2025 IL App (1st) 231109-U No. 1-23-1109 Order filed September 10, 2025 Third Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 01 CR 23489 02 ) SAMUEL APPLEWHITE, ) Honorable ) Alfredo Maldonado, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Martin and Justice Lampkin concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm defendant’s 45-year sentence for murder on resentencing over his contentions that (1) the circuit court plainly erred where the sentence is more severe than his original sentence and (2) the sentence is excessive.
¶2 In 2003, defendant Samuel Applewhite pled guilty to first degree murder for an offense he
committed at age 17 and was sentenced to 45 years in prison, which included a 25-year
enhancement for personally discharging a firearm that proximately caused death. In 2020, his
sentence was vacated as an unconstitutional de facto life sentence under Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460 (2012), and its progeny. People v. Applewhite, 2020 IL App (1st) 142330-B. On No. 1-23-1109
resentencing, the court declined to impose the firearm enhancement but sentenced defendant to 45
years in prison for murder. He appeals, arguing that (1) the court plainly erred by increasing his
“base sentence,” and (2) the sentence is excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 Defendant was charged with, inter alia, first degree murder for shooting and killing
Marshall Young. On September 25, 2003, defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to first degree
murder in exchange for a sentence of 45 years in prison, including a 25-year enhancement pursuant
to a statute that mandated adding 25 years to natural life for personally discharging a firearm that
proximately caused death (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2002)).
¶4 The State’s factual basis provided that, on August 19, 2001, defendant was present as
Young and others played dice. Defendant and a co-offender, Marcus Merrell, left the area and told
a third co-offender, Steven Austin, that they needed a firearm to rob someone in the dice game.
Defendant took a handgun from Austin. Defendant and Merrell donned masks, returned to the dice
game, and approached Young. Defendant shot at Young multiple times, striking him in the chest,
then fired towards an occupied vehicle. Merrell grabbed money from Young, and they fled. Young
died of a gunshot wound to the chest.
¶5 On the same day, defendant also pled guilty in a separate case to aggravated battery with a
firearm for shooting Lamar Smith (the Smith case) in exchange for a concurrent sentence of 12
years in prison. The State’s factual basis provided that, on July 11, 2001, Smith was playing dice.
Defendant approached and told Smith to give him money or he would shoot Smith. Smith threw
money on the ground, and defendant retrieved it, shot Smith in the chest, and fled.
¶6 Defendant swore the factual bases were true. The court accepted his pleas and, pursuant to
the agreements, imposed 45 years in prison in the instant case and 12 years in prison in the Smith
case, to be served concurrently. Defendant did not move to withdraw his pleas or appeal.
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¶7 On July 13, 2011, defendant filed pro se a petition for relief from judgment in both cases,
which he amended to allege that his plea agreement and sentences were void as consecutive
sentences were required. The State conceded the sentences were void. To remedy the error, the
court allowed the State to dismiss the aggravated battery charge in the Smith case, vacated
defendant’s conviction in the Smith case, and denied his petition. We affirmed on appeal, allowing
counsel to withdraw pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). People v.
Applewhite, No. 1-13-1549 (2014) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 23(c)).
¶8 On May 23, 2014, defendant filed pro se a petition for relief under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2014)). He claimed that, under Miller, the mandatory
firearm enhancement was unconstitutional as applied to him under the eighth amendment to the
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate penalties clause of the
Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11), as he was 17 years old on the date of his offense.
He requested the court vacate the enhancement, leaving a 20-year sentence.
¶9 The circuit court summarily dismissed defendant’s petition, and we affirmed. People v.
Applewhite, 2016 IL App (1st) 142330. Our supreme court then issued a supervisory order
directing us to vacate our judgment and reconsider in light of People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327.
People v. Applewhite, No. 121901 (Ill. Mar. 25, 2020) (supervisory order). Thereafter, we reversed
the dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition, finding his 45-year sentence was an
unconstitutional de facto life sentence, vacated his sentence, and remanded for a resentencing
hearing where the circuit court could consider his youth and its attendant characteristics.
