JUSTICE McDADE
delivered the opinion of the court:
In this case from the circuit court of Will County, the defendant, Sherman Campbell, appeals from his conviction for driving on a suspended license, for which he received 12 months of conditional discharge and 240 hours of community service. Campbell, who represented himself at trial, argues that his conviction should be reversed and the case remanded because he was not admonished of his right to have an attorney appointed to represent him. For the following reasons, we agree, and vacate his conviction and remand.
This case involves a single question of law: whether Supreme Court Rule 401 (134 Ill. 2d R. 401) requires the reversal of a conviction when a defendant who is charged with a crime for which imprisonment is a possible punishment, but who is not subsequently imprisoned on that charge, is not properly admonished of his right to an attorney and the availability of court-appointed counsel. The rule provides that the court must give an open-court admonishment of the right to counsel, including appointed counsel, to “a person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment.” (Emphasis added.) 134 Ill. 2d R. 401(a).
We note a split between the Second and Fourth Districts of the Appellate Court on this issue. The Second District has found that admonishment under Rule 401 is only required in cases where the defendant is subsequently sentenced to a prison term. People v. MacArthur, 313 Ill. App. 3d 864, 869, 731 N.E.2d 883, 886-87 (2000); People v. Stahr, 255 Ill. App. 3d 624, 626, 627 N.E.2d 394, 395 (1994); People v. Morgese, 94 Ill. App. 3d 638, 645, 418 N.E.2d 1124, 1130 (1981). The Second District relies, in reaching this conclusion, on Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 59 L. Ed. 2d 383, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979), a case involving only the imposition of a fine, in which the United States Supreme Court held that “the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.” Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 389, 99 S. Ct. at 1162. Based on the Scott holding, the Second District has found that the right to Rule 401(a) admonishments is only to ensure the knowing and intelligent waiver of the constitutional right to counsel. MacArthur, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 869, 731 N.E.2d at 886-87; Stahr, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 626, 627 N.E.2d at 395; Morgese, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 640, 418 N.E.2d at 1130. Since the constitutional right to counsel, according to Scott, is only implicated in cases where the defendant is actually sentenced to prison, the admonishment as well is only required when the defendant is sentenced to imprisonment. MacArthur, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 869, 731 N.E.2d at 886-87; Stahr, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 626, 627 N.E.2d at 395; Morgese, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 640, 418 N.E.2d at 1130 . We note that neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Illinois Supreme Court undertook in the Scott case the construction of Rule 401. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 59 L. Ed. 2d 383, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979); People v. Scott, 68 Ill. 2d 269, 368 N.E.2d 881 (1977). The United States Supreme Court considered only the constitutional question presented, and our supreme court construed only the two Illinois statutes relied upon by Scott. The supreme courts’ analyses in Scott therefore provide no precedent for resolution of the issue we consider in this case.1
The Fourth District has taken a different approach and reached a different result. In People v. Herring, 327 Ill. App. 3d 259, 762 N.E.2d 1186 (2002), the court found that the failure to admonish in a case where the defendant was not actually imprisoned was reversible error. Herring, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 262, 762 N.E.2d at 1189.
We agree with the Fourth District. The language of the rule is clear: a “person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment” must be admonished in open court and on the record. 134 Ill. 2d R. 401. The rules of statutory construction apply to the interpretation of supreme court rules. People v. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d 106, 116, 824 N.E.2d 250, 256 (2005). In construing a rule, the primary objective is to give effect to the intent of the enacting body, in this case the supreme court. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d at 116, 824 N.E.2d at 256. If intent can be determined from the plain language of the rule, there is no need to resort to interpretive aids. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d at 116, 824 N.E.2d at 256. When the language of the rule is plain and unambiguous, we will not read into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that are in conflict with its clear meaning, and we will not inject additional provisions that are not found in the rule. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d at 116, 824 N.E.2d at 256.
In the case of Rule 401, the meaning cannot be plainer that admonishments are required when a defendant has been charged with an offense for which imprisonment is an available penalty under the statute. The supreme court could easily amend the rule to effect the result reached by MacArthur and Stahr, but it has not done so. Presumably, the court has chosen to promote the public policy of ensuring that defendants who face jail time are fully apprised of their right to counsel at the time it will effectively serve its purpose — before trial. The means by which the public policy will be pursued is plain on the face of the rule, and we will not depart from it.
