People ex rel. Fountain v. Board of Supervisors

4 Barb. 64
New York Supreme Court·Decided July 5, 1848·Published·Cited by 22 cases

Opinion

By the Court, Babculo, J.

The question arises whether the board of supervisors can be compelled by mandamus to direct the levy and collection of the damages assessed to the relators under the act of 1845. In discussing this question, I shall assume that a mandamus is the proper remedy for the enforcement of the relators’ rights, if any they have; and that their rights are cut off and annulled by the repealing acts, if the legislature had the power thus to cut them off.

The case then involves the consideration of the following propositions: I. The general power of the legislature to destroy vested rights by a repeal of the statute under which they were acquired. II. How far the repealing acts in question conflict with the provision of the constitution of this state which forbids the taking of private property for public use, without just compensation. III. How far they fall within the inhibition contained in the constitution of the United States against passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts.

I. By the theory of the English government, the law-making power is omnipotent. An act,of parliament in plain and distinct terms, however unjust or oppressive, is binding upon individuals and courts of justice. It is the supreme law of the land, and demands perfect obedience. It has been said by an eminent jurist of this country, that, “ if there be no constitutional objection to a statute, it is with us as absolute and uncontrollable as laws flowing from the sovereign power, under any other form of government.” (1 Kents Com. 448.) In its broad and unlimited sense, I cannot subscribe to this doctrine, as applicable to republican governments. Here the legislature is not supreme; it is not the highest authority recognized. “It [71] is only one of the organs of that absolute sovereignty which resides in the whole body of the people. Like other departments of government, it can only exercise such powers as have been delegated to it; and when it steps beyond that boundary, its acts, like those of the most humble magistrate in the state, who transcends his jurisdiction, are utterly void.” We have written constitutions which limit and control the legislative power: and although, in the absence of a constitutional inhibition, the legislature may be presumed to have the power it exercises, in most cases, still I apprehend that this is not universally true. The constitution declares that “ the legislative power of this state shall be vested in a senate and assembly.” This is the authority under which our legislature acts; and under this clause it has the power of legislation within the fair scope of legislation, except so far as it is restricted by other provisions of the constitution. But it can hardly be said that under this general power of legislation it is omnipotent: that it can pass acts against natural right and justice, and subversive of decency and good order. Such power is the prerogative of despotism—not of free government. To suppose that the people have clothed their representatives with absolute and despotic power, under the general grant of legislative authority, is to presume them incapable of self-government and unworthy the name of freemen.

Protection to life, liberty, and property, is the great object of human governments. Whatever tends to this end is within the scope of legislative authority: whatever plainly destroys this, is beyond its legitimate scope. The legislature has full power to enact laws for the punishment of crimes : but suppose it should prescribe a uniformity of dress, or the quantity and quality of food for each person, or regulate the hours which every citizen should devote to labor and to sleep ; and, attempt to enforce such arbitrary interference with individual affairs, by pains and penalties; would such laws be valid? Could any court be found to enforce them ? I am aware that these may be called extreme casesand that it cannot be presumed that the representatives of the people will so far forget their [72] position, as to enter upon such fields of unauthorized legislation ; still, experience warns us not to be too sanguine even' upon this point. The past admonishes us of the necessity of guarding individual right against the encroachments of the law-making power. Our records show that several instances have occurred, within a few years, of laws being made in violation of the express provisions of the constitution. ( Warren v. The People, 2 Denio, 272. Quackenbush v. Danks, 1 Id. 128.)

It cannot be denied that excessive legislation is the great legal curse of the age. It is the mighty vortex which is drawing every thing within its grasp. So long as it keeps within the constitutional bounds and legitimate scope of its authority, it is our duty to enforce the laws : but when it transcends these, it is equally our duty to declare them null and void. (Kent's Com. lect. 20.) As this doctrine, limiting the omnipotence of the legislative power, by judicial interposition, has been recently denied by a learned member of the court of errors, in the case of Cochran v. Van Surlay, (20 Wend. 382,) it may be well to see how it stands upon authority.

In Gardner v. The Village of Newburgh, (2 John. Ch. 162,) Chancellor Kent had occasion to discuss the power of the state to take private property for public purposes without making recompense therefor; and he held that this power could not be legally exercised, and accordingly granted an injunction restraining the defendants from proceeding under the act, until it should be so amended as to give the plaintiff a just compensation for his property. This it will be remembered was in the absence of any constitutional restriction: as the first incorporation of that principle into our state constitutions was in 1821. In his commentaries, this eminent jurist reviews the American authorities on this subject, and declares that the principle exists with stringent force, independent of any positive (constitutional provision, “ and is laid down by jurists as an Acknowledged principle of universal law.” (2 Kent's Com. 339, and note.)

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

People ex rel. Fountain v. Board of Supervisors, 4 Barb. 64 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1848).

4 Barb. 64 (People ex rel. Fountain v. Board of Supervisors) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Close v. Potter
21 N.Y.S. 1086 (Superior Court of New York, 1892)
Close v. Potter
2 Misc. 1 (Superior Court of Buffalo, 1892)
People ex rel. Reynolds v. Common Council
2 Misc. 7 (Superior Court of Buffalo, 1892)
United States v. Curtis
11 Abb. N. Cas. 1 (S.D. New York, 1882)
Peerce v. Kitzmiller
19 W. Va. 564 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1882)
Van Dyck v. . McQuade
86 N.Y. 38 (New York Court of Appeals, 1881)
Lamb v. Schottler
54 Cal. 319 (California Supreme Court, 1880)
Lawson v. Jeffries
47 Miss. 686 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1873)
In re Widening Broadway of New York
61 Barb. 483 (New York Supreme Court, 1872)
Davidson v. Mayor of New York
2 Rob. 230 (The Superior Court of New York City, 1864)
Lehman v. McBride
15 Ohio St. (N.S.) 573 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1863)
Warfield v. Ravesies
38 Ala. 518 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1863)
Township of Marathon v. Township of Oregon
8 Mich. 372 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1860)
Borman v. State
34 Ala. 216 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1859)
Sadler v. Langham
34 Ala. 311 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1859)
Wild v. Board of Supervisors
9 How. Pr. 315 (New York Supreme Court, 1854)
Milhau v. Sharp
15 Barb. 193 (New York Supreme Court, 1853)
Hampton v. Commonwealth
19 Pa. 329 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1852)
Thorne v. Cramer
15 Barb. 112 (New York Supreme Court, 1851)