23CA1933 Peo v Morado 08-20-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1933 Weld County District Court No. 21CR1291 Honorable Julie C. Hoskins, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Patrick Morado, Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Pawar and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 20, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Majid Yazdi, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Andrew Vierra, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Patrick Morado, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of disorderly conduct, obstructing a peace officer, and twelve counts of felony menacing with a deadly weapon. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The following facts are supported by evidence introduced at trial.
¶3 Late at night in June 2021, a group of four civilians stopped to use the restroom at a park in Greeley. After exiting their car, they noticed Morado sitting at a park bench nearby, mumbling, yelling, and manipulating a pair of shiny objects in his hands. Morado stood up from the bench and made a beeline for the group, swinging two “katana” swords and yelling.
¶4 The civilians became frightened, got back into their car, and drove away. Morado ran after the car and continued swinging his swords and yelling. One of the civilians eventually called 911 to report the incident.
¶5 Officers arrived and observed Morado yelling and waving the two swords. After a chase, officers confronted Morado and repeatedly ordered him to drop his weapons. In response, Morado
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clanged the swords together, yelled at the officers to stay back, and said, “Lord, Heavenly Father, kill them.” Officers attempted to subdue Morado with beanbag rounds, a taser, and pepper spray. All proved unsuccessful.
¶6 Morado returned to the street and continued swinging his swords, one of which had been broken from the force of clanging them together. After he lost control of his remaining sword, the officers tackled and arrested him.
¶7 The prosecution charged Morado with multiple counts of both first degree assault on a peace officer, § 18-3-202(1)(e), C.R.S. 2020, and menacing with a deadly weapon, § 18-3-206(1)(a), (b), C.R.S. 2020.1 At trial, the defense argued that Morado was experiencing an extreme mental health crisis or was intoxicated, rendering him incapable of satisfying the mens rea elements of the charges. According to Morado, he was guilty of only disorderly conduct and obstructing a peace officer.
1 Although section 18-3-202 has remained unchanged since the
June 2021 incident, section 18-3-206 has been amended. See Ch. 462, sec. 195, § 18-3-206, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 3173. We therefore cite the versions of the statutes in effect when the incident occurred.
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¶8 The jury found Morado not guilty of the assault charges but guilty of twelve counts of menacing (four against civilians and eight against peace officers). In a series of interrogatories on the verdict forms, the jury found that Morado committed the acts of menacing while using a deadly weapon. It also found him guilty of disorderly conduct and obstructing a peace officer.
II. Discussion
¶9 On appeal, Morado contends that the trial court reversibly erred by (1) failing to instruct the jury that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard applied to the deadly weapon sentence enhancers; (2) overruling his objections to statements the prosecutor made during closing argument; and (3) denying his challenge to the prosecution’s use of a peremptory strike on a prospective juror who was a member of a minority group. We address and reject each contention in turn.
A. Deadly Weapon Jury Instruction
¶ 10 We first address Morado’s contention that the trial court reversibly erred by not instructing the jury that the deadly weapon sentence enhancers for the menacing charges needed to be proved
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beyond a reasonable doubt. While we agree that the court erred, we conclude that the error doesn’t require reversal.
1. Additional Background
¶ 11 The court’s final instructions to the jury stated the elements of menacing but didn’t mention the deadly weapon sentence enhancer. Instead, the court provided a series of deadly weapon interrogatories that appeared in the verdict forms. But the interrogatories didn’t mention the prosecution’s burden to prove the sentence enhancer beyond a reasonable doubt, asking only whether the jury found that Morado’s menacing involved the use or suggested use of a deadly weapon.
2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 12 A “trial court has a duty to instruct the jury properly on all of the elements of the offenses charged.” People v. Bastin, 937 P.2d 761, 764 (Colo. App. 1996).
¶ 13 “A person commits the crime of menacing if, by any threat or physical action, he or she knowingly places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” § 18-3-206(1). Menacing is a class 3 misdemeanor, but a person who commits menacing with a deadly weapon is guilty of a class 5
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felony. § 18-3-206(1)(a). As relevant here, a deadly weapon includes a “knife” or “any other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance . . . that, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.” § 18-1-901(3)(e)(II), C.R.S. 2020. The deadly weapon sentence enhancer must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Cisneros, 2014 COA 49,
¶ 12.
¶ 14 We review de novo whether the trial court accurately instructed the jury on the law. Tibbels v. People, 2022 CO 1, ¶ 22. In doing so, we review all the instructions given by the trial court together to determine whether they properly advised the jury. People v. DeGreat, 2018 CO 83, ¶ 15.