We believe that the Second District meshes the constitutional right to counsel with the right to admonishments established by Rule 401. It may be true that the constitution only requires that a defendant who has actually been imprisoned was assigned counsel or clearly waived that right. However, we are not dealing here with the constitutional right to counsel itself, but rather with the right to admonishments, which must be given to a defendant as established by rule. We do not believe that the scope of the rule is tested or limited by the constitutional requirement it serves, but rather by its plain language. Undoubtedly, the constitutional right to counsel and the right to admonishments about that right derive from the same concern that defendants receive proper representation when their liberty is at stake. Nevertheless, the two rights are different and they originate from different sources.
In 1988, nine years after its decision in Scott, our supreme court decided People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 103, 529 N.E.2d 218, 221 (1988), in which it directed that all the supreme court’s rules of criminal procedure are mandatory; they are rules of procedure, not mere suggestions. They are binding on parties and courts alike. We are therefore required to enforce the right to admonishment in a manner consistent with the unambiguous language of the rule.
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JUSTICE McDADE
delivered the opinion of the court:
In this case from the circuit court of Will County, the defendant, Sherman Campbell, appeals from his conviction for driving on a suspended license, for which he received 12 months of conditional discharge and 240 hours of community service. Campbell, who represented himself at trial, argues that his conviction should be reversed and the case remanded because he was not admonished of his right to have an attorney appointed to represent him. For the following reasons, we agree, and vacate his conviction and remand.
This case involves a single question of law: whether Supreme Court Rule 401 (134 Ill. 2d R. 401) requires the reversal of a conviction when a defendant who is charged with a crime for which imprisonment is a possible punishment, but who is not subsequently imprisoned on that charge, is not properly admonished of his right to an attorney and the availability of court-appointed counsel. The rule provides that the court must give an open-court admonishment of the right to counsel, including appointed counsel, to “a person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment.” (Emphasis added.) 134 Ill. 2d R. 401(a).
We note a split between the Second and Fourth Districts of the Appellate Court on this issue. The Second District has found that admonishment under Rule 401 is only required in cases where the defendant is subsequently sentenced to a prison term. People v. MacArthur, 313 Ill. App. 3d 864, 869, 731 N.E.2d 883, 886-87 (2000); People v. Stahr, 255 Ill. App. 3d 624, 626, 627 N.E.2d 394, 395 (1994); People v. Morgese, 94 Ill. App. 3d 638, 645, 418 N.E.2d 1124, 1130 (1981). The Second District relies, in reaching this conclusion, on Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 59 L. Ed. 2d 383, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979), a case involving only the imposition of a fine, in which the United States Supreme Court held that “the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.” Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 389, 99 S. Ct. at 1162. Based on the Scott holding, the Second District has found that the right to Rule 401(a) admonishments is only to ensure the knowing and intelligent waiver of the constitutional right to counsel. MacArthur, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 869, 731 N.E.2d at 886-87; Stahr, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 626, 627 N.E.2d at 395; Morgese, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 640, 418 N.E.2d at 1130. Since the constitutional right to counsel, according to Scott, is only implicated in cases where the defendant is actually sentenced to prison, the admonishment as well is only required when the defendant is sentenced to imprisonment. MacArthur, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 869, 731 N.E.2d at 886-87; Stahr, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 626, 627 N.E.2d at 395; Morgese, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 640, 418 N.E.2d at 1130 . We note that neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Illinois Supreme Court undertook in the Scott case the construction of Rule 401. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 59 L. Ed. 2d 383, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979); People v. Scott, 68 Ill. 2d 269, 368 N.E.2d 881 (1977). The United States Supreme Court considered only the constitutional question presented, and our supreme court construed only the two Illinois statutes relied upon by Scott. The supreme courts’ analyses in Scott therefore provide no precedent for resolution of the issue we consider in this case.1
The Fourth District has taken a different approach and reached a different result. In People v. Herring, 327 Ill. App. 3d 259, 762 N.E.2d 1186 (2002), the court found that the failure to admonish in a case where the defendant was not actually imprisoned was reversible error. Herring, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 262, 762 N.E.2d at 1189.