Applewhite, 2020 IL App (1st) 142330-B.
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¶ 10 For defendant’s resentencing, the State submitted the transcript of defendant’s plea
hearing; a handwritten statement he gave to an assistant state’s attorney and a detective on August
30, 2001; his Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) disciplinary records; and a victim impact
statement from Young’s father.
¶ 11 Defendant’s handwritten statement largely comports with the factual basis from his plea
hearing.
¶ 12 His IDOC records reflect 12 incidents resulting in disciplinary infractions, 9 classified as
major, including an assault and a planned assault in 2005, and 3 instances of intimidation or threats
during 2017 and 2018. Additionally, on October 12, 2018, a letter defendant wrote to two wardens
was intercepted and stated: “Dear Wardens, I pray I catch you b*** a*** wardens while I’m down
here. I will beat the living s*** out of you b***. Warden Love I hate you the most because you’re
a [sic] uncle Tom I will break your face b***.”
¶ 13 In his statement, Young’s father requested a maximum sentence. He wrote that defendant
had been old enough to know that his actions (shooting a gun) could kill Young.
¶ 14 The defense submitted a mitigation report prepared by Helen Skinner, an attorney and
social worker; 17 certificates defendant earned in culinary classes from April 7, 2023, to April 12,
2023; letters from defendant’s family; and a letter from defendant.
¶ 15 In the mitigation report, Skinner wrote that she reviewed defendant’s records from arrests,
schools, prison, and hospitals; interviewed him three times; and interviewed several family
members and friends. According to the mitigation report, defendant was born on September 7,
1983. His father was an alcoholic and drug user, actively involved with the Gangster Disciples,
sold drugs, and beat defendant’s mother. Defendant’s mother was also an alcoholic and would beat
him with objects, leaving welts and scars. Defendant’s parents permanently separated when
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defendant was about seven years old. Defendant’s mother then began a relationship with a drug
addict, with whom she had two children. Defendant and his older sister were the “de facto parents”
of the younger children.
¶ 16 Defendant learned how to fight because of his environment. He was bullied and chased
home from school every day. Defendant saw people shot and stabbed, and witnessed a seven-year-
old boy fall out a window and die after being dangled by his ankle. Defendant was robbed at
gunpoint when he was 12 and 13 years old, and was beaten and hospitalized during the second
incident. Defendant had a learning disability and required special education services. He attended
seven schools by eighth grade. He was expelled from his second high school for fighting and
dropped out of his next high school after one day due to a “gang war.”
¶ 17 Defendant’s older cousin was in the Gangster Disciples. His cousin and his cousin’s friends
would pay defendant to determine how many people were in a given area before they robbed the
targeted group. Defendant joined the Gangster Disciples in high school for protection from rival
gang members. When defendant was 15 years old, he was arrested for possessing crack cocaine.
A probation officer wrote that defendant was a “follower”- who used marijuana and drugs “to
please” others.
¶ 18 When defendant was 16 years old, his girlfriend became pregnant with twins; she
miscarried one and the other was stillborn. Around this time, defendant was charged with
possessing a firearm and incarcerated for about one year. Upon release, he briefly worked at a
restaurant but he wanted more money for his girlfriend who was pregnant, again, and his mother
who asked him for money. To get more cash, he committed robberies. Defendant would rob drug
dealers and gang members but not women or “normal civilians.” His son was born in February
2002, after defendant was incarcerated for the instant offense.
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¶ 19 In 2005, defendant and his cell mate fought often and the guards did not seem to care. One
fight resulted in defendant’s 2005 ticket for assault. He was only transferred to another cell after
he was found with a homemade noose around his neck in February 2006. Defendant was diagnosed
with anxiety, depression, schizoaffective disorder, “Cluster B Personality Disorder,” sleep
disorder, PTSD, gender dysphoria, and bipolar disorder, and struggled with his sexual and gender
identities. He took GED classes, although his sentence was too long for him to be permitted to take
the exam. He also worked and earned certificates, needing only one more class for a “chef license.”