¶ 15 If we determine that the trial court erred, whether we reverse depends on the applicable standard of reversal. See People v. Crabtree, 2024 CO 40M, ¶ 23. Structural errors generally require automatic reversal. Id. at ¶ 25. But reversal for nonstructural trial errors hinges on “an appropriate case-specific, outcome- determinative analysis” — constitutional or nonconstitutional
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harmless error review for preserved errors and plain error for unpreserved errors. Id. at ¶ 27.
3. The Trial Court Provided Erroneous Jury Instructions
¶ 16 We agree with Morado that the trial court’s instructions and verdict forms didn’t adequately inform the jury that the prosecution needed to prove the deadly weapon sentence enhancer beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 17 People v. Dunlap, 124 P.3d 780 (Colo. App. 2004), is instructive. There, the defendant was charged with second degree kidnapping, and the verdict form contained an interrogatory asking whether the defendant committed the crime using a deadly weapon. Id. at 793-94. While the trial court’s instructions properly defined reasonable doubt and told the jury that the prosecution must prove each element of each count beyond a reasonable doubt, no instruction specified that the deadly weapon sentence enhancer also needed to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 794. As a result, the division determined that “the instructions and verdict form did not adequately inform the jury that it must find the enhancement factors beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
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¶ 18 Similarly here, the trial court’s instructions stated only that Morado’s guilt and the elements of menacing needed to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The verdict forms containing the deadly weapon interrogatory didn’t mention the standard of proof, and the court’s other instructions stated only that the jury’s decision needed to be unanimous. Thus, as in Dunlap, “no single instruction expressly told the jury that . . . the existence of an enhancement factor [must be] proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. We therefore agree with Morado that the court provided erroneous jury instructions.
4. The Error Doesn’t Require Reversal
¶ 19 Nevertheless, we conclude that the court’s error doesn’t require reversal.
¶ 20 Morado argues that the court’s failure to instruct the jury that the deadly weapon sentence enhancer needed to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt impermissibly lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof and therefore constituted structural error requiring automatic reversal. But in Washington v. Recuenco, the United States Supreme Court made clear that the “[f]ailure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element to
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the jury, is not structural error.” 548 U.S. 212, 222 (2006); see also People v. Ewing, 2017 COA 10, ¶ 21 (applying the plain error standard to an unpreserved contention that the trial court erred by failing to submit a sentence enhancer to the jury); Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1, 8 (Colo. 2001) (adopting the reasoning of Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), on which Recuenco relied). The Colorado Supreme Court recently reached a similar conclusion in Crabtree, concluding that a trial court’s error in failing to submit to the jury whether the defendant had been previously convicted of three or more relevant offenses, an element of felony DUI, constituted a trial error, not structural error requiring automatic reversal. See Crabtree, ¶¶ 31-40.
¶ 21 Given Recuenco and Crabtree, we fail to see how a trial court’s omission of part of a sentence enhancer (the beyond a reasonable doubt standard) could constitute structural error when omission of the entire sentence enhancer would be reviewed only for harmlessness or plain error. See United States v. Freeman, 70 F.4th 1265, 1280 n.14 (10th Cir. 2023) (“Whether we label the purported error as a misstatement or omission of an element, the error is still subject to harmless error review.”).
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¶ 22 We aren’t persuaded otherwise by Morado’s reliance on Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1993), and Tibbels, ¶ 22, in which the appellate courts found structural error when the trial courts erroneously described the prosecution’s burden under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The Supreme Court has since abrogated Sullivan’s reasoning as inconsistent with its case law on harmless error review. See Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 222 n.4 (“We recognized in Neder . . . that a broad interpretation of our language from Sullivan is inconsistent with our case law. . . . [O]ur rejection of Neder’s proposed application of the language from Sullivan compels our rejection of this argument here.”). And in Tibbels, the trial court used a nonlegal, real-world analogy that improperly lowered the prosecution’s burden to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tibbels, ¶¶ 10- 12, 49-53. No such analogy was used here. See People v. Sanders, 2022 COA 47, ¶ 49 (finding Tibbels inapplicable when the prosecutor’s comments didn’t trivialize the prosecution’s burden), aff’d on other grounds, 2024 CO 33.
¶ 23 Thus, we conclude that the trial court’s omission of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard from the deadly weapon
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sentence enhancer interrogatories didn’t constitute structural error requiring automatic reversal.
¶ 24 Defense counsel conceded at oral argument that the trial court’s error wouldn’t be reversible under any standard of reversal other than structural error. Evidence introduced at trial supported counsel’s concession. Based on this concession, we need not undertake a harmlessness or plain error analysis.
