NEIGHBORS, Justice.
We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals’ decision in People v. Briggs, 668 P.2d 961 (Colo.App.1983). The court reversed the defendant’s conviction and ordered a new trial, holding that certain testimonial and real evidence must be suppressed because it was derived from involuntary statements that were obtained from the defendant. The court ruled that a witness’ testimony compelled by the grant of immunity from prosecution is not a sufficient act of free will on the part of the witness to dissipate the taint of illegality for purposes of the attenuation doctrine. The court also concluded that the inevitable discovery issue had not been properly preserved by the People for appellate review. We reject the per se rule adopted by the court of appeals and formulate appropriate standards to be used by the trial court in determining whether the disputed evidence has been purged of the taint of illegality by significant intervening events. We agree with the court of appeals that the inevitable discovery question was not presented to the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals in part and reverse in part, and we remand to the court of appeals with directions to return the case to the district court for further findings.
I.
The defendant, Paul Briggs, was charged with first-degree murder1 by an information filed in the Douglas County District Court. Briggs was sentenced to life imprisonment after the jury found him guilty of the crime. His motion for a new trial was denied and he appealed to the court of appeals.
The following are the facts pertinent to the issues upon which we granted certiora-ri review. The victim, Harry Dewey, died from a gunshot wound to the head on or about November 22, 1979. Investigating officers determined that the murder weapon was likely to have been a rifle reported stolen during the burglary of a mountain cabin in which Dewey was suspected of having participated.2 The investigation into Dewey’s death thus focused on his friends and associates, with a view toward discovering a possible connection between the burglary and Dewey’s murder.
Briggs and Dewey had briefly lived together shortly before the homicide. During the investigation Briggs was questioned by detectives several times. On December 19 and 20, 1979, he was interviewed [914]*914in connection with the general investigation of Dewey’s friends and associates. On the afternoon of December 20, Briggs was taken to the police station, advised of his Miranda, 3 rights, and questioned. The advisement form given to Briggs states “that you are being questioned in connection with the crime of burglary, theft by receiving, murder and you may be a possible suspect of this crime.” On January 4, 1980, Briggs was again taken to the police station. The trial court found that he was given no Miranda warnings, and that, in return for information about the burglary, Briggs was promised immunity from prosecution for that crime “as well as the promise of whatever he [the defendant] said, would not be used against him.” Briggs admitted that he and Dewey had committed the burglary and that a friend, Kirk Martin, had taken some of the stolen property to Indiana.4
Pursuing this lead, the police officers immediately confronted Martin with Briggs’ statements and questioned him in an effort to gather further facts about the murder and/or the burglary. Martin informed the officers that he had sold a number of the stolen items to a friend in Indiana, Bill Neeley. On January 7, a detective went to Indiana and questioned Neeley, who related certain statements made to him by Martin to the effect that Martin and Briggs had planned to kill an individual in order to silence what Briggs viewed as that person’s indiscreet bragging about his participation with Briggs in a burglary.
When confronted by the officers with this information on January 9, Martin requested and was granted “immunity” 5 and disclosed that Briggs had discussed with him the contemplated murder of Dewey. Martin related that, on the evening of the murder, he had driven Dewey’s roommate around Denver in order to prevent the roommate from interfering with Briggs’ plan to kill Dewey. When Martin and Briggs met afterward, the latter described to Martin the details of Dewey’s murder.
Martin subsequently took two lie detector tests, acceptable performance on which was a condition to the grant of “immunity” approved by the district attorney and offered to Martin by the investigating officers. Because Martin’s statements could not be corroborated and both tests were interpreted by experts as indicating deceptive responses by Martin, he allowed himself to be outfitted with electronic sound recording equipment and agreed to engage Briggs in a conversation designed to elicit and surreptitiously record inculpatory statements. Martin successfully initiated such a conversation on January 14, and comments by Briggs were recorded in which he incriminated himself as the sole perpetrator of Dewey’s murder.
