Peo in Interest of LD

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 5, 2025
• Docket: 25CA0047
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0047 Peo in Interest of LD 06-05-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0047 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 24JV30682 Honorable Elizabeth McCarthy, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of L.D., a Child,

and Concerning M.D.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Tow and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 5, 2025

Katie McLoughlin, Acting City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Christina R. Kinsella, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Beth Padilla, Office or Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Durango, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 M.D. (father) appeals (1) the judgment adjudicating L.D. (the

child) dependent or neglected and (2) the juvenile court’s initial

dispositional order. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In July 2024, the Denver Department of Human Services

received a report that mother and father were involved in a

domestic dispute in which father hit mother and bit the child on her

arm. When mother met with a caseworker, she denied the

allegations, claiming that a three-year-old relative had bitten the

child. Following a medical examination, a doctor specializing in

child abuse determined that the child had been bitten by an adult,

not another child.

¶3 Based on this information, the Department filed a petition in

dependency or neglect. Father denied the allegations and requested

a trial. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court adjudicated the

child dependent or neglected under section 19-3-102(1)(a)-(c),

C.R.S. 2024. The court then held a contested dispositional hearing

and adopted a treatment plan for father that required, among other

things, that he address domestic violence (DV) in the home.

1 II. Scope of Expert Testimony

¶4 Father asserts that the juvenile court abused its discretion by

allowing the caseworker and a doctor to testify beyond the scope of

their expertise. We perceive no abuse of discretion.

¶5 Once a witness is qualified as an expert, “the witness’s expert

opinion testimony must still be limited to the scope of his or her

expertise.” People v. McFee, 2016 COA 97, ¶ 88. “Whether opinion

testimony is within a particular witness’s expertise generally is a

matter addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” People v.

Watson, 53 P.3d 707, 711 (Colo. App. 2001). A court abuses its

discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair, or based on an erroneous understanding of the law. People

in Interest of M.W., 2022 COA 72, ¶ 32.

¶6 To begin, we decline to address father’s assertion that the

juvenile court allowed the caseworker to testify outside the scope of

her expertise. Father hasn’t directed us to any place in the record

where he objected to the caseworker’s testimony on that basis. See

People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14 (noting that appellate

courts don’t consider issues that weren’t raised or ruled on in the

juvenile court); see also People v. Tallent, 2021 CO 68, ¶ 11 (“[A]n

2 appellate court has an independent, affirmative duty to determine

whether a claim is preserved . . . , regardless of the positions taken

by the parties.”). While our own independent review reveals that

father’s counsel objected to one question regarding domestic

violence as outside the scope of the caseworker’s expertise, the

court sustained the objection by preventing the caseworker from

giving “an opinion on domestic violence as an expert.” Father’s

counsel didn’t request further relief. Under these circumstances,

we decline to consider father’s contention that the court erred by

allowing the caseworker to testify outside the scope of her expertise.

See Settle v. Basinger, 2013 COA 18, ¶ 102.

¶7 Next, father asserts that the juvenile court abused its

discretion by allowing the doctor to testify about the bite marks on

the child’s arm, arguing that she wasn’t an expert in dentistry or

odontology. We disagree because the record shows that the doctor

didn’t testify about matters outside her area of expertise. See

Gonzales v. Windlan, 2014 COA 176, ¶ 25 (concluding that “the fact

that [the doctor] was qualified as an expert in family medicine

rather than radiology did not preclude him from testifying about

MRI reports”). For example, father objected to the county attorney’s

3 question about how much force it would take to “break the skin.”

The doctor’s answer — “the type of activity or the type of force

required to cause this type of injury would not be an activity that

would be mistaken for play or an accidental injury” — was based on

the doctor’s experience as a child abuse pediatrician and didn’t

require expertise in dentistry or odontology. Likewise, the doctor

didn’t need to be an expert in dentistry or odontology to testify that

the bite mark was likely made by an adult because “adult mouths

are consistently larger than children’s mouths.”

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶8 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by adjudicating

the child dependent or neglected because no evidence showed that

father bit the child to coerce and control mother. We disagree.

¶9 “Whether a child is dependent [or] neglected presents a mixed

question of fact and law because it requires application of

evidentiary facts to the statutory grounds.” People in Interest of

M.M., 2017 COA 144, ¶ 17. To establish that a child is dependent

or neglected, a department must prove the allegations in the

petition by a preponderance of the evidence. See § 19-3-505(1),

(7)(a), C.R.S. 2024; People in Interest of S.G.L., 214 P.3d 580, 583

4 (Colo. App. 2009). As relevant here, a child is dependent or

neglected if (1) a parent has subjected a child to mistreatment or

abuse or allowed another to mistreat or abuse the child without

taking means to stop it; (2) the child “lacks proper parental care

through the actions or omissions” of a parent; or (3) the child’s

“environment is injurious to his or her welfare.” § 19-3-102(1)(a)-

(c).

¶ 10 When determining whether the evidence is sufficient to

sustain an adjudication, we review the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prevailing party and draw every inference fairly

deducible from the evidence in support of the juvenile court’s

determination. S.G.L., 214 P.3d at 583. We won’t disturb the

court’s judgment if the evidence supports it, even though

reasonable people might reach different conclusions based on the

same facts. Id.

¶ 11 The evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing

established that the family had gone to a party at paternal

grandmother’s home. At the party, mother and father got into an

argument, causing mother to leave with the child. When father

returned home, mother and the child had gone to maternal

5 grandmother’s home. Father claimed that he didn’t know until

several days later that the child had been bitten; he was told that

one of his nephews had bitten her. Based on its investigation, the

Department believed that father had bitten the child at the party,

prompting mother’s hasty departure from the party and the couple’s

residence. However, the Department didn’t call mother or any of

the family members to testify.

