2020 IL App (1st) 172156 No. 1-17-2156 Opinion filed June 4, 2020
FOURTH DIVISION
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of Cook County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 12 CR 18726 (02) ) DANIEL GUERRERO, ) The Honorable ) Matthew E. Coghlan, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice Reyes concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Lampkin specially concurred, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant Daniel Guerrero was found guilty by a jury of first degree murder and
sentenced to 45 years with the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). On appeal, he
claims (1) that certain remarks made by the prosecutor during the State’s rebuttal closing
argument constituted prosecutorial misconduct and (2) that his sentence is excessive when
compared to the lesser sentence of a codefendant. For the following reasons we affirm his
conviction and sentence. No. 1-17-2156
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 On appeal, defendant raises no issues concerning the sufficiency of the evidence
against him. We, therefore, summarize the evidence below.
¶4 The State’s evidence at trial established that, on May 29, 2010, at midnight, a group
of men, who belonged to the same gang, approached two men on a nearby street because one
of the two men was wearing a red shirt, which was the color of a rival gang. One of the two
men, Mario Gallegos, was able to escape, and he testified at trial as an eyewitness. The other
man, Alan Oliva, who was wearing the red shirt, was beaten to death. Gallegos identified
defendant as the first person to strike the victim. Gallegos testified that defendant swung a
baseball bat at the victim, thereby knocking the victim to the ground, whereupon the other
men beat and stabbed the victim until he stopped moving. The victim later died from his
wounds.
¶5 After listening to closing arguments and jury instructions, the jury found defendant
guilty of first degree murder. After considering factors in aggravation and mitigation, the trial
court sentenced defendant to 45 years with IDOC. On July 11, 2017, defendant filed a timely
notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.
¶6 ANALYSIS
¶7 I. Rebuttal Closing
¶8 Defendant argues that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by making
certain prejudicial remarks in its rebuttal closing.
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¶9 A. Standard of Review
¶ 10 While the State has wide latitude in both its opening statements and closing
arguments and may comment on the evidence, it is still improper for the State to make
comments that have no other purpose than to arouse the prejudices and passions of the jury.
People v. McNeal, 2019 IL App (1st) 180015, ¶ 43; People v. Jones, 2016 IL App (1st)
141008, ¶ 21. Even if the remarks were inappropriate, reversal is required only if they
engendered substantial prejudice against the defendant such that it is impossible to tell
whether the verdict of guilt resulted from them. People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 123
(2007); McNeal, 2019 IL App (1st) 180015, ¶ 43. If the reviewing court cannot determine
whether the prosecutor’s improper remarks contributed to the defendant’s conviction, then it
must grant a new trial. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 123; McNeal, 2019 IL App (1st) 180015, ¶ 43.
¶ 11 This court has applied, in different cases, both a de novo standard and an abuse of
discretion standard when reviewing a prosecutor’s closing arguments. McNeal, 2019 IL App
(1st) 180015, ¶ 44; People v. Johnson, 2015 IL App (1st) 123249, ¶ 39 (“[t]his court has
noted confusion regarding the appropriate standard of review regarding alleged errors
occurring during closing arguments”); see also People v. Boston, 2018 IL App (1st) 140369,
¶ 82; People v. Johnson, 385 Ill. App. 3d 585, 603 (2008) (“Since Wheeler, appellate courts
have been divided regarding the appropriate standard of review.”). An abuse of discretion
occurs when the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no
reasonable person would take the position adopted by the trial court. See, e.g., McNeal, 2019
IL App (1st) 180015, ¶ 28. De novo consideration means that the reviewing court performs
the same analysis that a trial judge would perform. See, e.g., McNeal, 2019 IL App (1st)
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180015, ¶ 29. In the case at bar, we need not resolve this dispute, because the outcome would
be the same under either standard of review, as we explain below.
¶ 12 B. Forfeiture
¶ 13 Defendant concedes that he failed to object at trial to the instances of prosecutorial
misconduct that he now alleges on appeal.
¶ 14 To preserve an error for appellate review, a defendant must both object at trial and
raise the error in a posttrial motion; otherwise it is considered forfeited. People v. Sebby,
2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48; McNeal, 2019 IL App (1st) 180015, ¶ 82. Even if an error is forfeited,
we may still review it under the plain error doctrine. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48; McNeal,
2019 IL App (1st) 180015, ¶ 82. Under this doctrine, an error rises to the level of plain error
if it is a clear or obvious error and either (1) the evidence is so closely balanced that the error
alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the
seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the
defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the
closeness of the evidence. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48; McNeal, 2019 IL App (1st) 180015,
¶ 82. In the case at bar, defendant asks this court to consider the forfeited issues under the
first, or closely-balanced, prong.
