24CA2008 Peo v Martinez 07-02-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2008 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CR15136 Honorable A. Bruce Jones, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Xavier J. Martinez,
Defendant-Appellant.
SENTENCE AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Pawar and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 2, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Allison S. Block, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Ruth Summers, Alternate Defense Counsel, Louisville, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Xavier J. Martinez, appeals his sentence of
seventeen years in the custody of the Department of Corrections
(DOC). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 According to the affidavit of probable cause for arrest, the
victim and his girlfriend were walking to a convenience store when
one or both of them got into a verbal confrontation with one or more
passengers in a nearby car. Martinez, who was in the backseat of
the car, rolled down his window and fired multiple gunshots,
striking the victim multiple times. Martinez was sixteen years old
at the time.
¶3 Under the direct file statute, the prosecution charged Martinez
in Denver District Court with, among other offenses, two counts of
attempted first degree murder, one count of first degree assault,
and two crime of violence counts. See § 19-2.5-801(1)(a), C.R.S.
2025.
¶4 Nine months later, Martinez entered into a plea agreement
with the prosecution. Under the agreement, Martinez would plead
guilty to first degree assault, and the remaining counts would be
dismissed. The first degree assault conviction carried a potential
1 DOC sentence in the range of ten to thirty-two years. See § 18-3-
202(2)(b), (c), C.R.S. 2025; § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V.5)(A), (8)(a)(I), (10)(a),
(10)(b)(XII), C.R.S. 2025; § 18-1.3-406(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. The
parties stipulated to a sentencing range of fourteen to twenty years
in the DOC. The district court accepted Martinez’s guilty plea at
the providency hearing.
¶5 Before sentencing, the probation department filed its
presentence investigation report, and the defense filed reports by a
forensic social worker regarding mitigation evidence and her
interviews of staff members at the juvenile detention facility where
Martinez was being held.
¶6 At sentencing, the court informed the parties that it had
reviewed all the information submitted by both parties before
sentencing. The court then heard from Martinez’s mentor from a
youth mentoring program, his uncle, his guardian ad litem, his
counsel, the prosecutor (who read aloud a letter from the victim’s
mother), and Martinez himself (through a letter read aloud). The
defense requested a DOC sentence of fourteen years, while the
prosecution requested a DOC sentence of between eighteen and
twenty years. After reading and hearing all this information, the
2 district court engaged in a somewhat lengthy discussion of its
sentencing decision before sentencing Martinez to seventeen years
in the DOC’s custody.
II. Analysis
¶7 On appeal, Martinez contends that the district court failed to
consider essential sentencing factors and based its sentencing
decision on unsubstantiated information.
¶8 As an initial matter, we agree with the parties that Martinez
can’t appeal the propriety of his sentence because his seventeen-
year sentence falls within the plea agreement’s stipulated
sentencing range of fourteen to twenty years. See § 18-1-409(1),
C.R.S. 2025 (“[I]f the sentence is within a range agreed upon by the
parties pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant shall not have
the right of appellate review of the propriety of the sentence.”). So,
we may not consider any arguments pertaining to “the intrinsic
fairness or appropriateness of the sentence itself taking into
account ‘the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the public interest.’” Sullivan v. People, 2020 CO 58, ¶ 13 (citation
omitted); see also People v. Garcia, 55 P.3d 243, 244 (Colo. App.
2002) (an argument that the trial court abused its discretion by
3 emphasizing punishment to the exclusion of other sentencing
objectives constituted a challenge to the propriety of the sentence).
¶9 But Martinez may seek review of “the manner in which the
sentence was imposed,” which involves those extrinsic factors and
procedures that affect the determination of the sentence, “including
the sufficiency and accuracy of the information on which it was
based.” § 18-1-409(1); see Sullivan, ¶¶ 11-26. We will construe
Martinez’s arguments on appeal as a challenge to the manner in
which the court imposed his sentence.
¶ 10 A district court enjoys broad discretion in imposing a
sentence, and we won’t overturn its decision absent a clear abuse of
discretion. People v. Fuller, 791 P.2d 702, 708 (Colo. 1990).
¶ 11 Before turning to Martinez’s contentions, we disagree with the
People’s argument that we “can only consider [Martinez’s] claim as
an ‘illegal manner’ allegation” under Crim. P. 35(a). This is a direct
appeal, so section 18-1-409(1) controls, not Crim. P. 35(a).
