23CA1870 Peo v Edwards 07-17-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1870 Adams County District Court No. 22CR423 Honorable Jeffrey Smith, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
David Edwards,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Kuhn and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 17, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jaycey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Arielle Roter, Deputy State Public Defender, Brighton, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, David Edwards, appeals the judgment of conviction
entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of third degree assault
and false imprisonment. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Edwards and the victim, Julie Sandoval, had been dating for
three and a half years when the incident giving rise to the charges
occurred. Sandoval lived with Edwards in his apartment, but she
continued to pay rent for her own apartment elsewhere. One night
during dinner with Edwards, Sandoval called a longtime male
friend. This upset Edwards and he went to the bedroom. Once
Sandoval finished the call, she went to the bedroom to “give
[Edwards] affection,” but he pushed her away. Sandoval asked
Edwards why he was “being mean.” He pushed her away again,
and her body hit the dresser. Sandoval and Edwards gave two very
different accounts of what happened next.
¶3 According to Sandoval, after Edwards had pushed her twice,
she gathered her belongings in a trash bag so she could return to
her own apartment. When she tried to leave, Edwards grabbed her
by her shoulders, turned her around, and started choking her.
Edwards released her and she tried to run toward the bedroom, but
1 Edwards grabbed her again. He interlocked his fingers with hers
and twisted them back toward her body. Sandoval managed to get
away from Edwards, and she ran to the bedroom to escape out of
the window. Edwards came into the bedroom and threw a
television at Sandoval, which she dodged. Sandoval then laid down
on the bed. Edwards got on top of her, threw her legs over her
head, and choked her, first with his forearm and then with both of
his hands. Once Edwards let her go, he went to the living room to
clean up. Sandoval remained in the bedroom for about three
minutes until she saw that Edwards was “calm.” She then grabbed
her belongings, left the apartment, and knocked on three neighbors’
doors. The third neighbor answered, and she told him to call the
police. Sandoval also called the police herself. Shortly thereafter,
police arrived and took Sandoval to the hospital, where a nurse
evaluated and treated her injuries.
¶4 According to Edwards, no physical altercation occurred.
Instead, Sandoval became hysterical during their argument and
couldn’t calm down. He wanted her to leave, packed up her
belongings, and placed them in a bag outside the door of the
2 apartment. Sandoval wouldn’t leave, so he got in his car and left
his apartment.
¶5 The People charged Edwards with second degree assault, third
degree assault, and false imprisonment, all as acts of domestic
violence given Edwards and Sandoval’s relationship. At trial,
Edwards’ defense was that Sandoval fabricated her account of the
assault — that is, there was no assault.
¶6 The jury found Edwards guilty of third degree assault and
false imprisonment. The district court sentenced him to two years
of probation and mandatory domestic violence evaluation and
treatment.
II. Discussion
¶7 Edwards contends that we must reverse his convictions for
three reasons: (1) the district court erred by admitting the
statements Sandoval made to a forensic nurse examiner (FNE) on
the night of the incident; (2) the court erred by allowing the FNE to
give “declarative and conclusory” testimony about Sandoval’s
injuries; and (3) even if neither of these errors individually requires
reversal, their cumulative prejudicial effect does. We address, and
reject, these contentions in turn.
3 A. Sandoval’s Statements to the FNE
¶8 Edwards first contends that the district court abused its
discretion by admitting People’s Exhibit 5, a purportedly verbatim
transcription of Sandoval’s statements to the FNE about the
incident. We disagree.
1. Standard of Review
¶9 We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. People v. Martinez, 2020 COA 141, ¶ 25. A court
abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies the law. Id.
2. Additional Background
¶ 10 The prosecution called the FNE who examined Sandoval to
testify as an expert witness. In examining Sandoval, the FNE took a
“history” of what happened to “guide [her] assessment and guide
[her] diagnosis and treatment.” Invoking CRE 803(4), which excepts
statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis and
treatment from CRE 802’s hearsay bar, the prosecutor moved to
admit this written history as Exhibit 5. The exhibit includes the
following statements by Sandoval:
4 He strangled me, um, he pushed me into the coffee table and I hit the coffee table with my left side and went to the floor. And he grabbed me when I was on the bed he was choking me there again. He put my legs up, I was trying to curl into a ball, I couldn’t breathe. When I was crying he was making fun of me. And then he grabbed my hands, he was trying to stop me, I was trying to leave. He grabbed my fingers and was twisting them. He hurt them. I ran out of the house and was banging on the neighbor’s door. I went to the hall and people living there, I asked them to call the cops. I said ‘my boyfriend is hitting me.’ He said ‘ok’ and then closed the door. And that’s when I saw [Edwards]. He threw my bags in the front yard and then he jumped in his car and drove down the street.
