22CA1703 Peo v Martinez 02-13-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 22CA1703 City and County of Denver District Court No. 14CR10285 Honorable Edward D. Bronfin, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Teresa Martinez,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE YUN J. Jones and Brown, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 13, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Patrick R. Henson, Alternate Defense Counsel, Andrew Gargano, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Teresa Martinez appeals the postconviction court’s order
denying her Crim. P. 35(c) motion after a hearing. She contends
that the court erred by finding that her conviction from a guilty plea
was not barred by the statute of limitations and that the court
abused its discretion by denying her request for discovery
sanctions. We reject these contentions and affirm the order.
I. Background
¶2 In 2006 and 2007, Martinez and her family ran a fraudulent
mortgage scheme through their business, Worldwide Mortgage, Inc.,
and related family-run business entities (collectively, Worldwide).
The scheme generally worked as follows:
(1) Worldwide would purchase a residential property by
securing a mortgage in a straw buyer’s name (often
through false representations on the loan application).
Worldwide would cover the down payment and handle
closing on the property; the straw buyer would not live in
the home, take possession of the keys, or pay the
mortgage.
(2) Several weeks later, Worldwide would locate a second
straw buyer to purchase the property from the original
1 straw buyer at an inflated price. Worldwide would again
secure a mortgage, cover the down payment, and handle
the closing process.
(3) The profits from the sale would be diverted away from the
first straw buyer via “a private payoff letter” — a
document directing the title company to pay a portion of
the proceeds from the sale to somebody other than the
seller — and into the bank account of a member of the
Martinez family (often Martinez herself). The money
would then be rerouted into a different bank account
controlled by Worldwide.
(4) The second straw buyer would not make the required
mortgage payments, and the lender would foreclose on
the property.
Martinez herself acted as the initial straw buyer for two pieces of
property purchased and sold under this scheme.
¶3 In 2011, the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI) began a
lengthy investigation into Worldwide after it received a tip on its
fraud hotline from the bank that refinanced one of Worldwide’s
offices. In 2012, after that bank successfully foreclosed on the
2 office, CBI gained access to over two hundred boxes of transaction
files that were abandoned by Worldwide. Mortgage and financial
fraud specialists with CBI spent months evaluating the documents
and eventually uncovered the straw buyer scheme.
¶4 In 2014, the Martinez family members were each indicted for
their roles in the scheme. Martinez, for her part, was charged with
violations of the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act (COCCA),
theft, and conspiracy to commit theft, all predicated on the
purchase and sale of eleven properties. In exchange for the
dismissal of these charges,1 Martinez pleaded guilty to one count of
criminal mischief.
¶5 Martinez thereafter filed a Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(III) motion alleging,
as relevant here, that the district court was without subject matter
jurisdiction to enter a conviction on her guilty plea because the
statute of limitations barred the charges against her.2 Specifically,
1 The conspiracy to commit theft charge was dismissed for other
reasons before the plea bargain and is not relevant to this appeal. 2 Martinez’s court-appointed counsel did not proceed on any of the
other claims in Martinez’s pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion. Accordingly, those claims were abandoned. See People v. Smith, 2024 CO 3, ¶ 20 (“[A] conscious decision not to pursue the omitted pro se claims . . . constitutes an abandonment of those claims.”).
3 she argued that the victims (the lenders and the straw buyers) and
the State of Colorado — through the Department of Regulatory
Agencies (DORA) and its Division of Real Estate — all knew or
should have known of the facts establishing the criminal charges
against her more than three years before the indictment was filed.
Martinez also moved for sanctions for spoilation of evidence based
on DORA’s response to her postconviction subpoena.
¶6 The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing.
Martinez called a single witness to authenticate some of the
voluminous records she had submitted to the court — reports from
the CBI’s and DORA’s investigations, transcripts from the grand
jury proceedings, and documents subpoenaed from the lender
victims — but otherwise rested on those exhibits and her
arguments. The People, on the other hand, called an analyst from
CBI who worked on the Worldwide case to testify about how the
investigation unfolded. The evidence admitted during the hearing
and the postconviction court’s rulings are summarized as follows.
