Per Curiam.
Following a four-day jury trial, defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, contrary to MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), and felonious assault, contrary to MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277. Defendant was sentenced to two years in prison for the felony-firearm conviction, received a suspended sentence for the felonious assault conviction, and now appeals of right.
Defendant’s conviction resulted from a shooting which took place at the Clock Restaurant in Howell. The complainant, James Hale, charged that the defendant rammed his car into the back end of Hale’s 1973 Pinto several times as he and two friends were driving into Howell at approximately 1:30 a.m. on September 16, 1979. As the vehicles approached Grand River Avenue, defendant turned toward the Clock Restaurant and Hale and his two friends went in the opposite direction. Hale later decided he wanted to find out why defendant had rammed into his car and he and his friends went looking for the defendant. They found [228]*228defendant’s car in the parking lot of the Clock Restaurant. Hale went into the restaurant while his friends waited in the car.
There is conflicting testimony as to what took place in the restaurant. Hale walked in and approached defendant, who was sitting alone in a booth. Angry words were exchanged and defendant stood up and hit Hale. Several witnesses said that the defendant pulled a handgun out of his pocket, aimed it at Hale, and fired from a distance of two to three feet. Other witnesses said the gun went off as defendant was swinging at Hale a second time, with the gun in his hand, and defendant did not aim the gun before it discharged. The bullet grazed Hale’s forehead, leaving a three- to four-inch laceration. After he was shot, Hale fell to the floor. Defendant walked out of the restaurant, kicking Hale in the face as he left. Once outside, defendant was confronted by Hale’s two friends. They had gotten out of their car when they saw defendant leave the restaurant. One of them held a tire iron in his hand. The police arrived before any further encounter took place. Defendant voluntarily gave himself up to the police.
On appeal, defendant makes three claims of reversible error. We find that two claims require reversal of his conviction.
Defendant first contends that the assistant prosecutor injected misstatements and prejudicial comments into the trial so as to deny defendant a fair trial. We agree. The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. People v Thomas, 86 Mich App 752; 273 NW2d 548 (1978), People v Williams, 11 Mich App 62; 160 NW2d 599 (1968). On 11 different occasions the assistant prosecutor went beyond the scope of proper prosecutorial statement and [229]*229comment upon the evidence. We will not discuss each instance, but state the most serious errors.
We note that defense counsel did not object at trial to all of the alleged errors claimed on appeal. However, failure to object does not preclude review if failure to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice. People v Duncan, 402 Mich 1, 15-16; 260 NW2d 58 (1977).
The assistant prosecutor personally vouched for the character of two key prosecution witnesses. During closing argument he stated:
"You saw the first two that testified. If they look very assaultive or aggressive, I am sorry. They are two of the meekest, mildest people I have seen in this line of business. I don’t know how they could have instilled any fear in somebody.”
It is well-established that the prosecutor may not vouch for the character of a witness or place the prestige of his office behind them. People v Yearrell, 101 Mich App 164; 300 NW2d 483 (1980), People v Erb, 48 Mich App 622; 211 NW2d 51 (1973). Moreover, on direct examination the assistant prosecutor impermissibly questioned the victim concerning his character for peacefulness before his character was attacked contrary to MRE 404. Since defendant’s case rested in part upon a theory of self-defense, the comments prejudiced that defense.
The assistant prosecutor unnecessarily inflamed the jury with the unsubstantiated and off-handed statement:
"I shutter [sic] to think what would happen if somebody came in that didn’t have anything to do with that and say something to the man. He was ornery and [230]*230obnoxious and he would probably have tried to kill them, too.”
The prosecutor is not free to speculate as to what might have happened with somebody else. The trial court properly sustained defense counsel’s objection.
The assistant prosecutor also stated:
"Listen carefully to what Mr. Decocq [defense counsel] tells you and what he promised to show you when he started this trial. Because when an attorney argues to you he tries to bridge a gap between you and he [sic] for credibility. If you are going to buy my argument, you have to believe that I am a credible person. I am saying that in order to be credible you have to do and show what you feel you can show.”
This comment was impermissible because it suggested that defense counsel was personally not a credible person and therefore he had failed to prove his case. The comment subtly implied that defendant failed to prove his innocence and, as such, was in error even though no objection was made at trial.
Further, counsel stated:
"Mr. Decocq has also talked lesser included offenses. Yes, the judge does have to give lesser included offenses * * *. It is just like somebody being shot and murdered and lying on the floor in front of you. And you can ask to find him guilty of the lesser offenses of attempted murder, he is dead.