Defendant learned about the law, wrote his own postconviction petition, and became a “jailhouse
lawyer.” He spoke with his son every day and tried to lecture him about avoiding street life. Since
being remanded to the Cook County jail in 2020, after his original sentence was vacated, he has
had no behavioral issues.
¶ 20 The mitigation report also summarized defendant’s disciplinary infractions. Skinner wrote
that research showed the first years of confinement for those with long sentences are often marked
by rule violations as the prisoner is “tested” by more hardened inmates. At one point, defendant
entered protective custody after learning there was a “bounty” to kill him from a rival gang.
Entering protective custody “meant that he would be done with the Gangster Disciples,” as most
inmates who entered protective custody were “snitches” or gay. A mental health provider indicated
that defendant’s mental health issues may have contributed to one 2017 ticket for, inter alia,
intimidation or threats.
¶ 21 In their letters, four of defendant’s siblings indicated their bonds with defendant suffered
due to his imprisonment and requested his release so the family could strengthen their
relationships. Defendant wrote in his letter that, if released, he planned to live in Milwaukee with
his fiancée. He would work as a barber or operate a food truck, and he and his son planned to build
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and rent “tiny homes” as affordable housing. Until he could do those things, he would work “any
job to put food on the table and build up [his] credit if possible.”
¶ 22 For purposes of the resentencing, the court ordered a new presentence investigative report
(PSI). According to the PSI, defendant reported that he was a member of the Gangster Disciples
from 1994 to 2013 and before leaving the gang he had been a “Regent” with “rank and a role.” He
began drinking alcohol daily at age 13 and smoking marijuana daily at age 12. He was “ashamed
of [his] youth,” and remorseful for his crime. In 1999, he was adjudicated delinquent for possessing
a controlled substance and sentenced to probation, which was terminated unsatisfactorily. In 2000,
he was convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and sentenced to one year in prison. He
reported earning about 30 certificates since being remanded to the Cook County jail.
¶ 23 On June 6, 2023, the court held a resentencing hearing. The State argued the court should
consider in aggravation defendant’s history of delinquency, his criminal history, and the need for
deterrence. The State noted that defendant could be considered for parole after serving 20 years of
his sentence.
¶ 24 Defense counsel argued that defendant took responsibility for his actions by pleading guilty
and was not claiming innocence. The mitigation report showed that defendant had changed. His
disciplinary record was “[r]elatively” minor, and he had substantial mental health issues.
Defendant’s upbringing had prevented him from fully understanding the consequences of his
actions. His fiancée, mother, sister, brother, two stepbrothers, sister-in-law, nephew, two nieces,
and friend were present in support. Counsel requested that the court decline to apply the firearm
enhancement, which the court now had discretion to do (see 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b) (West
2022)). Counsel noted that, when defendant pled guilty, the State had offered him 20 years in
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prison for first degree murder and he accepted, but recognized the court “can go higher.” Counsel
argued a sentence less than 40 years in prison was appropriate.
¶ 25 In allocution, defendant stated: “I’m just remorseful for everything that happened. I can’t
stop what I did. If I could I would. I’m just sorry, man. It should have never happened. That’s all
I can say.”
¶ 26 The court stated it had “carefully” reviewed the mitigation report, and would consider the
report, the PSI, and the other exhibits. It had listened to the arguments and defendant’s allocution.
It had reviewed the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation, including the juvenile
sentencing factors from Miller codified in section 5-4.5-105(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections
(Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2022)), read the mandate remanding the cause for findings
regarding defendant’s history and character, and was mindful that a sentence must meet the
objective of restoring a defendant to useful citizenship.
¶ 27 Regarding the juvenile offender factors, the court found that defendant had been immature
from his “chaotic upbringing.” He experienced gang influence, peer pressure, and familial
pressure, but the instant crime was not “forced upon him” and showed “a level of free will.”
Defendant suffered childhood trauma from a home environment that included drug use, instability,
and abuse. As to his rehabilitative potential, he had “significant problems” in school but, while
incarcerated, he earned certificates in cooking and was “close to being certified as a chef.”
