Peo in Interest of JMQ

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 27, 2025
• Docket: 24CA0913
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0913 Peo in Interest of JMQ 02-27-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0913 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 22JV346 Honorable Laurie A. Clark, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of J.M.Q. and G.Q., Children,

and Concerning J.L.M. and K.J.Q.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Tow and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 27, 2025

Kerry Tipper, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Beth Padilla, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Durango, Colorado, for Appellant J.L.M.

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant K.J.Q. ¶1 J.L.M. (mother) and K.J.Q. (father) appeal the juvenile court’s

judgment terminating their parent-child legal relationships with

J.M.Q. and G.Q. (the children). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 This case has a long history beginning in 2016 when the

Adams County Department of Human Services (Adams County)

opened a voluntary case — involving the children and two older

siblings — to address concerns about medical neglect and domestic

violence in the home. When the parents did not comply with the

treatment plans adopted in their voluntary case, the court removed

then-two-year-old J.M.Q. and then-one-year-old G.Q. from the

home.1

¶3 In 2017, the juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent

or neglected and adopted treatment plans for the parents that

required, among other things, that they engage in substance abuse

evaluations and treatment. In 2018, the court returned the

children to the parents’ care only to remove them again in 2019

1 Parental responsibilities for the older two siblings were allocated to

their maternal aunt and uncle with the parents receiving no family time. That allocation is not before us.

1 after it found that the children had suffered medical neglect and

that there were concerns about the parents’ drug use.

¶4 In 2020, Adams County moved to terminate the parents’

parental rights. After several days of testimony, the juvenile court

judge recused herself and vacated the hearing.

¶5 In March 2021, the parents had another child, N.Q. Instead of

resetting the termination hearing with respect to the children, after

N.Q.’s birth, the court returned J.M.Q. and G.Q. to the parents’

care in December 2021. But four months later, the court removed

the children — along with N.Q. — again because of the parents’

disengagement with their treatment plans and their suspected drug

use.

¶6 In October 2022, venue changed from Adams County to

Denver County because the Denver Department of Human Services

(the Department) had filed a companion dependency and neglect

case concerning N.Q. The juvenile court placed the children in

foster care but allowed N.Q. to return to the parents’ care.2

2 N.Q.’s companion case is not before us.

2 ¶7 The court adopted amended treatment plans for mother and

father in December 2022. Mother’s treatment plan required her to

(1) manage her mental health issues and continue mental health

therapy; (2) engage in drug and alcohol testing, remain sober, and

talk with her mental health therapist about how her drug use

impacted her parenting; (3) engage in family time; and (4) seek out

supports through a domestic violence agency. Father’s treatment

plan required him to (1) complete a mental health evaluation and

comply with any recommendations; (2) engage in drug and alcohol

testing and remain sober; (3) participate in the Caring Dads

Program; (4) engage in family time; and (5) complete a domestic

violence evaluation and comply with any recommended treatment.

¶8 In October 2023, the Department moved to terminate mother’s

and father’s parental rights. After a multiday hearing, the court

granted the motion.

II. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978

¶9 Mother and father state that it’s not clear whether the

Department complied with the due diligence requirements of the

Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963.

But neither contend that the juvenile court erred by finding that

3 ICWA did not apply. Nor do they argue that ICWA does apply.

Without any argument that the juvenile court erred, the parents

haven’t developed a viable claim for appellate consideration. See

Middlemist v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 958 P.2d 486, 495 (Colo. App.

1997) (Certain claims were not properly presented for appeal when

the appellant had “fail[ed] to identify any specific errors committed

by the trial court . . . and provide[d] no legal authority to support an

allegation that the trial court erred in making its rulings.”).

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 10 Each parent contends that the juvenile court erred by finding

that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate them

and reunify their family. We aren’t convinced.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 11 Before the juvenile court may terminate parental rights under

section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024, a department must make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.

See §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h),

C.R.S. 2024. “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence

and care” for a child who is in out-of-home placement. § 19-1-

103(114).

4 ¶ 12 Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy

the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114); see also People in

Interest of E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 19. Among the services required

under section 19-3-208 are screenings, assessments, and

individual case plans for the provision of services; home-based

family and crisis counseling; information and referral services to

available public and private assistance resources; family time

services; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b).

¶ 13 When evaluating a department’s efforts, the juvenile court

should consider whether the services provided were appropriate to

support the parent’s treatment plan. People in Interest of S.N-V.,

300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). But the parent is ultimately

responsible for using those services to obtain the assistance needed

to comply with the treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259

P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011). And the court may consider a

parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment in determining

whether the department made reasonable efforts. People in Interest

of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

5 B. Standard of Review

¶ 14 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves the

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile

court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data

underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they

have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,

¶ 10. But we review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions

based on those facts. Id. In particular, the ultimate determination

of whether a department provided reasonable efforts is a legal

conclusion we review de novo. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022

COA 146, ¶ 8.

C. Reasonable Efforts to Rehabilitate Mother

¶ 15 The juvenile court determined that the Department made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and “consistently

reassessed the services offered, and the services needed to” reunify

the family, resulting in multiple amendments to her treatment plan.