¶ 11 Defense counsel objected to the admission of Exhibit 5. The
court discussed the admissibility of the exhibit with the parties
outside the jury’s presence. Defense counsel argued that the
statements in the exhibit were “less focused on the medical issues
at hand” and “not proper for [the FNE] to go through” because they
constituted a description of “the incident,” not a “medical history.”
Thus, counsel continued, the exhibit was inadmissible under CRE
803(4). The prosecutor countered that the statements were prior
consistent statements, citing People v. Miranda, 2014 COA 102, in
5 support of their admissibility for that reason, in addition to their
admissibility under CRE 803(4).
¶ 12 The court admitted the entire exhibit, ruling that “several
statements” fell within the medical diagnosis and treatment
exception of CRE 803(4) and that all the statements were
admissible as prior consistent statements “to rehabilitate Ms.
Sandoval’s credibility.” The court reasoned that “her credibility
ha[d] been generally attacked in the case in opening statements”
because defense counsel argued the case was “a credibility case and
that this did not happen” — that is, “she made up the story of
strangulation.”
3. Analysis
¶ 13 Edwards contends that the exhibit wasn’t admissible because
(1) Sandoval’s statements therein didn’t fall within the medical
diagnosis and treatment hearsay exception and (2) Sandoval’s
character for truthfulness was never attacked.
¶ 14 Under CRE 803(4), “[s]tatements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or
present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general
character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as
6 reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment” are excepted from
CRE 802’s bar to the admission of hearsay. See People v. Jaramillo,
183 P.3d 665, 669 (Colo. App. 2008). But statements attributing
fault or identifying an assailant aren’t admissible under Rule
803(4), unless such information is necessary for treatment. People
v. Allee, 77 P.3d 831, 834-35 (Colo. App. 2003).
¶ 15 We conclude that most of the first half of the transcription
(everything except, “When I was crying he was making fun of me”)
was admissible under Rule 803(4). Sandoval’s description of how
she incurred her injuries was relevant to medical diagnosis and
treatment because the FNE needed to know “where [she] should be
looking, and what type of injuries [she] should be looking for.” See
Kelly v. Haralampopoulos, 2014 CO 46, ¶ 24 (“[I]f a statement is
offered for the purpose of determining the nature, source, or cause
of a patient’s medical condition, it falls within the language of Rule
803(4) . . . .”).
¶ 16 But the rest of the transcription — namely, “When I was crying
he was making fun of me,” and everything following the statement,
“He hurt them” — wasn’t admissible under Rule 803(4). Sandoval’s
description of leaving the house and knocking on neighbors’ doors
7 and her reference to Edwards as the person who had hit her weren’t
statements made for the purpose of receiving medical diagnosis or
treatment. Rather, Sandoval made these statements for the
purpose of describing her version of the incident.
¶ 17 Nonetheless, the district court didn’t abuse its discretion by
admitting the exhibit because all of Sandoval’s statements in the
exhibit were admissible as prior consistent statements.
¶ 18 “[P]rior consistent statements may be used for rehabilitation
when a witness’s credibility has been attacked, as such statements
are admissible outside CRE 801(d)(1)(B).” Miranda, ¶ 15 (quoting
People v. Eppens, 979 P.2d 14, 21 (Colo. 1999)). The rationale for
this rule is that, where an attack on credibility is general and not
limited to specific facts, “the jury should have access to all the
relevant facts, including consistent and inconsistent statements.”
People v. Elie, 148 P.3d 359, 362 (Colo. App. 2006); see People v.
Allgier, 2018 COA 122, ¶ 47 (because defense counsel generally
attacked the victim’s credibility by saying in opening statement that
the victim had given inconsistent versions of events, and had cross-
examined the victim as to details of those inconsistencies, the
victim’s prior statements to a police officer were admissible); People
8 v. Manzanares, 2020 COA 140M, ¶¶ 33-34 (the trial court didn’t
abuse its discretion by admitting notes as a prior consistent
statement because defense counsel “launched a general and
sustained attack on [the prosecution witness’s] credibility that was
not limited to specific facts”); People v. Clark, 2015 COA 44, ¶¶ 132-
133 (the trial court didn’t abuse its discretion by admitting a
witness’s videotaped interview after defense counsel attacked that
witness’s credibility because “admission of the entire video was
proper to give the jury the full picture of what he had said to the
police”).