However, the court disagreed that defendant’s disciplinary history while incarcerated was “minor
or non-violent,” and found it “more than de minimis.” The court found some incidents “rather
troubling,” including his intercepted letter threatening to beat the wardens. Nevertheless,
defendant’s “significant mental health issues *** would be stressful and would probably explain
these behaviors.”
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¶ 28 The court further noted that defendant was “the central figure” in Young’s death, which
resulted from defendant’s “intentional act.” Defendant meaningfully participated in his defense,
entered a plea, and acknowledged his culpability. He had “significant” criminal history when
including the aggravated battery in the Smith case. Other information that the court found relevant
was defendant’s history of gang involvement and the number of people present for defendant,
which “[did] speak well” of him.
¶ 29 As to the “standard” aggravating and mitigating factors, the court explained it had already
considered defendant’s criminal and juvenile delinquency history under the juvenile sentencing
factors. The court found applicable the need for deterrence, stating that “this crime is something
that happens and happens and happens again on a generational level as this is something that
happened over 20 years ago, and it keeps happening in the streets of our city time and time again.”
However, the court believed that factor was also “intertwined in the Miller principles.” The court
found that no statutory mitigating factors applied but was “mindful of the ultimate mitigator,” that
defendant was under the age of 18. The court also considered whether defendant’s character and
attitude rendered him unlikely to commit another crime, but did not think that factor applied. The
court stated that it had applied every Miller factor plus non-statutory factors in mitigation.
¶ 30 The court declined to impose the now-discretionary firearm enhancement. It noted that
defendant would be eligible for parole as he had already served 20 years of his sentence, and
imposed a sentence of 45 years in prison. The court denied his motion to reconsider the sentence.
¶ 31 On appeal, defendant argues that the resentencing court improperly increased his sentence
from his original sentence. Defendant acknowledges that he has forfeited this argument by failing
to raise it below, but requests we review it for plain error or find that his counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to preserve the issue.
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¶ 32 The plain error doctrine allows this court to review unpreserved sentencing issues when a
clear or obvious error occurred and (1) “the evidence at sentencing was closely balanced” or (2)
“the error was so egregious that it denied the defendant a fair sentencing hearing.” People v.
Hussain, 2024 IL App (1st) 230471, ¶ 24. The first question is whether a clear or obvious error
occurred, without which there is no plain error. People v. Pacheco, 2023 IL 127535, ¶¶ 55, 61.
Likewise, counsel is not ineffective for failing to object where there has been no error. People v.
Castejon, 2025 IL App (1st) 221918, ¶ 55. We find no error here.
¶ 33 Section 5-5-4(a) of the Code provides that, when a sentence has been set aside, “the court
shall not impose a new sentence *** which is more severe than the prior sentence *** unless the
more severe sentence is based upon conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the original
sentencing.” 730 ILCS 5/5-5-4(a) (West 2022). Defendant claims the court violated section 5-5-
4(a), an issue we review de novo. People v. Moore, 359 Ill. App. 3d 1090,1092 (2005).
¶ 34 In making this claim, defendant contends that he originally received a “base sentence” of
20 years for murder, plus a 25-year firearm enhancement. He argues that, although the resentencing
court did not apply the firearm enhancement, it impermissibly increased his “base sentence” to 45
years, and we should reduce his sentence to the minimum 20 years in prison that had been
originally imposed. However, defendant did not originally receive a “base sentence” for murder
separate from the firearm enhancement, but one 45-year sentence that included the firearm
enhancement. See People v. Taylor, 2015 IL 117267, ¶ 21 (declining to consider a 9-year prison
term and a mandatory 15-year enhancement as “two separate pieces”); People v. Barnes, 364 Ill.
App. 3d 888, 896-97 (2006) (10 years in prison for the underlying offense and a 15-year firearm
enhancement were not “distinct, independent prison terms rather than a single 25-year sentence”).
