Peo in Interest of LAB

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 10, 2025
• Docket: 24CA2225
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA2225 Peo in Interest of LAB 07-10-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2225 Montrose County District Court No. 20JV99 Honorable D. Cory Jackson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of L.A.B., a Child,

and Concerning T.R.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE BROWN Dunn and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 10, 2025

Julie R. Andress, County Attorney, Montrose, Colorado, for Appellee

Robert G. Tweedell, Counsel for Youth, Delta, Colorado, for L.A.B.

Ainsley Bochniak, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, T.R. (mother)

appeals the judgment allocating parental responsibilities of L.A.B.

(the child) to T.B. (father). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Montrose County Department of Health and Human

Services opened this case because the child’s paternal

grandmother, who was the child’s guardian, was killed and no other

family members were available to care for the child. The

Department alleged that it was trying to secure a psychiatric

placement for the eleven-year-old child so he could receive

treatment. The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and

neglected and adopted treatment plans for the parents. Father was

incarcerated when the case opened but was released from prison

four months later.

¶3 Shortly after the case opened, the child was detained at Grand

Mesa Youth Services Center (GMYS) in connection with a juvenile

delinquency case based on his alleged involvement in his

grandmother’s death. Early in his detention, the child was deemed

incompetent but had to wait until he turned twelve to be

transferred to the Colorado Mental Health Hospital in Pueblo to

1 receive competency restoration services there. After his competency

was restored, he was transferred back to GMYS. The child later

pleaded guilty to manslaughter in connection with his

grandmother’s death and served a one-year sentence at GMYS.

¶4 While the child was detained, he had telephone and virtual

visits with both parents, although mother’s visits had to be

supervised and were suspended on more than one occasion based

on concerns about her inappropriate behavior. About three and a

half years after the case opened, the child was released from GMYS

into father’s care. When that happened, the child refused further

visits with mother.

¶5 The Department moved for an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR) to father, which father and the child’s Counsel

for Youth supported. Mother, who opposed the Department’s

proposed APR, did not appear at the APR hearing, and the court

denied her counsel’s motion to continue. Following the evidentiary

hearing, the court granted an APR to father and ordered that

mother have supervised family time “with times to be arranged

between the parties and [the child].”

2 II. Motion to Continue

¶6 Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion

by denying her motion to continue.1 We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 The Colorado Children’s Code directs courts to “proceed with

all possible speed to a legal determination that will serve the best

interests of the child.” § 19-1-102(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024. Thus, when

ruling on a motion to continue, the court should balance the need

for orderly and expeditious administration of justice against the

facts underlying the motion and the child’s need for permanency.

People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 11.

¶8 We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a motion to continue

for an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 13. A court abuses its discretion

when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or

when it misapplies or misconstrues the law. People in Interest of

1 Although mother asserts that she was denied due process in her

statement of the issues presented and in the argument header for this section of her brief, she develops no such argument. We decline to address this issue further. See People in Interest of D.B- J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to address an appellate argument presented without supporting facts, specific argument, or supporting authorities).

3 E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14. “The totality of the circumstances is

relevant when determining whether the trial court committed an

abuse of discretion by denying a continuance.” Id. (quoting People

in Interest of D.J.P., 785 P.2d 129, 131 (Colo. 1990)).

B. Additional Background

¶9 Mother moved to appear by Webex at the APR hearing nearly a

month in advance. In that motion, her counsel indicated he

“desire[d] to make arrangements” for her to appear by Webex at his

office, which was much closer to her residence than the courthouse.

The court granted her request.

¶ 10 When mother did not appear at the hearing, the court noted,

“we had some others that were on the phone. I don’t know if

[mother] was previously on the phone. She may have dropped off.”

Mother’s counsel indicated that mother’s phone had been turned off

the last several days, that he had hoped she would come to his

office and appear by Webex or phone, and that he did not know if

she was one of the individuals in the Webex waiting room. Her

counsel then requested a continuance.

¶ 11 The court denied the request, noting that it “would not find”

such a continuance to be in the child’s best interests. The court

4 expressed concern that mother may not be able to appear at a

continued hearing. It reasoned that (according to her counsel)

mother had an opportunity to appear from counsel’s office. And it

noted that there were ways parties may appear that do not involve a

phone, such as Webex.

C. Analysis

¶ 12 On this record, we discern no abuse of discretion. The court’s

ruling reflects that it properly weighed the need for an expeditious

resolution of the proceedings against counsel’s suggested reason for

the continuance and the child’s need for permanency. See R.J.B.,

¶ 11. By the time of the APR hearing, the case had been open

nearly four years, and the court was concerned about mother’s

ability to appear in the future if it continued the hearing.

¶ 13 Still, mother asserts that the parties knew it would be difficult

for her to participate in the hearing without a reliable phone. But

the court had granted her request to appear by Webex, and her

counsel indicated his intent to have her appear by Webex at his

office. Mother does not explain on appeal, nor did she explain to

the juvenile court, how having an unreliable phone impacted her

5 ability to attend the APR hearing by Webex at her counsel’s office or

otherwise.

