25CA0608 Peo in Interest of LD 08-21-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0608 El Paso County District Court No. 21JV502 Honorable Robin Chittum, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of L.D., a Child,
and Concerning W.D.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Lipinsky and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 21, 2025
Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Sara Sonsalla, Assistant County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, W.D. (father)
appeals the judgment allocating parental responsibilities for L.D.
(the child) to maternal grandparents. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In June 2021, the El Paso County Department of Human
Services filed a petition in dependency and neglect concerning the
child and her sister, K.D., who is not the subject of this appeal.
The Department received reports that father had threatened to kill
himself, the child, and K.D., and later learned that father had been
placed on a mental health hold. In addition, the Department
alleged in the petition that father had a history of mental health
issues, substance abuse, and family violence.
¶3 Father moved to Texas shortly after the case opened and
remained there for the duration of the case. After father admitted
the allegations in the petition, the juvenile court adjudicated the
then eight-year-old child dependent or neglected and adopted a
treatment plan for father. Among other terms, father’s treatment
plan required him to address his mental health issues and
substance abuse. The child was placed with her maternal
grandmother and maternal grandmother’s husband (maternal
1 grandparents) in Michigan in May 2022, where she remained for the
remainder of the case.
¶4 The Department moved for an allocation of parental
responsibilities (APR) to maternal grandmother. After conducting
an evidentiary hearing in February 2025, the court granted the
motion and ordered that father would have supervised parenting
time.
¶5 Father appeals, claiming the court erred by awarding an APR
to maternal grandparents. We affirm.
II. Discussion
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶6 When allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency and
neglect proceeding, a juvenile court must consider the legislative
purposes of the Children’s Code under section 19-1-102, C.R.S.
2024. People in Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶ 18. The overriding
purpose of the Children’s Code is to protect a child’s welfare and
safety by providing procedures through which the child’s best
interests can be served. Id. at ¶ 19. Therefore, if a court allocates
parental responsibilities, it must do so in accordance with the
child’s best interests, People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208
2 (Colo. App. 2011); see § 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024, and must
focus on the protection and safety of the child and not the parents’
custodial interests. People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA 70, ¶ 13.
¶7 The allocation of parental responsibilities is a matter within
the juvenile court’s discretion. See In re Parental Responsibilities
Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A court abuses its
discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unfair, or when it misapplies or misconstrues the law. People in
Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14. The credibility of witnesses, the
sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence, as well as
the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from it, are within the
juvenile court’s discretion. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d
244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). And when the juvenile court’s findings
have record support, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding
on review. B.R.D., ¶ 15. But whether the court applied the correct
legal standard is a question of law that we review de novo. People in
Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 10.
B. Analysis
¶8 In support of his contention that the juvenile court abused its
discretion by awarding an APR to maternal grandparents, father
3 points to his progress on his treatment plan and the child’s
“expressed wishes to be returned home to [f]ather or placed with her
paternal grandmother.” We perceive no error.
¶9 The court found that maternal grandparents met all the child’s
needs, including the child’s mental health concerns. Noting the
child had “been through a lot of trauma,” the court found that
maternal grandparents provided the child with stability,
consistency, and commitment during the child’s nearly three-year
placement with them. And the court found that maternal
grandparents had also supported the child’s relationship with her
parents and K.D.
¶ 10 The record supports the court’s findings. The caseworker
testified that maternal grandparents were consistent caregivers who
met the child’s needs, and that the child had been stable during her
placement with them. For instance, the child was participating in
individual therapy at the time of the hearing. Maternal
grandparents also supported the child’s relationship with her
parents and K.D., all of whom lived outside Michigan at the time of
the APR hearing.
4 ¶ 11 The court also found compelling reasons not to return the
child home to father. See People in Interest of M.D., 2014 COA 121,
¶ 43 (“[T]he department must establish a compelling reason why it
is not in the child’s best interests to return home before the court
may award permanent custody to a nonparent.”). Specifically, the
court found that while father had made progress during the case,
he was not “fully to the place” where he could meet the child’s
needs. The court also found that the child was still working on her
relationship with father.
