OPINION OF THE COURT
Rubin, J.
This appeal raises the question of whether a defendant who has inflicted a mortal wound on another person can escape a homicide conviction because of the acts of hospital doctors in removing the victim’s kidneys and spleen for transplant and thereafter disconnecting life support systems. In essence, defendant’s principal contention is that the People have not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he “cause[d] the death” of the victim (Penal Law, § 125.00). Additionally, he claims that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the definition of death.
After considering all of the circumstances of this case, it is clear that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support the jury verdict. The trial court’s charge was meticulous and exhaustive and allowed for a full range of possible verdicts. Key concepts of intent and causation were presented. It was not reversible error for the trial court to have refused to define death.
_
[397]*397The underlying physical facts constituting the crimes charged are not in dispute. Defendant was acquainted with a small-time marihuana dealer named Orlando Miranda, also known as “Little Man”. The two became enemies and apparently had several arguments. Defendant felt that Miranda was deliberately harassing and embarrassing him in front of his cohorts. Finally, on the evening of February 6, 1979, defendant saw Miranda outside of the cleaning store where defendant was employed, at which time Miranda gave him “a bad look”. Prior to this, defendant had been drinking and had consumed somewhere between one and one and one-half quarts of rum with three other friends. Defendant borrowed a 32-caliber pistol from a friend, and went to the area where Miranda could normally be found. He located Miranda and kept him under observation for about two hours, waiting until he was alone. He then approached Miranda and attempted to buy some marihuana from him. An argument ensued and defendant pulled out the gun and fired at least twice at Miranda. One bullet entered the right earlobe, passed through the right side of the brain, bruising but not destroying the brainstem,1 and came to rest in the left rear portion of the brain. The other bullet appears to have entered the body through the right shoulder and exited the left chest near the breastbone.
The defendant fled the scene and shortly thereafter, at about 10:30 p.m., a police car arrived. A police officer immediately radioed for an ambulance, but when none appeared within a few minutes, he placed Miranda in his police car and rushed him to Brookdale Hospital. When the victim arrived at the hospital emergency room, he was comatose, but had some slight reaction to noxious stimuli. Within minutes his condition deteriorated. He became totally unresponsive and remained so thereafter. He was placed on a respirator and various drug therapies were [398]*398undertaken without result. On the following day, February 7, he was totally areflexic — completely unresponsive to all stimuli. His respiration and blood pressure were artificially supported. Two electroencephalograms (EEGs)2 were reported to be “flat”.3 Dr. Meyer Rosenberg, chief of neurosurgery at the hospital, pronounced Miranda’s condition to be cerebral death. Shortly thereafter the victim’s mother signed a consent and Miranda’s kidneys and spleen were removed for donation.
Investigation by the police ultimately led to defendant and, in April of 1979, he was arrested. He confessed twice to the shooting, first to a detective, and then to an Assistant District Attorney, waiving his right to an attorney in both instances. He was indicted and charged with murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
At trial the evidence as to the actual cause of death was provided by the Brookdale Hospital report, the autopsy report and the testimony of three physicians. Dr. Rosenberg, the attending physician, and Dr. Milton Wald, the medical examiner, testified for the People and Dr. H. Richard Beresford testified for the defense. All three medical witnesses were highly qualified.
Dr. Rosenberg first saw Miranda on the morning of February 7, 1979, at around 9:00 a.m. Prior to examining him he had received a medical history. At the time of the examination Miranda was on a mechanical respirator. Dr. Rosenberg proceeded to subject him to a series of standard tests and found him to be totally areflexic, i.e., without reflex. Testimony revealed that these tests included: touching cotton to the eyeball to see if the eye closed; flashing light on the pupil to see if it would constrict; turning the head to one side to detect eye movement (doll’s [399]*399eye test); and pinching the side of the neck to see if the eye would dilate to the painful stimulus. Miranda was completely immobile and unresponsive to light or to any other stimulus. The doctor also tested Miranda for spontaneous respiration by disconnecting the mechanical respirator for two or three minutes. Miranda was unable to breathe without the aid of the machine and it was reconnected.