The court acknowledged that mother at times engaged with the

services but other times “resisted engagement” and that the

6 Department made new referrals to assist mother when needed,

including, for example, “[m]ultiple types of therapy [and] modalities

of therapy, as well as different types of parenting support.” The

court determined that these efforts were unsuccessful “through no

fault of the Department.” The record supports this determination.

¶ 16 All three caseworkers who worked with the family over the

course of this case testified to mother’s pattern of initially engaging

with her treatment plan and then disengaging once the children

returned to her care. They each described mother’s inconsistent

compliance with her treatment plan, including lapses of substance

use and the lack of substance abuse monitoring, and her inability

to maintain her mental health and sobriety while parenting.

¶ 17 The most recent caseworker to work with the family opined

that mother would not be able to “handle [the children’s] behavioral

as well as emotional needs” and that, if they were placed back in

the home, “we would go through the same cycle,” which would “be

detrimental for [the children’s] emotional well-being.” And despite

the years of services and intervention provided to mother, the

caseworker opined that mother had not changed her behavior and

had not “successfully completed her treatment plan.”

7 ¶ 18 Still, mother asserts that, notwithstanding the breadth and

duration of offered services, the Department did not make

reasonable efforts because it did not provide family therapy “as

recommended by its own expert.” The record shows, however, that

attempts were made to provide family therapy in August 2022, but

the parents declined because they felt an additional service would

be a stressor. The Department again placed a family therapy

referral in June 2023, but the provider could not reach the parents

to start the service. And a new referral was not made because both

children’s therapists thought it would be detrimental to them.

¶ 19 Mother also contends the Department failed to provide child-

protective psychotherapy (CPT) as recommended by a departmental

expert. While we acknowledge the Department didn’t put in a

referral for this therapy, the Department has “discretion to prioritize

certain services or resources to address a family’s most pressing

needs in a way that will assist the family’s overall completion of the

treatment plan.” People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO

35, ¶ 33; see also S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915. And, again, the record

here supports the court’s finding that the Department “consistently

re-assessed the services offered and the services needed . . . to

8 reunify this family.” It was mother’s lack of consistent

engagement — and not the Department’s lack of efforts or the

specific lack of CPT — that prevented mother’s rehabilitation.

¶ 20 Given the totality of the services provided to mother, we can’t

conclude that the juvenile court erred by determining that the

Department provided reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and

reunify the family.

D. Reasonable Efforts to Rehabilitate Father

¶ 21 The record also supports the juvenile court’s determination

that the Department provided reasonable efforts to rehabilitate

father, including “referrals for services to address substance abuse

and mental health.”

¶ 22 The evidence shows the Department provided multiple

referrals to address father’s mental health and substance abuse

needs but that father’s engagement was inconsistent. He struggled

with relapses and maintaining sobriety throughout the case. His

most recent caseworker testified that as recently as 2023, the

Department had referred father for substance abuse and mental

health treatment, but father missed four individual therapy

sessions and twenty-five group therapy sessions. At the

9 termination hearing, father admitted he was an addict and was not

currently in recovery. And, despite intensive family time and

parenting services, father’s progress was inconsistent, and he still

required supervised family time in 2023. Finally, although the

Department referred father for domestic violence treatment, and

father participated in a class, he did not complete a domestic

violence evaluation as required by his treatment plan.

¶ 23 We are unpersuaded by father’s contentions that (1) the

caseworker did not maintain contact; (2) family time services were

delayed; (3) visits were not moved to his home; (4) he did not receive

in-home services; (5) he should have had life adaptive skills

training; and (6) the Department was required to offer different

services than Adams County had already provided. As to these

specific points, the most recent caseworker testified as follows:

• She made several attempts every month to call father, and she

also offered to meet at his workplace, but father did not

provide his location.

• Family time services were not delayed due to a lack of

referrals; rather, father did not follow up on opportunities to

visit during those times of delay.

10 • She tried to assess the safety of father’s home for visits in the

months leading up to the termination, but despite efforts to do

so, she could not reach father at home or at work.

• Adams County put in place in-home services to help the

parents respond to the children’s “high energy.” The services

began in January 2022. But within a few months, the

parents’ engagement in those services started to decline.

• The Department again made referrals for in-home services to

assist the parents with managing the children’s behaviors

from December 2022 until June 2023. The services ended

because the parents reported the services were no longer

beneficial.

• A life skills worker was referred to the family in 2017 and

again in 2022.

• The Department “implemented different services” than Adams

County.

¶ 24 To the extent that father points to evidence which supports

other inferences, it is the role of the juvenile court to weigh

conflicting testimony and determine credibility. See People in

Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 41.

11 ¶ 25 Finally, father claims that the Department did not “make a

case management approach,” but he doesn’t develop or explain this

argument. We therefore decline to address it. See Antolovich v.

Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d 582, 604 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 26 We agree with the juvenile court that the Department made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father.

IV. Fitness

¶ 27 Mother also asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding her

unfit and that termination was in the children’s best interests. We

disagree.

¶ 28 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the

parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.

S.K., ¶ 74. Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that

the parent provides nurturing and safe parenting sufficient to meet

the child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs and conditions.