¶ 15 However, the first step of any plain error analysis is to determine whether a clear or
obvious error occurred. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49; McNeal, 2019 IL App (1st) 180015,
¶ 81. For the reasons explained below, we cannot find a clear or obvious error.
¶ 16 C. Expert
¶ 17 Defendant’s first claim regarding the State’s rebuttal closing is that the State
improperly attacked the defense’s expert witness.
4 No. 1-17-2156
¶ 18 At trial, the defense called Dr. Mary Maclin, a psychology professor, as an expert
witness to testify generally about potential issues that could affect the reliability of an
identification. After the State had an opportunity to voir dire the witness, defense counsel
asked the court to qualify Dr. Maclin “as an expert in the field of memory and eyewitness
identification.” However, the court ruled that it would “allow the witness to testify as an
expert in the field of memory.” The court did not refer to eyewitness identification, and the
defense did not object or follow up. Thus, Dr. Maclin was accepted as an expert in memory
only.
¶ 19 During the State’s initial closing argument, the State did not mention this expert.
However, during the defense closing, the defense argued, “And there’s not been one
challenge from the state’s attorney as to the science here.” The State responded during its
rebuttal closing, and it is the State’s remarks in response that are at issue here. People v.
Willis, 2013 IL App (1st) 110233, ¶ 110 (the State “may respond in rebuttal to statements of
defense counsel that noticeably invite a response”). Defendant quoted in his appellate brief
the passages that he objects to, and we quote and discuss each one below.
¶ 20 The first remarks about the expert that defendant quotes are ones in which the
prosecutor exhorted the jurors to still use their common sense:
“[S]he thinks that she’s got a lot of this stuff figured out what’s going on up here
of us. What we are able to do.
And I will submit to you that they are in the baby form of that science about
figuring it out. We all know through our life and this is where you get to use our
common sense. The judge has told you, and I will tell you, your life experiences, you
get to bring that to the jury and think about it.
5 No. 1-17-2156
And you will know from your life that things that happen that you are able to see,
some of you are able to recognize them, you don’t know what parts. You can’t
analyze it. You can’t say it’s because it’s a distance between their eyes or their nose
or anything like that specifically. That’s going on in us. That’s science has no clue
about that. And I submit to you maybe a hundred years from now, they will get a
better clue. But from this person that they brought in yesterday, this professor that
they brought in, we didn’t learn anything about science. Nothing was learned about
that science.”
See In re Commitment of Gavin, 2014 IL App (1st) 122918, ¶ 61 (a party may argue that an
expert’s opinion is contrary to common sense and may exhort the jury to “use common
sense” in assessing the expert’s testimony). Defendant claims that, with the above remarks,
the prosecutor was testifying as the State’s own expert witness. However, in addition to
exhorting the jurors to use their common sense, the prosecutor was building on what the
defense expert had testified to. Dr. Macklin had testified that “one of the notoriously difficult
things with faces is that they’re really hard to describe.” Based on this, the prosecutor argued
that people identify faces without knowing exactly how they do it—without knowing if it is
“the distance between their eyes.” Although Dr. Maclin testified about factors that could
adversely affect memory such as stress, weapon focus, passage of time, and night viewing,
she did not testify about the neurology behind facial recognition or how we humans
recognize faces. The prosecutor could be understood as arguing that the jurors had not
learned anything “about that science”—namely, facial recognition—from this expert, which
would be correct.
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¶ 21 The next set of remarks regarding the expert that defendant quotes concerned the
expert’s own memory lapse on the stand and her payment for this case:
“She can’t even remember what she is saying during the time she is talking about
her field of specialty. Her field of pay me two hundred 1 dollars an hour to sit here. I
hope they got a deduction for every time she forgot what the heck she was talking
about.”
Defense counsel did object to that last line, and the trial court overruled the objection. This
was the only time that the defense objected during the State’s rebuttal closing. Although the
trial court did not explain why the objection was overruled, we observe that Dr. Macklin did,
in fact, forget what question she was asked while in the middle of her response, several
times, and actually poked fun at herself for doing it. During her direct examination, defense
counsel had asked her to talk about “the passage of time and the forgetting curve.” In the
middle of her response, Dr. Macklin asked: “I’m sorry. I’m—Could you repeat—.” When
defense counsel reminded her that the question was about the forgetting curve, she remarked,
“That’s funny.” At another point in her direct examination, she stopped in the middle of a
response and said: “And I sort of forgot your question, if you could repeat it.” And yet at
another point in her direct examination, she again stopped in mid-response and said, “And
I’m sorry, I’m getting a little—What was your question?”