¶ 25 Accordingly, although we agree with Morado that the trial court erred, we discern no basis to reverse.
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct
¶ 26 Morado next contends that the prosecution committed misconduct during closing argument by denigrating defense counsel and misstating the elements of menacing. We disagree.
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 27 “Whether a prosecutor’s statements constitute misconduct is generally a matter left to the trial court’s discretion.” Domingo- Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1049 (Colo. 2005). We won’t disturb the court’s rulings regarding such statements absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Strock, 252 P.3d 1148, 1152
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(Colo. App. 2010), overruled on other grounds by, People v. Kennedy, 2025 CO 63, ¶ 18.
¶ 28 In analyzing prosecutorial misconduct claims, we first determine whether the prosecutor’s questionable conduct was improper based on the totality of the circumstances and, if the conduct was improper, consider whether such conduct warrants reversal under the proper standard of review. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096 (Colo. 2010).
¶ 29 A prosecutor enjoys wide latitude in the language and style they employ in closing argument, and in replying to an argument by opposing counsel. People v. Samson, 2012 COA 167, ¶ 30. While a prosecutor may not denigrate defense counsel, they may comment on the absence of evidence supporting a defendant’s contentions. Id. at ¶¶ 31-32. In addition, counsel may not misstate or misinterpret the law. People v. Grant, 174 P.3d 798, 810 (Colo. App. 2007).
2. Denigrating Defense Counsel
¶ 30 During closing argument, the prosecutor said to the jury, “You guys have all been sitting here now quite a while this morning. I’m not going to belabor the point. You’ve been here all week. I don’t
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need to get down in the weeds. That’s what [d]efense [c]ounsel’s asking you to do.” The prosecutor then went on to repeat the same “in the weeds” phrase three more times.
¶ 31 Later, the prosecutor said, “My learned colleagues over here in this corner provided argument, provided this — argued that this issue of intent exists. But the problem is that’s the best they could do ’cause that’s what the facts — that’s, that’s as good as they get with these facts. There’s nothing more.”
¶ 32 Morado contemporaneously objected to both categories of statements, but the court overruled his objections.
¶ 33 Morado now contends that these two categories of statements denigrated defense counsel because they encouraged the jury to hold the length of the trial against the defense, implied that defense counsel didn’t believe that Morado’s case had merit, and suggested that defense counsel argued the issue of Morado’s mental state merely because they had to argue something.
¶ 34 We conclude that the prosecutor’s statements fell within the wide range of reasonable responses to defense counsel’s arguments. See Samson, ¶ 30. For example, defense counsel encouraged the jury to focus on minor details such as the length of time it took the
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civilians to drive from one location to another before calling 911. The prosecutor’s “in the weeds” statement was responsive to that and similar arguments. In addition, defense counsel consistently argued that Morado didn’t form the requisite mens rea.
¶ 35 Moreover, read in context, the prosecutor’s statements constituted permissible comments on the lack of evidence supporting Morado’s theory of the case, not denigrating statements toward defense counsel. See People v. Carter, 2015 COA 24M-2, ¶¶ 67, 72 (prosecutor’s argument that “both sides were accusing the other of trying to distract you” and that “there are red herrings that [the defense has] thrown out there” didn’t denigrate defense counsel); People v. Ramirez, 997 P.2d 1200, 1211 (Colo. App. 1999) (prosecutor’s characterization of the defense’s argument as “blowing smoke” wasn’t improper because it simply implied that the defense’s case lacked substance), aff’d, 43 P.3d 611 (Colo. 2001).
¶ 36 Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecutor’s challenged statements didn’t denigrate defense counsel.
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3. Misstating the Law
¶ 37 Morado also argues that the prosecutor improperly misstated the law. During the prosecutor’s closing argument, the following exchange occurred:
[PROSECUTOR]: Something that I want to emphasize, . . . there is no element in that menacing charge requiring the [p]rosecution to prove that those victims were in actual fear. . . . [T]here’s no subjective element. You’ll read the instructions. You’ll read the elementals. You just have to find that that was what he wanted. That was — what he was attempting to do was to put those individuals in fear.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Misstates the element.
[PROSECUTOR]: It does not.
THE COURT: Overruled.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Specifically, as to the nature of the fear, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled. Again, you have the instructions. You will rely on the instructions.
¶ 38 Morado contends that the prosecutor misstated the elements of menacing because he (1) removed the “knowingly” mens rea element, replacing it with “wanted”; and (2) replaced “fear of
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imminent serious bodily injury” with fear in a general sense. § 18-3-206(1). We disagree.