On the date of the defendant’s preliminary hearing, in accordance with the agreement reached between the authorities and Martin, a formal immunity order was entered by the trial court pursuant to section 13-90-118, 6 C.R.S. (1973). The order stated that Martin “shall not be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty of [sic] forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he testifies, except a prosecution for perjury in the first degree or contempt committed while giving testimony pursuant to this order.”
Briggs requested the trial court to suppress the statements first made by him on January 4 and reaffirmed on January 5, on the ground that those statements we re induced by promises of immunity. He also contended that the testimony of Martin and the tape-recorded conversation should be suppressed as “fruits” of his involuntary statements. The trial court suppressed [915]*915Briggs’ stateinents, finding that the promises of immunity made by detectives to elicit those statements rendered them involuntary. The court declined, however, to suppress the tape-recorded conversation and the testimony of Martin, ruling that Martin’s “intervening independent act” sufficiently attenuated the causal connection between that evidence and Briggs’ involuntary statements.
The suppression of Briggs’ statements was not appealed by the People. However, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s refusal to suppress Martin’s testimony and the tape recording. The court held that evidence was directly and immediately derived from the defendant’s illegally-obtained statements. In ordering Martin’s statements to the police officers, his testimony, and the tape recording suppressed, the court of appeals further held that the grant of immunity to Martin precluded a finding that the exercise of his free will attenuated the taint of the initial illegality.
II.
The People contend that the court of appeals erred in holding that the suppressed evidence was not sufficiently attenuated from Briggs’ statements to allow its admission. We conclude that the trial court must first resolve the attenuation issue by the application of appropriate standards to the evidence.
A.
Both the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and article II, section 18 of the Colorado Constitution contain provisions establishing a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.6 Each constitution guarantees that a person shall not be compelled to provide any evidence to the government which it might use to obtain his or her conviction of a crime. Each of the respective provisions contains an implied self-executing exclusionary rule: Evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional provision may not be used in criminal proceedings. “The Fifth Amendment, ... is by its terms an exclusionary rule....” United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir.1976).
It is a longstanding principle in this state that article II, section 18 of the Colorado Constitution “was not intended to merely protect a party from being compelled to make confessions of guilt, but protects him from being compelled to furnish a single link in a chain of evidence by which his conviction of a criminal offense might be secured.” Tuttle v. People, 33 Colo. 243, 255, 79 P. 1035, 1039 (1905). Accord Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951); see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).
In order to implement the privilege against self-incrimination, both this court and the Supreme Court have looked to fourth amendment analysis and its exclusionary rule for guidance in developing a principled basis to remedy violations of the self-incrimination privilege. It has long been established under the federal constitution that “knowledge gained by the Government’s own wrong cannot be used by it_” Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 183, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920). Thus, the exclusionary rule mandates the suppression not only of evidence obtained by means abridging constitutional rights, but also the “fruits” of that evidence. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); People v. Lowe, 200 Colo. 470, 616 P.2d 118 (1980).
Although “[t]he cases which mark the origin and development of the tainted fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine involved violations of the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures,” United States v. Massey, 437 F.Supp. 843, 855 (M.D.Fla.1977), the [916]*916doctrine also applies to the fruits of a statement obtained in violation of an accused’s fifth amendment rights. United States ex rel. Hudson v. Cannon, 529 F.2d 890 (7th Cir.1976).' Similarly, we have held that “[t]he ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine applies to Miranda violations.” People v. Saiz, 620 P.2d 15, 20 (Colo.1980).7 The Supreme Court has relied, to a considerable extent, on fourth amendment cases in determining what evidence is excludable- as the fruit of a coerced confession. Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968). Kurzer, 534 F.2d at 516 n. 8.
It is established that third-party, live-witness testimony is a fruit under the poisonous tree doctrine, under both the fourth and fifth amendments. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978); United States v. Schaefer, 691 F.2d 639 (3d Cir.1982); United States v. Hooton, 662 F.2d 628 (9th Cir.1981); Hudson, 529 F.2d at 892. We hold that such evidence is likewise a fruit for purposes of article II, section 18 of the Colorado Constitution. To conclude otherwise and permit the use of such tainted evidence would be inconsistent with the principle that the reliability of a particular coerced confession cannot serve to justify its admissibility. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961). It necessarily follows that the “fruits” analysis must be utilized in any case in which the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is implicated. See Harrison, 392 U.S. 219, 88 S.Ct. 2008 (fruits of a coerced confession must be suppressed); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 79, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 1609, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964) (“[A] state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him.”). Accordingly, we must apply the “fruits” doctrine to this case, where the poisonous tree is involuntary statements obtained from the defendant.