¶ 22 As for her payment, when the prosecutor asked her on cross examination if having an
“independent administrator” was important, she responded defensively that she did not “have
a personal stake in this,” despite expecting to receive $2400 for this case and having worked
1 In his appellate brief, defendant quotes the prosecutor as stating “[h]er field of pay me two thousand dollars an hour to sit here.” However, the transcript shows that the prosecutor actually stated two hundred dollars an hour which was, in fact, what the expert testified was her rate of pay. 7 No. 1-17-2156
for this defense counsel before. Both lines of comments, about forgetting and payment,
stemmed directly from the expert’s testimony. See People v. Luna, 2013 IL App (1st)
072253, ¶¶ 131-33 (we found no error in the prosecutor’s argument that the expert was
“ ‘motivated by money,’ ” where it was an attempt to establish the expert’s possible bias and
was drawn from the evidence); see also People v. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d 256, 291 (1997) (the
bias possibly created by an expert’s payment is a proper subject for closing argument).
¶ 23 Defendant compares the prosecutor’s comments in the instant case to the prosecutor’s
comments in People v. Moss, 205 Ill. 2d 139 (2001), and People v. Griffith, 334 Ill. App. 3d
98 (2002). In Moss, the prosecutor used phrases such as “ ‘psycho-babble’ ” (Moss, 205 Ill.
2d at 170) and “ ‘cash for trash doctors’ ” (Moss, 205 Ill. 2d at 170) to denigrate a defense
expert. These remarks were made at a sentencing hearing where the defendant had received
the death penalty. Moss, 205 Ill. 2d at 144, 169. Our supreme court found these phrases
“unacceptable,” but not reversible error. Moss, 205 Ill. 2d at 170-71.
¶ 24 In Griffith, the murder served as an aggravating factor which led the defendant to
receive the death penalty in another case. Griffith, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 119-20. During closing
argument, the prosecutor argued that defense counsel’s argument would give the defendant a
“ ‘license to kill’ ” and that the defense expert was “ ‘ridiculous.’ ” Griffith, 334 Ill. App. 3d
at 119. Similar to our supreme court in Moss, the appellate court in Griffith found these
remarks “unprofessional,” but not reversible error. Griffith, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 119.
¶ 25 In the case at bar, the prosecutor did not call the expert “trash” or label her testimony
“babble” or “ridiculous,” although he did point out her own memory lapses and criticized the
substance of her testimony, clearly hoping that the jury would draw its own conclusions. For
8 No. 1-17-2156
these reasons, and because Moss and Griffith both involved the death penalty, we find them
distinguishable.
¶ 26 Immediately after the trial court overruled defendant’s one objection, the prosecutor
stated, “Which one of us here is going to rely on her for the science of the brain? I don’t
think any of you would.” Defendant argues that it was improper for the prosecutor to use the
word “us” because he was then aligning himself with the jury. In support, defendant cites
People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. App. 3d 465, 468 (1986), where the appellate court found it
improper for the prosecutor to “align[ ] himself with the jury by referring to ‘our job’ to find
the facts.” In the case at bar, while the use of the phrase “one of us” was inappropriate, the
prosecutor quickly corrected the error in his very next sentence by replacing it with “any of
you.” Thus, any error was de minimis and harmless.
¶ 27 The third set of remarks about the expert that defendant quotes concerned mainly her
alleged failure to write a report in this case:
“How about this other part, she doesn’t want to write a report. What does that tell
you. She doesn’t have any confidence to go and face it. If it is in science, it is the way
it is. It can’t be changed if it is in science. Write a report. Give a report to both sides
and say and stand by it. That’s what you’re supposed to do.
No. We are going to talk about it on the phone back and forth instead. I don’t
even know when I got these [police] reports about this incident. I don’t even know
when I went and charged him about this stuff. Comes up here and you want to rely on
her memory. Are you kidding me.
9 No. 1-17-2156
She comes up there and she sits there before you and starts talking on and on
about [memory] which maybe some of you were able to follow. G-d love you. Way
more knowledgeable than I could.
I will talk real quickly about a couple of things that I did note that she talked
about. She got cute names for it too, attention arousal relationship. And that’s talking
about the weapon, the weapon okay. She is talking about the weapon.”
Defendant claims that the State denigrated the witness by using the word “cute.” However,
the prosecutor used the word “cute,” not to refer to the witness, but to the name of the
theory—which theory he did not disagree with. In fact, he went on to agree with the witness
that, of course, if one’s attention is drawn to one thing, then one may not notice something
else. His point was, “Boy, you need science for that? That’s our common sense.” Again, he
was exhorting the jurors to rely on their common sense, which he is allowed to do. Gavin,
2014 IL App (1st) 122918, ¶ 61.
¶ 28 As for the lack of a report, that was the subject of both voir dire and cross
examination, particularly in light of the fact that the expert could not recall which police
reports she had received and reviewed in connection with this case. Also, she could only
“guess” at how many times she had previously been found qualified to testify as an expert,
which she believed was at most 6 to 8 times in the 14 years that she had worked as a
consultant and expert witness. She testified that she had never been found not qualified but
there were “times my testimony wasn’t allowed to be presented.” The lack of a report was a
legitimate subject of inquiry, and defendant does not cite a case to the contrary. Defendant
does cite a case that found: “Unless predicated on evidence that defense counsel behaved
unethically, it is improper for a prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of attempting to create
10 No. 1-17-2156
reasonable doubt by confusion, misrepresentation, or deception.” People v. Johnson, 208 Ill.