¶ 39 During closing argument, defense counsel said that, because the officers moved back when Morado approached them, the officers “were not placed in imminent fear” and “[t]hat’s what the element of menacing is.” But, as the prosecutor pointed out, Morado would be guilty of menacing even if he only attempted to place the officers in fear. See id. (A person is guilty of menacing if “he or she knowingly places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” (emphasis added)). We therefore agree with the People that the prosecutor wasn’t attempting to recite all the elements of menacing; rather, he permissibly focused on one element to correct the defense’s earlier misstatement. See People v. Castillo, 2014 COA 140M, ¶ 69 (“[I]t is not improper for an attorney in closing argument to focus on one element of an offense or defense without addressing the other elements as long as the attorney does not suggest that those other elements are irrelevant.”), rev’d on other grounds, 2018 CO 62.
¶ 40 Accordingly, we reject Morado’s argument that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument.
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C. Batson Challenge
¶ 41 Morado contends that the trial court erred by denying his Batson challenge to the prosecution’s use of a peremptory strike on Juror R. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). We detect no error.
1. Additional Background
¶ 42 During voir dire, the prosecutor posed a hypothetical about a football player who kicks a ball towards the uprights but misses. He asked a prospective juror, “What do you think [the kicker’s] intent was, in that example?” The juror responded, “To get it to the upright.”
¶ 43 The prosecutor later turned to Juror R:
[PROSECUTOR]: How do you feel about being a[] juror on this case?
JUROR [R]: I don’t know. I don’t really have a feeling, yet.
[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Do you have any sort of, thoughts about that intent hypothetical? Is there anything that you would look at to try and drive somebody’s intent?
JUROR [R]: No.
[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. And what do you look for when you’re weighing credibility?
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JUROR [R]: The facts and what’s true and what’s not true.
[PROSECUTOR]: Do you have any sort of fundamental disagreement when it comes to laws that are designed to protect members of law enforcement?
JUROR [R]: No.
¶ 44 When the prosecutor later used a peremptory strike to excuse Juror R, defense counsel raised a Batson challenge. Defense counsel argued that Juror R was a member of a minority group and that her responses to questions during voir dire didn’t indicate that she would be unable to serve as an impartial juror. The prosecutor responded that he struck Juror R because she seemed “largely non- responsive” and had a “visceral reaction” to the phrase “back the blue,” which raised the inference that she may not support peace officers. Defense counsel then argued that the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral explanations were impermissible under recent precedent from a division of this court.2
2 Specifically, defense counsel pointed to People v. Romero, 2022
COA 119 (Romero I). Notably, however, the supreme court reversed Romero I after the trial in this case. See People v. Romero, 2024 CO 62, ¶ 75 (Romero II).
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¶ 45 After the court asked the prosecutor whether he would like to make “[a]ny additional record,” the prosecutor added that it seemed “evident” that Juror R wasn’t paying attention to other jurors’ answers when he questioned her about another juror’s response.
¶ 46 The court ultimately denied Morado’s Batson challenge. It explained that Juror R’s visceral reaction to the “back the blue” phrase, when coupled with the prosecutor’s observations that she wasn’t following the proceeding and seemed uninterested, constituted sufficient race-neutral explanations for the strike.
2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 47 Colorado law permits a party to use a peremptory strike to excuse a prospective juror “for almost any reason.” People v. Johnson, 2024 CO 35, ¶ 11. But the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibits excusing a juror based on the juror’s race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86-87; Johnson, ¶ 13; see Colo. Const. art. II, § 25.
¶ 48 When a party objects to their opponent’s use of a peremptory strike as racially motivated, Colorado courts follow Batson’s three- step framework. Johnson, ¶ 17.
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¶ 49 At Batson’s first step, the objecting party must make a prima facie showing that their opponent used a peremptory strike based on the juror’s race. Johnson, ¶ 18. At step two, the burden shifts to the striking party to provide a race-neutral explanation for using the strike. Id. at ¶ 19. The objecting party may then rebut the striking party’s stated reason. Id.
¶ 50 At step three, the court must consider all the circumstances related to purposeful discrimination, including the striking party’s demeanor, the reasonableness of the striking party’s race-neutral explanation, and whether the explanation is based in acceptable trial strategy. Id. at ¶ 20. While the court must consider all relevant evidence, it need not make express findings regarding how that evidence contributed to its ultimate conclusion. People v. Beauvais, 2017 CO 34, ¶ 32.
¶ 51 To prevail on a Batson challenge, the objecting party must prove purposeful discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Johnson, ¶ 21. “[T]he ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” Id. at ¶ 20 (quoting People v. Wilson, 2015 CO 54M, ¶ 14).