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¶ 35 Defendant disagrees, relying on People v. Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d 439 (1995). However, that
case involved consecutive sentences for different offenses, which, unlike enhancements, are
treated as separate sentences. See id. at 446 (“[C]onsecutive sentences are not treated as a single
sentence.”); People v. Cole, 2016 IL App (1st) 141664, ¶ 43 (noting a “longstanding rule that
consecutive sentences constitute separate sentences for each crime of which a defendant has been
convicted”).
¶ 36 Defendant acknowledges that this court has rejected this same argument, albeit in
unpublished decisions. See, e.g., People v. Agosto, 2023 IL App (1st) 220636-U, ¶¶ 65-69 (citing
Taylor and Barnes and disagreeing that a term of years imposed as a sentencing enhancement was
distinct from a base sentence for the underlying offense); see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(b), (e)(1) (eff.
June 3, 2025) (nonprecedential orders entered under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) may be cited as
persuasive authority). He asserts those cases are not controlling and fail to articulate “a principled
reason for treating the sentencing components of a single offense differently” than consecutive
sentences for different offenses. Defendant further contends that Taylor and Barnes are
distinguishable because the defendants in those cases were adults and the enhancements were
mandatory, whereas, here, the enhancement was discretionary on resentencing as defendant was a
juvenile.
¶ 37 We rejected the latter argument in Agosto, 2023 IL App (1st) 220636-U, ¶ 67. We agree
with the reasoning in Agosto and the other cases and decline to deviate from them here. See People
v. Garza, 2025 IL App (1st) 231600-U, ¶ 52 (following Agosto and rejecting “invitation to treat
an underlying murder charge and a weapons enhancement as separate sentences”); People v.
Gomez, 2023 IL App (1st) 220810-U, ¶ 42 (considering a sentence comprised of a discretionary
term and a mandatory enhancement as a whole, not different parts).
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¶ 38 Defendant further notes that his prior sentence was the minimum possible given the 20-to-
60-year range for murder and the then-mandatory enhancement of at least 25 years. He asserts his
new sentence is more severe because the minimum sentence for first degree murder at resentencing
was 20 years in prison, given the enhancement had become discretionary, and he received a
sentence more than double that length. However, we decline to find that defendant’s sentence is
more severe than his prior sentence where the sentences are the same length. See People v.
Vatamaniuc, 2023 IL App (2d) 210665-U, ¶ 46 (finding a sentence of the same length as the prior
sentence, but without a discretionary enhancement that had been previously applied, was not more
severe than the original sentence).
¶ 39 In sum, defendant’s original sentence was 45 years in prison, and the resentencing court
also sentenced him to 45 years in prison. “[N]othing in the Code mandates a lower sentence on
remand.” People v. Raya, 267 Ill. App. 3d 705, 709 (1994). For the reasons stated, the court did
not violate section 5-5-4(a) by imposing a more severe sentence. As the court did not err, it did not
commit plain error, and defendant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to
argue below that the court erred by imposing a more severe sentence. Pacheco, 2023 IL 127535,
¶ 61; Castejon, 2025 IL App (1st) 221918, ¶ 55.
¶ 40 Next, defendant argues his sentence is excessive, and requests we reduce it or remand for
resentencing.
¶ 41 The Illinois Constitution requires that sentences “be determined both according to the
seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.”
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. We give the sentencing court deference as that court is better
positioned to consider the relevant sentencing factors. People v. Clark, 2024 IL 127838, ¶ 76. We
will only disturb a sentence where the trial court abused its discretion, which occurs when the
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sentence greatly varies with the purpose and spirit of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to
the nature of the offense. People v. Guerrero, 2020 IL App (1st) 172156, ¶ 52. A sentence within
the permitted statutory range is presumed proper. Id.
¶ 42 We will also find an abuse of discretion where the sentence “does not reflect an adequate
consideration” of mitigating factors. People v. Woodson, 2024 IL App (1st) 221172, ¶ 89.
However, where a court has considered the relevant mitigating factors, we may not substitute our
judgment merely because we may have weighed them differently. Clark, 2024 IL 127838, ¶ 76.