2d 53, 82 (2003). However, unlike Johnson, the prosecutor’s criticism in the case at bar was
directed, not at defense counsel, but squarely at the expert and her inability to recall certain
facts, which was exacerbated by the lack of a report.
¶ 29 The fourth set of remarks that defendant quotes related to how brightly-lit the streets
of Chicago are:
“It was dark out there. It was dark out there. Well, you know maybe in Iowa
where it gets dark out, it is dark. Unfortunately, we don’t see much darkness in
Chicago because it is [sic] city lights. They are very bright. You saw it there on the
corner. There is a city light right there.”
The expert, who was a professor at the University of Northern Iowa in Cedar Falls, Iowa,
testified generally about the problems with nighttime viewing. In closing, the prosecutor
made a joke to hammer home a relevant point, namely, that the State’s photos of the crime
scene showed that there was a street light close by. Humor is not banned from closing
argument. C.f. McNeal, 2019 IL App (1st) 180015, ¶ 77 (“An attorney may use a personal, or
even make-believe, story to make a point during closing arguments.”).
¶ 30 The fifth set of prosecutorial remarks that defendant quotes concerned an example
that the expert had given:
“And what’s your example. You know when you come out of the movies and it’s
real dark and your eyes have to refocus, what does that have to do with this. What
movie is she talking about.”
During her direct examination, the expert had explained that we have cones in our eyes that
allow us to see in color and that enhance our “sharp focus” and that we have rods that allow
11 No. 1-17-2156
us to see in black and white and that enhance our peripheral vision. She then provided the
following example: “[W]hen you go into the movies and you’re a little bit late and you can’t
see when you get in there and that’s because your cones have to turn off and your rods have
to turn on.” In the above quote from the prosecutor, he mistakenly referred to the example as
what happens when one leaves the movies, rather than when one enters. Thus, he appears to
have inadvertently misstated the testimony. However, there was no objection to it, and it was
a minor point in her testimony.
¶ 31 The sixth set of prosecutorial remarks quoted by defendant concerned eyewitness
certainty:
“Oh, if you have any certainty in you about something, throw it out the window, I
guess, because there is this magic carpet that says about certainly being stressed and
if you did something during that time and you think during this stressful situation this
is what happens, throw it out the window, because in her opinion it didn’t happen.”
¶ 32 Under Illinois law, certainty is one of the factors considered to determine the
reliability of an identification. To assess the reliability of an identification, our courts utilize
the five factors set forth in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), known as the Biggers
factors: (1) the witness’s opportunity to view the offender during the offense, (2) the
witness’s degree of attention at the time of the offense, (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior
description of the offender, (4) the witness’s level of certainty at the identification, and
(5) the length of time between the offense and the identification. People v. Joiner, 2018 IL
App (1st) 150343, ¶ 47 (citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200); People v. Macklin, 2019 IL
App (1st) 161165, ¶ 22 (“These are often referred to as the Biggers factors.”). Thus, under
Illinois law, certainty is one of the factors considered.
12 No. 1-17-2156
¶ 33 However, the expert in the case at bar testified that certainty is a weak factor:
“It may seem counterintuitive but the science shows that competency—
competency—confidence is not related to accuracy. So you can have a very confident
witness and they could still be wrong. Similarly you could have a witness that isn’t so
sure and they could be right. They are independent variables. There’s a weak
relationship but it’s sort of like on a scale of one to ten, it’s, like, a three. It’s just not
a very strong relationship between confidence and accuracy.”