¶ 12 The record supports these findings, as well. The caseworker
testified that she had not been made aware that father had
completed a mental health evaluation. And, though father
completed a substance use evaluation in Texas, the caseworker
testified that there were “issues” with the evaluation because it did
not recommend treatment even though father had been diagnosed
with significant use disorder, and did not require a urinalysis test
or consider collateral information. Thus, the caseworker testified
that before considering father as a potential placement option, he
would need to complete a mental health evaluation and a
5 “legitimate substance abuse” evaluation to determine his treatment
needs.
¶ 13 Moreover, the caseworker testified that father wasn’t yet able
to parent at the time of the hearing because he was “still getting
stable himself.” She noted that father was incarcerated for five
months during the case due to charges related to substance use.
And she characterized the child’s relationship with father as
“strained,” noting that during portions of the case, the child refused
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25CA0608 Peo in Interest of LD 08-21-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0608 El Paso County District Court No. 21JV502 Honorable Robin Chittum, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of L.D., a Child,
and Concerning W.D.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Lipinsky and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 21, 2025
Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Sara Sonsalla, Assistant County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, W.D. (father)
appeals the judgment allocating parental responsibilities for L.D.
(the child) to maternal grandparents. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In June 2021, the El Paso County Department of Human
Services filed a petition in dependency and neglect concerning the
child and her sister, K.D., who is not the subject of this appeal.
The Department received reports that father had threatened to kill
himself, the child, and K.D., and later learned that father had been
placed on a mental health hold. In addition, the Department
alleged in the petition that father had a history of mental health
issues, substance abuse, and family violence.
¶3 Father moved to Texas shortly after the case opened and
remained there for the duration of the case. After father admitted
the allegations in the petition, the juvenile court adjudicated the
then eight-year-old child dependent or neglected and adopted a
treatment plan for father. Among other terms, father’s treatment
plan required him to address his mental health issues and
substance abuse. The child was placed with her maternal
grandmother and maternal grandmother’s husband (maternal
1 grandparents) in Michigan in May 2022, where she remained for the
remainder of the case.
¶4 The Department moved for an allocation of parental
responsibilities (APR) to maternal grandmother. After conducting
an evidentiary hearing in February 2025, the court granted the
motion and ordered that father would have supervised parenting
time.
¶5 Father appeals, claiming the court erred by awarding an APR
to maternal grandparents. We affirm.
II. Discussion
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶6 When allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency and
neglect proceeding, a juvenile court must consider the legislative
purposes of the Children’s Code under section 19-1-102, C.R.S.
2024. People in Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶ 18. The overriding
purpose of the Children’s Code is to protect a child’s welfare and
safety by providing procedures through which the child’s best
interests can be served. Id. at ¶ 19. Therefore, if a court allocates
parental responsibilities, it must do so in accordance with the
child’s best interests, People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208
2 (Colo. App. 2011); see § 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024, and must
focus on the protection and safety of the child and not the parents’
custodial interests. People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA 70, ¶ 13.
¶7 The allocation of parental responsibilities is a matter within
the juvenile court’s discretion. See In re Parental Responsibilities
Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A court abuses its
discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unfair, or when it misapplies or misconstrues the law. People in
Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14. The credibility of witnesses, the
sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence, as well as
the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from it, are within the
juvenile court’s discretion. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d
244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). And when the juvenile court’s findings
have record support, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding
on review. B.R.D., ¶ 15. But whether the court applied the correct
legal standard is a question of law that we review de novo. People in
Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 10.
B. Analysis
¶8 In support of his contention that the juvenile court abused its
discretion by awarding an APR to maternal grandparents, father
3 points to his progress on his treatment plan and the child’s
“expressed wishes to be returned home to [f]ather or placed with her
paternal grandmother.” We perceive no error.
¶9 The court found that maternal grandparents met all the child’s
needs, including the child’s mental health concerns. Noting the
child had “been through a lot of trauma,” the court found that
maternal grandparents provided the child with stability,
consistency, and commitment during the child’s nearly three-year
placement with them. And the court found that maternal
grandparents had also supported the child’s relationship with her
parents and K.D.
