Justice VOLLACK
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
The People of the State of Colorado (the People) petition from the court of appeals decision in People v. Ross, 819 P.2d 507 (Colo.App.1991), wherein the court of appeals determined that fists are not deadly weapons within section 18-l-901(3)(e), 8B C.R.S. (1986). The court of appeals reversed Ross’ conviction for second degree assault on the elderly with a deadly weapon. We reverse and remand with directions.
I.
On February 26, 1988, Samuel Cohn (Cohn) was seventy-two years old. While playing golf with two companions, Cohn accidentally hit a red car traveling down a street adjacent to the golf course with his golf ball. Cohn approached the driver of the car, Howard Ross (Ross). Ross, then thirty years old, exchanged words with Cohn. Ross struck Cohn with a cupped hand. As a result of Ross’ blow, Cohn was taken to an emergency hospital room where he was treated in a trauma unit by Dr. Riccio.
Ross was subsequently charged with second degree assault and second degree assault on the elderly with a deadly weapon. At Ross’ trial, Dr. Riccio testified that Cohn sustained eight major fractures around his eyes, nose, and mouth. According to Dr. Riccio, Cohn’s nose was essentially crushed. Dr. Riccio also testified that Cohn was at great risk of having severe permanent damage. Cohn testified that he was unable to fully close one eye and had his lower jaw replaced as a result of Ross’ blow to his face.
A jury found Ross guilty of second degree assault pursuant to section 18-3-203(l)(a), 8B C.R.S. (1986), and assault on the elderly pursuant to section 18-3-209, 8B C.R.S. (1986).1 Ross appealed his con[1312] victions, and the court of appeals reversed his conviction of assault on the elderly with a deadly weapon. Ross, 819 P.2d at 508. The court of appeals premised its reversal on the grounds that a fist is not a deadly weapon. Id. The People appeal the reversal of the conviction of assault on the elderly with a deadly weapon.
II.
The People present one issue for our consideration: whether a fist can be a deadly weapon as defined in section 18-1-901(3)(e). We find that it can.
Section 18-l-901(3)(e) provides:
“Deadly weapon” means any of the following which in the manner it is used or intended to be used is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury:
(I) A firearm, whether loaded or unloaded;
(II) A knife;
(III) A bludgeon; or
(IV) Any other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or inanimate.
§ 18-l-901(3)(e), 8B C.R.S. (1986) (emphasis added). We have previously construed this section when considering whether various items were deadly weapons. Williams v. People, 687 P.2d 950, 954-55 (Colo.1984) (holding that an unloaded firearm is a deadly weapon as a matter of law); Bowers v. People, 617 P.2d 560, 562-63 (Colo.1980) (holding that a quart whiskey bottle may be a deadly weapon depending on the manner in which it is used); People v. Bramlett, 194 Colo. 205, 209, 573 P.2d 94, 96-97 (1977) (holding that any object used in a manner capable of producing death or bodily injury is a deadly weapon); Miller v. District Court, 193 Colo. 404, 407, 566 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1977) (holding that a firecracker in a bottle may be a deadly weapon depending on its actual or intended use); see also Grass v. People, 172 Colo. 223, 471 P.2d 602 (1970) (holding that a shoe may be a deadly weapon depending on the manner of its use, among other things, under a prior version of the section).
We have consistently analyzed whether objects are deadly weapons by evaluating the manner in which the objects are used. Bowers, 617 P.2d at 563 (holding that an object may be a deadly weapon depending on how it is used); Bramlett, 194 Colo. at 209, 573 P.2d at 96-97 (holding that objects are deadly weapons if used in a particular manner); and Miller, 193 Colo. at 407, 566 P.2d at 1066 (holding that object’s actual or intended use determines whether it is a deadly weapon). Our analysis has been controlled by the statutory definition of deadly weapons found in section 18-1-901(3)(e). Accordingly, we have noted that section 18-l-901(3)(e) “expressly prescribes a test to determine whether items other than firearms, knives, and bludgeons are deadly weapons, based not on the intrinsic nature of the items but upon their use or intended use.” Bowers, 617 P.2d at 562-63 (emphasis added).
The plain language of section 18 — 1— 901(3)(e) supports our object-use test. Section 18-l-901(3)(e) expressly states that an object can be a deadly weapon if used in a particular manner. § 18 — 1—901(3)(e), 8B C.R.S. (1986); see People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Colo.1990) (holding that there is no need to resort to interpretive rules where statutory language is clear and unambiguous); Thiret v. Kautzky, 792 P.2d 801, 806 (Colo.1990) (holding that it is unnecessary to examine its legislative history where the meaning of a statute is clear). The precise issue before us, however, is whether a fist can be a deadly weapon depending on the manner in which it is used. We find that it can.
A.
Section 18-l-901(3)(e) segregates objects into two categories: items “deadly ... by their essential nature” (firearms, knives, and bludgeons), and “[a]ll other items.” Bowers, 617 P.2d at 563. In Bowers, we found that the statute contemplates a scheme whereby objects not intrinsically deadly may become so, depending on the manner in which they are used. Id. Thus, [1313] in Bowers, we found a quart bottle of whiskey to be a deadly weapon when used to strike a store owner on the head, causing him to suffer a concussion and several cuts. Id.