¶ 34 In a recent opinion, this court explained that, while our courts do “admit expert
testimony” criticizing certainty as a factor, we also have not “reject[ed] a witness’s
expression of certainty as an appropriate factor in the reliability analysis,” and we explained
why. Macklin, 2019 IL App (1st) 161165, ¶ 31; see also People v. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496,
¶ 1 (the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the defendant’s motion to allow expert
testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness identifications). “[R]ecent research has
recognized a distinction between the reliability of lineup and in-court identifications 2 and
concluded that expressions of certainty at the time of initial identification are a relevant
indicator of accuracy.” Macklin, 2019 IL App (1st) 161165, ¶ 32 (citing John T. Wixted &
Gary L. Wells, The Relationship Between Eyewitness Confidence and Identification
Accuracy: A New Synthesis, 18 Psychol. Sci. in the Pub. Int. 10, 55 (2017)). 3 In sum, Illinois
caselaw strikes a balance: on the one hand, allowing litigants to offer testimony from experts
2 In the case at bar, Dr. Maclin did not distinguish between initial and subsequent in-court identifications in her discussion of certainty. 3 The article found that: “According to the available data, the relationship between confidence and accuracy for an initial ID from an appropriately administered lineup is sufficiently impressive that it calls into question the very notion that eyewitness memory is generally unreliable.” John T. Wixted & Gary L. Wells, The Relationship Between Eyewitness Confidence and Identification Accuracy: A New Synthesis, 18 Psychol. Sci. in the Pub. Int. 10, 55 (2017)). 13 No. 1-17-2156
who minimize certainty as a factor; and, on the other hand, still keeping certainty as a factor
in our reliability analysis.
¶ 35 As a result, the prosecutor did not need his own expert to argue for certainty as a
factor. 4 He had our precedent behind him. In addition, it was the expert who testified about
“the magic number.” Dr. Maclin testified that “if you ever did take intro to psych, you might
remember this term, seven plus or minus two, the magic number, that we’ve got a limited
capacity for taking in information.” Thus, we do not find persuasive defendant’s criticism of
the prosecutor’s remarks about certainty.
¶ 36 The last set of prosecutorial remarks about the expert which defendant quotes were
the following:
“You know everything that the expert witness they presented, they are trying to
tell you that your common sense, throw it out the window. The judge tells you, do not
throw it out the window. The judge tells to you bring it in. Your life experiences are
worth mountains, mountains of value, way more than the two hundred dollars an hour
that that person would testify for.”
Defendant claims that the prosecutor was arguing that the judge sided with him. Defendant
claims this was prejudicial and cites in support People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398, 400 (1963).
However, in Sprinkle, it was the judge’s own actions—the judge’s own questions and
comments—that were at issue. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d at 403. Thus, Sprinkle is inapposite.
Again, as we observed above, the expert’s pay and exhortations to use common sense were
both proper subjects of closing argument. See Gavin, 2014 IL App (1st) 122918, ¶ 61.
4 Later, during cross examination, the expert testified that she was familiar with the “saying” that “what happened to me on that day will stay with me forever”; and, when asked whether she was “here to tell us that we were wrong about that,” she said no. 14 No. 1-17-2156
¶ 37 Having considered every passage that defendant quoted and objected to in his
appellate brief concerning the expert, we cannot find that these remarks constituted error, and
they certainly did not rise to the level of clear and obvious error needed for the plain error
doctrine. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49; McNeal, 2019 IL App (1st) 180015, ¶ 81.
¶ 38 D. Jury Fears
¶ 39 Next, defendant claims that the prosecutor made remarks during his rebuttal closing
to appeal to the jury’s fear of gangs.
¶ 40 The trial court had admitted evidence of gang membership as evidence of motive
because, without this evidence, it was completely inexplicable why a group of men would
beat a complete stranger to death for wearing a red shirt.
¶ 41 This court previously addressed the relevance of gang-membership evidence to this
case, when two of defendant’s codefendants challenged its admission on appeal. Affirming
the admission of this evidence in both appeals, we explained: “ ‘One of the purposes for
which gang evidence is admissible is to “provide a motive for an otherwise inexplicable
act.” ’ ” People v. Colon, 2018 IL App (1st) 160120, ¶ 35 (quoting People v. Villarreal, 198
Ill. 2d 209, 233 (2001), quoting People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 58 (1990)) (Pablo Colon was
a codefendant of defendant); see also People v. Sams, 2017 IL App (1st) 160869-U, ¶ 94
(“admissible to provide a motive for an otherwise inexplicable act” (citing Smith, 141 Ill. 2d
at 58 (“admissible to show common purpose or design, or to provide a motive for an
otherwise inexplicable act”)) (Gary Sams was a codefendant of defendant).
¶ 42 “Although there is ‘widespread disapproval that exists towards street gangs,’ a defendant
may not insulate the fact finder from the fact of his gang membership, despite prejudice
toward it, if that fact is relevant to understanding the case.” Colon, 2018 IL App (1st)
15 No. 1-17-2156
160120, ¶ 34 (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 142 Ill. 2d 481, 488-89 (1991)) (codefendant);
Sams, 2017 IL App (1st) 160869-U, ¶ 93 (also citing Gonzalez, 142 Ill. 2d at 489 for the
same point) (codefendant). Thus, we found:
“While the gang testimony may have had a prejudicial, even horrifying, impact on the
jury, it would be impossible to understand why this group of men would spontaneously
exit a party and beat an innocent passerby to death without this evidence, in particular,
the victim’s wearing of the color red, which was the color of a rival gang.” Colon, 2018
IL App (1st) 160120, ¶ 42 (codefendant); Sams, 2017 IL App (1st) 160869-U, ¶ 98
(“There is no question that the general nature of the beating was gang-related.”)