At trial, the doctor stated that he did not perform another common test known as the colonie or ice water test whereby a physician introduces ice water into the ear canal and watches for eye movement in the direction of this uncomfortable stimulus. Based on his previous experience with head injuries such as Miranda’s, he considered the “constellation” of tests used sufficient. On the following day, February 8, 1979, Dr. Rosenberg went through some of the same tests once again, with identical results. By this time, he had also been notified of the results of two EEGs which confirmed his diagnosis. He accepted the oral report that they were flat though he did not personally evaluate the EEGs. After this final examination, Dr. Rosenberg pronounced Miranda “brain dead”. Dr. Rosenberg testified that he had seen other gunshot wounds of the type that Miranda had received and to his knowledge no one had ever survived a wound or trauma of this nature. He attributed the direct cause of death to the gunshot wound and its secondary effect on the brain. Beginning at about 9:25 p.m., Miranda’s kidneys and spleen were removed for transplant. Hospital records disclose that anesthesia was not used during the operation though the victim remained on the respirator.
Dr. Milton Wald, the medical examiner, testified that he performed the autopsy on Miranda on February 9, 1979. He detailed the locations of the bullet wounds, and noted the removal of the deceased’s kidneys. He stated, repeatedly and without qualification, on both direct and cross-examination, that Miranda’s death was solely attributable to the bullet wound to the skull and brain:
“Q Could you say specifically and unequivocally, doctor, that the death of Orlando Miranda was solely attributable to the gunshot wounds?
“A Yes, sir.
[400]*400“Q You can say that?
“Q Unequivocally?
“A Yes.
“Q That’s based upon your examination or is that also based upon the determination of brain death as received by you from Brookdale Hospital?
“A Without the determination of brain death. Without that.
“Q And without the transplant?
“A Without the transplant.
“Q Death was caused solely by the —
“A Gunshot wound of head and brain.”
Dr. Wald described the sticky, soft texture of the victim’s brain as being consistent with brain death. However, he could not specify when brain death occurred nor could he prognosticate how long Miranda would have survived in a vegetative state or otherwise were it not for other intervening factors.
Dr. H. Richard Beresford, both a physician and a lawyer, qualified as an expert witness for the defense in the field of medicine and neurology. He, of course, did not examine Miranda but he had inspected the Brookdale Hospital records and the autopsy report. He elaborated on certain tests which he felt were essential to an examiner in order for him to make a finding of brain death, and expressed the opinion that the tests that had been administered did not meet current neurologie criteria. Dr. Beresford voiced doubt as to whether Miranda was actually “brain dead” when he was so pronounced. He did not, however, testify that Miranda was alive at that time or that the surgery or removal from the respirator was the cause of death. His judgment was based on his evaluation of the hospital records which did not specify all of the diagnostic tests performed by Dr. Rosenberg. Two unlisted tests (the doll’s eye test and the spontaneous respiration test), considered essential by Dr. Beresford, were actually performed.
Dr. Beresford admitted that there were varying criteria acceptable to the medical community for determination of [401]*401brain death, with no single definitive procedure required. He disagreed with the method used by Dr. Rosenberg in testing for spontaneous respiration and with his evaluation of the two EEGs. Reading from the hospital record, he noted an entry concerning the first EEG stating that it was “normal”. Dr. Rosenberg had relied on an oral report that this same EEG was “flat”, indicating that there was no brain activity at that particular time. The second EEG exhibited “artefacts” which are signs of electrical activity. Dr. Beresford was not clear whether these artefacts could be attributed to a source other than the brain or if in fact this EEG was indeed “flat”. The doctor further stated that the EEG was a means of measuring higher level brain function, and not a test that would exclusively establish brain death.4 He opined that measurement of brainstem function could be achieved either through the doll’s eye response or the ice water test.