We also presume that the court properly considered all evidence of mitigating factors and the
defendant’s rehabilitative potential, unless the defendant affirmatively shows the contrary.
Hussain, 2024 IL App (1st) 230471, ¶ 44. The existence of mitigating evidence does not require a
minimum sentence. Id. ¶ 47.
¶ 43 When sentencing a defendant who was under age 18 at the time of the offense, section 5-
4.5-105(a) of the Code also requires the court to consider the following factors in mitigation: (1)
the person’s age, impetuosity, level of maturity, and ability to consider consequences when he
committed the offense, including any cognitive or developmental disabilities; (2) whether he was
subjected to peer pressure, familial pressure, or negative influences; (3) his family, home,
educational, and social backgrounds, including any parental neglect, abuse, or other childhood
trauma; (4) his potential for, or evidence of, rehabilitation; (5) the circumstances of the offense;
(6) his degree of participation and specific role in the offense, including his level of planning before
the offense; (7) whether he could meaningfully participate in his defense; (8) his prior juvenile or
criminal history; and (9) any other information the court finds relevant and reliable, including an
expression of remorse. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2022).
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¶ 44 Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, which carries a sentencing range of 20 to
60 years in prison. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2022). At resentencing, the court exercised its
discretion and declined to impose a 25-year-or-longer sentencing enhancement for personally
discharging the firearm that proximately caused Young’s death. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b), 5-8-
1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2022). Defendant was resentenced to 45 years in prison, within the range for
first degree murder. We therefore presume his sentence is proper unless defendant affirmatively
demonstrates otherwise. See Guerrero, 2020 IL App (1st) 172156, ¶ 52 (reviewing court presumes
within-range sentence is proper).
¶ 45 To make that showing, defendant claims that the resentencing court failed to meaningfully
implement the juvenile sentencing factors in section 5-4.5-105(a) and abused its discretion in
imposing the 45-year sentence. Specifically, he argues the court inadequately considered the first
four factors by failing to mention that he (1) repeatedly witnessed and suffered violence as a child,
which prompted him to join a gang and “followed him to prison”; (2) had only negative role
models; (3) had not been disciplined for fighting in prison since 2005; (4) left his gang; (5) took
GED classes, worked, learned about the law, and assisted other inmates; (6) was well-behaved
since being remanded to the county jail; and (7) demonstrated self-awareness and remorse. He
asserts that he accepted responsibility by pleading guilty, and his sentence is a de facto life term
as it exceeds 40 years. See Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 40 (a sentence exceeding 40 years in prison
for a juvenile offender is a de facto life term).
¶ 46 Initially, defendant did not receive a de facto life sentence. As he was younger than 21
years old at the time of his offense, his new sentence made him eligible for parole review after
serving 20 years of his sentence, which he has already completed. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b)
(West 2022) (if sentenced after June 1, 2019, a person convicted of first degree murder who was
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younger than 21 years old at the time of the offense is eligible for parole review after serving 20
years of his sentence). Although defendant argues that the parole review scheme in Illinois does
not provide a meaningful opportunity for release, our supreme court recently disagreed and held
that a sentence exceeding 40 years, where the defendant is eligible for parole, is not a de facto life
sentence. People v. Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶¶ 35-40.
¶ 47 Additionally, all the mitigating information that defendant cites was included in the
mitigation report defense counsel submitted, which the court stated it had “carefully” considered.
The court also expressly analyzed each factor from section 5-4.5-105(a). Defendant provides no
affirmative evidence that the court failed to consider the mitigating evidence . See Hussain, 2024
IL App (1st) 230471, ¶¶ 44, 47 (reviewing court presumes the court considered the relevant
mitigating factors, and a “harsh sentence, standing alone, does not show that the court ignored
mitigating evidence” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Defendant’s arguments are, essentially,
a request that we reweigh the factors in aggravation and mitigation, which we cannot do. Clark,