(codefendant).
¶ 43 In the case at bar, defendant criticizes the State for referring in its rebuttal closing to
defendant “and his boys,” for discussing their gang tattoos, and for arguing that what
happened in this case was “insane.” The prosecutor argued: “As insane as this is, this is
what’s going on, on the streets unfortunately. This is how insane it could be. You turn [a
pitchfork tattoo] upside down and that’s *** disrespect and that red [shirt] is disrespect.”
However, defendant does not argue on appeal that admission of this evidence was error, and
this was the evidence in this case. It is “insane” that a man could be murdered for wearing a
red shirt but that is what happened here.
¶ 44 Defendant next criticizes the prosecutor for arguing, “Latin Count K. Killer. Those
are the guys out there.” Defendant argues that this was a blatant appeal to the jurors to protect
themselves from “the guys out there.” The prosecutor’s remark was a reference to the
testimony of Officer Chris Chmelar, 5 who was qualified as an expert in Chicago street gangs
5 The witness stated his first name as “Chris,” not “Christopher.” 16 No. 1-17-2156
and who testified that one of codefendant Ramirez’s tattoos indicated that Ramirez was “a
killer of a Latin Count.” The Latin Counts were a rival gang, and Chmelar explained that, in
the tattoo, the Latin Count symbol was “upside down” with the letters “LCK,” which stood
for Latin Count killer.
¶ 45 In support, defendant cites People v. Fluker, 318 Ill. App. 3d 193, 202-04 (2000),
in which we found that the prosecutor’s argument constituted reversible error. 6 In Fluker, the
prosecutor argued in the State’s rebuttal closing:
“ ‘The only issue in this case is not is this a mistaken identity ***. The only issue is
who do you want to control our criminal justice system? ***
***
*** Do you want *** the Four Corner Hustlers to control our society?’ ” Fluker,
318 Ill. App. 3d at 203.
The prosecutor’s remark in the case at bar about “[t]hose *** guys out there” is simply not
similar to the prosecutor’s remark in Fluker that an acquittal was the same as a decision to let
gangs “ ‘control our society.’ ” See Fluker, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 203.
¶ 46 Defendant also claims that the following remarks constituted misconduct:
“You know when you hear [defendant’s] statements to the officers and you see it on a
video, it’s incredible. Incredible about how [defendant] continuously says, I mean,
honest to God’s truth, honest to God’s truth. How many times did you hear that when
[defendant] said, honest, officer. Honest. he throws around God all the time.
6 This court observed: “The trial court exacerbated the error by overruling defendant’s prompt, appropriate objections.” Fluker, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 203. Thus, unlike the case at bar, the remarks in Fluker were preserved for our review in a case that we described as presenting “a very close question.” Fluker, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 204. 17 No. 1-17-2156
You know when he is not our boy, the little devil with the pitchfork [tattoo], he
throws around honest to God’s truth, Honest. There is no honesty coming from him at
all about what he did on that night.”
Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s references to “God” were an attempt to stir religious
feeling and compares them to the remarks of the prosecutor in People v. Quiroz, 257 Ill. App.
3d 576, 584-85 (1993), which were found to be improper, although harmless. In Quiroz, the
prosecutor had argued concerning the defendant’s gang, the Satan Disciples, as follows:
“ ‘Now, ladies and gentlemen, it’s a little ironic that a disciple of Satan would
come into this courtroom—
—and tell you or ask you to find him guilty of second degree murder and not first
degree murder because he was acting out of passion. The word “[p]assion,” ladies and
gentlemen, comes from the word of the suffering of Christ between the Last Supper
and the following day. [A] Disciple of Satan wants to hide from that.’ ” Quiroz, 257
Ill. App. 3d at 584.
The remarks quoted above from Quiroz are readily distinguishable from the remarks at issue
here. The remarks in Quiroz were an extended discussion of Christian theology that was
entirely unrelated to the facts of the Quiroz case. Quiroz, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 585 (finding
“particularly” improper “the prosecutor’s comments regarding the Passion of Christ”). By
contrast, in the case at bar, the original references to “God” were made—not by the State—
but by defendant, when he was talking to the officers. The prosecutor was quoting
defendant’s statement, which was in evidence. See Quiroz, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 585
(criticizing the prosecutor for “denounc[ing] the defendant by drawing upon religious
18 No. 1-17-2156
imagery” when it had “no relevance to the facts of the case”). Thus, Quiroz is inapposite to
the case at bar.
