23CA1308 Peo v Woodard 12-11-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1308 Chaffee County District Court No. 22CR78 Honorable Patrick W. Murphy, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Cameron B. Woodard,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Johnson and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 11, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Lisa K. Michaels, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Mark Evans, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Cameron B. Woodard, was convicted of assaulting
a corrections officer. On appeal, he contends that the district court
erred in instructing the jury on the definition of “deadly weapon”
and by failing to note on the mittimus the amount of presentence
confinement credit (PSCC) awarded at sentencing. We affirm the
judgment of conviction and remand the case for the court to correct
the mittimus.
I. Background
¶2 The victim worked as a lieutenant in the correctional facility
where Woodard was serving a prison sentence in connection with
an unrelated case. During her morning rounds on the day in
question, the victim noticed that Woodard had placed a sheet over
the bars to his cell, and she ordered him to remove it. Later, the
victim saw that Woodard had placed the sheet back up on his cell’s
bars. When the victim attempted to remove the sheet, Woodard
struck her with a plastic chair, pushed her against a wall, and
punched her in the face. Woodard punched the victim five or six
more times while she was on the ground. The victim sustained
serious bodily injury from the attack.
1 ¶3 The State charged Woodard with two counts of first degree
assault, two counts of second degree assault, and six crime of
violence counts. Some of the substantive offenses and the crime of
violence counts had as an element the use or threatened use of a
deadly weapon.
¶4 During trial, the parties discussed how to instruct the jury on
the definition of “deadly weapon,” given that Woodard had used his
fists to inflict serious bodily injury on the victim. Over defense
counsel’s objection, the district court granted the prosecution’s
request to add language to the definitional instruction to inform the
jury that body parts can be deadly weapons. Consequently, the
court instructed the jury as follows:
“Deadly weapon” means a knife, bludgeon, or any other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or inanimate, that, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. Any object can be a deadly weapon if it is used in a manner capable of producing death or serious bodily injury; body parts can be deadly weapons depending on the manner in which they are used.
¶5 Woodard’s theory of defense was that although he had
physically assaulted the victim, he did not form the specific intent
2 to cause serious bodily injury. The jury rejected that defense and
convicted him as charged. The district court sentenced Woodard to
an aggregate term of twenty-four years in prison and awarded him
seventy days of PSCC.
II. Deadly Weapon Jury Instruction
¶6 Woodard asserts that the district court erred by giving the
deadly weapon instruction. He argues, primarily, that the added
language concerning body parts as deadly weapons deviated from
the statutory definition of “deadly weapon” and “violated the
principle that jury instructions should not be pulled from judicial
opinions.” We perceive no error.
A. Standard of Review and Legal Authority
¶7 A court has a duty to instruct the jury on all matters of law
applicable to the case. Roberts v. People, 2017 CO 76, ¶ 18. In
discharging this duty, “the trial court may instruct the jury
concerning a principle of law that is related to an issue in
controversy.” People v. Hayward, 55 P.3d 803, 805 (Colo. App.
2002). We review de novo the question of whether a court
accurately instructed the jury on the law. Tibbels v. People, 2022
CO 1, ¶ 22.
3 ¶8 “As long as the instruction properly informs the jury of the
law, a trial court has broad discretion to determine the form and
style of jury instructions.” McDonald v. People, 2021 CO 64, ¶ 54
(quoting Day v. Johnson, 255 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Colo. 2011)). Thus,
we review a court’s decision to give a particular instruction for an
abuse of discretion. Id.
¶9 Section 18-1-901(3)(e), C.R.S. 2025, provides that “‘[d]eadly
weapon’ means . . . [a] firearm . . . knife, bludgeon, or any other
weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether
animate or inanimate, that, in the manner it is used or intended to
be used, is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.”
The corresponding model jury instruction uses the same language.
COLJI-Crim. F:88 (2024).
¶ 10 In interpreting section 18-1-901(3)(e), the Colorado Supreme
Court has consistently held that “fists may be deadly weapons if in
the manner they are used or intended to be used they are capable
of producing death or serious bodily injury.” People v. Ross, 831
P.2d 1310, 1312-13 (Colo. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by
Montez v. People, 2012 CO 6, ¶ 16; see also Washington v. People,
2024 CO 26, ¶ 28 (fists can be deadly weapons); People v. Lee, 2020
4 CO 81, ¶ 19 (“[H]ands may be deadly weapons if in the manner they
are used, they are capable of producing death or serious bodily
injury.”); People v. Saleh, 45 P.3d 1272, 1276 (Colo. 2002) (“Objects
which are not inherently deadly, such as feet and hands, can
become deadly weapons when used to start an unbroken,
foreseeable chain of events capable of producing serious bodily
injury or death.”). This legal principle is recognized in a comment
to the deadly weapon model jury instruction. See COLJI-Crim. F:88
cmt. 3.
B. Analysis
¶ 11 The deadly weapon jury instruction at issue here contained
two sentences: (1) the unobjected-to first sentence that provided the
statutory definition of “deadly weapon”; and (2) the challenged
second sentence setting forth the rule, derived from case law, that
body parts can be deadly weapons.