The People have not appealed the trial court’s ruling that the statements of Briggs to the investigating detectives on January 4 and 5 were involuntary. Therefore, we are bound by that factual determination. We are thus presented only with the question of whether Martin’s extra-judicial statements, testimony, and tape-recorded conversation with Briggs are inadmissible “fruits” of Briggs’ involuntary statements.8
B.
Martin revealed pertinent information about the burglary on January 4 or 5, after being directly confronted with Briggs’ statements that Martin had disposed of stolen property. That information led the officers to Indiana and Neeley. Armed with Neeley’s statements, the detec[917]*917tives again confronted Martin who implicated Briggs in the homicide. Therefore, it is plain that the evidence sought to be suppressed was derived from the involuntary statements of Briggs. However, “[n]ot all evidence is rendered inadmissible simply because it would not have come to light but for the unconstitutional actions of the police.” Saiz, 620 P.2d at 20. The Supreme Court has stated that, even given such a “but for” relationship, “the more apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ J. Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959).” Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S.Ct. at 417. Where, as here, the attenuation doctrine is invoked to support the admissibility of evidence derived from a “poisonous tree,” it must be ascertained whether the relationship between the defendant’s involuntary statements and the challenged evidence is “so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.” Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 268, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939). Thus, notwithstanding the direct connection between Briggs’ involuntary statements and the challenged evidence, the pertinent inquiry is whether the events separating those statements from the evidence “here sought to be introduced have so dissipated the causal link between them as to render the offered evidence significantly free from contamination.” Saiz, 620 P.2d at 20.
Where the challenged evidence involves the testimony of a live witness, the most usual intervening event is the exercise of free will by that witness. In such cases, the Supreme Court has noted that the inquiry into attenuation is “appropriately concerned with the differences between live-witness testimony and inanimate evi-dence_” Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 278-79, 98 S.Ct. at 1061. This difference centers around the power of volition possessed by a live witness:
[EJvaluated properly, the degree of free will necessary to dissipate the taint will very likely be found more often in the case of live-witness testimony than other kinds of evidence. The time, place and manner of the initial questioning of the witness may be such that any statements are truly the product of detached reflection and a desire to be cooperative on the part of the witness. And the illegality which led to the discovery of the witness very often will not play any meaningful part in the witness’ willingness to testify.
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276-77, 98 S.Ct. at 1060. It is, of course, true that “[wjitness-es are not like guns or documents which remain hidden from view until one turns over a sofa or opens a filing cabinet,” and that “[witnesses can, and often do, come forward and offer evidence entirely of their own volition.” Id. at 276, 98 S.Ct. at 1060. These considerations lead us to agree with those courts eschewing the formulation of bright line rules in this context: “The unpredictability of the human will, which is necessarily involved in the use of a witness to prove essential elements of a crime forecloses the adoption of any rigid rules.” United States v. Harder, 474 F.2d 1192, 1196 (5th Cir.1973).
A variety of considerations have been found pertinent to the inquiry into the possibility of attenuation between the constitutional violation and the evidence sought to be introduced at trial.9 In this [918]*918case, we conclude that the trial court should consider, at least, the following factors in determining whether the evidence sought to be introduced through Martin is attenuated from Briggs’ involuntary statements: (1) the role played by Briggs’ involuntary statements in inducing Martin’s cooperation; (2) the length of time between the involuntary statements and discovery of the challenged evidence; (3) whether Martin was a suspect; (4) the degree of free will exercised by Martin; and (5) the time, place, and manner of all of the questioning of Martin. United States v. Schaefer, 691 F.2d 639 (3d Cir.1982); United States v. Hooton, 662 F.2d 628 (9th Cir.1981). See also Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054.