¶ 10 The record supports the court’s findings. The caseworker
testified that maternal grandparents were consistent caregivers who
met the child’s needs, and that the child had been stable during her
placement with them. For instance, the child was participating in
individual therapy at the time of the hearing. Maternal
grandparents also supported the child’s relationship with her
parents and K.D., all of whom lived outside Michigan at the time of
the APR hearing.
4 ¶ 11 The court also found compelling reasons not to return the
child home to father. See People in Interest of M.D., 2014 COA 121,
¶ 43 (“[T]he department must establish a compelling reason why it
is not in the child’s best interests to return home before the court
may award permanent custody to a nonparent.”). Specifically, the
court found that while father had made progress during the case,
he was not “fully to the place” where he could meet the child’s
needs. The court also found that the child was still working on her
relationship with father.
¶ 12 The record supports these findings, as well. The caseworker
testified that she had not been made aware that father had
completed a mental health evaluation. And, though father
completed a substance use evaluation in Texas, the caseworker
testified that there were “issues” with the evaluation because it did
not recommend treatment even though father had been diagnosed
with significant use disorder, and did not require a urinalysis test
or consider collateral information. Thus, the caseworker testified
that before considering father as a potential placement option, he
would need to complete a mental health evaluation and a
5 “legitimate substance abuse” evaluation to determine his treatment
needs.
¶ 13 Moreover, the caseworker testified that father wasn’t yet able
to parent at the time of the hearing because he was “still getting
stable himself.” She noted that father was incarcerated for five
months during the case due to charges related to substance use.
And she characterized the child’s relationship with father as
“strained,” noting that during portions of the case, the child refused
to speak with father due to her anger toward him.
¶ 14 Based on these findings, the court concluded that granting an
APR to maternal grandparents was in the child’s best interests.
And because the court rested its determination on findings that
enjoy record support, its resolution of the evidence is binding on
review. See B.R.D., ¶ 15. On this record, we perceive no abuse of
discretion. See E.B., ¶ 14.
¶ 15 Nor are we persuaded by father’s argument that the court
erred by entering the APR given his progress on his treatment plan
and the child’s wishes about placement.
¶ 16 To be sure, the court heard testimony that father made
progress during the case. The court also heard testimony that the
6 child periodically mentioned she would be willing to be placed with
father, so long as K.D. was also placed with him. But, upon
weighing all the evidence — including evidence suggesting that
father could not yet meet the child’s needs — the court determined
that returning the child home to father was not appropriate for the
reasons described above. It is exclusively within the juvenile court’s
discretion to weigh the evidence. See A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 249-50.
¶ 17 The court also considered the child’s wish, expressed to her
guardian ad litem a few days before the hearing, to be placed with
her paternal grandmother. According to the guardian ad litem (who
nonetheless supported an APR to maternal grandparents), the child
expressed this wish because maternal grandparents took away her
internet privileges for a month for not cleaning her room.
Additionally, paternal grandmother had never volunteered to the
Department to act as a placement and had not undergone a
background check or kinship study at the time of the APR hearing.
¶ 18 The court ultimately found that the child’s report about
maternal grandparents’ discipline did not raise safety concerns,
such as emotional or physical abuse. Rather, the court found that
the child’s dissatisfaction with her placement coincided with the
7 loss of her internet access, deeming this a case of the child
“pushing . . . boundaries.” Again, because the court’s findings
enjoy record support, we defer to its resolution of the evidence. See
B.R.D., ¶ 15.
¶ 19 In essence, father asks us to reweigh the evidence and to
substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court, which we
cannot do. See People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62; see
also A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 250 (“[I]t is important to defer to the
[juvenile] court . . . when it hears contradictory testimony on
material issues . . . .”).
¶ 20 Finally, to the extent that father asserts the court should have
delayed its APR ruling to allow further investigation regarding the
child’s placement preference, we are not persuaded. Based upon
the evidence, the court determined that further delaying the
resolution of the case was not in the child’s best interests. And,
indeed, the case had already been open for over three years by the
time of the APR hearing.
¶ 21 In sum, the record supports the juvenile court’s findings, and
its APR based on those findings was neither a misapplication of the
8 law nor manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Accordingly,
the court did not abuse its discretion. See E.B., ¶ 14.
III. Disposition
¶ 22 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE LUM concur.