25CA1754 Peo in Interest of EG 03-26-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1754 Boulder County District Court No. 23JV30177 Honorable J. Keith Collins, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of El.G. and Es.G., Children,
and Concerning G.G.,
Appellant,
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Freyre and Brown, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 26, 2026
Ben Pearlman, County Attorney, Cheryl Koh-Sicotte, Assistant County Attorney, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency or neglect proceeding, G.G. (father) appeals
the juvenile court’s judgment denying his motion to continue the
termination hearing, at which the court ultimately terminated his
parent-child legal relationship with E.G and a second child with the
same initials (the children). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Boulder County Department of Housing and Human
Services (Department) filed a petition in dependency or neglect after
receiving information that father and the children’s mother had
domestic violence and substance use issues and had been
incarcerated.1 The juvenile court placed the children — who were
then three and four years old — first with paternal grandparents
and then with maternal grandmother. Father, who at the time was
sentenced to a work release program, admitted the petition,
stipulating that the children’s environment was injurious. A
magistrate adjudicated the children dependent or neglected with
regard to father and adopted a treatment plan for him.
1 Mother is a not a party to this appeal.
1 ¶3 Father’s treatment plan required him to (1) participate in
substance use disorder and/or mental health treatment; (2) comply
with random substance use monitoring; (3) obtain and maintain
safe and stable housing for himself and the children; (4) complete
the requirements of his work release program; (5) obtain stable
employment or community resources to meet his family’s basic
needs; (6) attend family time with the children; and (7) maintain a
working relationship with case professionals.
¶4 Seventeen months after the court adopted the treatment plan,
the Department filed a motion to terminate father’s parental rights.
Father did not appear at the termination hearing. At the beginning
of the hearing, father’s counsel requested a continuance. Father’s
counsel said that father did not have notice of the hearing. The
Department objected to any continuance, and the court denied the
request. After receiving evidence, the court terminated father’s
parental rights.
II. Father’s Requested Continuance
¶5 Father contends that the juvenile court violated his right to
procedural due process by denying his motion to continue the
termination hearing. We disagree.
2 A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶6 In general, parents have a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in the care, custody, and management of their children.
People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 17. Due process
requires that the state provide fundamentally fair procedures in
dependency or neglect proceedings. People in Interest of J.R.M.,
2023 COA 81, ¶ 7. At a minimum, a parent must be given
adequate notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to protect
their rights. People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 262 (Colo.
App. 2007). To establish a due process violation based on the
denial of a motion for continuance, a parent must establish “actual
prejudice resulting from the juvenile court’s denial of [the]
requested continuance.” People in Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55,
¶ 22.
¶7 The Colorado Children’s Code directs courts to “proceed with
all possible speed to a legal determination that will serve the best
interests of the child.” § 19-1-102(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025. Thus, when
ruling on a motion to continue, the juvenile court “should balance
the need for orderly and expeditious administration of justice
against the facts underlying the motion and the child’s need for
3 permanency.” People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 11. When
a child is less than six years old when the petition is filed, the
expedited permanency planning (EPP) provisions apply. Id. at ¶ 12.
In such cases, the juvenile court shall hold a termination hearing
within 120 days after the termination motion is filed and “shall not
grant a delay unless good cause is shown and unless the court
finds that the best interests of the child will be served by granting a
delay.” § 19-3-602(1), C.R.S. 2025.
¶8 We review a juvenile court’s denial of a motion to continue for
an abuse of discretion. R.J.B., ¶ 13. A court abuses its discretion
“when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair,
or when it misapplies or misconstrues the law.” E.B., ¶ 14. We
review a procedural due process claim de novo. R.J.B., ¶ 26.
B. Analysis
¶9 For the reasons discussed below, the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in denying father’s request for a continuance.
And father’s due process rights were not violated.
¶ 10 First, the record reflects that the court balanced the need for
“orderly and expeditious administration of justice” against the facts
of the case and the children’s need for permanency. R.J.B., ¶ 11.
4 The termination hearing was held ninety-nine days after the motion
to terminate was filed. And this EPP case had been open for almost
two years. The court found that, “given the age of the children and
the [amount of time that] this case has been pending, . . . it is in the
best interest of the children to proceed today.”
¶ 11 Second, the record indicates that father had notice of the
termination hearing. Shortly after his appointment, father’s court-
appointed counsel visited him in jail and, together, they “went
through the advisement” and father’s admission to the dependency
or neglect petition. The written admission included an advisement
that “[t]ermination of the parent-child legal relationship[] is a
possible remedy[,] which is available to the court.” But counsel lost
contact with father for the last eight months of the proceeding. At
the termination hearing, however, the caseworker told the court
that she had informed father, personally, of the date of the
termination at their last contact only one and a half months before
the hearing.
¶ 12 But even if father did not receive notice of the termination
hearing, there is no question that his counsel, who appeared at the
hearing, received the notice. That is all that is required. See People
5 in Interest of J.E.B., 854 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Colo. App. 1993) (“There
is no requirement in statute or case law requiring service of notice
of the termination hearing upon both counsel and a client.”).
