Peo v. Martinez

Opinion

22CA2150 Peo v Martinez 08-21-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA2150 Adams County District Court No. 21CR2102 Honorable Roberto Ramírez, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Eric Julio Martinez,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Schock and Taubman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 21, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jenna Baker, Assistant Attorney General Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Robin Rheiner, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 Defendant, Eric Julio Martinez, appeals the judgment entered

on a jury verdict finding him guilty of first degree assault. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 One summer afternoon, the victim — Martinez’s girlfriend —

approached a stranger and asked him to call 911. The victim had a

large head wound and blood covering the side of her face and

running “down her dress” to her feet. She was crying and appeared

frightened.

¶3 After the man called 911, an ambulance and police officers

soon arrived. The victim reported that Martinez had hit her

repeatedly. The victim suffered multiple lacerations and a serious

brain bleed.

¶4 The prosecution charged Martinez with first degree assault

causing serious bodily injury with a deadly weapon (his hands and

fists).

¶5 While awaiting trial, Martinez admitted on a jail-recorded call

that he slapped “the fuck out of [his] bitch” and that because he

had “boxing skills from back in the day” the prosecution was “trying

to say [his] hands [were] fucking deadly weapons.”

1 ¶6 Martinez didn’t testify at trial, but his counsel defended on the

theory that Martinez acted in self-defense. As to the victim’s head

injury, defense counsel argued that the victim was drunk and fell,

causing the brain bleed.

¶7 The jury convicted Martinez as charged and found that the

assault was an act of domestic violence. The district court

sentenced Martinez to fourteen years in prison.

¶8 On appeal, Martinez contends that the district court erred by

(1) denying his motion to suppress; (2) admitting evidence that he

was a boxer; and (3) allowing prosecutorial misconduct in rebuttal

closing argument. He also contends that the cumulative effect of

these errors requires reversal. We address each contention in turn.

II. Motion to Suppress

¶9 Martinez contends that the district court erred by denying his

motion to suppress statements he made to a police officer before he

was arrested. Specifically, he contends that the officer’s

questioning constituted custodial interrogation in violation of

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). We disagree.

2 A. Additional Background

¶ 10 After the victim reported the assault and identified her

attacker, officers located Martinez at a nearby bus stop. Officer

Patrick Toelle first contacted Martinez and called out, “Hey, buddy.

Eric, yeah, you mind telling me what’s going on . . . ?” Martinez

confirmed his name, where he lived, and his girlfriend’s name.

Observing blood on Martinez’s face and shirt, Officer Toelle asked,

“What’s that from?” Martinez responded that his girlfriend had

been drinking and “got in a fight with her home girl.” He said that

he tried to get his girlfriend to go, but she scratched him and took

off. Martinez said he didn’t know if his girlfriend had been hurt in

the fight with her friend.

¶ 11 Less than two minutes later, officers asked Martinez to sit

down. They then took his backpack and arrested him. When

Martinez asked why he was under arrest, Officer Toelle explained

that he didn’t know what had happened and they would talk more

about it. One other officer was visibly present while Officer Toelle

spoke with Martinez, and a couple of other officers arrived as the

brief encounter unfolded.

3 ¶ 12 Before trial, Martinez moved to suppress the statements he

had made to Officer Toelle, arguing that he was in custody and

interrogated in the absence of a proper Miranda advisement. After a

hearing, the district court denied the motion, finding that Martinez

was not in custody when he answered Officer Toelle’s questions

before he was handcuffed.

B. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 13 To uphold the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-

incrimination, officers must provide certain warnings before a

custodial interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; see also People

v. Bohler, 2024 CO 18, ¶ 18. “Custody for Miranda purposes

depends on whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position

would believe they were in police custody ‘to a degree associated

with a formal arrest.’” Bohler, ¶ 19 (citation omitted). To make this

determination, we consider, among other factors, (1) the time, place,

and purpose of the encounter; (2) the persons present during the

encounter; (3) the words an officer spoke to the defendant; (4) the

officer’s tone of voice and demeanor; (5) the length and mood of the

encounter; (6) whether officers placed any limitation of movement or

other form of restraint on the defendant; (7) the officer’s response to

4 any questions the defendant asked; (8) whether the officer gave

directions to the defendant; and (9) the defendant’s verbal or

nonverbal response to such directions. Id.; see also People v.

Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 465-66 (Colo. 2002).

¶ 14 Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes is a

mixed question of law and fact. Bohler, ¶ 17. We defer to the

district court’s factual findings when they’re supported by the

record, although we may independently review recordings, including

police body camera footage. Id. We review de novo the legal

question whether those facts, taken together, establish that the

person was in custody. Id.

