine and he carried the beer is corroborated by the testimony of Mr. Poirier. .Defendant said Whiteside “got undressed, took his pants and shoes off.” A photograph of Whiteside in evidence corroborates this statement. Whiteside’s blood had .21 alcoholic content. He was under the influence of alcohol and possibly intoxicated. He told defendant to lie down on the bed and go to sleep, and “You had better do as I am asking you.” Defendant started to leave the room. As he did so, Whiteside grabbed him, threw him on the bed, and pulled his pants almost off. He had a “scissors grip” around defendant’s waist with his legs. There was “an almost complete recent tear” of the nail on Whiteside’s left little finger through two-thirds of its width and an obvious laceration on his arm. Defendant is a small man; he is about 5 feet, 5 inches tall, and weighs about 125 pounds. Whiteside was a large, powerful man; he was 6 feet, % inch tall, and at the time of the autopsy weighed 158 pounds. It is manifest that defendant could not cope with him or defend himself in mere physical combat. The autopsy report shows the injuries were exactly as one would expect them to be from defendant’s version of what occurred. Defendant was afraid of “what was going to happen.” He was afraid of Whiteside. “ [T]he
attack was one of sodomy” and that was what defendant “was seared of at that time.” He grabbed a wine bottle off the night stand and struck Whiteside until the latter “let go.” When Whiteside relaxed his legs from around defendant, defendant “ceased to strike him.” When Whiteside “quit struggling,” defendant “got up off the bed,” pulled up his pants, got his jacket off a chair, and “immediately left the room.”
There was nothing inherently improbable in defendant’s account of the affray and no evidence that it occurred in any manner other than that related by him to Officer Cullings. On the contrary, the physical evidence described by Mr. Shishima and depicted in a photograph of the deceased and the room he occupied and the comparative size of the parties tend to corroborate defendant’s statements to the officer. On the evidence, defendant was not the aggressor, nor did he enter into the struggle voluntarily, but under circumstances which did not compel him to retreat.
On the evidence there was no previous animosity between defendant and Whiteside. There was no evidence of any motive other than self-defense. There was no evidence of an intent to kill, or of flight, or of anything indicating a consciousness of guilt. Defendant returned to the hotel the following Saturday to tell Whiteside “he was sorry he hit him,” and left his true name and address with the room clerk. Defendant asked the officers if they “thought he was right in defending himself against” Whiteside. Defendant was not shown to have been the instigator of any difficulty with Whiteside. There are only the statements of defendant with respect to the details of the encounter. In our opinion there is nothing indicated by the statements of defendant to Officer Cullings to warrant the conclusion that defendant, in repelling the attack of Whiteside, acted other than in self-defense. Defendant made no incriminatory statement. As he pictured the encounter, no particular interval of time elapsed between the assault committed by Whiteside until the fatal blow was struck. There was no duty on defendant to retreat under the circumstances. It was not necessary that he should have in words pictured his state of mind as it was at the time of the attack, for under his statement of the encounter the circumstances were such as to indicate nothing else but that by doing what he did he was defending himself against the commission of a felony. The proof of the prosecution showed a ease of justification and there is nothing in any
of the other evidence which in anywise tends to contradict or dispute defendant’s version of the affair. There was no evidence disproving the claim of self-defense. On the contrary, the only other evidence harmonizes with defendant’s version.
The prosecution, having presented as a part of its case the statement of defendant as to how the killing occurred, is hound by that evidence in the absence of proof to the contrary.
(People
v.
Coppla,
100 Cal.App.2d 766, 769 [224 P.2d 828].) If there be any well-established circumstance which may be reasonably regarded as incompatible with the theory that the killing was justifiable, the trier of fact, from a consideration of all the evidence, is warranted in finding that the act amounted to an unlawful homicide.
(People
v.
Acosta,
45 Cal.2d 538, 541 [290 P.2d 1].) We find nothing in defendant’s statement or in the other evidence which may be reasonably regarded as incompatible with the theory that the killing was justifiable. The fact that on two previous occasions Whiteside had committed sodomy on defendant does not negate the conclusion that the homicide was justifiable. Defendant went to Whiteside’s room because he was hungry and Whiteside promised to give him something to eat. On the two previous occasions Whiteside “made” defendant play the part of a woman. There is no evidence with respect to the details of the prior acts: whether defendant consented; whether he was under the influence of liquor ; or how long before the night of the homicide the acts took place. On the occasion of the homicide as defendant started to leave, Whiteside grabbed him and attempted by force to accomplish the act. There is nothing in the evidence to indicate that defendant could reasonably anticipate the violent use of force by Whiteside on the occasion in question. In the words of Dr. Gore: “ [D] efendant was suffering from a panic reaction at the time of the commission of the offense, and his only desire was to escape from the immediate vicinity of the aggressor.”
The facts in
People
v.
Estrada,
60 Cal.App. 477 [213 P. 67], were similar to those at bar. There the deceased assaulted the defendant. The defendant stabbed him. When he was first questioned by the police the defendant denied any involvement. Later he made a statement to the police describing the entire incident. His statement, like that of defendant here, established a justifiable homicide in self-defense. There was no evidence contradicting the statement. A finding of guilty of manslaughter was reversed. The court said (p. 481) :
“In our opinion there is nothing indicated by the narrative as expressed in the statement of the defendant to warrant the conclusion that defendant, in repelling the attack of Murillo, acted other than in necessary self-defense.”
The facts in
People
v.
Toledo,
85 Cal.App.2d 577 [193 P.2d 953], were also similar to those at bar. There the defendant was assaulted by the deceased. A statement of the defendant to the police was introduced in evidence by the People. In a nonjury trial the defendant was convicted of manslaughter. Reversing, the court stated (p. 580) :
“The right of necessary self-defense, long recognized and protected by the law, obviously deals with an emergency situation in which a certain degree of elasticity is essential if the defense is to be of any practical value to the person assaulted. . . .
“ [P. 581.] In the instant ease, as appellant’s brief asserts, ‘the record is silent of any evidence to bring home to the defendant any violent act committed by him toward the deceased, ’ other than that done in repelling the knife assault of the deceased. ‘Unless,’ as appellant says, ‘we arbitrarily see fit to believe only those words of the defendant’s statement and testimony wherein he acknowledges striking the decedent and disbelieve all the rest of his statement and testimony and further disbelieve the testimony of other witnesses as to the circumstances leading up to the blows being struck by Toledo, it cannot be determined that a criminal homicide was committed. The prosecution having presented as a part of its case the statement of the defendant which justified the homicide is bound by that evidence in the absence of proof to the contrary. ’
“In this connection may be noted the case of
People
v.
Salaz,
66 Cal.App. 173,181 [225 P. 777], where the court said: ‘The jury could not have found, from the evidence for the people, that the killing was done by appellant except upon the latter’s admissions, which carried, in close and immediate connection with proof of the killing, circumstances of necessary self-defense. ... No presumption of guilt weighed against the presumption of innocence.’ ”
Under the evidence, the acts of Whiteside gave defendant reasonable grounds to believe that Whiteside was about to commit a felony (Pen. Code, § 286), and that there was imminent danger of its being accomplished. We hold the evi
dence establishes as a matter of law that the homicide was justifiable.
Reversed.
Shinn, P. J., and Ford, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 26, 1961. Sehauer, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.