(1) DORA
¶7 Between 2009 and 2011, DORA engaged in a regulatory
investigation into Worldwide and its employees in response to
4 consumer complaints filed against the company. These complaints
stemmed from Worldwide’s retention of unearned fees, failure to
provide the keys to a newly purchased home, and the practice of
real estate or loan generation by unlicensed individuals — including
Martinez. As a result of the investigation, multiple Worldwide
employees had their real estate licenses revoked or suspended, and
Martinez was sent an order to cease and desist from unlicensed
activities.
¶8 The postconviction court found that DORA learned during its
investigation that
(1) Worldwide engaged in transactions involving falsified documents and incomplete loan applications, (2) unlicensed individuals worked at Worldwide, (3) Worldwide seemed to use fraudulent appraisals, fake relative gift letters, and aliases, (4) sometimes closing costs were received by Worldwide on the loan, and (5) . . . a number of the properties were foreclosed.
One of the DORA reports noted that Worldwide purchased
properties “with the intent to resell to Colorado borrowers” for “a
much higher price (sometimes double) than what they purchased
the property for, usually only months after the property had been
purchased.” Additionally, a DORA investigator’s memorandum
5 specifically about Martinez (drafted more than three years before
the indictment was filed) listed multiple possible regulatory
violations, including a “scheme to defraud,” and requested that the
case be referred to law enforcement agencies.
¶9 Nevertheless, the postconviction court concluded that this
evidence was insufficient to show that DORA “either knew or should
have known of the specific straw buyer scheme(s) at issue” because
it did not include the “bank records of [Martinez,] other family
members, and Worldwide, from which it would have been apparent
that [Martinez] was simply operating as a conduit through whom
Worldwide transferred money received from a bank financing a
home purchase from a second straw buyer to Worldwide via several
layers of transactions.” The court noted that the memorandum
about Martinez did not demonstrate knowledge of the straw buyer
scheme because it “list[ed] suspected violations of mortgage loan
originator licensing requirements” and was “devoid of any details
explaining the facts underlying the suspected
mortgage-loan-originator-based violations,” including the scheme to
defraud.
6 (2) Victims
¶ 10 In 2015, before Martinez accepted her plea agreement, the
People learned that some of the lender victims filed suspicious
activity reports with the federal government for properties included
in the indictment more than three years before the indictment was
filed. These reports documented potential issues with appraisals
and misrepresentations in the mortgage applications. “[B]ased on
the arguable possibility that the [statute of limitations] d[id] in fact
bar their use as part of the prosecution for the substantive [t]heft
charge,” the People moved to dismiss the transactions involving the
properties in the suspicious activity reports from the theft charge.3
¶ 11 In her Rule 35(c) motion, Martinez contended that the “same
recognizable signs of fraud [in the suspicious activity reports] were
present in the sales” of the properties that supported the remaining
charges, and therefore, the victims for those properties knew or
3 The People did not dismiss these transactions as predicate acts for
the COCCA charges. See § 18-17-103(3), C.R.S. 2024; People v. Davis, 2012 COA 56, ¶ 34 (“[I]f one predicate act falls within its respective limitations period, other predicate acts occurring within ten years before the occurrence of the first can be presented as evidence of racketeering activity even if they could not give rise to a separate prosecution.”).
7 should have known about the facts underlying the criminal charges
against her. Alternatively, she argued that the lender victims and
straw buyers should have investigated and uncovered those facts
during the properties’ foreclosure proceedings.
¶ 12 At the hearing, the People’s witness testified that title
companies, not the lenders, “handle[d] all the money in and out of
[the] real estate transactions,” and therefore the title companies had
the “bank names and account numbers and owner names that
[CBI] needed” to uncover the straw buyer scheme. She further
testified that the lenders “would have no record or have even asked
about” private payoff letters — the method Worldwide used to
appropriate the profits from their straw buyer scheme. Crediting
this testimony, the postconviction court concluded that, without the
information held exclusively by the title companies, “the victim
lenders and straw buyers did not and could not have reasonably
known that [Martinez] obtained lender funds . . . after the sale to
the second straw buyer which were immediately transferred to
Worldwide.”
8 (3) Subpoenaed Documents
¶ 13 In 2010, as part of its investigation into Worldwide, DORA
obtained and audited documents relating to approximately
thirty-nine real estate transactions involving Worldwide. When
Martinez subpoenaed these documents as part of the postconviction
proceedings, DORA’s records custodian informed her that the
documents “were no doubt destroyed long ago.” Martinez moved for
sanctions for spoilation of evidence under both Crim. P. 16 and the
due process clause and argued that the appropriate sanction would
be an adverse inference that the destroyed “documents contained
information showing illegal activity related to the loans for the
properties in question in this matter.”