Fists have not been legislatively designated as inherently deadly weapons. Thus, if fists come within the ambit of “[a]ny other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or inanimate,” fists may be deadly weapons depending on the manner in which they are used. § 18-l-901(3)(e)(IV), 8B C.R.S. (1986).
We have not previously given that phrase a narrow or limiting construction. Rather, we have interpreted the phrase to include any object or device. Bowers, 617 P.2d at 563 (holding that any items in addition to those enumerated in the statute can be deadly weapons); Bramlett, 194 Colo. at 209, 573 P.2d at 96 (“[T]he statutory definition of ‘deadly weapon’ includes any object.”); Miller, 193 Colo. at 407, 566 P.2d at 1066; Grass, 172 Colo. at 229, 471 P.2d at 605 (holding that instruments or things can be deadly weapons).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Justice VOLLACK
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
The People of the State of Colorado (the People) petition from the court of appeals decision in People v. Ross, 819 P.2d 507 (Colo.App.1991), wherein the court of appeals determined that fists are not deadly weapons within section 18-l-901(3)(e), 8B C.R.S. (1986). The court of appeals reversed Ross’ conviction for second degree assault on the elderly with a deadly weapon. We reverse and remand with directions.
I.
On February 26, 1988, Samuel Cohn (Cohn) was seventy-two years old. While playing golf with two companions, Cohn accidentally hit a red car traveling down a street adjacent to the golf course with his golf ball. Cohn approached the driver of the car, Howard Ross (Ross). Ross, then thirty years old, exchanged words with Cohn. Ross struck Cohn with a cupped hand. As a result of Ross’ blow, Cohn was taken to an emergency hospital room where he was treated in a trauma unit by Dr. Riccio.
Ross was subsequently charged with second degree assault and second degree assault on the elderly with a deadly weapon. At Ross’ trial, Dr. Riccio testified that Cohn sustained eight major fractures around his eyes, nose, and mouth. According to Dr. Riccio, Cohn’s nose was essentially crushed. Dr. Riccio also testified that Cohn was at great risk of having severe permanent damage. Cohn testified that he was unable to fully close one eye and had his lower jaw replaced as a result of Ross’ blow to his face.
A jury found Ross guilty of second degree assault pursuant to section 18-3-203(l)(a), 8B C.R.S. (1986), and assault on the elderly pursuant to section 18-3-209, 8B C.R.S. (1986).1 Ross appealed his con[1312] victions, and the court of appeals reversed his conviction of assault on the elderly with a deadly weapon. Ross, 819 P.2d at 508. The court of appeals premised its reversal on the grounds that a fist is not a deadly weapon. Id. The People appeal the reversal of the conviction of assault on the elderly with a deadly weapon.
II.
The People present one issue for our consideration: whether a fist can be a deadly weapon as defined in section 18-1-901(3)(e). We find that it can.
Section 18-l-901(3)(e) provides:
“Deadly weapon” means any of the following which in the manner it is used or intended to be used is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury:
(I) A firearm, whether loaded or unloaded;
(II) A knife;
(III) A bludgeon; or
(IV) Any other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or inanimate.
§ 18-l-901(3)(e), 8B C.R.S. (1986) (emphasis added). We have previously construed this section when considering whether various items were deadly weapons. Williams v. People, 687 P.2d 950, 954-55 (Colo.1984) (holding that an unloaded firearm is a deadly weapon as a matter of law); Bowers v. People, 617 P.2d 560, 562-63 (Colo.1980) (holding that a quart whiskey bottle may be a deadly weapon depending on the manner in which it is used); People v. Bramlett, 194 Colo. 205, 209, 573 P.2d 94, 96-97 (1977) (holding that any object used in a manner capable of producing death or bodily injury is a deadly weapon); Miller v. District Court, 193 Colo. 404, 407, 566 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1977) (holding that a firecracker in a bottle may be a deadly weapon depending on its actual or intended use); see also Grass v. People, 172 Colo. 223, 471 P.2d 602 (1970) (holding that a shoe may be a deadly weapon depending on the manner of its use, among other things, under a prior version of the section).
We have consistently analyzed whether objects are deadly weapons by evaluating the manner in which the objects are used. Bowers, 617 P.2d at 563 (holding that an object may be a deadly weapon depending on how it is used); Bramlett, 194 Colo. at 209, 573 P.2d at 96-97 (holding that objects are deadly weapons if used in a particular manner); and Miller, 193 Colo. at 407, 566 P.2d at 1066 (holding that object’s actual or intended use determines whether it is a deadly weapon). Our analysis has been controlled by the statutory definition of deadly weapons found in section 18-1-901(3)(e). Accordingly, we have noted that section 18-l-901(3)(e) “expressly prescribes a test to determine whether items other than firearms, knives, and bludgeons are deadly weapons, based not on the intrinsic nature of the items but upon their use or intended use.” Bowers, 617 P.2d at 562-63 (emphasis added).