We agree with the Fourth District. The language of the rule is clear: a “person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment” must be admonished in open court and on the record. 134 Ill. 2d R. 401. The rules of statutory construction apply to the interpretation of supreme court rules. People v. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d 106, 116, 824 N.E.2d 250, 256 (2005). In construing a rule, the primary objective is to give effect to the intent of the enacting body, in this case the supreme court. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d at 116, 824 N.E.2d at 256. If intent can be determined from the plain language of the rule, there is no need to resort to interpretive aids. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d at 116, 824 N.E.2d at 256. When the language of the rule is plain and unambiguous, we will not read into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that are in conflict with its clear meaning, and we will not inject additional provisions that are not found in the rule. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d at 116, 824 N.E.2d at 256.
In the case of Rule 401, the meaning cannot be plainer that admonishments are required when a defendant has been charged with an offense for which imprisonment is an available penalty under the statute. The supreme court could easily amend the rule to effect the result reached by MacArthur and Stahr, but it has not done so. Presumably, the court has chosen to promote the public policy of ensuring that defendants who face jail time are fully apprised of their right to counsel at the time it will effectively serve its purpose — before trial. The means by which the public policy will be pursued is plain on the face of the rule, and we will not depart from it.
We believe that the Second District meshes the constitutional right to counsel with the right to admonishments established by Rule 401. It may be true that the constitution only requires that a defendant who has actually been imprisoned was assigned counsel or clearly waived that right. However, we are not dealing here with the constitutional right to counsel itself, but rather with the right to admonishments, which must be given to a defendant as established by rule. We do not believe that the scope of the rule is tested or limited by the constitutional requirement it serves, but rather by its plain language. Undoubtedly, the constitutional right to counsel and the right to admonishments about that right derive from the same concern that defendants receive proper representation when their liberty is at stake. Nevertheless, the two rights are different and they originate from different sources.
In 1988, nine years after its decision in Scott, our supreme court decided People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 103, 529 N.E.2d 218, 221 (1988), in which it directed that all the supreme court’s rules of criminal procedure are mandatory; they are rules of procedure, not mere suggestions. They are binding on parties and courts alike. We are therefore required to enforce the right to admonishment in a manner consistent with the unambiguous language of the rule.
Moreover, admonishments are given prior to trial and sentencing comes at the end, after the judgment. As a practical matter, the failure to give the admonitions either forecloses the imposition of prison time or requires a new trial if the unadmonished defendant is incarcerated. It also leaves open the question, as is present in this case, of what punishment can be imposed if a defendant fails to meet the conditions of his discharge or probation or perform the requisite community service. Since such problematic alternatives are completely avoided by admonishing a defendant charged with any crime punishable (as opposed to punished) by incarceration of his or her right to counsel, as Rule 401 directs, the interpretation advanced in MacArthur, Stahr and Morgese seems not only strained but ill-advised and inefficient.
At the very least, substantial compliance with Rule 401 is required. People v. Stoops, 313 Ill. App. 3d 269, 274, 728 N.E.2d 1241, 1244 (2000). Substantial compliance with the rule is sufficient when the waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and voluntary and where the admonishment that was received by the defendant did not prejudice his rights. People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 236, 673 N.E.2d 318, 333 (1996). When the defendant does not receive any admonishments, however, the reviewing court need not consider whether the defendant waived his right to counsel. People v. Childs, 278 Ill. App. 3d 65, 74, 662 N.E.2d 161, 166-67 (1996). He clearly did not.
Here, the record reflects that the defendant did not receive the admonishments consistent with Rule 401. Because of the failure to admonish, the defendant’s conviction should be vacated and the case remanded. Stoops, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 275, 728 N.E.2d at 1245. It appears likely that defendant has satisfied the sentence that the circuit court of Will County found to be appropriate for conviction of this offense and that requiring a new trial at this time would be both unfair to him and wasteful of the circuit court’s resources. We believe that, because of these unique circumstances, simply vacating the conviction and remanding the case would be appropriate.
CONCLUSION
The defendant was not properly admonished of his right to proceed with counsel as required by Rule 401, and we decline to adopt an interpretation of the rule that only requires admonishments in cases where the defendant has actually been sentenced to imprisonment, since that interpretation is not supported by the plain, unambiguous language of the rule. We therefore find that the defendant’s conviction must be vacated and the case remanded.
Conviction vacated and case remanded.