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¶ 52 We review a trial court’s conclusions at step one and step two de novo. Id. at ¶ 21. But we review a trial court’s step-three conclusion for clear error. Id. At this step, we defer to the trial court’s ultimate Batson ruling if the record (1) demonstrates that the court considered all relevant circumstances and (2) supports the trial court’s ruling as to whether the objecting party proved purposeful racial discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Romero, 2024 CO 62, ¶¶ 47, 66 (Romero II).
3. Analysis
¶ 53 Morado contends that the trial court erred by denying his Batson challenge because it (1) allowed the prosecutor to provide a new, false race-neutral explanation for the strike after defense counsel rebutted the prosecutor’s initial explanations; (2) didn’t consider all the pertinent circumstances; and (3) didn’t make sufficient findings for appellate review.
¶ 54 We disagree with Morado’s first contention. At the outset, we note that we could affirm the trial court’s denial of Morado’s Batson challenge based on the prosecutor’s first two explanations alone — that Juror R seemed largely nonresponsive and may have been biased against peace officers. See People v. Owens, 2024 CO
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10, ¶¶ 85-86 (affirming trial court’s denial of a Batson challenge based on a subset of the prosecutor’s explanations); People v. Robinson, 187 P.3d 1166, 1173-74 (Colo. App. 2008) (affirming denial of Batson challenge based on prosecutor’s explanations that a stricken juror slept during voir dire and had a visible reaction when another juror discussed peace officers’ credibility).
¶ 55 But even if we considered the substance of Morado’s argument, we would reject it. True, our supreme court has said that the prosecution must “stand or fall on the plausibility of the reasons [it] gives” and that a court shouldn’t consider “additional reasons offered after the fact.” People v. Madrid, 2023 CO 12, ¶¶ 40-41 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). The rationale behind this rule is that “shifting explanations for a peremptory strike signal pretext.” Id. at ¶ 38.
¶ 56 Here, though, the prosecutor offered his additional explanation immediately after defense counsel’s rebuttal, not after the fact. Cf. Madrid, ¶¶ 2, 41 (cautioning that a party can’t introduce new explanations “on remand”). And the prosecutor had good reason for wanting to make a full record that Juror R appeared unengaged. See Romero II, ¶¶ 15, 68-71 (affirming denial of Batson challenge
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based on the prosecutor’s explanation that the stricken juror “didn’t seem particularly focused or interested in what was going on”); see also United States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he Government’s concern about a juror’s inattentiveness is a good reason for its exercising a peremptory challenge”).
¶ 57 Further, we disagree with Morado that the prosecutor’s additional explanation was “new.” The prosecutor could have reasonably interpreted Juror R’s short, one-word response to his question about the intent hypothetical as evidence that she wasn’t paying attention to other jurors’ answers, an explanation that aligned with the prosecutor’s initial assertion that Juror R was nonresponsive. See Owens, ¶¶ 88, 94 (court’s comment that a juror was a “news junky” didn’t constitute a new race-neutral explanation because it was connected to the prosecutor’s concern,
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also explored with other jurors, that the juror’s views on the death penalty were influenced by news media).3
¶ 58 We similarly reject Morado’s contentions that the court didn’t consider all pertinent circumstances or make sufficient findings for appellate review. The court expressly considered (1) Juror R’s “visceral reaction” to the “back the blue” phrase and (2) the prosecutor’s observations that the juror “seemed to be not interested” and “was not following.” While Morado now argues that the court didn’t consider defense counsel’s statement about Juror R’s responsiveness or the juror’s answers to the prosecution’s questions, this proves only that the record was, at best, in “equipoise.” Romero II, ¶ 70. When the record is in equipoise, the defendant “falls short” of meeting their burden to prove purposeful racial discrimination. Id. And by denying the Batson challenge, the trial court impliedly, but necessarily, credited the prosecutor’s race-
3 We also reject Morado’s argument that the trial court didn’t
provide defense counsel an opportunity to address the prosecutor’s additional record prior to ruling. See People v. Robinson, 187 P.3d 1166, 1174 (Colo. App. 2008) (rejecting a similar contention because, while the trial court didn’t ask defense counsel “if he had any rebuttal to offer,” nothing in the record indicated that “defendant’s counsel objected to the court’s ruling or requested an opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s stated reasons”).
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neutral explanations and concluded that Morado hadn’t satisfied his burden of proving purposeful racial discrimination. See Romero II, ¶¶ 20, 62.
¶ 59 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court didn’t err by denying Morado’s Batson challenge.
III. Disposition
¶ 60 We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.