¶ 19 Sandoval’s statements were admissible as prior consistent
statements because (1) the defense’s theory was that Sandoval had
fabricated her version of events and (2) that theory rested in large
part on alleged inconsistencies in Sandoval’s story. During her
opening statement, defense counsel generally attacked Sandoval’s
credibility and said that Edwards never assaulted Sandoval. On
cross-examination of Sandoval, defense counsel focused on various
inconsistencies in Sandoval’s memory, including the number of
times she was strangled, where in the apartment the assault
9 happened, who packed her belongings into the trash bag, and
whether anyone answered the door when she knocked for help.
¶ 20 Edwards’ reliance on People v. Serra, 2015 COA 130, for the
proposition that questioning the credibility of and identifying
inconsistencies in a witness’s accounts doesn’t constitute an attack
on the witness’s character is misplaced. Serra addressed a different
question than the one before us. The division in Serra determined
whether evidence of a victim’s character for truthfulness could be
admitted under CRE 608 when the defense hadn’t yet attacked her
character for truthfulness. Id. at ¶¶ 65-67. But CRE 608 isn’t
implicated in this case. While the defense generally attacked
Sandoval’s credibility and recollection of the incident, defense
counsel didn’t present any evidence relating to her propensity to be
untruthful, and the prosecution didn’t offer the statements as
evidence that Sandoval had a truthful character.
¶ 21 In sum, we conclude that the court didn’t abuse its discretion
by admitting Exhibit 5.
B. Expert Testimony
¶ 22 Next, Edwards contends that the district court reversibly erred
by allowing inadmissible expert testimony. Again, we disagree.
10 1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 23 We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings regarding the
admissibility of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. People
v. Baker, 2019 COA 165, ¶ 12, aff’d, 2021 CO 29. Where, as in this
case, counsel didn’t object to the admission of the challenged
evidence, we review any error for plain error. People v. Hagos, 2012
CO 63, ¶ 14. Plain error is error that is obvious and that so
undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast serious
doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction. Id. “The
defendant has the burden of showing that any error was plain.”
People v. Carter, 2021 COA 29, ¶ 49.
¶ 24 Under CRE 702, a witness may testify as an expert if she has
“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [that] will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue.” While testimony in the form of an opinion isn’t
objectionable merely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the jury, “an expert witness can’t tell the jury what
result to reach or form conclusions for the jurors that they are
competent to reach on their own.” Baker, ¶ 14.
11 2. Additional Background
¶ 25 The FNE testified as an expert in forensic examination and
strangulation. During direct examination, the prosecutor asked the
FNE whether the injuries she observed on Sandoval were
“consistent or inconsistent with what Ms. Sandoval stated.”
Defense counsel objected on the basis that it was up to the jury, not
the FNE, to determine whether the injuries were consistent or
inconsistent with Sandoval’s accusation. The court sustained the
objection. The prosecutor and defense counsel then approached
the bench and discussed this line of questioning with the court.
The court said these kinds of questions improperly bolstered
Sandoval’s credibility. It told the prosecutor that he could ask
generally whether certain injuries were consistent with certain types
of assault but that the FNE couldn’t opine whether certain injuries
were consistent with Sandoval’s report of what Edwards had done.
¶ 26 Once direct examination resumed, the prosecutor asked the
FNE whether the injuries to Sandoval’s thumb were “consistent or
inconsistent with someone who may have had their hands
manipulated.” The FNE said that they were consistent, and defense
counsel objected again. The court sustained the objection. The
12 prosecutor then asked the FNE whether the bruising on Sandoval’s
hand was “inconsistent with an injury that could have occurred
that day.” Defense counsel objected, and the court overruled the
objection. The FNE answered, “In my opinion it is consistent with
Ms. Sandoval’s history with having her hand hurt in an assault.”
Defense counsel didn’t object to the answer.