As indicated by the foregoing synopsis of Dr. Beresford’s testimony, a primary thrust of the defense strategy was predicated on brain death. We are, therefore, constrained under these circumstances to consider this proposed definition of death. However, the critical issue in this case is “causation”.
Until recent years the legal definition of death had evolved through the common law as a cardiorespiratory standard and was generally recognized as: “The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent thereon, such as respiration, pulsation etc.” (Black’s Law Dictionary [4th ed, 1968], p 488). The science of medicine has advanced to a point where traumas and illnesses which were certain to cause death a few years ago do not necessarily result in death at the present time. Of immense importance in this area has been the invention and development of so-called “life support systems”. Today most hospitals have equipment which can either substitute for, or stimulate and [402]*402maintain, certain basic body functions which are necessary to sustain life. In most cases they are used until such time as corrective medical practices, such as surgery, or the natural recuperative powers of the human body itself, restore the individual to normal function. Of course, there are cases where the damage is so severe that neither artificial means nor natural recuperative powers can succeed and, as a result, basic life functions continue only so long as the artificial life support systems sustain them or, in some cases, death occurs in spite of the life support systems. These advances in medical technology sometimes blur the distinction between life and death (Matter of Eichner [Fox], 73 AD2d 431, 448, mod 52 NY2d 363). This has brought about a need for an expanded definition of “death”, going beyond the classical definition set forth above (see Biorck, When is Death?, 1968 Wis L Rev 484; see, also, Showalter, Determining Death: The Legal and Theological Aspects of Brain-Related Criteria, 27 Cath Lawyer 112).
The latest edition of Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed, 1979) now defines death (p 360) as follows: “The cessation of life; permanent cessations of all vital functions and signs. Numerous states have enacted statutory definitions of death which include brain-related criteria.” Parenthetically, it should be stated that New York is not one of the States which has enacted such a statutory definition. Since 1975, bills have been introduced in the State Legislature to add a new section 4140-a to the Public Health Law, the latest being in February, 1983.5 Such proposed legislation has never been voted out of committee.
The latest edition of Black’s Law Dictionary also defines “brain death” as follows (p 170):
[403]*403“Numerous states have enacted statutory definitions of death which include brain-related criteria. ‘A person shall be pronounced dead if it is determined by a physician that the person has suffered a total and irreversible cessation of brain function. There shall be independent confirmation of the death by another physician,’ Calif. Health & Safety Code, Section 7180 (1976).
“Characteristics of brain death consist of: (1) unreceptivity and unresponsiveness to externally applied stimuli and internal needs; (2) no spontaneous movements or breathing; (3) no reflex activity; and (4) a flat electroencephalograph reading after 24 hour period of observation. Com. v. Golston, Mass., 366 N.E.2d 744. An increasing number of states have adopted this so-called ‘Harvard’ definition of brain death, either by statute or court decision.” Actually all three medical witnesses in the case at bar appeared to be in general agreement with this definition and differed only as to the procedures and number of tests necessary to diagnose brain death.
To date, 27 States have enacted laws defining death (see President’s Comm Report, Appendix C, p 120; n 1, supra). The precursor was the Kansas statute, “An Act Relating to and Defining Death”, passed in 1970 (Kan Stats Ann, § 77-202). This seminal statute defines death as the cessation of circulatory and respiratory function or, in the event these functions are being artificially maintained, defines death as occurring with the total and irreversible cessation of brain function (see C apron and Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U of Pa L Rev 87, 108). Of great significance is the Uniform Determination of Death Act which has been disseminated by the July, 1981 report “Defining Death” (President’s Comm Report, op cit., p 119). The definition contained in that act has the support of both the American Bar Association and the American Medical Association. It states in relevant part that: “An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards”. The simplic[404]*404ity of this dual definition is embodied in the most recent proposal to add a section 4140-a to the New York Public Health Law (see n 5, supra). It recognizes that death occurs when the brain ceases to function, notwithstanding the fact that vital organs continue to be artificially sustained. If passed, a statute embodying this definition would help to alleviate the legal quandary that now exists and eliminate judicial second guessing. At present, it is conceivable that a victim such as Miranda could be pronounced brain dead in a State with a statutory definition of death while considered alive in another State simply based on the fact that his cardiorespiratory functions continue under the aegis of a machine.