C. Martinez Wasn’t in Custody

¶ 15 Considering the nonexclusive factors outlined above and based

on our own independent review of the bodycam footage, we agree

with the district court that Martinez wasn’t in custody when Officer

Toelle initially questioned him.

¶ 16 While the purpose of the initial contact was to identify the

individual who matched the description of the alleged assailant, the

encounter occurred at a public bus stop in the middle of the day.

See id. at ¶ 20 (concluding that public questioning next to a four-

5 lane street — even though at night — was neutral); see also People

v. Cline, 2019 CO 33, ¶¶ 21-22 (noting that an interaction in a

parking area “in broad daylight” weighed against custody).

¶ 17 Officer Toelle and one other officer initially contacted Martinez.

Though in uniform, neither officer displayed any weapons. While a

couple of other officers arrived after the initial contact, they

remained in the background. Only Officer Toelle questioned

Martinez. See People v. Pleshakov, 2013 CO 18, ¶ 30 (the defendant

wasn’t in custody when, despite the presence of four officers at the

scene, only one officer spoke with the defendant “while the

remaining officers engaged in other tasks”).

¶ 18 And contrary to Martinez’s assertion, the questioning was not

confrontational or accusatory. Officer Toelle remained calm, and

his tone was conversational. See People v. Davis, 2019 CO 84, ¶ 34

(the defendant wasn’t in custody when the “overall mood of the

interrogation” was “calm and conversational”). The questions

themselves were neutral. Namely, Officer Toelle asked about

Martinez’s identity, where he lived, his girlfriend’s name, and why

he was bleeding. See Bohler, ¶ 25 (noting that an officer’s neutral

6 questions about why the defendant was bleeding weighed against

custody).

¶ 19 The questioning lasted less than two minutes, see People v.

Willoughby, 2023 CO 10, ¶ 33 (noting that the more brief the

encounter, the less likely that it is custodial); no threats were made;

and Martinez was neither handcuffed nor restrained during the

questioning, see People v. Garcia, 2017 CO 106, ¶ 37 (concluding

that the defendant was not in custody because, among other things,

he “was never physically restrained and the officers made no

threats, promises, or even references to criminal liability”).

¶ 20 Though Martinez is correct that he was ultimately instructed

to sit down and put his hands behind his back, that happened at

the end of the short encounter. By that time, the questioning was

over.

¶ 21 Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that

Martinez was not in custody when Officer Toelle questioned him.

The district court therefore properly refused to suppress the

statements Martinez made to Officer Toelle before he was arrested.

7 III. Boxing Evidence

¶ 22 Martinez argues that the district court erred by admitting

evidence that he told the victim he was a boxer whose hands were

registered weapons. He maintains that the evidence was irrelevant,

unfairly prejudicial, and constituted inadmissible other act

evidence. Again, we disagree.

A. Additional Background

¶ 23 Before trial, defense counsel moved to exclude testimony that

Martinez was a boxer because the victim had “no personal

knowledge” of Martinez’s “history as an alleged boxer” and because

the evidence would be “more prejudicial than probative.” Martinez

didn’t argue that the evidence was improper other act evidence.

The court denied the motion, ruling that the victim “may certainly

testify as to anything [Martinez] told her.”

¶ 24 The victim testified at trial that Martinez told her that “he was

a boxer,” “he knew how to fight and hurt somebody,” and his

“hands were registered weapons.” The jury also heard Martinez’s

admission on the jail-recorded call that he beat the victim and had

boxing experience. (Martinez didn’t object to the admission of these

portions of the recorded call.) The prosecution argued in closing

8 that Martinez was guilty of first degree assault because he caused

serious bodily injury to the victim using his fists as deadly

weapons.

B. The Boxing Evidence Was Relevant and Not Unduly Prejudicial

¶ 25 Martinez contends that evidence about his boxing experience

was not relevant to any material issue at trial under CRE 401, and,

even if marginally relevant, the evidence was unduly prejudicial

under CRE 403.

¶ 26 While Martinez raised an objection under CRE 403 before the

district court, the parties dispute whether he preserved his CRE

401 objection. Because the evidence was properly admitted, we

needn’t resolve the dispute.

¶ 27 We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Brown, 2022 COA 19, ¶ 69.