"The law says you have to give the lesser instruction of attempt murder. But he is dead, how can you say it is not murder.”
Defendant was not charged with murder and the victim was not dead. A critical element of the case [231]*231concerned defendant’s intent to inflict injury. The jury was required to determine whether defendant aimed the gun and fired directly at the victim or whether the gun discharged during a physical altercation between the defendant and the victim. It was essential to defendant’s theory of the case that the jury be instructed on lesser included offenses. His right to a conviction commensurate with the evidence produced at trial is more than a mere formality.
The assistant prosecutor proceeded to explain why the bullet only grazed the victim’s head and did not pierce his skull, if in fact defendant aimed the gun before firing from a distance of two to three feet:
"So if you ask me to explain how come it doesn’t go right through his head, maybe it was a dead on center shot and the bullet didn’t go through. It happens a lot in Viet Nam.”
Defense counsel objected and the trial judge properly instructed the jury that whatever happened in Viet Nam was not in evidence at trial.
Finally, the prosecutor argued that there were no powder burns on the victim, indicating that the victim’s injury was caused by a gun fired at short range and not a gun which discharged as it was used to strike the victim.
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Per Curiam.
Following a four-day jury trial, defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, contrary to MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), and felonious assault, contrary to MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277. Defendant was sentenced to two years in prison for the felony-firearm conviction, received a suspended sentence for the felonious assault conviction, and now appeals of right.
Defendant’s conviction resulted from a shooting which took place at the Clock Restaurant in Howell. The complainant, James Hale, charged that the defendant rammed his car into the back end of Hale’s 1973 Pinto several times as he and two friends were driving into Howell at approximately 1:30 a.m. on September 16, 1979. As the vehicles approached Grand River Avenue, defendant turned toward the Clock Restaurant and Hale and his two friends went in the opposite direction. Hale later decided he wanted to find out why defendant had rammed into his car and he and his friends went looking for the defendant. They found [228]*228defendant’s car in the parking lot of the Clock Restaurant. Hale went into the restaurant while his friends waited in the car.
There is conflicting testimony as to what took place in the restaurant. Hale walked in and approached defendant, who was sitting alone in a booth. Angry words were exchanged and defendant stood up and hit Hale. Several witnesses said that the defendant pulled a handgun out of his pocket, aimed it at Hale, and fired from a distance of two to three feet. Other witnesses said the gun went off as defendant was swinging at Hale a second time, with the gun in his hand, and defendant did not aim the gun before it discharged. The bullet grazed Hale’s forehead, leaving a three- to four-inch laceration. After he was shot, Hale fell to the floor. Defendant walked out of the restaurant, kicking Hale in the face as he left. Once outside, defendant was confronted by Hale’s two friends. They had gotten out of their car when they saw defendant leave the restaurant. One of them held a tire iron in his hand. The police arrived before any further encounter took place. Defendant voluntarily gave himself up to the police.
On appeal, defendant makes three claims of reversible error. We find that two claims require reversal of his conviction.
Defendant first contends that the assistant prosecutor injected misstatements and prejudicial comments into the trial so as to deny defendant a fair trial. We agree. The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. People v Thomas, 86 Mich App 752; 273 NW2d 548 (1978), People v Williams, 11 Mich App 62; 160 NW2d 599 (1968). On 11 different occasions the assistant prosecutor went beyond the scope of proper prosecutorial statement and [229]*229comment upon the evidence. We will not discuss each instance, but state the most serious errors.
We note that defense counsel did not object at trial to all of the alleged errors claimed on appeal. However, failure to object does not preclude review if failure to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice. People v Duncan, 402 Mich 1, 15-16; 260 NW2d 58 (1977).
The assistant prosecutor personally vouched for the character of two key prosecution witnesses. During closing argument he stated:
"You saw the first two that testified. If they look very assaultive or aggressive, I am sorry. They are two of the meekest, mildest people I have seen in this line of business. I don’t know how they could have instilled any fear in somebody.”
It is well-established that the prosecutor may not vouch for the character of a witness or place the prestige of his office behind them. People v Yearrell, 101 Mich App 164; 300 NW2d 483 (1980), People v Erb, 48 Mich App 622; 211 NW2d 51 (1973). Moreover, on direct examination the assistant prosecutor impermissibly questioned the victim concerning his character for peacefulness before his character was attacked contrary to MRE 404. Since defendant’s case rested in part upon a theory of self-defense, the comments prejudiced that defense.