In formulating these relevant considerations, we reject that aspect of the balancing process in the attenuation analysis that weighs the flagrancy and purpose of the official misconduct against the deterrent effect of an exclusionary rule.10 Balancing these factors is not an appropriate consideration where introduction of the evidence would violate the defendant’s right [919]*919to be free from self-incrimination. It is clear that the exclusionary rule in fifth amendment cases deters police misconduct, as it does in fourth amendment cases, and ensures the trustworthiness of evidence. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-50, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2364-67, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). However, application of the rule for fifth amendment violations has only an incidental effect on deterrence because that rationale is not the primary purpose for the rule in situations in which the fifth amendment is implicated. Thus, in many contexts, exclusion of evidence collected in violation of a defendant’s fifth amendment rights is required to implement those rights. It has been noted that, while one principal purpose of the judicially created fourth amendment exclusionary rule is to deter official misconduct, “[t]he Fifth Amendment, in contrast, is by its terms an exclusionary rule.... ” United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir.1976). Accord United States v. Tantalo, 680 F.2d 903, 908 (2d Cir.1982); United States v. Celia, 568 F.2d 1266, 1285 (9th Cir.1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 497 F.Supp. 979, 983 (E.D.Pa.1980). See also United States v. Henderson, 406 F.Supp. 417, 421 n. 4 (D.Del.1975) (the judicially created fourth amendment exclusionary rule and the constitutionally mandated exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of fifth amendment rights rest upon different grounds, and are not subject to the same analysis).
Legal commentators have recognized this distinction between the fourth and fifth amendment exclusionary rules. One author has observed that, because “the primary purpose of the Fifth Amendment privilege is to avoid forcing an individual to contribute to the imposition of criminal penalties upon himself, not to protect his privacy,” Comment, Standards for Exclusion in Immunity Cases after Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82 Yale L.J. 171, 177 (1972), it is inadequate merely to apply the deterrence rationale of the fourth amendment exclusionary cases to the fifth amendment:
Thus, unlike the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment is directly concerned with the introduction of tainted evidence at trial; it is in fact the introduction of such evidence that constitutes the primary violation of the Amendment. Even if the exclusion of evidence derived from a coerced confession is unlikely to have a deterrent effect on the police, its introduction will still represent an infringement on the individual’s privilege against self-incrimination.
Id. at 178 (footnote omitted). Another writer states that “[t]he privilege against self-incrimination thus simply is the exclusion of such evidence: without this exclusion there is no privilege.” Zupancic, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 1981 Ariz.St.L.J. 1, 19. “This point cannot be over-emphasized. The substantive sanctions against the police who violate the privilege ... simply are not adequate. This is not a question of deterring police from future misconduct.” Id. at 19 n. 5.
C.
We now consider, in light of the legal principles stated in parts A. and B. of this section, whether immunized testimony is the equivalent of compelled testimony and is insufficient to attenuate the taint of a constitutional violation.
It will often be the case that the degree of compulsion inhering in immunized testimony will be such as to negate the possibility that the witness has sufficiently exercised his free will to attenuate the taint of the initial illegality. It is generally true that:
Testimony given in response to a grant of legislative immunity is the essence of coerced testimony. In such cases there is no question whether physical or psychological pressures overrode the defendant’s will; the witness is told to talk or face the government’s coercive sanctions, notably, a conviction for contempt. The information given in response to a grant of immunity may well be more reliable than information beaten from a helpless defendant, but it is no less compelled.
New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459, 99 S.Ct. 1292, 1297, 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (1979).
[920]*920We decline, however, to establish a per se rule that the immunized testimony can never be an act of free will on the part of the witness sufficient to attenuate the taint of the initial illegality. We consider the Supreme Court’s comments regarding a possibly coerced confession following an illegal arrest to be useful in assessing the present situation as well:
The question whether a confession is the product of a free will under Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case. No single fact is dispositive. The workings of the human mind are too complex, and the possibilities of misconduct too diverse, to permit protection of the Fourth Amendment to turn on such a talismanic test.
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975).11
D.