¶ 28 A person commits first degree assault if, “[w]ith intent to cause

serious bodily injury to another person, he causes serious bodily

injury to any person by means of a deadly weapon.” § 18-3-

202(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024. Fists (and other body parts) may be deadly

weapons if used or intended to be used in a manner “capable of

producing death or serious bodily injury.” People v. Ross, 831 P.2d

9 1310, 1313 (Colo. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Montez v.

People, 2012 CO 6, ¶ 16; People v. Saleh, 45 P.3d 1272, 1276 (Colo.

2002) (noting that feet and hands “can become deadly weapons”);

see also § 18-1-901(3)(e)(II), C.R.S. 2024 (defining “[d]eadly

weapon”).

¶ 29 If evidence is probative of a material fact, then it is relevant

and presumptively admissible unless its probative value is

substantially outweighed by other concerns, like the danger of

unfair prejudice. Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8, ¶ 3; see also CRE

401-03. “[E]vidence of an element” of the offense “is always

relevant” and “not unfairly prejudicial.” People v. Kembel, 2023 CO

5, ¶ 54.

¶ 30 Evidence that Martinez had boxing experience was probative of

his ability to throw and land a punch that could cause serious

bodily injury. It was also probative to show that, as used against

the victim, his fists were deadly weapons. Cf. People v. Castro, 10

P.3d 700, 703 (Colo. App. 2000) (“[T]estimony regarding the victim’s

boxing lessons may be admissible in relation to the issue of whether

his fists could have been a deadly weapon.”). The boxing evidence

10 was therefore relevant to prove the elements of first degree assault.

See Kembel, ¶ 54.

¶ 31 Nor was the evidence that Martinez had boxing experience

unfairly prejudicial. Evidence is only unfairly prejudicial if it has an

undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis, such

as sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution, or horror. People v.

Rath, 44 P.3d 1033, 1043 (Colo. 2002). Nothing about Martinez’s

boxing experience is inherently prejudicial or inflammatory. And

even if the boxing evidence damaged Martinez’s defense — as

Martinez suggests — evidence isn’t unfairly prejudicial under Rule

403 simply because it harms the defendant’s case. See Kembel,

¶ 53; see also People v. Dist. Ct., 785 P.2d 141, 147 (Colo. 1990)

(“[E]vidence [is not] unfairly prejudicial simply because it damages

the defendant’s case.”).

¶ 32 Because it was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial, the

district court properly admitted the boxing evidence.1

1 To the extent that Martinez contends that the boxing evidence was

inadmissible because the victim didn’t have personal knowledge about his boxing experience, Martinez doesn’t explain how the court erred by finding that the victim could testify to statements Martinez had made to her.

11 C. The Boxing Evidence Wasn’t Inadmissible Other Act Evidence

¶ 33 Martinez also argues that the boxing evidence violated CRE

404(b) because the evidence “cannot be separated from the

prohibited inference that Martinez is a violent person.”

¶ 34 Because Martinez failed to preserve this contention, we will

reverse only if the error was plain. That means error that was

“obvious, substantial, and ‘so undermined the fundamental fairness

of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the

judgment of conviction.’” People v. Snelling, 2022 COA 116M, ¶ 33

(citation omitted).

¶ 35 Evidence of “any other crime, wrong, or act” is not admissible

to prove a defendant’s character to show that he acted in conformity

with that character in committing the charged offense. CRE

404(b)(1). But if the other act evidence “does not suggest bad

character, Rule 404(b) does not apply and admissibility is governed

by Rules 401-403.” Rojas, ¶ 52.

¶ 36 We are skeptical that evidence that someone is a boxer

suggests bad character. Boxing is simply a sport. Thousands of

individuals engage in competitive boxing at amateur and

professional levels. Being a boxer doesn’t make an individual prone

12 to violence outside the ring, nor does it suggest bad character.

Indeed, Martinez doesn’t explain how a person’s participation in an

organized sport indicates a propensity toward violence or to commit

first degree assault.

¶ 37 But even assuming some propensity inference could be made,

because nothing about Martinez’s boxing experience obviously

suggests bad character, we cannot conclude that the district court

plainly erred by not considering Rule 404(b) without the benefit of

an objection. See People v. Crabtree, 2024 CO 40M, ¶ 42. And

because Martinez admitted that he assaulted the victim in a

recorded jail call, we are confident that the boxing evidence didn’t

impact the reliability of the conviction or the fairness of the trial.2

See People v. Perez, 2024 COA 94, ¶¶ 26, 32.