Such a definition and knowledge of the time of death as defined by the Legislature is essential in those situations where organ transplants are to be performed (Note, Medical Jurisprudence — Determining the Time of Death of the Heart Transplant Donor, 51 NC L Rev 172). Success of a transplant is maximized if the organ is removed as soon after death as possible. This prevents deterioration and assures the organ’s prime condition for the preservation of another life (see Organ Transplant — Test for Death of Donor, Ann., 76 ALR3d 913; Matter of New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v Sulsona, 81 Misc 2d 1002). It is for this reason that artificial means are used to maintain the donor’s “traditional life-signaling functions” (Ann., 76 ALR3d 913, 914) even after pronouncement of brain death, though this produces the anomalous result of a dead brain coexisting with live organs. However, prolonged sustenance of a brain-dead individual will destroy the viability of any of his organs (Note, Survey of the Legal Aspects of Organ Transplantation, 50 Chi-Kent L Rev 510).
The fact that respiration and heartbeat continue, albeit through mechanical means, creates a dilemma for the physician who is to perform organ removal surgery and then disconnect the brain-dead patient from supportive equipment. Strict adherence to the traditional definition of death could squarely place hospitals and physicians in the path of tort and criminal liability. It was to prevent this result and thereby encourage anatomical gifts that our State adopted the Uniform Anatomical Gifts Act (Public [405]*405Health Law, art 43). That act, however, does not define death or the time at which it occurs. This has had a “chilling” effect on transplant surgery. In an effort to implement the purposes of the act, the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation petitioned the New York Supreme Court for a declaratory judgment as to the legislative intent in the use of the word “death”. The court ruled that it should be construed in accordance with generally accepted medical standards which now encompass a neurologically oriented concept of death (Matter of New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v Sulsona, supra).
The stringent criteria that have been promulgated to justify the diagnosis of brain death under laws of this nature were first used in 1968 by the Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death (McCabe, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J Amer Med Assn 337; see Matter of Bowman, 94 Wn 2d 407). They seek to evaluate both higher brain function as well as lower brainstem function and are the criteria that have been included in the Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed) definition of brain death. It should be noted that the criterion of a flat EEC is not mandatory but is considered confirmatory. There must be permanent destruction of the entire brain evidenced by reproduction of these criteria after a passage of 24 hours. If drugs and hypothermia can be ruled out as a cause of the persistent coma and the patient’s status persists, brain death has occurred (Hirsh, Brain Death: Medico-Legal Fact, or Fiction? 3 N Ky State L F 16; Comment, The Criteria for Determining Death in Vital Organ Transplants — A Medico-Legal Dilemma, 38 Mo L Rev 220; Victor, Brain Death: An Overview, 1981 Med Trial Technique Q 37, 45; see Matter of Mora, 107 Misc 2d 290). Though this determination is not simple, and new criteria have arisen which are not universally recognized or applied (Friloux, Death, When Does It Occur?, 27 Baylor L Rev 10,11; Compton, Telling the Time of Human Death by Statute: An Essential and Progressive Trend, 31 Wash and Lee L Rev 521, 522;. lc Gordy-Gray, Attorneys’ Textbook of Medicine, pars 29A.02, 29A.10), the sine qua non of a determination of brain death, whatever the protocol used, appears to be careful clinical assessment by the [406]*406attending physician accompanied by the identification of the cause of the damage to the brain (President’s Comm Report, op cit., p 27).