2024 IL 127838, ¶ 76.
¶ 48 Further, as the court noted, defendant’s killing of Young was not forced by peer pressure
but resulted from defendant’s “intentional act.” The record shows that defendant planned the
offense by leaving the dice game, obtaining a firearm, donning a mask, returning, and shooting at
Young and an occupied vehicle, threatening serious harm to the vehicle’s occupants. See 730 ILCS
5/5-5-3.2(a)(1) (West 2022) (court may consider in aggravation that the defendant’s conduct
threatened serious harm). The circumstances of the offense and defendant’s level of planning are
therefore aggravating, and the court could weigh the seriousness of the offense more heavily than
the evidence of defendant’s rehabilitation. See People v. Wyma, 2020 IL App (1st) 170786, ¶ 99
(seriousness of the offense is the most important factor, even when sentencing juvenile offenders).
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¶ 49 The court could also weigh defendant’s criminal history and disciplinary record, which
both included violence and threats, as an aggravating factor. The court noted that defendant had
“significant” criminal history when considering the Smith case, and his IDOC records included
“rather troubling” behavior. The IDOC records show that the letter in which he threatened to beat
the wardens was intercepted on October 12, 2018, when he was 35 years old, weakening his
argument that he is unlikely to reoffend because his prior bad behavior was due to his youth and
its attendant characteristics. Despite these aggravating factors, defendant received a sentence near
the midpoint of the statutory range. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2022) (sentence for first
degree murder must be between 20 and 60 years in prison). That defendant is eligible for parole
review also mitigates against finding that his sentence is excessive. People v. Anderson, 2024 IL
App (1st) 220864, ¶ 28.
¶ 50 Defendant additionally challenges the circuit court’s belief that the need for deterrence was
an applicable aggravating factor. As defendant notes, “deterrence is diminished in juvenile
sentencing because juveniles’ recklessness, immaturity, and impetuosity make them less likely to
consider possible punishment.” People v. Morris, 2017 IL App (1st) 141117, ¶ 33. However,
although the court here found the need for deterrence applicable, it also stated that the need for
deterrence was “intertwined in the Miller principles” that the court was considering. It was not
necessarily improper for the court to mention deterrence as an aggravating factor. See People v.
Smith, 2022 IL App (4th) 200666, ¶¶ 28-30 (the Supreme Court has not precluded sentencing
courts from considering deterrence as an aggravating factor when sentencing juvenile offenders).
Moreover, given the court’s much more lengthy analysis of the juvenile sentencing factors, it is
unclear whether the court gave deterrence much weight, if any, in fashioning defendant’s sentence.
Cf. People v. Haynie, 2020 IL App (1st) 172511, ¶¶ 34-35 (finding sentencing court’s “focus on
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deterrence” in sentencing a juvenile improper); People v. McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907,
¶ 89 (finding court gave “improper weight” to deterrence when sentencing a juvenile where it
stated it had considered “all of those new factors” for juvenile sentencing “but the sentence must
deter future criminal conduct”).
¶ 51 Last, defendant compares his case to McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907, and Woodson,
2024 IL App (1st) 221172, where, following resentencings pursuant to Miller and its progeny, we
reduced the defendants’ sentences for failing to adequately account for the juvenile sentencing
factors. Those cases are distinguishable where each defendant proved to be a “model inmate,”
whereas the court here found defendant’s disciplinary record was more than de minimis and
included a violent threat when he was 35 years old. See McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907, ¶ 75
(stating the defendant was “a model inmate,” who, inter alia, had zero tickets throughout his 17-
year imprisonment); Woodson, 2024 IL App (1st) 221172, ¶ 93 (the defendant “was a model
inmate” who, inter alia, received four tickets for minor infractions during his 16 years in prison).
The sentencing courts in those cases also improperly weighed or disregarded some of the juvenile
sentencing factors, which the court here did not do. McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907, ¶¶ 87-
90; Woodson, 2024 IL App (1st) 221172, ¶¶ 91-98. Most significantly, this argument is another
request for us to reweigh the sentencing factors, which we may not do.
¶ 52 In sum, defendant has not shown the court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence. We therefore affirm his sentence.
¶ 53 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 54 Affirmed.
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