¶ 38 We are not persuaded otherwise by Kaufman v. People, 202

P.3d 542 (Colo. 2009). Kaufman was decided before the Colorado

Supreme Court updated the CRE 404(b) doctrine in Rojas, and we

are guided by Rojas. But even considering Kaufman, Martinez

2 Though the victim testified that Martinez told her that his hands

were registered weapons, any claimed prejudice from that testimony was mitigated by the prosecution’s admission that no such registry exists.

13 overlooks the fact that, in that case, the supreme court concluded

evidence of the defendant’s specialized “training in knives” was

properly admitted when the defendant was alleged to have stabbed

two victims (though general evidence of his martial arts training

wasn’t relevant to the stabbing). Id. at 556-57. Like the Kaufman

defendant’s knife training, Martinez’s boxing training was relevant

to whether he committed first degree assault using his fists. Thus,

Kaufman also supports the admission of the boxing evidence.

IV. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 39 Martinez contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct

during rebuttal closing argument by telling the jury that the victim

was “honest” and testified to “what happened.” We see no

misconduct.

¶ 40 Defense counsel argued in closing that Martinez was not the

aggressor and that he “walked away from a drunk woman who was

antagonizing him, who was pissed at him, who threw things at him,

and who ultimately attacked and injured him.” And defense

counsel argued that the victim “[wa]s stretching the truth” and that

“someone who is intoxicated may not be able to accurately assess

14 what’s happening and may not be able to accurately recall what

happened.”

¶ 41 In rebuttal closing, the prosecutor countered the attacks on

the victim’s credibility, arguing as follows:

• “[The victim] was extremely forthcoming on the witness

stand. It’s not easy to come in here in front of 13

strangers, lawyers, a judge, perhaps an audience . . . and

talk about how you are an alcoholic. She was

forthcoming. She was honest. She didn’t hide from her

past.”

• “[The victim] answered every question for better or for

worse with what happened, with honesty. And that’s not

easy to do.”

• “This is not someone who like the defense wants you to

think has it out for him, wants him in trouble. That is,

like, the opposite of how she came across. That is the

opposite of what we have here. That’s why she is to be

believed. That’s credibility.”

• “This is just what happened. She is just telling you the

facts.”

15 ¶ 42 Though Martinez didn’t object to these rebuttal comments at

trial, he now says that they were improper expressions of personal

opinion that vouched for the victim’s credibility.

¶ 43 We apply a two-step analysis to claims of prosecutorial

misconduct. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096 (Colo. 2010).

We first determine “whether the prosecutor’s questionable conduct

was improper based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id. If it

was, we next consider whether that conduct warrants reversal. Id.

We review unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct for plain

error. Id. at 1097.

¶ 44 While it’s improper for a prosecutor to communicate their

opinion on the truth or falsity of witness testimony during closing

argument, Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1049 (Colo.

2005), a prosecutor may respond to defense counsel’s argument,

comment on the evidence, and argue reasonable inferences that

may be drawn from the evidence, People v. Roadcap, 78 P.3d 1108,

1113-14 (Colo. App. 2003).

¶ 45 The prosecutor’s rebuttal argument was not based on opinion

but rather was a fair response to defense counsel’s closing

argument. Indeed, the prosector countered defense counsel’s claim

16 that the victim was drunk and could not remember what happened

by specifically directing the jury’s attention to the 911 call, the

victim’s admission to drinking, and the bodycam footage of the

police interview with her. From the evidence, the prosecutor

properly argued why the jury should believe the victim. That’s not

an opinion; it’s fair argument. See Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at

1051 (“[C]ounsel may properly argue from reasonable inferences

anchored in the facts in evidence about the truthfulness of a

witness’ testimony.”).

¶ 46 But even if we assume that any of the rebuttal comments

could be construed as improper expressions of personal opinion, we

cannot conclude that any of the comments were so obviously

improper that the district court should have intervened without the

benefit of an objection. See Cardman v. People, 2019 CO 73, ¶ 34.

Nor — given Martinez’s admission to assaulting the victim — did

any of the comments so undermine the fairness of the trial as to

cast doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction. See

Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1053 (considering, among other

factors, “the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction” to

17 determine whether prosecutorial misconduct undermined the

reliability of the judgment of conviction).

V. Cumulative Error

¶ 47 Martinez contends that, collectively, the district court’s errors

violated his right to a fair trial, entitling him to a new one. See

Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 24. But cumulative error

requires multiple errors resulting in cumulative prejudice. Id. at

¶ 25. Because we disagree that the district court committed

multiple errors, cumulative error doesn’t apply.

VI. Disposition

¶ 48 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE SCHOCK and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.