Brain death as just described must be distinguished from the persistent vegetative state exhibited in the widely publicized Karen Ann Quinlan case (Matter of Quinlan, 137 N J Super 227, mod 70 NJ 10, cert den sub nom. Garger v New Jersey, 429 US 922). The issue there focused on whether life support systems could be removed even though the brain was not irreversibly and totally destroyed. In New York, a similar situation was recently addressed in the case of Matter of Eichner (Fox) (102 Misc 2d 184, mod 73 AD2d 431, mod 52 NY2d 363, supra). In our court, the very scholarly and all encompassing opinion by Presiding Justice Mollen established a set of guidelines, later modified, which enables parties with standing to remove life supports from patients who are terminally ill, in a perpetual coma, and lack cognitive brain functions associated with the higher level of brain activity. These individuals possess some primitive form of reflex activity of the brainstem. Though lacking the sapient functions of thinking, feeling, sensing, and understanding, they nonetheless can be maintained in a vegetative state independently or with the assistance of mechanical support.
The defendant herein seeks to capitalize on the enigma of death, brain death, and their “definition”. Prior to the commencement of the trial, the prosecutor and defense counsel had discussions with the court concerning a legal definition of death and the record indicates that considerable research was done on the -question. At that time the court initially indicated that it would give the jury a somewhat different definition of death than the classic cessation of respiration and heart function, and that it intended to instruct the jury that: “death is the irreversible cessation of all functions of the brain”.
The prosecutor and defense counsel indicated agreement with that definition. The court, however, also recognized that perhaps it was being premature and chose to “hold off” on any decision as to that instruction. During the trial, the jury was told that unlike some States, New York has no legal definition of death and when it occurs. Later, at the [407]*407conclusion of testimony, Justice Kooper properly refused defendant’s request to charge a brain death definition.
This court has previously declared that postulation of brain death criteria for the determination of death “has not as yet been accepted as legally conclusive of the issue in this State” (Matter of Eichner [Fox], 73 AD2d 431, 449, mod 52 NY2d 363, supra). While it is primarily the Legislature’s prerogative to make substantive changes in the law, based on the facts sub judice it is unnecessary to usurp the legislative function in view of settled law in this State on criminal causation. In the absence of any statutory directive, and with the knowledge that the New York Legislature has been unable to reach a consensus on this controversial issue, we are not inclined to select from the many definitions of sister States.6
The issue of whether to charge a judicially formulated definition of death, absent a statutory definition, has been confronted in other jurisdictions. In Cranmore v State (85 Wis 2d 722), the court declined to instruct the jury on what constitutes death and when it occurs. On review, it was found not to be reversible error. Wisconsin, like New York, was awaiting a legislative determination of an acceptable definition. As in the case at bar, the possibility existed under the facts in Cranmore that the Harvard criteria had not been fully complied with. There, however, no expert medical witness testified for the defense addressing the issue of brain death. The appeals court said (p 774): “We do not choose to define death, nor do we believe that the trial court was required to do so. We need only determine whether the jury could reasonably be convinced from the evidence which it had a right to believe and accept as true that the defendants were responsible for the death of [the victim.]”
The Massachusetts trial court in Commonwealth v Golston (373 Mass 249, cert den 434 US 1039), specifically [408]*408charged a brain death definition. Significantly, the appeals court in accepting the definition said (p 257): “[I]f the issue of ‘brain death’ had not been submitted to the jury, the same evidence would have been considered on the issue whether the doctor’s conduct in disconnecting the respirator was an independent supervening cause of death. The outcome would have been the same.”
It was therefore decided that error, if any, in submitting this instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and the Judge’s charge was not an ex post facto change in the law or an invasion of the Legislature’s province (cf. Henderson v Kibbe, 431 US 145).
By judicial fiat, the Supreme Court of Colorado in Lovato v District Ct. (198 Col 419), adopted a brain death definition to supplement traditional medical standards. It asserted (p 432): “We do not, however, believe that in the absence of legislative action we are precluded from facing and resolving the legal issue of whether irretrievable loss of brain function can be used as a means of detecting the condition of death. Under the circumstances of this case we are not only entitled to resolve the question, but have a duty to do so. To act otherwise would be to close our eyes to the scientific and medical advances made world wide in the past two or three decades.” An instruction on brain death derived from Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed) was charged in an Indiana case, Swafford v State (_ Ind _, _, 421 NE2d 596, 598), and no error was found. Upon review the court remarked that it too would not close its eyes to change and disregard reality. Therefore, the disposition of the case was not controlled by the traditional definition of death (see Matter of Bowman, 94 Wn 2d 407, supra).