¶ 12 Martinez first argues that although the district court at
sentencing “noted factors it was required to consider and balance”
under section 18-1-102.5, C.R.S. 2025, it “did not indicate that it
considered all of them.” This argument is belied by the record. The
4 district court’s discussion of its reasoning for selecting a seventeen-
year DOC sentence touched on all the factors in section 18-1-102.5,
and the court also explicitly said, “I’ve taken all of these factors into
account.” Even if that weren’t the case, the court wasn’t required to
make explicit findings on each of the statutory sentencing factors.
See Walton v. People, 2019 CO 95, ¶ 17.
¶ 13 Martinez also argues that although “[t]he court expressly
considered Mr. Martinez’s age,” “the record contains no evidence
that the court considered Mr. Martinez’s significant trauma history
and resultant diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder.” But
recall, the court specifically noted at the beginning of the
sentencing hearing that it had reviewed all the information
submitted by both parties, including the forensic social worker’s
reports regarding mitigation evidence and her interviews of staff
members at the juvenile detention facility where Martinez was being
held. And during its sentencing decision, the court said that it had
“listened very carefully” to the statements made by the four people
who spoke on Martinez’s behalf at sentencing. The mitigation
evidence submitted before, and presented at, sentencing included
information about Martinez’s trauma history and post-traumatic
5 stress disorder. The court’s statements that it had reviewed and
listened carefully to all that mitigation evidence is sufficient to show
that it considered Martinez’s trauma history and post-traumatic
stress disorder.
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24CA2008 Peo v Martinez 07-02-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2008 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CR15136 Honorable A. Bruce Jones, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Xavier J. Martinez,
Defendant-Appellant.
SENTENCE AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Pawar and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 2, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Allison S. Block, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Ruth Summers, Alternate Defense Counsel, Louisville, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Xavier J. Martinez, appeals his sentence of
seventeen years in the custody of the Department of Corrections
(DOC). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 According to the affidavit of probable cause for arrest, the
victim and his girlfriend were walking to a convenience store when
one or both of them got into a verbal confrontation with one or more
passengers in a nearby car. Martinez, who was in the backseat of
the car, rolled down his window and fired multiple gunshots,
striking the victim multiple times. Martinez was sixteen years old
at the time.
¶3 Under the direct file statute, the prosecution charged Martinez
in Denver District Court with, among other offenses, two counts of
attempted first degree murder, one count of first degree assault,
and two crime of violence counts. See § 19-2.5-801(1)(a), C.R.S.
2025.
¶4 Nine months later, Martinez entered into a plea agreement
with the prosecution. Under the agreement, Martinez would plead
guilty to first degree assault, and the remaining counts would be
dismissed. The first degree assault conviction carried a potential
1 DOC sentence in the range of ten to thirty-two years. See § 18-3-
202(2)(b), (c), C.R.S. 2025; § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V.5)(A), (8)(a)(I), (10)(a),
(10)(b)(XII), C.R.S. 2025; § 18-1.3-406(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. The
parties stipulated to a sentencing range of fourteen to twenty years
in the DOC. The district court accepted Martinez’s guilty plea at
the providency hearing.
¶5 Before sentencing, the probation department filed its
presentence investigation report, and the defense filed reports by a
forensic social worker regarding mitigation evidence and her
interviews of staff members at the juvenile detention facility where
Martinez was being held.
¶6 At sentencing, the court informed the parties that it had
reviewed all the information submitted by both parties before
sentencing. The court then heard from Martinez’s mentor from a
youth mentoring program, his uncle, his guardian ad litem, his
counsel, the prosecutor (who read aloud a letter from the victim’s
mother), and Martinez himself (through a letter read aloud). The
defense requested a DOC sentence of fourteen years, while the
prosecution requested a DOC sentence of between eighteen and
twenty years. After reading and hearing all this information, the
2 district court engaged in a somewhat lengthy discussion of its
sentencing decision before sentencing Martinez to seventeen years
in the DOC’s custody.
II. Analysis
¶7 On appeal, Martinez contends that the district court failed to
consider essential sentencing factors and based its sentencing
decision on unsubstantiated information.