Before turning to the inevitable discovery issues, we address the court of appeals’ characterization of the agreement between Martin and the investigating detectives as “immunity” because that matter is critical to the attenuation analysis, particularly the “free will” criterion. The police officers, the witness, and counsel for the parties have consistently applied the “immunity” label to that agreement. However, based on the undisputed testimony, we conclude that the more precise description of the People’s agreement with Martin is a promise of immunity or promise not to prosecute.
Upon being confronted with the statements of Neeley, Martin requested “immunity.” After the detectives conferred with the district attorney, a bargain was struck. Martin agreed to tell the officers what he knew about the details of the homicide. In return, the officers promised Martin he would not be charged with the murder if he was not involved in a crime of violence and he passed a lie detector test. After failing two polygraph examinations, the detectives and Martin entered into further negotiations. A second agreement was reached whereby Martin would be granted immunity if he was able to obtain incriminating statements from Briggs. When such statements were obtained, a formal order of immunity was entered by the trial court.
In light of the principles set forth in this opinion, it is necessary to distinguish between Martin’s in-court testimony, given pursuant to a formal judicial grant of immunity in the criminal proceedings, and his statements to the officers and the tape recording. There are principled reasons why we decline to equate a promise of immunity with a grant of immunity.12
There is a functional distinction between a promise and a grant of immunity in terms of the sanctions which the court may invoke against a witness who refuses to perform his end of the bargain. Violation of a formal immunity grant can result [921]*921either in a jail term for contempt or prosecution for perjury. Indeed, it is the availability of such sanctions which have led courts to characterize immunized testimony as “compelled” or “coerced.” E.g., United States v. Scios, 590 F.2d 956 (D.C.Cir.1978). On the other hand, statements made pursuant to a mere promise of immunity are not subject to such sanctions, so that while they may be induced by the promise, they are not “compelled.” See State v. Wakinekona, 53 Hawaii 574, 499 P.2d 678 (1972); R. Thornburgh, Reconciling Federal Prosecution and the Fifth Amendment: “Criminal Coddling, ” “The New Torture” or “A Rational Accommodation?,” 67 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 155, 166 (1976).
Moreover, where the promise of immunity is made conditional, e.g., upon satisfactory performance on a polygraph examination, the promisee recognizes the possibility that he may not receive immunity. While the witness may continue to have an incentive to speak to the law enforcement authorities, he has not been induced to do so to the same extent as in the unconditional promise or formal grant of immunity situations. Cf. United States v. Houltin, 566 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 826, 99 S.Ct. 97, 58 L.Ed.2d 118, reh’g denied, 439 U.S. 997, 99 S.Ct. 600, 58 L.Ed.2d 671 (1978).13
It is thus important for trial courts to examine the degree of volition exercised by a witness or suspect by evaluating the context in which his statement was made. See Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will and the Law of Confessions, 65 Va.L.Rev. 859-60 (1979). Although the Supreme Court has rarely used this approach in express terms, but see United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 n. 11, 91 S.Ct. 547, 557 n. 11, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971), it implicitly adheres to such a practice. Compare Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), and Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 99 S.Ct. 492, 58 L.Ed.2d 466 (1978) (a guilty plea is voluntary even though induced by threat of substantially higher penalty or promise of benefit), with Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897); accord Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 97 S.Ct. 202, 50 L.Ed.2d 194 (1976) (per curiam) (confession involuntary if obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight).
In considering whether a witness has acted of his own free will in giving a statement, it is instructive to consider cases involving a coerced confession. Whether free will was exercised in such situations depends on the circumstances of the particular case. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). The analogy is useful where immunized testimony is at issue, because “compelled” utterances are present in both instances. In confession cases, however, the speaker’s statement will be used against him, whereas in the immunity-attenuation context, it will be used against others. Since an individual will generally be more reluctant to incriminate himself than someone else, a greater degree of free [922]*922will must be shown in the former instance than in the latter to establish attenuation.
III.
The People claim that the prosecution raised the inevitable discovery question at the suppression hearing and that the case should be remanded to the trial court for factual findings on the issue. We reject both arguments.