The plain language of section 18 — 1— 901(3)(e) supports our object-use test. Section 18-l-901(3)(e) expressly states that an object can be a deadly weapon if used in a particular manner. § 18 — 1—901(3)(e), 8B C.R.S. (1986); see People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Colo.1990) (holding that there is no need to resort to interpretive rules where statutory language is clear and unambiguous); Thiret v. Kautzky, 792 P.2d 801, 806 (Colo.1990) (holding that it is unnecessary to examine its legislative history where the meaning of a statute is clear). The precise issue before us, however, is whether a fist can be a deadly weapon depending on the manner in which it is used. We find that it can.
A.
Section 18-l-901(3)(e) segregates objects into two categories: items “deadly ... by their essential nature” (firearms, knives, and bludgeons), and “[a]ll other items.” Bowers, 617 P.2d at 563. In Bowers, we found that the statute contemplates a scheme whereby objects not intrinsically deadly may become so, depending on the manner in which they are used. Id. Thus, [1313] in Bowers, we found a quart bottle of whiskey to be a deadly weapon when used to strike a store owner on the head, causing him to suffer a concussion and several cuts. Id.
Fists have not been legislatively designated as inherently deadly weapons. Thus, if fists come within the ambit of “[a]ny other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or inanimate,” fists may be deadly weapons depending on the manner in which they are used. § 18-l-901(3)(e)(IV), 8B C.R.S. (1986).
We have not previously given that phrase a narrow or limiting construction. Rather, we have interpreted the phrase to include any object or device. Bowers, 617 P.2d at 563 (holding that any items in addition to those enumerated in the statute can be deadly weapons); Bramlett, 194 Colo. at 209, 573 P.2d at 96 (“[T]he statutory definition of ‘deadly weapon’ includes any object.”); Miller, 193 Colo. at 407, 566 P.2d at 1066; Grass, 172 Colo. at 229, 471 P.2d at 605 (holding that instruments or things can be deadly weapons).
Our interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of the words “weapon, device, instrument, material, [and] substance.” 2 See Climax Molybdenum Co. v. Walter, 812 P.2d 1168, 1173 (Colo.1991); Charnes v. Lobato, 743 P.2d 27, 30 (Colo.1987) (Statutory terms are to be given effect according to their plain and obvious meaning). We are not persuaded that a deviation from our traditionally expansive view of this section is warranted with respect to fists. We thus conclude that fists may be deadly weapons if in the manner they are used or intended to be used they are capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. § 18 — 1—901(3)(e), 8B C.R.S. (1986).3
B.
Our holding accords with the law of numerous other jurisdictions.4 Baker v. State, 441 So.2d 1061, 1062 (Ala.Crim.App.1983) (holding that fists may be deadly weapons depending on the manner of their use where a mother beat her twenty-one-month-old son with her fists, resulting in the infant’s death); Konrad v. State, 763 P.2d 1369, 1373-74 (Alaska Ct.App.1988) [1314] (holding that a hand may be deemed a dangerous instrument depending on the precise manner in which it is used); Boling v. State, 244 Ga. 825, 262 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1979) (holding that fists may be deadly weapons depending on the manner of their use where a husband asphyxiated his estranged wife); Gabler v. State, 177 Ga. App. 3, 338 S.E.2d 469, 472 (1985) (holding that fists may be deadly weapons depending on the manner of their use where an adult beat and kicked another adult, causing severe facial lacerations); Pulliam v. State, 298 So.2d 711, 713 (Miss.1974) (holding that fists may be deadly weapons depending on the manner of their use where two adults beat and kicked another adult, causing broken ribs and severe facial lacerations); State v. Shubert, 102 N.C.App. 419, 402 S.E.2d 642, 645 (1991) (finding that fists may be deadly weapons where defendant used his fists to beat an eighty-one-year-old victim, causing permanent brain damage); State v. Zangrilli, 440 A.2d 710, 711-12 (R.I.1982) (finding that hands may be a deadly weapon if used to produce substantial bodily harm where defendant beat and strangled his ex-wife); Cooper v. State, 773 S.W.2d 749, 750 (Tex.Ct.App.1989) (holding that fists may be deadly weapons depending on the manner of their use where defendant caused infant’s death by severe blows); see also 2 Wayne LeFave & Austin Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 7.2, at 195 (1986) (observing that fists may be found to be deadly weapons in appropriate cases involving big men attacking small,5 frail men, women or children).6
III.
Lastly, we must ascertain whether the manner in which Ross used his fist was capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. Ross admitted at trial that he struck Cohn. As a result of the blow, Cohn was taken to Denver General Hospital where he was admitted and treated for major trauma. Dr. Riccio, Cohn’s treating physician, testified that Cohn sustained multiple facial fractures and was at great risk of sustaining severe permanent damage.
The facts compel us to conclude that Ross used his fist as a deadly weapon within the meaning of section 18 — 1— 901(3)(e) when he hit Cohn and caused Cohn’s injuries. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals decision and remand to the court of appeals with directions to reinstate the judgment of conviction and sentence.
LOHR, J., dissents.