On appeal here the defendant addresses the issue of his culpability under both the common-law and brain death definitions. If this court subscribes solely to the traditional definition whereby cessation of heartbeat and respiration are tantamount to death, then the defendant asserts that Miranda did not die until his kidneys and the respirator were removed by the independent intervening acts of the hospital physicians. If, however, death is no longer solely synonymous with these observable phenomena but also rests upon a finding of brain death, defendant alternately [409]*409asserts that the criteria were not met by the attending physician, Dr. Rosenberg. Therefore, the defendant contends that, by any definition, someone else “caused” Miranda’s death.
Although in every homicide trial, by statute, it is necessary that the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant “cause[d] the death of a person” (Penal Law, § 125.00), New York has no concomitant statutory provision to guide a court in the determination of the effect of the intervening act of a hospital staff upon the defendant’s criminal liability (People v Stewart, 40 NY2d 692, 696; People v Kibbe, 35 NY2d 407, 412). The issue of whether the bullet wound to the brain was a proximate cause of Miranda’s death must be a sui generis determination based on the facts in this particular case. The use here of life sustaining equipment merely adds a variation on the theme of criminal causation but does hot alter existing law. Accordingly, a statute defining death would not aid the defendant in a case such as this (see State v Holsclaw, 42 NC App 696).
Criminal liability for homicide requires that the defendant’s actions be a sufficiently direct cause of death (People v Stewart, supra, p 697; People v Kibbe, supra, p 413), but direct does not mean immediate or unaided (Cox v People, 80 NY 500; People v Brengard, 265 NY 100). It is enough that defendant’s conduct forged a link in a chain of events which brought about the death (People v Stewart, supra, p 697). Intervention of a secondary agency constitutes a defense only if the death is solely attributable to it (People v Stewart, supra; People v Kibbe, supra).
Regardless of which definition of death is followed, defendant’s actions were dangerous to life and were a substantial and sufficiently direct factor in the chain. He set in motion the chain of events which ultimately resulted in the victim’s death (People v Stewart, supra, p 696; People v Kibbe, supra, p 412). It cannot be said that there was an obscure or merely probable connection between the assault and Miranda’s demise (People v Brengard, supra, p 108; People v Stewart, supra, p 697). The bullet wound to the brain was the proximate cause of death and the homicide was properly attributed to the defendant.
[410]*410The organ removal was not performed to treat or remedy the victim’s injuries. Furthermore, this is not an instance “where the death is solely attributable to the secondary agency, and not at all induced by the primary one” (People v Kane, 213 NY 260, 270). The prognosis for Miranda’s survival, as expressed by all three testifying experts, was very unfavorable.7 Organ removal would not have been initiated but for the mortal wound. This case is distinguishable from the Stewart case (40 NY2d 692, supra) on which the defense heavily relies. In Stewart, operating surgeons performed unrelated surgical repair on a hernia immediately after attending to a stab wound in the victim’s abdomen. One month following surgery the victim died of cardiac arrest. Testimony indicated that probably he would have survived the operation for the stab wound if the other procedure had not been performed. In addition, there was also evidence that the anesthesiologist may have been negligent in failing to oxygenate the victim and this alone could have caused the fatal result. Therefore, the defendant’s actions were not a sufficiently direct cause of death (People v Kibbe, 35 NY2d 407, supra) and his conviction for manslaughter in the first degree was reduced to assault in the first degree (cf. People v Warner-Lambert Co., 51 NY2d 295, 307).