¶ 47 For the foregoing reasons, we do not find persuasive defendant’s arguments about the
prosecutor’s rebuttal closing.
¶ 48 II. Sentencing
¶ 49 Lastly, defendant claims that his sentence is excessive when compared to a
codefendant’s sentence.
¶ 50 Defendant acknowledges that he failed to raise this issue about allegedly disparate
sentencing in the court below and thereby forfeited it for our review. “In order to preserve a
claim of sentencing error, both a contemporaneous objection and a written postsentencing
motion raising the issue are required.” People v. Harvey, 2018 IL 122325, ¶ 15. Although
defendant filed a postsentencing motion to reconsider sentence, he did not set forth the
alleged disparity with his codefendant as a ground for reconsideration. As a result, he asks us
to review this claim either pursuant to the plain error doctrine or as ineffective assistance of
counsel for counsel’s alleged failure to object. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564-65
(2007) (plain error doctrine). However, either ground would require a finding of error.
People v. Hensley, 2014 IL App (1st) 120802, ¶ 47. The first step under the plain error
doctrine is considering whether a plain or obvious error occurred (Harvey, 2018 IL 122325,
¶ 15); similarly, if the trial court did not err, then counsel did not render ineffective assistance
by not objecting (Hensley, 2014 IL App (1st) 120802, ¶ 47 (where there is no plain error,
there is no ineffectiveness of counsel)). Since we find no error as explained below, neither
ground applies.
19 No. 1-17-2156
¶ 51 The trial court has “broad discretionary powers” in sentencing a defendant. People v.
Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000). A trial court’s sentencing decision receives substantial
deference on review, since “the trial judge, having observed the defendant and the
proceedings, is in a much better position to consider factors such as the defendant’s
credibility, demeanor, moral character, mentality, environment, habits and age.” People v.
Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36. In crafting a sentence, the trial court must balance “the
seriousness of the offense” and “the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.”
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11; People v. Wilson, 2012 IL App (1st) 101038, ¶ 61. However, a
defendant’s rehabilitative potential is not entitled to greater weight than the seriousness of the
offense. People v. Reed, 2018 IL App (1st) 160609, ¶ 62.
¶ 52 When a trial court imposes a sentence within the permitted statutory range, a
reviewing court will start with the presumption that it is proper. People v. Knox, 2014 IL App
(1st) 120349, ¶ 46. Generally, a reviewing court will disturb a sentence “only if the trial court
abused its discretion in the sentence it imposed.” People v. Jones, 168 Ill. 2d 367, 373-74
(1995). A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing when the sentence is “greatly at
variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of
the offense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212
(2010). Our supreme court has cautioned that a reviewing court “must not substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed the factors
differently.” People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999).
¶ 53 Our supreme court has found that fundamental fairness requires that “similarly
situated” codefendants, who were involved in the same crime, should not “receive grossly
disparate sentences.” Fern, 189 Ill. 2d at 58; see also U.S. Const., amend. XIV (due process
20 No. 1-17-2156
clause); Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 11 (due process and proportionate penalties clauses). An
“improper sentence disparity” may occur when “equally culpable defendants with similar
backgrounds are given substantially different sentences.” People v. Ramos, 353 Ill. App. 3d
133, 139 (2004); People v. Smith, 214 Ill. App. 3d 327, 342 (1991). To prevail on a claim of
disparate sentencing, a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that he and his
codefendant were both (1) equally culpable and (2) “similarly situated with respect to
background, prior criminal history, and potential for rehabilitation.” Ramos, 353 Ill. App. 3d
at 139; People v. Curry, 296 Ill. App. 3d 559, 569 (1998). In the case at bar, defendant’s
claim falters on the first prong. For the reasons explained below, we cannot find that the trial
court abused its discretion in making a factual finding that defendant was more culpable than
the other codefendants.
¶ 54 Defendant argues that he was less culpable than codefendant Ramirez, who received a
shorter sentence. Defendant was the first person to hit the victim and, by knocking the victim
to the ground, defendant enabled the attack to proceed. However, defendant argues that it
was Ramirez who stabbed the victim when the victim was down and that the assistant
medical examiner testified that the victim died from these stab wounds. Thus, defendant
argues that he was not the person who administered the fatal stroke.