¶ 14 Notably, mother does not articulate any harm resulting from

the court not continuing the APR hearing. Although mother argues

that “it would have been in the child’s best interests for the court to

hear from [her] directly about her position regarding the APR order,”

she does not explain what her position would have been had she

been present to testify. See E.B., ¶ 22 (“Father failed to make any

offer of proof indicating how he would have testified or what other

evidence he would have offered had he been present, so ‘we are

unable to discern that the termination proceedings would have been

affected in any appreciable way’ by his testimony.” (quoting People

in Interest of C.G., 885 P.2d 355, 358 (Colo. App. 1994))).

Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion

by denying mother’s continuance motion.

6 III. Allocation of Parental Responsibilities

¶ 15 Mother next contends that the court abused its discretion by

allocating parental responsibilities to father.2 We disagree.

¶ 16 When allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency and

neglect proceeding, the court must consider the legislative purposes

of the Children’s Code under section 19-1-102, C.R.S. 2024. People

in Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶ 18. The overriding purpose of

the Children’s Code is to protect a child’s welfare and safety by

providing procedures through which the child’s best interests can

be served. Id. at ¶ 19. Therefore, the court must allocate parental

responsibilities in accordance with the child’s best interests. People

in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011); see

§ 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024. While the court may consider the

factors listed in the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, section

14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2024, the focus must be on the protection

2 In her statement of the issues presented, argument summary, and

argument header for this section of her brief, mother also asserts that the court erroneously granted father and the child discretion to determine when mother’s family time would occur. Again, because mother fails to develop this argument, we decline to address it. See D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 531.

7 and safety of the child and not the parents’ custodial interests.

People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA 70, ¶ 13.

¶ 17 The allocation of parental responsibilities is a matter within

the juvenile court’s discretion. See In re Parental Responsibilities

Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. The credibility of witnesses,

the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence, as well

as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from it, are within

the juvenile court’s discretion. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d

244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). And when the juvenile court’s findings

have record support, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding

on review. B.R.D., ¶ 15. But whether the court applied the correct

legal standard in making its findings is a question of law that we

review de novo. People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 10.

B. Analysis

¶ 18 Mother contends that the court abused its discretion by

allocating parental responsibilities to father, primarily because he

was a registered sex offender. We are not persuaded.

¶ 19 The court allocated to father sole decision-making

responsibility and all family time, except for mother’s supervised

visits, which were to occur at times arranged by the parties and the

8 child. The court found that the child was doing well in father’s

care. It found that mother was resistant to family time and, at the

time of the hearing, the child was unwilling to participate in family

time with her. And it found that a “safety concern” existed related

to the potentially disruptive nature of mother’s visits.

¶ 20 The record evidence supports these findings:

• The caseworker, whose testimony the court found credible,

opined that father complied with his treatment plan and

that the child was safe and doing well in father’s care.

• Mother’s visits were sporadic due to being missed or

suspended by GMYS.

• The caseworker observed “various concerns” during

mother’s visits, such as hearing “snorting in the bathroom

during a visit.”

• The caseworker opined that the child was having

“significant behavioral issues after visits and related to

visits” with mother and testified that the child refused

further visits with her upon his release from GMYS.

• The caseworker opined that mother had not complied with

her treatment plan.

9 • When outlining why she believed father should be granted

an APR and mother should be granted only supervised

family time, the caseworker cited, among other concerns,

mother’s “history of contact” with the child, “instability,”

and “drug abuse and how that affects . . . the safety of [the

child].”

¶ 21 Because the court rested its determination on findings that

enjoy record support, its resolution of the evidence is binding on

review. See B.R.D., ¶ 15. The court concluded that granting an

APR primarily to father was in the child’s best interests. On this

record, we perceive no abuse of discretion. See E.B., ¶ 14.

¶ 22 Still, mother contends that the court erred by entering the APR

because father was a registered sex offender who “could relapse at

any time.” But to support this contention, she relies on testimony

from a hearing other than the APR hearing, which we do not

consider. See Boulder Plaza Residential, LLC v. Summit Flooring,

LLC, 198 P.3d 1217, 1222 (Colo. App. 2008) (an appellate court will

not consider evidence that a party failed to introduce at trial). She

also claims that her involvement in the child’s upbringing

“protected him from future neglect by his father” but provides no

10 record citation to, nor can we locate, any such evidence. See id; see

also In re Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1223 (Colo. App.

2006) (“Only facts appearing in the record can be reviewed [by an

appellate court] . . . .”).

¶ 23 True, the court found that the child’s and father’s

“extraordinary” progress during the case was “somewhat delicate.”

But through the findings that followed, including its finding that

mother’s family time presented a safety concern for the child, the

court appeared concerned that unsupervised family time with

mother could disrupt the child’s and father’s progress. In any

event, mother’s contention — essentially that father “could relapse”

and therefore should not be granted an APR — asks us to reweigh

the evidence, which we cannot do. See People in Interest of K.L.W.,

2021 COA 56, ¶ 62 (we cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute

our judgment for that of the juvenile court); A.J.L., 243 P.3d at

249-50 (“[I]t is important to defer to the [juvenile] court, particularly

when it hears contradictory testimony on material issues . . . .”).

¶ 24 In sum, the record supports the juvenile court’s findings, and

its APR based on those findings was neither a misapplication of the

11 law nor manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Accordingly,

the court did not abuse its discretion. See E.B., ¶ 14; B.R.D., ¶ 15.

IV. Disposition

¶ 25 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.