Unlike the stab wound in Stewart (supra), the bullet wound to Miranda’s brain was operative as the cause of death (accord People v Roberts, 73 AD2d 954; People v Lozano, 107 Misc 2d 345). Therefore, even if Miranda’s doctors were hasty or erroneous in their diagnosis of brain death, and even if they were negligent in disconnecting the life support systems, their intervention would not be a supervening act relieving the defendant from liability (People v Kane, supra, p 262). The defendant will be held [411]*411accountable “although other factors, entering after the injury, have contributed to the fatal result” (People v Stewart, supra, p 697; cf. People v Cicchetti, 44 NY2d 803, 804). He is responsible in law and must answer for the consequences of his actions (Ryu, Causation in Criminal Law, 106 U of Pa L Rev 773, 783).
While it is true that Miranda was an ideal source for organ donation because of his young age and otherwise good health, and that speed was essential to the outcome of a successful transplant, there is no indication, as the defense posited in its summation, that untoward motivation existed to hasten the brain death determination before it was warranted. The defendant’s argument cannot be accepted that one who acts in good faith, and negligently or by error of judgment shuts off life support machinery, or removes essential organs, is responsible for death instead of the culprit who acts of his own volition and inflicts a massive traumatic wound to the brain with a deadly weapon.
Defendant’s identical defense strategy has been raised in other jurisdictions in cases with facts similar to those that are before us. The courts therein have all reached a similar result. The Arizona Supreme Court in State v Fierro (124 Ariz 182, 185) held that “removal of life support systems did not change nor alter the natural progression of the victim’s physical condition from the gunshot wounds in the head to his resulting death”, nor was it “ ‘indispensible to a conviction that wounds be fatal and the direct cause of death’ ” (p 184). It was “ ‘sufficient that they cause death indirectly through a chain of natural effects’ ” (pp 184-185). There, too, the gunshot wounds were found to be the proximate cause of death though there was a removal of life support systems. The court also noted that a statutory definition of death was not necessary for resolution of the case.
In State v Shaffer (223 Kan 244), an expert testified, as did Dr. Beresford, that more tests should have been performed before the pronouncement of death. The doctors determined the victim was brain dead and removed one of his kidneys for transplant and then turned off the respirator. Nevertheless, the defendant was found guilty. The [412]*412court stated that (p 250) “[w]here a person inflicts upon another a wound which is calculated to endanger or destroy life, it is not a defense to a charge of homicide that the alleged victim’s death was contributed to or caused by the negligence of the attending physicians”. The courts uniformly appear to hold that intervening medical error is not a defense to exculpate one who has inflicted a mortal wound to another (People v Vanderford, 77 Mich App 370; People v Olson, 60 Ill App 3d 535; Cranmore v State, 85 Wis 2d 722, supra). Of course, the “acts of the defendant must be a real cause, a cause without which the decedent’s death would not have occurred” (State v Holsclaw, 42 NC App 696, 699, supra) whether they “contribute either mediately or immediately to the death” (Swafford v State, _ Ind _, _, 421 NE2d 596, 602, supra). Therefore it becomes immaterial to defendant’s guilt whether death is pronounced before or after the life support system is disconnected (People v Vanderford, supra).
Finally, we consider the learned Trial Justice’s very thorough instructions to the jury.8 The charge included six possible crimes and covered the many permutations of intent, causation, recklessness, effect of intoxication and intervention of a secondary agency. Also before the jury was the credibility, persuasiveness and conflicting clinical opinions of the three experts, and various medical protocols. Nonetheless, it found the defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree in that he intended serious harm and caused death; and, in addition, it found him guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
The finding by the trier of fact against the defendant now entitles the prosecution to the most favorable view of the evidence. This includes the indulgence in all permissible inferences in its favor (People v Benzinger, 36 NY2d 29, 32; Matter of Kornblum Metals Co. v Intsel Corp., 38 NY2d 376). It is also well settled that a reviewing court will not supplant the determination of the jury where the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence (People v O’Brien, 48 AD2d 446). It cannot be said as a matter of law that the [413]*413jury’s finding is wrong or that failure to charge a definition of death is error when a jury charge is as thorough and detailed as that made in this case.
Accordingly, the judgment should be affirmed.