¶ 14 The postconviction court denied the motion, ruling that,
because Martinez’s conviction “was and is already final, . . . neither
DORA nor the prosecution ha[d] any duty under Crim. P. 16 or due
process principles to disclose the documents from the DORA audit
as part of this Crim. P. 35(c) proceeding.” And even if there was a
disclosure obligation, the court ruled, Martinez “has presented no
evidence that the contents of those documents possessed
9 exculpatory value that was apparent before those documents were
destroyed.”
¶ 15 Martinez now appeals the postconviction court’s rulings on the
applicability of the statute of limitations and her request for
discovery sanctions.
II. Statute of Limitations
¶ 16 Martinez argues that DORA and the victims knew or should
have known of the facts establishing the criminal charges against
her more than three years before the indictment was filed. She
contends, therefore, that the statute of limitations had run and the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter her guilty
plea. After discussing the standard of review and applicable law, we
address Martinez’s contentions concerning DORA and the victims in
turn.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 17 In reviewing the denial of a Rule 35(c) motion after a hearing,
we review conclusions of law de novo but defer to the postconviction
court’s findings of fact if they are supported by the evidence.
People v. Villanueva, 2016 COA 70, ¶ 28. “[W]e presume the validity
of the conviction and the defendant bears the burden of proving
10 h[er] claim[] by a preponderance of the evidence.” Dunlap v. People,
173 P.3d 1054, 1061 (Colo. 2007). “Where the evidence in the
record supports the findings and holding of the court, the judgment
of the court will not be disturbed on review.” Id. at 1062.
¶ 18 Under Rule 35(c)(2)(III), a defendant may seek relief on the
ground that “the court rendering judgment was without jurisdiction
over . . . the subject matter.” In Colorado, a statute of limitations
challenge in a criminal case implicates the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction and cannot be waived. People v. Butler, 2017 COA 117,
¶ 14.
¶ 19 The limitations period for most felony offenses, including theft
and COCCA violations, is three years. § 16-5-401(1)(a), C.R.S.
2024. For the offenses alleged in this case, the applicable
limitations period commences “upon discovery of the criminal act.”
§ 16-5-401(4.5) (emphasis added).
¶ 20 The purpose of the “discovery” provision, section
16-5-401(4.5), is to
extend the limitations period for crimes that are susceptible to remaining undetected for extended periods of time, so that prosecution of such crimes will not be foreclosed as a result of concealment. . . . [W]ithout the
11 discovery tolling provision, our Criminal Code would provide surreptitious defendants a windfall for successfully concealing criminal conduct from their victims, contrary to the General Assembly’s intent.
People v. McKinney, 99 P.3d 1038, 1044-45 (Colo. 2004) (citation
omitted).
¶ 21 In People v. Cito, 2012 COA 221, a division of this court
interpreted and applied the “discovery” provision of section
16-5-401(4.5). There, an employee was charged with theft by
deception for obtaining money from his employer for unused
personal time, when the employee had actually used that time.
Cito, ¶¶ 4-5. The district court held that “discovery” of the criminal
acts occurred at the time the defendant received the payments from
the employer, rather than when the employer discovered that the
defendant had lied about his time off. Id. at ¶ 9. On appeal, a
division of this court reversed the district court’s decision. In
interpreting the terms “discovery” and “criminal act” in subsection
(4.5), the division held that “‘discovery of the criminal act’ . . . refers
to the point at which the victim or the state knew or through the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the facts
establishing the crime at issue.” Id. at ¶ 31. Noting that “the
12 criminal act [there] was theft by deception, not merely the act of
obtaining the money,” the division held that the victims would not
have “discover[ed]” the criminal act until they realized they were
deceived. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 31.
¶ 22 This case, like Cito, involved crimes involving an element of
deception or fraud. See § 18-4-401(1), C.R.S. 2024 (theft by
deception); 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (bank fraud). Thus, “discovery of the
criminal act” in this case refers to the point at which the victims or
the State knew or should have known of facts establishing that
Worldwide was (1) using straw buyers to generate fake profits from
real estate sales (the fraud or deception) and (2) diverting those
profits to itself and its members (obtaining the money). See id. at
¶ 31.