¶ 55 Although all the trials of the defendants involved in this offense were severed, the
same trial judge presided over the trials and sentencings of all four defendants charged in the
offense. After considering factors in aggravation and mitigation, he sentenced them as
follows: (1) defendant, 45 years; (2) Pablo Colon, 40 years (People v. Colon, 2018 IL App
(1st) 160120, ¶ 1); (3) Marco Ramirez, 35 years (People v. Ramirez, 2018 IL App (1st)
161554-U, ¶ 2); and (4) Gary Sams, 30 years (People v. Sams, 2017 IL App (1st) 160869-U,
21 No. 1-17-2156
¶ 2). 7 See People v. James, 2017 IL App (1st) 143391, ¶ 162 (in a disparate sentencing claim,
a reviewing court may take judicial notice of codefendants’ appeals and sentences); see
People v. Jimerson, 404 Ill. App. 3d 621, 634 (2010) (a reviewing court may take judicial
notice of codefendant’s related appeal).
¶ 56 Similar to defendant, codefendant Colon argued on appeal that his 40-year sentence
was disproportionate to a lesser sentence received by another codefendant. Colon, 2018 IL
App (1st) 160120, ¶¶ 63-64 (arguing that his sentence was disproportionate to the 30-year
sentence received by codefendant Sams). In Sams, we did not find Colon’s claim persuasive,
where the trial court specifically found that Colon’s involvement in the offense was greater
than Sam’s involvement, since Colon was one of the people “ ‘leading the charge’ ” and,
thus, “ ‘deserved a more severe sentence.’ ” Colon, 2018 IL App (1st) 160120, ¶ 69.
¶ 57 Similarly, in the case at bar, the trial court found “that the defendant was the leader of
the pac[k], so to speak, and that he was armed with the bat that struck the first blow that
knocked the victim down and allowed the other individuals to continue the attack.” The trial
court explained that “defendant’s primary rol[e]” in the attack “require[d] [in] the Court’s
discretion a sentence greater than the minimum, and greater commensurate with the other
individuals based on their level of participation.”
¶ 58 Thus, the trial court specifically considered the issue that defendant raises now—
namely, relative culpability—and made a specific factual finding regarding it. First, although
the trial court did not expressly refer to codefendant Ramirez by name in its statement, we
observe that the court’s finding that defendant was the first person to strike the victim
7 In his brief to this court, defendant argues that “it is possible that the disparity was simply unknown to the trial judge.” We do not find this argument availing, in light of the fact that it was the same trial judge who presided over every sentencing. 22 No. 1-17-2156
necessarily includes the finding that Ramirez was not the first to attack. Second, the court
stated that it had considered “the other individuals” and “their level of participation” and that
it had found, in its discretion, that defendant’s sentence should be “greater” due to
defendant’s primary role in the offense. Lastly, the trial court’s carefully graduated
sentencing, with each sentence five years apart from the next sentence, indicates that the trial
court considered each defendant’s role in the offense. As we did in Colon, we cannot find
that the trial court abused its discretion in making its findings about this issue and, thus,
affirm. See Colon, 2018 IL App (1st) 160120, ¶ 70.
¶ 59 Consideration of the second prong—namely, the respective backgrounds of defendant
and codefendant Ramirez—does not lead us to a different conclusion. Defendant argues that,
like Ramirez, he had no felony convictions prior to the instant offense. However, the lack of
felony convictions prior to the instant offense is only one piece of defendant’s criminal
history. Defendant’s presentence report shows that, prior to the instant offense, he pled guilty
on November 30, 2005, to “Aggravated Assault-Gun, Knife” and was sentenced to one year
of court supervision. In addition, after the offense in question, defendant plead guilty in 2017
to gunrunning and was sentenced to seven years and seven months with IDOC. See 720 ILCS
5/24-3A(a) (West 2012) (“A person commits gunrunning when he or she transfers 3 or more
firearms” in violation of section 24-3 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/24-3 (West
2012).). At the sentencing hearing in the case at bar, the State established that the underlying
acts of defendant’s felony gunrunning conviction occurred in April 2012, two years after the
murder here. The two-year time lapse between the instant offense and the subsequent
gunrunning offense showed that defendant remained unrepentant long after the instant
offense occurred. Based on the subsequent offense, the trial court expressly found: “I have
23 No. 1-17-2156
considered aggravating that the defendant continued in his gang activity with the other case
of gun running that occurred after this incident.” Thus, defendant has also failed to show that
the respective backgrounds of the two defendants were similarly situated.
¶ 60 CONCLUSION
¶ 61 For the foregoing reasons, we do not find defendant’s claims on appeal persuasive
and affirm his conviction and sentence.
¶ 62 Affirmed.
¶ 63 JUSTICE LAMPKIN, specially concurring:
¶ 64 I respectfully concur only in the judgment reached.
24 No. 1-17-2156
No. 1-17-2156
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12-CR- 18726(02); the Hon. Matthew E. Coghlan, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Andrew Smith, of State for Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. for Spellberg, Tasha-Marie Kelly, and Hareena Meghani-Wakely, Appellee: Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.