¶8 As an initial matter, we agree with the parties that Martinez
can’t appeal the propriety of his sentence because his seventeen-
year sentence falls within the plea agreement’s stipulated
sentencing range of fourteen to twenty years. See § 18-1-409(1),
C.R.S. 2025 (“[I]f the sentence is within a range agreed upon by the
parties pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant shall not have
the right of appellate review of the propriety of the sentence.”). So,
we may not consider any arguments pertaining to “the intrinsic
fairness or appropriateness of the sentence itself taking into
account ‘the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the public interest.’” Sullivan v. People, 2020 CO 58, ¶ 13 (citation
omitted); see also People v. Garcia, 55 P.3d 243, 244 (Colo. App.
2002) (an argument that the trial court abused its discretion by
3 emphasizing punishment to the exclusion of other sentencing
objectives constituted a challenge to the propriety of the sentence).
¶9 But Martinez may seek review of “the manner in which the
sentence was imposed,” which involves those extrinsic factors and
procedures that affect the determination of the sentence, “including
the sufficiency and accuracy of the information on which it was
based.” § 18-1-409(1); see Sullivan, ¶¶ 11-26. We will construe
Martinez’s arguments on appeal as a challenge to the manner in
which the court imposed his sentence.
¶ 10 A district court enjoys broad discretion in imposing a
sentence, and we won’t overturn its decision absent a clear abuse of
discretion. People v. Fuller, 791 P.2d 702, 708 (Colo. 1990).
¶ 11 Before turning to Martinez’s contentions, we disagree with the
People’s argument that we “can only consider [Martinez’s] claim as
an ‘illegal manner’ allegation” under Crim. P. 35(a). This is a direct
appeal, so section 18-1-409(1) controls, not Crim. P. 35(a).
¶ 12 Martinez first argues that although the district court at
sentencing “noted factors it was required to consider and balance”
under section 18-1-102.5, C.R.S. 2025, it “did not indicate that it
considered all of them.” This argument is belied by the record. The
4 district court’s discussion of its reasoning for selecting a seventeen-
year DOC sentence touched on all the factors in section 18-1-102.5,
and the court also explicitly said, “I’ve taken all of these factors into
account.” Even if that weren’t the case, the court wasn’t required to
make explicit findings on each of the statutory sentencing factors.
See Walton v. People, 2019 CO 95, ¶ 17.
¶ 13 Martinez also argues that although “[t]he court expressly
considered Mr. Martinez’s age,” “the record contains no evidence
that the court considered Mr. Martinez’s significant trauma history
and resultant diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder.” But
recall, the court specifically noted at the beginning of the
sentencing hearing that it had reviewed all the information
submitted by both parties, including the forensic social worker’s
reports regarding mitigation evidence and her interviews of staff
members at the juvenile detention facility where Martinez was being
held. And during its sentencing decision, the court said that it had
“listened very carefully” to the statements made by the four people
who spoke on Martinez’s behalf at sentencing. The mitigation
evidence submitted before, and presented at, sentencing included
information about Martinez’s trauma history and post-traumatic
5 stress disorder. The court’s statements that it had reviewed and
listened carefully to all that mitigation evidence is sufficient to show
that it considered Martinez’s trauma history and post-traumatic
stress disorder.
¶ 14 Martinez further argues that the district court improperly
“relied on beliefs regarding the victim that were unsupported by the
record.” Specifically, he highlights the court’s statement at
sentencing that the victim “appears [to be] someone who was
completely innocent” because the victim “appears to just be
completely uninvolved and yet, he is shot.” He argues that the
victim wasn’t “completely uninvolved” because the record indicates
that (1) the victim later told law enforcement that his ex-girlfriend
was one of the passengers in the car, and (2) the victim engaged in
a verbal confrontation with passengers in the car before the
shooting.
¶ 15 But the court also said at sentencing, “I can’t even tell from
this information I have whether this was an instance of shooting
someone that the defendant thought was in a gang, or simply
because of a beef between a former girlfriend and a current
girlfriend.” The court’s own statement thus reveals that it
6 acknowledged the victim’s “involvement” as it related to his
girlfriend and a former girlfriend in the car. More importantly,
though, the victim’s prior relationship with one of the car’s
occupants and verbal confrontation with passengers in the car
didn’t justify being shot multiple times. Indeed, the court also said,
“anyone who is shot under circumstances where they’re unarmed
and not threatening anyone is . . . innocent.” In any event, nothing
in the record suggests that the court’s discussion of the victim
being “uninvolved” influenced its decision to impose a seventeen-
year sentence rather than some lesser sentence.
III. Disposition
¶ 16 We affirm the sentence.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.