B. DORA
¶ 23 Martinez contends that, given the suspicious activity noted in
the investigative reports, DORA’s investigation triggered the
“discovery of the criminal act” for statute of limitations purposes
because “DORA either knew or, had it exercised reasonable
diligence by further investigating Worldwide, it would have known,
13 of the facts necessary to discover[] the criminal acts in this case.”
We are not persuaded for two reasons.
1. Actual or Constructive Knowledge
¶ 24 First, we discern no error in the postconviction court’s finding
that the submitted evidence did not demonstrate that DORA had
actual or constructive knowledge of the criminal acts underlying the
charges in this case. The court found that there was “no evidence
that any of the properties listed as a basis for the charges in the
Indictment against [Martinez] were included in the files obtained by
DORA” and that DORA was not “aware of the banking records
necessary to disclose that private payoff letters were issued to
[Martinez], or that [Martinez] then immediately deposited those
funds into Worldwide-related accounts.” These findings are
supported by the record, see Dunlap, 173 P.3d at 1062, and
Martinez does not meaningfully contest them.4 And without these
documents, DORA could not have known that Worldwide was
4 Martinez suggests that the destroyed documents might have
included references to the properties in the indictment and that DORA could have obtained more bank records through its subpoena powers, but these arguments have no bearing on the postconviction court’s findings about the evidence submitted for the Crim. P. 35(c) hearing.
14 obtaining profits from the straw buyer scheme — a necessity for
discovery of the underlying criminal act. See Cito, ¶ 31.
¶ 25 Instead, Martinez contends that DORA’s memorandum listing
her possible regulatory violations (including a “scheme to defraud”)
and requesting the matter be referred to law enforcement
demonstrates that DORA was aware of Worldwide’s scheme. But
evidence in the record shows that no referral was never made, and
we agree with the postconviction court that the “memorandum is
devoid of any details explaining the facts underlying the suspected
mortgage-loan-originator-based violations.” It is therefore mere
speculation that the memorandum’s mention of noncriminal
regulatory offenses referred to the straw buyer scheme here. Thus,
the record supports the postconviction court’s finding that DORA
did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the facts
establishing the criminal acts in this case based on its regulatory
investigation, and we will not disturb it. See id.
2. Duty to Investigate
¶ 26 Second, we reject Martinez’s argument that the suspicious
information mentioned in DORA’s reports obligated DORA to
investigate further and that such an investigation would have
15 uncovered the straw buyer scheme. DORA’s Division of Real Estate
is a civil agency tasked with “the administration and enforcement
of” the civil real estate statutes through “the prosecution of all
persons charged with violating any of their provisions” and by
“conduct[ing] audits of business accounts of licensees.”
§ 12-10-207(2), C.R.S. 2024. It has the authority to issue sanctions
for a licensee’s civil violations, including the severe sanction of
license suspension or revocation. See § 12-10-217(1), C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 27 Here, DORA investigated consumer complaints against
Worldwide based on allegations of civil violations of the real estate
statutes. As a result of its investigation, DORA revoked or
suspended the licenses of several of Worldwide’s employees and
issued cease and desist orders to the unlicensed members whom it
did not have the authority to sanction. Indeed, by 2010, Worldwide
had shut down its mortgage loan origination company (but not its
realty or investment companies).
¶ 28 Section 12-10-217(10) does require the Division of Real Estate
to refer information to law enforcement agencies when it “becomes
aware of facts or circumstances that fall within the jurisdiction of a
criminal justice or other law enforcement authority upon
16 investigation of the activities of a licensee.” But the statute’s plain
language does not require DORA to expand its investigation beyond
violations of the real estate statutes, nor does it require DORA to
take action on mere suspicions.
¶ 29 DORA completed its investigation into the consumer
complaints levied against Worldwide and issued the most severe
sanctions available to it, and Worldwide’s mortgage company (which
caused the complaints) ceased operating. Under these
circumstances, we cannot conclude that it was unreasonable for
DORA to end its investigation without looking into other potentially
suspicious activity. Therefore, the postconviction court did not err
by finding that Martinez “failed to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that [DORA] knew or should have reasonably known of
the facts establishing the charges against [her] based on its
investigation of real estate and mortgage licensing issues before CBI
began its detailed investigation into Worldwide and Worldwide’s
principals.”