The assistant prosecutor unnecessarily inflamed the jury with the unsubstantiated and off-handed statement:
"I shutter [sic] to think what would happen if somebody came in that didn’t have anything to do with that and say something to the man. He was ornery and [230]*230obnoxious and he would probably have tried to kill them, too.”
The prosecutor is not free to speculate as to what might have happened with somebody else. The trial court properly sustained defense counsel’s objection.
The assistant prosecutor also stated:
"Listen carefully to what Mr. Decocq [defense counsel] tells you and what he promised to show you when he started this trial. Because when an attorney argues to you he tries to bridge a gap between you and he [sic] for credibility. If you are going to buy my argument, you have to believe that I am a credible person. I am saying that in order to be credible you have to do and show what you feel you can show.”
This comment was impermissible because it suggested that defense counsel was personally not a credible person and therefore he had failed to prove his case. The comment subtly implied that defendant failed to prove his innocence and, as such, was in error even though no objection was made at trial.
Further, counsel stated:
"Mr. Decocq has also talked lesser included offenses. Yes, the judge does have to give lesser included offenses * * *. It is just like somebody being shot and murdered and lying on the floor in front of you. And you can ask to find him guilty of the lesser offenses of attempted murder, he is dead.
"The law says you have to give the lesser instruction of attempt murder. But he is dead, how can you say it is not murder.”
Defendant was not charged with murder and the victim was not dead. A critical element of the case [231]*231concerned defendant’s intent to inflict injury. The jury was required to determine whether defendant aimed the gun and fired directly at the victim or whether the gun discharged during a physical altercation between the defendant and the victim. It was essential to defendant’s theory of the case that the jury be instructed on lesser included offenses. His right to a conviction commensurate with the evidence produced at trial is more than a mere formality.
The assistant prosecutor proceeded to explain why the bullet only grazed the victim’s head and did not pierce his skull, if in fact defendant aimed the gun before firing from a distance of two to three feet:
"So if you ask me to explain how come it doesn’t go right through his head, maybe it was a dead on center shot and the bullet didn’t go through. It happens a lot in Viet Nam.”
Defense counsel objected and the trial judge properly instructed the jury that whatever happened in Viet Nam was not in evidence at trial.
Finally, the prosecutor argued that there were no powder burns on the victim, indicating that the victim’s injury was caused by a gun fired at short range and not a gun which discharged as it was used to strike the victim. Defense counsel objected and the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the comment because there was no evidence whatsoever on the issue of powder burns.
It is obvious that the assistant prosecutor violated the elementary rule of trial conduct that the prosecution is permitted to comment on the evidence but may not suggest to the jury that they decide the case on other than the evidence itself. People v Farrar, 36 Mich App 294; 193 NW2d 363 [232]*232(1971). We conclude that the cumulative effect of the assistant prosecutor’s remarks unduly prejudiced defendant and amounted to a denial of a fair trial. We also deem the cumulative effect of this intentional conduct sufficiently significant to overcome the fact that the evidence available to the people against this defendant was overwhelming.
Defendant contends secondly that the trial judge erroneously refused defendant’s request for an instruction, as a lesser included offense, on the crime of careless, reckless, or negligent use of a firearm. MCL 752.861; MSA 28.436(21). The offense is defined as a misdemeanor not punishable by more than two years in prison. Defense counsel requested the instruction but misinformed the trial court that the offense was punishable by only one year in prison. The trial judge refused to give the instruction based on the rule of People v Chamblis, 395 Mich 408; 236 NW2d 473 (1975).
We find, under the facts of this case, that reckless discharge of a firearm causing injury is a lesser included offense of assault with intent to commit murder. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to permit a finding of guilt as to this offense. Therefore, the charge should have been given and failure to do so was reversible error. People v Phillips, 385 Mich 30; 187 NW2d 211 (1971), People v Hamilton, 76 Mich 212; 42 NW 1131 (1889). The fact that this error was premised on a misunderstanding of the punishment for this offense shared by the prosecutor, defense counsel and the trial court neither removes the error nor renders it harmless. The jury was denied the freedom to act according to the evidence and was deprived of the option of convicting defendant consistent with his theory of the case. Moreover, defendant could not have been convicted of felony-[233]*233firearm if the jury had convicted him of the misdemeanor.
Finally, we reject defendant’s claim that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on all elements of felony-firearm. The instruction given substantially informed the jury of the elements of the alleged charge in the language of the statute. The instruction adequately apprised the jury of each element without being misleading.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.