Peo in Interest of JG

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 5, 2026
• Docket: 25CA1843
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1843 Peo in Interest of JG 03-05-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1843 Douglas County District Court No. 21JV160 Honorable Ryan J. Stuart, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of J.G., a Child,

and Concerning K.G.,

Appellant,

and

J.G.,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Fox and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 5, 2026

Jeffrey A. Garcia, County Attorney, Erinn E. Walz, Assistant County Attorney, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Appellee The People of the State of Colorado

Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem

Genevieve Manco, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Thornton, Colorado, for Appellant Joel M. Pratt, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee J.G. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, K.G. (mother)

appeals the portion of the juvenile court’s judgment allocating

parental responsibilities for five-year-old J.G. (the child) and

awarding sole residential custody to J.G. (father). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In October 2021, the Douglas County Department of Human

Services (the Department) filed a petition in dependency and neglect

based on concerns that the child had been abandoned by father

and was exposed to domestic violence and substance use in

mother’s care. A magistrate granted temporary legal custody of the

child to kin-like placements with the Department’s protective

supervision.

¶3 Mother admitted the petition, and the magistrate adjudicated

the child dependent and neglected. The magistrate adopted a

treatment plan for mother.

¶4 Father, who lives in Michigan, didn’t initially have contact with

mother or the child. But a month after the Department filed the

petition, father requested that the child be placed with his relative.

Later, the court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected with

1 regard to father and ordered a treatment plan for him. A year later,

father requested placement of the child with him in Michigan.

¶5 In August 2023, the Department moved to terminate mother’s

and father’s parent-child legal relationships with the child. The

court granted the Department’s request for a continuance to

consider father’s request for placement of the child in Michigan and

to reevaluate the child’s kin-like placement. In the meantime, the

court granted father’s request to allow the child to travel to

Michigan for a thirty-day visit. After holding a contested placement

hearing, the court granted the Department legal custody of the

child; the Department allowed her to remain with father. The

termination hearing was then vacated.

¶6 In August 2024, father moved for an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR). After several continuances, the court held an

APR hearing and allocated parental responsibilities. The court

awarded father sole residential custody and sole decision-making

responsibility. The court allocated mother virtual parenting time

twice per week and four hours of supervised in-person parenting

time.

2 II. Due Process

¶7 Mother argues that the juvenile court violated her due process

rights in several ways by denying her request for a continuance and

proceeding to award sole residential custody of the child to father

without her appearance or testimony.

A. Mother Had Notice

¶8 First, mother argues that the juvenile court violated her right

to procedural due process when it allegedly failed to notify her of

the APR hearing. But the record shows that mother was present

when the court continued the APR hearing to the new date.

Moreover, the court’s written order from that hearing included an

admonishment that the parties should participate in person in the

half-day contested APR hearing on the new date. Mother doesn’t

provide an explanation — nor are we aware of any — for why this

doesn’t constitute adequate notice.

B. Unpreserved Claim

¶9 Second, mother raises an as-applied substantive due process

claim, arguing that the juvenile court erred by holding the APR

hearing without her. Awarding father sole residential custody

under these circumstances, she argues, caused her actual prejudice

3 by denying her the opportunity to parent the child. We decline to

address this issue because mother failed to raise it before the

juvenile court.

¶ 10 While divisions of this court are divided on addressing

unpreserved constitutional arguments in dependency and neglect

cases, see People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 34, the general

rule in civil cases is that parties may not raise for the first time on

appeal “[a]rguments never presented to, considered by, or ruled

upon by a [district] court,” Colo. Div. of Ins. v. Statewide Bonding,

Inc., 2022 COA 67, ¶ 73. And while we don’t require talismanic

language to preserve an issue, a party must have presented the

“sum and substance” of the argument to the district court.

Madalena v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2023 COA 32, ¶ 50 (citation

omitted).

¶ 11 The sum and substance of mother’s argument on appeal —

that the juvenile court denied her due process and violated her

“fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of

[her] child” by denying her motion for a continuance and proceeding

with the APR hearing in her absence — wasn’t presented to the

juvenile court. Mother’s references to her trial counsel’s

4 explanation that mother “really wanted to be present at the

hearing,” and that counsel “not[ed] the seriousness of [the]

hearing,” were insufficient to place the juvenile court on notice that

mother’s counsel was asserting a constitutional claim. See Fisher v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2015 COA 57, ¶ 44 & n.3 (holding

as-applied constitutional claim wasn’t preserved for appeal because

appellant’s argument to the district court didn’t raise a

constitutional issue), aff’d, 2018 CO 39.