In People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583, 591 (Colo.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162, 102 S.Ct. 1036, 71 L.Ed.2d 318 (1982), we recognized the doctrine of inevitable discovery, in addition to a showing of independent source or attenuation, as a basis for the admission of evidence in circumstances where a constitutional violation has occurred. We stated: “As an alternative to a showing of independent source or sufficient attenuation the prosecution might be able to demonstrate, as a basis for admission, that the witnesses and their testimony inevitably would have been discovered in the normal course of police investigation.” (Citations omitted.) See also People v. Quintero, 657 P.2d 948 (Colo.), cert. dismissed sub nom. Colorado v. Quintero, 464 U.S. 1014, 104 S.Ct. 543, 78 L.Ed.2d 719 (1983).
The Supreme Court has recently established, in the sixth amendment right to counsel context, that the exclusionary rule does not compel the suppression of evidence that the prosecution can show would have been inevitably discovered' absent the police misconduct or mistake: “If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means ... then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (footnote omitted).14 Moreover, the reception of such evidence does nothing to compromise “either the integrity or fairness of a criminal trial.” Id. 104 S.Ct. at 2510. This analysis applies equally in the context of a fifth amendment violation. See id. at 2508 n. 3. Thus, the challenged evidence in this case would have been properly admitted if the People had demonstrated that it would have been inevitably discovered. See People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583 (Colo.1981).
We now turn to the court of appeals’ holding that the inevitable discovery question was not preserved for review. At the suppression hearing, the deputy district attorney made the following statements in his argument to the court:
MR. SELL: I realize that they learned of the — as we’ve, been calling here — the “Indiana Connection” through some statements obtained from Mr. Briggs. Then they, subsequently, learned of who Bill Neeley was through talking to Kirk Martin. And they, subsequently, learned through Bill Neeley various other bits of information once they had interviewed him. I think, when we look at the whole scenario of that, there are a number of exceptions to the Wong Sun rule that are present here. And the Court is aware there are several exception, [sic] one being if the evidence is the connection between illegality and the evidence subsequently discovered, if that connection is so attenuated as to dissipate the connection, there is not taint and the rule of law of suppressing that evidence would not apply.
Secondly, there’s the exception of independent source. I think that also applies in this case because we have an independent source. We have Bill Neeley. We also have Kirk Martin who is actually an independent source because they already knew his identity. They knew that he had some involvement with, the burglary that’s been investigated, so they came and talked to him.
[923]*923THE COURT: Are you saying this is an intervening independent act by a third party?
MR. SELL: It’s an independent intervening factor or intervening source.
The record establishes that the prosecutor did not rely upon “inevitable discovery” during the proceeding, but, instead, urged that the contested evidence should be admitted under either the “attenuation” or “independent source” exceptions to the exclusionary rule. There is a functional similarity between the inevitable discovery and independent source doctrines in that each is designed to prevent the prosecution from being in a worse position simply because of police error or misconduct, if the government can establish that the evidence was discovered through a source independent of the constitutional violation or that the information would have been inevitably discovered by lawful means. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). In his dissenting opinion in Nix, Justice Brennan cogently explained the distinction between the two exceptions.
When properly applied, the “independent source” exception allows the prosecution to use evidence only if it was, in fact, obtained by fully lawful means.... The “inevitable discovery” exception ... differs in one key respect from its next of kin: specifically, the evidence sought to be introduced at trial has not actually been obtained from an independent source, but rather would have been discovered as a matter of course if independent investigations were allowed to proceed.
Id. 104 S.Ct. at 2517 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In applying these principles to the record before us, we conclude that the inevitable discovery issue was not raised in the trial court. We construe the substance of the evidence presented by the prosecutor and his arguments at the suppression hearing as raising only the grounds of attenuation and independent source15 as exceptions to the exclusionary rule.16 Thus, the [924]*924inevitable discovery question is not presented by the record before us.17
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions to return the case to the district, court for further findings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
ROVIRA, J., dissents in part and concurs in part.
ERICKSON, J., joins in the dissent and concurrence.
KIRSHBAUM, J., does not participate.