C. Victims
¶ 30 Martinez also contends that the victims — the lenders and the
straw buyers — should have known of the facts establishing the
17 criminal charges in this case more than three years before the
indictment was filed. Specifically, she argues that the victims
should have investigated and would have uncovered the straw
buyer scheme if they were reasonably diligent. We disagree.
¶ 31 Even assuming that, to exercise reasonable diligence under
the circumstances, the victims should have investigated their
transactions with Worldwide, it is speculative that their
investigations would have uncovered Worldwide’s scheme. The
postconviction court found, as supported by the CBI analyst’s
testimony, that the lenders did not have access to the private payoff
letters and bank files needed to discover that Worldwide was
diverting the profits from the straw buyer sales to itself. The straw
buyers also would not have had the means to acquire these
documents. Martinez asserts in conclusory fashion that if the
victims “exercised reasonable diligence, they would have known
about the criminal activity underlying the[] loans,” but she does not
explain how they could have done so without these documents.
¶ 32 Thus, we agree with the postconviction court that, because
Martinez did not present any evidence that the victims had or could
access “information that the profits of the second straw buyer sale
18 were diverted to [Martinez] and Worldwide via a private payoff
letter, . . . [Martinez] has not shown that the victims knew or,
through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of
the facts establishing” the crimes in this case.5 See Cito, ¶ 31.
III. Motion for Sanctions
¶ 33 Martinez contends that the postconviction court abused its
discretion by declining to adopt, as a discovery sanction, her
proposed adverse inference that the documents DORA destroyed
“contained information showing illegal activity related to the loans
for the properties in question in this matter.” She argues that the
court should have made this adverse inference finding based on
(1) Crim. P. 16(III)(g); (2) due process; and (3) the court’s inherent
power.6 We disagree.
5 Martinez also contends that the bank that provided the fraud
hotline tip to CBI knew or should have known about the facts establishing the crimes in this case earlier. But that bank is not a victim of any of the criminal acts in this case, nor is it the State, so its knowledge is immaterial to the statute of limitations. See People v. Cito, 2012 COA 221, ¶ 2 (referring to “the victim or the state”). 6 The People contend that these arguments, to the extent that they
relate to conduct occurring before the postconviction proceedings, were waived by Martinez’s guilty plea. Because we conclude that the postconviction court did not err by denying the motion for sanctions, we need not resolve the People’s contention.
19 A. Standard of Review
¶ 34 We review a court’s resolution of discovery issues and its
decision whether to impose sanctions for discovery violations for an
abuse of discretion. People v. Acosta, 2014 COA 82, ¶ 10. A court
abuses its discretion when its discovery order is manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Tippet, 2023 CO 61,
¶ 35.
¶ 35 But “[w]e review de novo to determine whether the state
violated a defendant’s due process rights” by failing to preserve
potentially exculpatory evidence. People v. Eason, 2022 COA 54,
¶¶ 37, 40.
B. Rule 16(III)(g)
¶ 36 Martinez contends that, by failing to obtain and disclose the
materials from DORA’s audit of Worldwide, the People violated its
discovery obligations under Rule 16(I)(a) and (b)(4) that require
prosecuting attorneys to make available to defendants certain
“material and information which is in the control of the prosecuting
attorney . . . and concerning the pending case” and to “ensure that
a flow of information is maintained between the various
investigative personnel and his or her office sufficient to place
20 within his or her possession or control all material and information
relevant to the accused and the offense charged.” Martinez argues
that the court should have imposed sanctions under Rule 16(III)(g),
which permits a court to remedy a discovery violation by, as
relevant here, entering an “order as it deems just under the
circumstances.”
¶ 37 Martinez’s motion did not clearly identify when this supposed
disclosure violation occurred. But on appeal, Martinez clarifies that
her contention is “that the prosecution never obtained the DORA
files or provided them to [her] while the case was still at the district
court level,” and if they had, “the files would have been available for
the defense during the postconviction proceedings.” Irrespective of
when the violation occurred, we conclude that Rule 16 is
inapplicable here. See People v. Cooper, 2023 COA 113, ¶ 7 (we
may affirm the postconviction court’s order on any ground
supported by the record, whether or not the court relied on or
considered that ground).