¶ 12 We reject Woodard’s assertion that the inclusion of the second
sentence meant that the jury instruction impermissibly differed
from the statutory definition of deadly weapon. See People v.
Weinreich, 119 P.3d 1073, 1076 (Colo. 2005) (“A jury instruction
should substantially track the language of the statute describing
5 the crime; a material deviation from the statute can result in
reversible plain error, depending on the facts of the case.”). The
first sentence tracked the statutory definition of “deadly weapon”
and the language of the corresponding model jury instruction. See
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23CA1308 Peo v Woodard 12-11-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1308 Chaffee County District Court No. 22CR78 Honorable Patrick W. Murphy, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Cameron B. Woodard,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Johnson and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 11, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Lisa K. Michaels, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Mark Evans, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Cameron B. Woodard, was convicted of assaulting
a corrections officer. On appeal, he contends that the district court
erred in instructing the jury on the definition of “deadly weapon”
and by failing to note on the mittimus the amount of presentence
confinement credit (PSCC) awarded at sentencing. We affirm the
judgment of conviction and remand the case for the court to correct
the mittimus.
I. Background
¶2 The victim worked as a lieutenant in the correctional facility
where Woodard was serving a prison sentence in connection with
an unrelated case. During her morning rounds on the day in
question, the victim noticed that Woodard had placed a sheet over
the bars to his cell, and she ordered him to remove it. Later, the
victim saw that Woodard had placed the sheet back up on his cell’s
bars. When the victim attempted to remove the sheet, Woodard
struck her with a plastic chair, pushed her against a wall, and
punched her in the face. Woodard punched the victim five or six
more times while she was on the ground. The victim sustained
serious bodily injury from the attack.
1 ¶3 The State charged Woodard with two counts of first degree
assault, two counts of second degree assault, and six crime of
violence counts. Some of the substantive offenses and the crime of
violence counts had as an element the use or threatened use of a
deadly weapon.
¶4 During trial, the parties discussed how to instruct the jury on
the definition of “deadly weapon,” given that Woodard had used his
fists to inflict serious bodily injury on the victim. Over defense
counsel’s objection, the district court granted the prosecution’s
request to add language to the definitional instruction to inform the
jury that body parts can be deadly weapons. Consequently, the
court instructed the jury as follows:
“Deadly weapon” means a knife, bludgeon, or any other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or inanimate, that, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. Any object can be a deadly weapon if it is used in a manner capable of producing death or serious bodily injury; body parts can be deadly weapons depending on the manner in which they are used.
¶5 Woodard’s theory of defense was that although he had
physically assaulted the victim, he did not form the specific intent
2 to cause serious bodily injury. The jury rejected that defense and
convicted him as charged. The district court sentenced Woodard to
an aggregate term of twenty-four years in prison and awarded him
seventy days of PSCC.
II. Deadly Weapon Jury Instruction
¶6 Woodard asserts that the district court erred by giving the
deadly weapon instruction. He argues, primarily, that the added
language concerning body parts as deadly weapons deviated from
the statutory definition of “deadly weapon” and “violated the
principle that jury instructions should not be pulled from judicial
opinions.” We perceive no error.
A. Standard of Review and Legal Authority
¶7 A court has a duty to instruct the jury on all matters of law
applicable to the case. Roberts v. People, 2017 CO 76, ¶ 18. In
discharging this duty, “the trial court may instruct the jury
concerning a principle of law that is related to an issue in
controversy.” People v. Hayward, 55 P.3d 803, 805 (Colo. App.
2002). We review de novo the question of whether a court
accurately instructed the jury on the law. Tibbels v. People, 2022
CO 1, ¶ 22.
3 ¶8 “As long as the instruction properly informs the jury of the
law, a trial court has broad discretion to determine the form and
style of jury instructions.” McDonald v. People, 2021 CO 64, ¶ 54
(quoting Day v. Johnson, 255 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Colo. 2011)). Thus,
we review a court’s decision to give a particular instruction for an
abuse of discretion. Id.
¶9 Section 18-1-901(3)(e), C.R.S. 2025, provides that “‘[d]eadly
weapon’ means . . . [a] firearm . . . knife, bludgeon, or any other
weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether
animate or inanimate, that, in the manner it is used or intended to
be used, is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.”
The corresponding model jury instruction uses the same language.
COLJI-Crim. F:88 (2024).
¶ 10 In interpreting section 18-1-901(3)(e), the Colorado Supreme
Court has consistently held that “fists may be deadly weapons if in
the manner they are used or intended to be used they are capable
of producing death or serious bodily injury.” People v. Ross, 831
P.2d 1310, 1312-13 (Colo. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by
Montez v. People, 2012 CO 6, ¶ 16; see also Washington v. People,
2024 CO 26, ¶ 28 (fists can be deadly weapons); People v. Lee, 2020
4 CO 81, ¶ 19 (“[H]ands may be deadly weapons if in the manner they
are used, they are capable of producing death or serious bodily
injury.”); People v. Saleh, 45 P.3d 1272, 1276 (Colo. 2002) (“Objects
which are not inherently deadly, such as feet and hands, can
become deadly weapons when used to start an unbroken,
foreseeable chain of events capable of producing serious bodily
injury or death.”). This legal principle is recognized in a comment
to the deadly weapon model jury instruction. See COLJI-Crim. F:88
cmt. 3.
