Borman v. State

34 Ala. 216
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedJune 15, 1859
StatusPublished
Cited by107 cases

This text of 34 Ala. 216 (Borman v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Borman v. State, 34 Ala. 216 (Ala. 1859).

Opinion

R. W. "WALKER, J.

The principal question in this case is, whether the act, under which the defendant -was indicted, can be sustained as an exercise of power belonging to the legislature. The solution of this question demands some inquiry into the nature and limits of the legislative power vested by our constitution in the general assembly.

Antecedent to the formation of the Federal constitution, the people of the several States constituted separate, independent, and sovereign communities, with all the rights and powers inherent in sovereignty. Some of these powers they delegated to the government formed by that constitution; but their essential sovereignty — the supreme ultimate power, which with us. resides in the people alone, and cannot attach to government, and which is, in its very nature, incapable of mutilation or division — this they retained. Alabama became a member of the Union upon a footing of equality with the States which originally formed the Federal constitution. Consequently, although she has delegated to the general government the exercise of certain enumerated sovereign powers, she, like her sisters of the confederacy, the original parties to the compact of union, retains in its plenitude, unexhausted and unimpaired, her sovereignty as a State. The very existence of a State implies that it has appropriate organs to will and to act as such; and the necessity for these gives rise to government, which is, in fact, only the representative [230]*230of a State in its sovereign character, and the medium through which, as a sovereign, it speaks and acts. Each State of the Union has, therefore, a separate government of its own, which, being designed to extend to all the multiform and ever changing objects which, in the ordinary coarse of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and property of the people, and the internal order and prosperity of the State, is the representative and organ of the entire mass of powers properly appertaining to government, except only those which have been delegated to the Federal government, or withheld by the people themselves in organizing the State government.

In the ascertainment of the respective powers of the Federal and State governments, this fundamental distinction is to be observed — that whereas, by the Federal constitution, the States have delegated to the government thereby organized only specifically enumerated powers, withholding all not named, the State constitution, on the contrary, contains a grant from the people of all powers not expressly withheld. In the Federal constitution, the enumeration of powers is of those delegated; in the State constitution, it is of those reserved. But for the enumeration, the Federal government would have no powers ; but for the reservations, the State government would possess all the powers inherent in the people. Hence it has grown into a maxim of universal acceptance, among both jurists and statesmen, that “ the Federal government can do nothing but what is authorised expressly or by clear implication, while that of the State can do whatever is not prohibited.” — Sharpless v. Mayor, 21 Penn. 147-160; People v. Draper, 25 Barb. 359-60; Norris v. Clymer, 2 Barr, 285; Calhoun’s Works, vol. 6, p. 224.

By the constitution of this State, the powers of government are divided, and distributed to three departments, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. Section 1, article 3, declares, that “the legislative power of this State shall be vested in two distinct branches: the one to be style ‘ the senate,’ the other ‘the house of representatives,’ and both together ‘the general assembly of the State of Alabama.’ ” These words, standing by them[231]*231selves, import a general grant of all that legislative power which resides in the people as a sovereign community. But a part of the powers inherent in the people they had already delegated to the general government; and these, of course, are excepted out of the grant here made to the State legislature. The force of these terms is further weakened by qualifications and limitations carefully expressed in the constitution itself. In the first place, the power here conferred is legislative power — the power to make laios. The executive and judicial powers are expressly confided to other departments, and each of these three departments is emphatically forbidden ‘ to exercise any of the powers belonging to either of the others.’ (Article 2, sect. 2.) Here, then, is one restriction upon the legislative department of the State government. It can do no act not of .the nature of legislative power. Auy attempt on its part to exercise executive or judicial authority would be a naked usurpation. But there are still other restrictions, plainly declared in the constitution. The 1st article sets forth certain rights of the citizen, which are declared to constitute ‘general, great, and essential principles of liberty and free government,’ and which are expressly excepted out of ‘ the general powers of government.’ Subject to the restrictions and limitations here indicated, the people of the State have conferred on the general assembly the authority to exercise every power, legislative in its nature, which they themselves, as a sovereign community, possessed. When, therefore, an act of the legislature is assailed as unconstitutional, the objector assumes the burthen of showing, either that it is an exercise of authority not legislative in its nature, or that it is inconsistent with some other provision of the Federal or State constitution. — Wynehamer v. People, 3 Kernan, 390, 411, 430, &c.; Sill v. Corning, 1 Smith’s N. Y. 303; Sharpless v. Mayor, 21 Penn. 147; Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 27 Penn. 444-456; Clarke v. City of Rochester, 24 Barb. 480.

We are aware that the proposition has been sometimes asserted, that there áre limitations upon the legislative power of the State governments, aside from, and inde[232]*232pendent of, the constitutional restrictions to which we have adverted. Such unenacted limitations are sought to be deduced from the form and nature of the governments themselves, the objects which they were designed to accomplish, and the received political maxims and fundamental truths on which they are based. Nor is this view unsupported by the sanction of great names. Judge Chase, in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas, 386 ; Judge Story, in Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Peters, 657; Judge Bronson, in Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 145; Judge Strong, in People v. Toynbee, 20 Barb. 218 ; Judge Hosmer, of Connecticut, in Goshen v. Storlington, 4 Conn. 259 ; Chancellor Walworth, in Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige, 137; Judge Spalding, of Ohio, in Griffith v. Comm’rs, &c., 20 Ohio, 609; and Chief-Justice Parker, in Ross’ case, 2 Pick. 169, have all, in terms more or less strong, intimated that the authority of the legislature is not absolute in all cases where the constitution has failed to impose an explicit restraint, but that there are other restrictions growing out of the fundamental principles of free government and the original rights of men ; and several of these eminent judges have asserted it. as an inherent prerogative of the judiciary, independently of constitutional provisions, to arrest the execution of any law which is contrary to the cardinal rules of justice or morality, or, as it is sometimes expressed, which is in conflict with common reason and natural right. See, also, People v. Supervisors, &c., 4 Barb. 64, 74; Benson v. Mayor, 10 Barb. 223; Hatch v. Verm’t R. R., 25 Verm. 49 ; People v. Berberrick, 20 Barb. 230; Smith on Stat. & Const. Law, chap. 7 ; Ham v. McLaws, 1 Bay, 91; Bowman v. Middleton, ib. 250.

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Bluebook (online)
34 Ala. 216, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/borman-v-state-ala-1859.