¶ 38 To the extent Martinez argues that the violation occurred after
her guilty plea, the district court was correct that Rule 16 does not
apply to postconviction proceedings. See People v. Owens, 2014 CO
21 58M, ¶¶ 13-16; see also People v. Thompson, 2020 COA 117, ¶ 33
(“Crim. P. 35(c) is not a discovery mechanism to find new evidence,
but, rather, prescribes a procedure to present such evidence when
it has been obtained through other sources.”).
¶ 39 As for Martinez’s contention that the violation occurred before
her guilty plea, Rule 16(III)(g) allows a court to enter discovery
sanctions if “at any time during the course of the proceedings it is
brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply
with this rule.” (Emphasis added.) Given that Rule 16 is
inapplicable in postconviction proceedings, Owens, ¶¶ 13-16,
“during the course of the proceedings” does not include the
pendency of a Rule 35(c) motion. Because Martinez’s request for
sanctions under Rule 16 was not made “during the course of the
proceedings,” the postconviction court properly denied the motion.
C. Due Process
¶ 40 Martinez contends that DORA’s destruction of documents
violated her right to due process and therefore warranted discovery
sanctions.
¶ 41 To establish a due process violation based on the State’s
failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, Martinez “must
22 prove that the evidence was suppressed or destroyed by state action
and that the evidence was material.” Eason, ¶ 37 (quoting People v.
Braunthal, 31 P.3d 167, 172 (Colo. 2001)). Specifically, she must
show that “(1) the state suppressed or destroyed the evidence;
(2) the evidence had an exculpatory value that was apparent before
it was destroyed; and (3) [s]he was unable to obtain comparable
evidence by other reasonably available means.” Id.
¶ 42 To the extent that Martinez argues that the violation occurred
after her guilty plea, the postconviction court was correct that
“neither DORA nor the prosecution” had a duty “to disclose the
documents from the DORA audit as part of this Crim. P. 35(c)
proceeding.” The constitutional requirement to preserve and
disclose potentially exculpatory evidence ordinarily ends when a
conviction becomes final. See Dist. Attorney’s Off. v. Osborne,
557 U.S. 52, 68-69 (2009).
¶ 43 Additionally, the postconviction court found that Martinez
“presented no evidence that the contents of [the destroyed]
documents possessed exculpatory value that was apparent before
those documents were destroyed.” The court reasoned that DORA
23 wrote reports based in part on the documents it collected during the audit, which formed the basis for agency actions it took against Worldwide principals under its jurisdiction. These reports mention specific properties. It is reasonable to conclude that the properties included in the reports were associated with the most inculpatory actions taken by . . . licensees who worked at Worldwide. Yet, the properties that form the basis of the Indictment are not mentioned in these reports. The Court therefore infers either (1) that the audited documents did not contain the properties in the Indictment or (2) that if those properties were included in the audited documents, they were not sufficiently inculpatory (meaning exculpatory for statute of limitations purposes) for [DORA] to base agency actions on them.
¶ 44 We agree with the court’s reasoning and defer to the
reasonable inferences it drew from the record. See Dunlap,
173 P.3d at 1062. Martinez’s assertion that the destroyed
documents had exculpatory value because they included
documentation showing obvious signs of fraud regarding the
properties underlying this case is speculative and contrary to the
postconviction court’s findings. Such speculation is insufficient to
establish a due process violation. See Eason, ¶ 48.
24 ¶ 45 Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that
Martinez’s due process rights were violated. The district court thus
did not err by denying her motion for sanctions on that basis.
D. Inherent Powers
¶ 46 Finally, Martinez cites Aloi v. Union Pacific Railroad Corp.,
129 P.3d 999 (Colo. 2006), and Pfantz v. Kmart Corp., 85 P.3d 564
(Colo. App. 2003) — cases addressing a court’s inherent power to
issue sanctions for spoliation of evidence in civil cases — to contend
that the postconviction court should have made an adverse
inference finding. Martinez has not provided any authority, nor are
we aware of any, holding that case law governing sanctions for
spoliation of evidence in civil cases is applicable to Rule 35(c)
proceedings or criminal cases. Accordingly, the postconviction
court did not err by declining to enter sanctions on this basis
either.
IV. Disposition
¶ 47 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE BROWN concur.