¶ 12 The doctor examined the child a few days after the party. She

testified that the child’s injury was consistent with a bite, and as

noted above she didn’t believe that the injury could have been

caused by a three-year-old due to the bite mark’s size. The doctor

“made a diagnosis of child physical abuse” because the injury was

“deliberately inflicted” by an adult. She conceded, however, that

she couldn’t determine who specifically had bitten the child.

¶ 13 Based on this evidence, the juvenile court determined that the

child was dependent or neglected under section 19-3-102(1)(a)-(c).

In doing so, the court rejected father’s theory that the child was

bitten by a three-year-old and agreed with the doctor that the child

was more likely bitten by an adult. But the court stopped short of

finding that father had bitten the child, noting that, even if another

6 adult had bitten her, it could still find her dependent or neglected

under subsections (a)-(c). For example, the court found that the

evidence supported a conclusion that father had allowed another to

mistreat or abuse the child, the child lacked proper parental care

based on father’s omissions, and the child’s environment was

injurious to her welfare, “given the serious bite mark that

occurred.” See M.M., ¶ 25 (noting that the injurious environment

provision doesn’t require a finding that the parent caused the

injurious environment).

¶ 14 After viewing the evidence described above in the light most

favorable to the Department and drawing every inference fairly

deducible from the evidence in favor of the juvenile court’s

determination, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to

support an adjudication under section 19-3-102(1)(a)-(c). See

S.G.L., 214 P.3d at 583; see also People in Interest of B.W., 626 P.2d

742, 743 (Colo. App. 1981) (When a court’s decision “is based on

conflicting evidence,” the court doesn’t err.).

¶ 15 Father also asserts that the adjudication should be reversed

because no evidence showed that he had bitten the child “as an act

of ‘coercion and control’ over mother.” But nothing in the language

7 of section 19-3-102(1)(a)-(c) required the juvenile court to make a

finding that father had bitten the child as an act of coercion and

control. And in any event, the court didn’t find that the child was

dependent or neglected on that basis. Rather, the court’s findings,

as described above, comport with the statutory criteria in section

19-3-102(1)(a)-(c), and the evidence supported those findings. We

therefore discern no error in the court’s adjudication judgment.

IV. Treatment Plan

¶ 16 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by adopting a

treatment plan that required him to participate in a DV evaluation

and treatment. We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 17 The juvenile court has discretion to formulate an appropriate

treatment plan for a parent. People in Interest of C.L.S., 934 P.2d

851, 855 (Colo. App. 1996). “In determining whether a treatment

plan is appropriate, the court must consider whether the plan’s

objectives adequately address the safety concerns identified during

the assessment of the family.” People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA

21, ¶ 14. And because the purpose of a treatment plan is to

address the barriers to reunifying families, it may include issues

that weren’t the basis for the adjudication judgment. M.W., ¶ 43.

8 Generally, a court may require treatment “when it is warranted by

the record before the court.” People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA

57M, ¶ 51.

¶ 18 After hearing the evidence at the dispositional hearing, the

juvenile court adopted the proposed DV component, which

required, among other things, that father “complete a domestic

violence evaluation” and “domestic violence treatment.” The court

found that the evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing

established that the parents had a “conflict” and father had bitten

the child. The court also determined that the “injury proven at the

[c]ourt trial was an act of domestic violence” perpetrated by father.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the DV component was

“essential” to “address the power and control dynamics in this

case.”

¶ 19 Because the record supports the juvenile court’s decision to

impose a DV component, we reject father’s assertion. See id. As

noted, the evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing

established that the parents had a dispute that resulted in the child

being bitten. The caseworker testified, for example, that the

Department had received a report that the parents had been

9 involved in a DV incident that became physical and resulted in

father biting the child. Although the court didn’t make a finding at

the adjudicatory hearing that father had bitten the child, we aren’t

aware of any authority that prevented the court from making that

finding at the dispositional hearing.

¶ 20 The caseworker also testified at the dispositional hearing

about her experience with DV in previous dependency or neglect

cases and noted the similarities between those cases and the

current case, which involved, for example, isolation of mother from

her family.

¶ 21 We reject father’s other assertions as follows:

 Father’s reliance on People in Interest of E.S., 2021 COA

79, is misplaced because that case doesn’t require that

the other parent report DV for a juvenile court to include

a DV component in the treatment plan. Rather, E.S.

concludes that a court can impose a DV component if the

record supports it. See id. at ¶ 36.

 Nor does L.M. help father. In that case, a division of this

court determined that the juvenile court couldn’t impose

a sex offense evaluation and treatment where father was

10 acquitted in a criminal case involving an alleged sexual

offense and continued to deny the allegations. See L.M.,

¶ 52. L.M. is distinguishable because father wasn’t

charged with a crime, but the juvenile court found, with

record support, that he had committed DV. See id. at

¶ 51 (“[A] juvenile court may require such treatment

when it is warranted by the record before the court.”).

 Contrary to father’s argument, the treatment plan didn’t

require him to engage in Domestic Violence Offender

Management Board (DVOMB) treatment. See § 16-11.8-

103, C.R.S. 2024 (creating the DVOMB). Therefore,

father’s argument that he can’t be required to engage in

DVOMB treatment necessarily fails.

V. Disposition

¶ 22 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE YUN concur.