B. Analysis
¶ 11 The deadly weapon jury instruction at issue here contained
two sentences: (1) the unobjected-to first sentence that provided the
statutory definition of “deadly weapon”; and (2) the challenged
second sentence setting forth the rule, derived from case law, that
body parts can be deadly weapons.
¶ 12 We reject Woodard’s assertion that the inclusion of the second
sentence meant that the jury instruction impermissibly differed
from the statutory definition of deadly weapon. See People v.
Weinreich, 119 P.3d 1073, 1076 (Colo. 2005) (“A jury instruction
should substantially track the language of the statute describing
5 the crime; a material deviation from the statute can result in
reversible plain error, depending on the facts of the case.”). The
first sentence tracked the statutory definition of “deadly weapon”
and the language of the corresponding model jury instruction. See
§ 18-1-901(3)(e)(II); COLJI-Crim. F:88. The second sentence is akin
to a supplemental instruction and explained, correctly, that body
parts can fall within the statutory definition of a deadly weapon.
See People v. Stellabotte, 2016 COA 106, ¶ 31, aff’d, 2018 CO 66;
People v. Holwuttle, 155 P.3d 447, 449 (Colo. App. 2006).
¶ 13 The fact that the second sentence derives from judicial
opinions does not necessarily render the instruction erroneous.
While a district court’s “use of an excerpt from an opinion in an
instruction” is disfavored, Evans v. People, 706 P.2d 795, 800 (Colo.
1985), the practice does not inexorably result in error. See People v.
Benton, 829 P.2d 451, 453 (Colo. App. 1991) (explaining that, while
the supreme court has cautioned against the use of language from
opinions in instructions, there is no “prohibition against such
practice”). The problem with using excerpts from opinions to
formulate instructions is that the opinion language “may be a
proper expression of the law as related to th[e] facts and issues” in
6 that particular case but may not be “sufficiently general, clear, or
accurate to serve as a satisfactory or full instruction to the jury.”
People v. Riley, 708 P.2d 1359, 1366 (Colo. 1985) (quoting Cohen v.
People, 103 P.2d 479, 480 (1940)). But here, the statement that
body parts can constitute a deadly weapon is an accurate and
generally applicable expression of the law. See Stellabotte, ¶ 31
(“Colorado’s appellate courts have consistently upheld courts giving
the jury supplemental instructions, even when unnecessary, if the
instructions properly state the law.”). And the supplemental
instruction was appropriately tailored to the facts of the underlying
case, which involved allegations that Woodard used his hands to
assault the victim. See Idrogo v. People, 818 P.2d 752, 754 (Colo.
1991) (“[A]lthough an instruction couched in terms of the language
of the statute is proper, a trial court must tailor instructions to the
particular circumstances of a given case when the instructions,
taken as a whole, do not adequately apprise the jury of the
[applicable] law . . . .” (citation omitted)).
¶ 14 Finally, we are not persuaded by Woodard’s argument (raised
for the first time on appeal) that the instruction improperly
emphasized certain evidence — that his body parts could be deadly
7 weapons. According to Woodard, because the instruction already
explained that any “weapon, device, instrument, material, or
substance” can constitute a deadly weapon if capable of producing
death or serious bodily injury, the additional language about body
parts as deadly weapons improperly suggested that Woodard
intended to inflict serious bodily injury on the victim. But under
that theory, the instruction would improperly emphasize evidence
in any case involving a firearm, knife, or bludgeon, which are also
mentioned separately in the statutory definition of a deadly weapon.
In any event, we reject the notion that by clarifying that body parts
can constitute deadly weapons, the instruction “made it seem more
likely” that Woodard had the requisite mens rea for certain of the
charged offenses. It was undisputed that Woodard used his hands
to repeatedly punch the victim, causing serious bodily injury.
Whether he specifically intended to cause such serious injuries was
a separate issue, unaffected by the definition of deadly weapon.
¶ 15 As the district court noted, body parts do not intuitively satisfy
the definition of deadly weapon, which refers to a weapon, device,
instrument, material, or substance. For the reasons explained
above, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by
8 giving the supplemental instruction to ensure that the jury was not
confused as to whether body parts could be deadly weapons.
III. Presentence Confinement Credit
¶ 16 Woodard contends, the People concede, and we agree that a
remand is required for correction of the mittimus. The mittimus
should be amended to reflect the seventy days of PSCC that were
awarded at the sentencing hearing. See People v. Tennyson, 2023
COA 2, ¶ 37 (a court’s oral pronouncement of sentence takes
precedence over the mittimus), aff’d, 2025 CO 31; Crim. P. 36;
People v. Baker, 2019 CO 97M, ¶ 21.
IV. Disposition
¶ 17 The judgment of conviction is affirmed. The case is remanded
for the court to amend the mittimus.
JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.