¶ 27 During a discussion with the court over the subsequent lunch
break, defense counsel asked the prosecutor to advise the FNE on
the limits of her testimony. The court said that the FNE could
answer “yes” or “no” to whether Sandoval’s injuries were consistent
or inconsistent with an injury that could have occurred the day of
the alleged assault, but the court acknowledged that defense
counsel hadn’t objected to the FNE’s answer. The court warned
that, if the FNE testified beyond that limit, the court would hear
objections. Defense counsel didn’t ask the court for any remedy for
the FNE’s previous answer, and the prosecutor didn’t ask a similar
question later.
13 3. Analysis
¶ 28 Edwards argues that the FNE’s answer — “In my opinion it is
consistent with Ms. Sandoval’s history with having her hand hurt in
an assault” — was inadmissible expert testimony.
¶ 29 This argument is waived because defense counsel didn’t object
to the FNE’s answer and, when counsel subsequently discussed the
issue with the court, didn’t request a remedy.1
¶ 30 Waiver is the “intentional relinquishment of a known right or
privilege.” Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 28 (quoting People v.
Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39). A party’s waiver doesn’t need to be
express; it may be implied. People v. Garcia, 2024 CO 41M, ¶ 29.
“[A]n implied waiver occurs when a party’s conduct demonstrates
the intent to relinquish the right or when the party acts
inconsistently with the asserted right.” Id.
¶ 31 Counsel made two prior objections to the prosecution’s line of
questioning regarding the consistency of Sandoval’s injuries with
her statements, which the court sustained. When the prosecutor
1 We read Edwards’ briefs as challenging the FNE’s last answer but
not the question to which the answer was given. At trial, defense counsel objected to the question, not the answer.
14 reframed the question in a way that didn’t implicate Sandoval’s
statements, counsel objected to the question, the court overruled
counsel’s objection, and the FNE answered the prosecutor’s
question. Counsel didn’t object to the FNE’s answer. Moreover,
defense counsel later indicated that she was fully aware of the issue
but didn’t ask the court to strike the answer or take any other
action. See Forgette, ¶ 34 (where counsel was fully aware of the
issue (a sleeping juror) but didn’t ask the court to take any action to
address it, the issue was waived).
¶ 32 But even assuming defense counsel didn’t waive the issue, we
conclude that reversal isn’t required because if the district court
erred by admitting the FNE’s testimony, and the error was obvious,
Edwards’ contention would still fail the last prong of the plain error
test — prejudice — for a combination of reasons.
¶ 33 First, defense counsel extensively cross-examined the FNE.
See People v. Wittrein, 221 P.3d 1076, 1082 (Colo. 2009) (no plain
error when an expert was subject to cross-examination and testified
that she didn’t know with “one hundred percent certainty” whether
the victim was telling the truth). On cross, the FNE agreed that she
“[could not] personally say how [Sandoval] got any of her injuries.”
15 She also testified that she couldn’t be certain that Edwards’ hands
caused Sandoval’s injuries because she wasn’t there when the
incident occurred.
¶ 34 Second, there was other substantial and properly admitted
evidence proving that Edwards assaulted Sandoval. See People v.
Cook, 197 P.3d 269, 276 (Colo. App. 2008) (considering the
“strength and breadth of the properly admitted evidence” to
determine whether an investigating officer’s testimony so
undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast serious
doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction). This
evidence — the admissibility of which Edwards doesn’t challenge on
appeal — includes Sandoval’s testimony; her 911 call; photos of her
injuries; and the investigating officer’s testimony, photographs of
the bedroom, and body camera video.
¶ 35 Third, the fact defense counsel never requested a remedy for
the FNE’s testimony indicates that counsel didn’t view it as
substantially prejudicial. See Martinez, ¶ 75 (no plain error in
allowing certain expert testimony, in part because defense counsel
failed to object to the admissibility of expert testimony, which
“belies any claim that he was surprised or prejudiced” by the
16 testimony (quoting People v. Brown, 313 P.3d 608, 617 (Colo. App.
2011))).
¶ 36 Thus, even if the court erred by allowing this testimony,
reversal isn’t required.
C. Cumulative Error
¶ 37 Lastly, Edwards contends that the cumulative effect of the
district court’s errors requires reversal. Having found only one
possible error relating to the FNE’s testimony, we reject this
contention. See People v. Shanks, 2019 COA 160, ¶ 76 (for the
cumulative error doctrine to apply, numerous errors must have
been committed, not merely alleged).
III. Disposition
¶ 38 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE KUHN and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.