¶ 12 Moreover, while mother argues that she was “substantially

prejudiced” by the child’s placement, she doesn’t argue that this

prejudice amounted to a miscarriage of justice that requires review

of her unpreserved claim. See People in Interest of A.E., 914 P.2d

534, 539 (Colo. App. 1996) (In some “limited situations[,]” “an error

by the trial court, not otherwise properly preserved for appeal,

should be characterized as fundamental or one causing a

miscarriage of justice, thereby allowing us to consider it on

appeal.”).

¶ 13 We also can’t say that the juvenile court’s alleged error

constituted a miscarriage of justice. Mother cites Santosky v.

Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982), a case involving the termination

5 of parental rights, to argue that she needed to be present at the APR

hearing to prevent “the irretrievable destruction of [her] family life.”

We disagree with mother that this case “posed a similar destruction

of [m]other’s family life” as discussed in Santosky. While the child’s

out-of-state placement undoubtedly made exercising her parenting

time more challenging, mother’s “fundamental liberty interest[]” “in

the care, custody, and control of [her] child[]” — the liberty interest

articulated in Troxel v. Granville that is protected by substantive

due process — wasn’t at risk. 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). In this APR

proceeding, mother’s parental rights weren’t terminated. See L.L. v.

People, 10 P.3d 1271, 1276-78 (Colo. 2000) (recognizing that when

the termination of parental rights isn’t being pursued, the parent is

afforded lesser due process protections); People in Interest of L.B.,

254 P.3d 1203, 1206 (Colo. App. 2011) (same). Thus, we need not

take up mother’s unpreserved claim to prevent a “miscarriage of

justice.” M.B., ¶ 33 (citation omitted).

III. Motion to Continue

¶ 14 To the extent that mother argues that the juvenile court

abused its discretion by denying the motion to continue, we aren’t

persuaded.

6 A. Relevant Law and Standard of Review

¶ 15 The Colorado Children’s Code directs courts to “proceed with

all possible speed to a legal determination that will serve the best

interests of the child.” § 19-1-102(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025. Thus, when

ruling on a motion to continue, the juvenile court “should balance

the need for orderly and expeditious administration of justice

against the facts underlying the motion and the child’s need for

permanency.” People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 11.

¶ 16 We review a juvenile court’s denial of a motion to continue for

an abuse of discretion. People in Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14.

A court abuses its discretion “when its decision is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies or

misconstrues the law.” Id. “The totality of the circumstances is

relevant when determining whether the trial court committed an

abuse of discretion by denying a continuance.” Id. (citation

B. Analysis

¶ 17 We understand mother to argue that the juvenile court relied

on evidence not supported by the record — that mother had “a

pattern” of failing to appear in court — when it denied her

7 continuance motion. Mother misstates the court’s findings. The

court found, after reviewing mother’s court file, that mother had

exhibited “a pattern . . . not necessarily in court, but throughout the

treatment plan, [of] not showing up to things.” (Emphasis added.)

The record supports these findings. In the years leading up to the

APR hearing, mother left treatment against medical advice, was

inconsistent with her urinalysis testing, missed parenting time with

the child, and didn’t attend meetings with the case professionals.

¶ 18 To the extent that mother argues that the court didn’t credit

her appropriately for appearing at prior hearings, we disagree. The

court specifically noted that its finding of a pattern by mother of

“not showing up to things” did not necessarily include her

appearances in court. To the extent mother would like us to fault

the court for not weighing mother’s court appearances more

favorably, we can’t do so. See People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021

COA 56, ¶ 62 (“[I]t is not our role to reweigh the evidence or

substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court.”). Because

the court made its finding with record support, we perceive no

abuse of discretion.

8 ¶ 19 Mother also argues that the juvenile court failed to conduct

the proper balancing test before denying her motion to continue.

Again, we disagree. The court heard an objection from the child’s

guardian ad litem, who noted the previous delays in the case and

that the child “deserved permanency.” See In re Marriage of Udis,

780 P.2d 499, 504 (Colo. 1989) (appellate court may presume that

the district court considered all the evidence and argument

presented, even if the order doesn’t expressly recite such evidence).

The court also explicitly considered that the case had already been

continued at mother’s request at the last hearing — a finding that

enjoys record support. Most important, the court considered the

child’s best interests. See § 19-1-102(1)(c).

¶ 20 Given this record showing that the court balanced the “need

for orderly and expeditious administration of justice against the

facts underlying the motion and the child’s need for permanency,”

R.J.B., ¶ 11, we perceive no abuse of discretion.

IV. Disposition

¶ 21 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE KUHN concur.