¶ 13 And third, father has not shown that he was prejudiced by the
denial of his request for a continuance. E.B., ¶ 15. The court
found, with record support, that (1) father had not engaged in any
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25CA1754 Peo in Interest of EG 03-26-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1754 Boulder County District Court No. 23JV30177 Honorable J. Keith Collins, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of El.G. and Es.G., Children,
and Concerning G.G.,
Appellant,
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Freyre and Brown, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 26, 2026
Ben Pearlman, County Attorney, Cheryl Koh-Sicotte, Assistant County Attorney, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency or neglect proceeding, G.G. (father) appeals
the juvenile court’s judgment denying his motion to continue the
termination hearing, at which the court ultimately terminated his
parent-child legal relationship with E.G and a second child with the
same initials (the children). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Boulder County Department of Housing and Human
Services (Department) filed a petition in dependency or neglect after
receiving information that father and the children’s mother had
domestic violence and substance use issues and had been
incarcerated.1 The juvenile court placed the children — who were
then three and four years old — first with paternal grandparents
and then with maternal grandmother. Father, who at the time was
sentenced to a work release program, admitted the petition,
stipulating that the children’s environment was injurious. A
magistrate adjudicated the children dependent or neglected with
regard to father and adopted a treatment plan for him.
1 Mother is a not a party to this appeal.
1 ¶3 Father’s treatment plan required him to (1) participate in
substance use disorder and/or mental health treatment; (2) comply
with random substance use monitoring; (3) obtain and maintain
safe and stable housing for himself and the children; (4) complete
the requirements of his work release program; (5) obtain stable
employment or community resources to meet his family’s basic
needs; (6) attend family time with the children; and (7) maintain a
working relationship with case professionals.
¶4 Seventeen months after the court adopted the treatment plan,
the Department filed a motion to terminate father’s parental rights.
Father did not appear at the termination hearing. At the beginning
of the hearing, father’s counsel requested a continuance. Father’s
counsel said that father did not have notice of the hearing. The
Department objected to any continuance, and the court denied the
request. After receiving evidence, the court terminated father’s
parental rights.
II. Father’s Requested Continuance
¶5 Father contends that the juvenile court violated his right to
procedural due process by denying his motion to continue the
termination hearing. We disagree.
2 A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶6 In general, parents have a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in the care, custody, and management of their children.
People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 17. Due process
requires that the state provide fundamentally fair procedures in
dependency or neglect proceedings. People in Interest of J.R.M.,
2023 COA 81, ¶ 7. At a minimum, a parent must be given
adequate notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to protect
their rights. People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 262 (Colo.
App. 2007). To establish a due process violation based on the
denial of a motion for continuance, a parent must establish “actual
prejudice resulting from the juvenile court’s denial of [the]
requested continuance.” People in Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55,
¶ 22.
¶7 The Colorado Children’s Code directs courts to “proceed with
all possible speed to a legal determination that will serve the best
interests of the child.” § 19-1-102(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025. Thus, when
ruling on a motion to continue, the juvenile court “should balance
the need for orderly and expeditious administration of justice
against the facts underlying the motion and the child’s need for
3 permanency.” People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 11. When
a child is less than six years old when the petition is filed, the
expedited permanency planning (EPP) provisions apply. Id. at ¶ 12.
In such cases, the juvenile court shall hold a termination hearing
within 120 days after the termination motion is filed and “shall not
grant a delay unless good cause is shown and unless the court
finds that the best interests of the child will be served by granting a
delay.” § 19-3-602(1), C.R.S. 2025.
¶8 We review a juvenile court’s denial of a motion to continue for
an abuse of discretion. R.J.B., ¶ 13. A court abuses its discretion
“when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair,
or when it misapplies or misconstrues the law.” E.B., ¶ 14. We
review a procedural due process claim de novo. R.J.B., ¶ 26.
B. Analysis
¶9 For the reasons discussed below, the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in denying father’s request for a continuance.
And father’s due process rights were not violated.
¶ 10 First, the record reflects that the court balanced the need for
“orderly and expeditious administration of justice” against the facts
of the case and the children’s need for permanency. R.J.B., ¶ 11.
4 The termination hearing was held ninety-nine days after the motion
to terminate was filed. And this EPP case had been open for almost
two years. The court found that, “given the age of the children and
the [amount of time that] this case has been pending, . . . it is in the
best interest of the children to proceed today.”
¶ 11 Second, the record indicates that father had notice of the
termination hearing. Shortly after his appointment, father’s court-
appointed counsel visited him in jail and, together, they “went
through the advisement” and father’s admission to the dependency
or neglect petition. The written admission included an advisement
that “[t]ermination of the parent-child legal relationship[] is a
possible remedy[,] which is available to the court.” But counsel lost
contact with father for the last eight months of the proceeding. At
the termination hearing, however, the caseworker told the court
that she had informed father, personally, of the date of the
termination at their last contact only one and a half months before
the hearing.
¶ 12 But even if father did not receive notice of the termination
hearing, there is no question that his counsel, who appeared at the
hearing, received the notice. That is all that is required. See People
5 in Interest of J.E.B., 854 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Colo. App. 1993) (“There
is no requirement in statute or case law requiring service of notice
of the termination hearing upon both counsel and a client.”).
¶ 13 And third, father has not shown that he was prejudiced by the
denial of his request for a continuance. E.B., ¶ 15. The court
found, with record support, that (1) father had not engaged in any
aspect of his treatment plan; (2) his visits with the children had
been inconsistent; (3) he did not have housing; and (4) he remained
an unfit parent. Father does not identify any way in which his
presence at the hearing would have changed these findings or the
juvenile court’s assessment of the termination criteria in section 19-
3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025. Id. at ¶ 22. Thus, he has failed to
establish prejudice resulting from the denial. See E.B., ¶ 20
(Finding no due process violation because “[f]ather has failed to
show how his presence at the hearing could have changed the
juvenile court's determination that the four criteria for termination
under section 19-3-604 were met.”).
III. Disposition
¶ 14 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE BROWN concur.