Id. In considering a parent’s fitness, the court must consider the

factors listed in section 19-3-604(2), including whether

“[r]easonable efforts by child-caring agencies . . . have been unable

to rehabilitate the parent or parents” and whether “on two or more

occasions, a child in the physical custody of the parent has been

12 adjudicated dependent or neglected.” § 19-3-604(2)(h), (l); see also

People in Interest of M.H., 10 P.3d 713, 715 (Colo. App. 2000)

(considering some, but not all, of the statutory factors in

determining whether the court’s unfitness finding was supported).

¶ 29 The juvenile court found that, despite the Department’s

reasonable efforts, mother could not demonstrate the ability to meet

the children’s physical, mental, and emotional needs. See § 19-3-

604(2)(h). The court also considered the fact that, on two or more

occasions, a child in the physical custody of mother had been

adjudicated dependent or neglected. See § 19-3-604(2)(i).

¶ 30 The record supports the court’s findings. Testimony was

presented that several children in mother’s care had been

adjudicated dependent or neglected on different occasions. And

even though mother had made some progress on her treatment

plan, her progress was inconsistent and ultimately not sufficient to

rehabilitate her. The most recent caseworker testified that, at the

time of termination, despite the Department’s efforts, mother was

not able to meet the children’s needs, specifically their need for

emotional well-being. And she explained that, given mother’s past

inconsistency, the Department could not “guarantee a removal not

13 happening again,” which “would be a fourth removal for [the

children]” and “could be detrimental for [them].”

¶ 31 An expert in clinical psychology who evaluated mother opined

that mother struggled to maintain psychological stability and had

experienced domestic violence “against the backdrop of

longstanding substance abuse and with multiple relapses.” He

testified that he observed mother having “positive, but not

necessarily healthy interactions with [the children].” And he gauged

mother’s prognosis for successful parenting to be “guarded to poor

overall” because of her “longstanding dysfunction.”

¶ 32 We therefore disagree with mother that that the juvenile court

based its fitness determination on the “speculative conclusion” that

mother would continue to manifest a pattern of being unable to be

protective of the children’s well-being.

¶ 33 The record also supports the juvenile court’s finding that

termination was in the children’s best interests. The family’s most

recent caseworker testified that termination was in the children’s

best interest, opining that mother “exhibited patterns of engaging in

treatment and not engaging in treatment, [she had] not successfully

been in compliance the entirety of this case,” and “[the children]

14 deserve[d] permanency after seven years of [the case] being open.”

And the clinical psychology expert opined that long-term

impermanency creates “stress and strain” on children, making it

more complicated for them to develop a sense of self and capacity.3

¶ 34 Given the record support for the juvenile court’s findings that

mother was unfit and that termination was in the children’s best

interest, we will not disturb them.

V. Father’s New Claims on Appeal

¶ 35 Father asserts that the juvenile court and the Department

failed to provide him with reasonable accommodations for his

disability as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

(ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, violating his constitutional equal

protection and procedural due process rights.

¶ 36 Whether a person is a qualified individual with a disability

under the ADA requires a case-by-case determination. S.K., ¶ 21.

If a parent’s disability status is disputed, the juvenile court must

3 We do not consider father’s separate contention that the court

erred by finding mother unfit because he lacks standing to raise it. See People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 61 (one parent does not have standing to raise issues regarding the propriety of termination of the other parent’s rights).

15 first make a finding about whether the parent has a disability

before it requires the department to provide the parent with

reasonable accommodations. See id. at ¶ 21 n.2. Under the ADA, a

disability includes “a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities” of the person.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).

¶ 37 A parent is responsible for disclosing to the department and

the juvenile court information regarding a disability and any

accommodations that are needed to address the disability. S.K.,

¶ 21. A party ideally should raise an ADA issue before the court

adopts a treatment plan and enters a dispositional order so that the

department can include any requested accommodations in a

proposed treatment plan for the court’s approval. People in Interest

of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 16.

¶ 38 As we understand it, father now claims that he was sober at

the time of the termination hearing and, given his substance use

disorder, he had a protected disability under the ADA. Though he

concedes he never raised this issue before the juvenile court, he

urges us to address his unpreserved contention to avoid a

miscarriage of justice. We decline to do that because we would

16 have to make factual findings about whether father had a “qualified

disability” under the ADA, what reasonable accommodations he was

entitled to, and whether the Department provided those

accommodations. But we “don’t (and, indeed, can’t) make findings

of fact.” Carousel Farms Metro. Dist. v. Woodcrest Homes, Inc., 2019

CO 51, ¶ 19; see also S.Z.S., ¶ 21 (“[B]ecause mother never raised

the ADA issue . . . either before or during the termination hearing,

the juvenile court didn’t make any specific findings about the

applicability of the ADA for us to review.”).

¶ 39 Thus, we will not consider father’s unpreserved ADA and

related due process and equal protection claims. See People in

Interest of E.D., 2025 COA 11, ¶ 66 n.3 (declining to address an

issue not raised before the juvenile court for the first time on

appeal).

VI. Disposition

¶ 40 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.