Peo in Interest of EG

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 5, 2026
• Docket: 25CA1568
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1568 Peo in Interest of EG 03-05-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1568 Jefferson County District Court No. 23JV30301 Honorable Lindsay VanGilder, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of E.G., a Child,

and Concerning R.V.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Tow and Hawthorne*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 5, 2026

Kimberly S. Sorrells, County Attorney, Sarah Oviatt, Assistant County Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 R.V. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her

parent-child legal relationship with E.G. (the child). She contends

that the juvenile court erred by finding she abandoned the child.

We discern no error and affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 In 2022, the Jefferson County Division of Children, Youth,

Families and Adult Protection (the Division) filed a petition in

dependency and neglect alleging that mother had used illicit

substances during her pregnancy with the child. Mother saw the

child once after his birth and did not otherwise engage in the 2022

dependency and neglect case (the first case), which closed with an

allocation of parental responsibilities to J.G. (father). Six months

after the first case closed, the Division received a referral with

concerns about father’s mental health. It opened a voluntary case

in which it implemented a safety plan for father. The Division filed

a second petition in dependency and neglect in December 2025

when father failed to engage, and mother could not be located. The

juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected and

entered treatment plans for both parents. The Division later moved

to terminate both parents’ parental rights. In June 2025, just

1 before the child turned three years old, the court terminated

mother’s and father’s parental rights under sections 19-3-604(1)(a)

and (c), C.R.S. 2025.

II. Termination Due to Abandonment

¶3 Mother first contends that the juvenile court erred by

terminating her parental rights pursuant to 19-3-604(1)(a) because

she “demonstrated a firm intention to resume physical custody of”

the child. We disagree.

¶4 Although mother concedes this issue was not preserved, she

urges this court to nevertheless address her claims under the

miscarriage of justice exception to the preservation requirements.

See People in Interest of E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 14, 494 P.3d 1142,

1145. “Where an error of the trial court is considered fundamental

or involves a miscarriage of justice, we may consider the issue for

the first time on appeal.” In re Petition of R.G.B., 98 P.3d 958, 959

(Colo. App. 2004). The miscarriage of justice exception has a

narrow scope, however. See People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA

13, ¶¶ 23-24, 459 P.3d 766, 771. We need not determine whether

mother’s claim meets this standard because the outcome is the

same whether we conclude that mother failed to preserve the issue

2 for appellate review or whether we address it on the merits. See

L & R Expl. Venture v. Grynberg, 271 P.3d 530, 536 (Colo. App.

2011) (declining to resolve an issue when adjudicating it would not

change the case’s outcome).

¶5 Under section 19-3-604(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025, abandonment

occurs when a parent has surrendered physical custody of the child

for a period of six months or more and, during that time, has not

manifested a firm intention to resume physical custody or make

permanent legal arrangements for the child’s care.

¶6 Abandonment is primarily a question of intent and may be

determined by the parent’s actions or words. People in Interest of

A.D., 56 P.3d 1246, 1248 (Colo. App. 2002). In making that

determination, the juvenile court must view the circumstances in

light of the child’s best interests. Id.

¶7 Mother points to three specific instances in which she says

she “demonstrated the firm intention to resume physical custody” of

the child: (1) her counsel’s January 2024 request for a bus pass

and parenting time; (2) a January 2024 phone conversation with

the caseworker during which mother said she would like to begin

family time with the child; and (3) her presence at a hearing in

3 February 2024. Although the record contains references to these

occurrences, the court did not receive evidence about any of them

at the termination hearing. Even if it had, the record does not, as

mother claims, “firmly support[] the conclusion that [she]

demonstrated a plain and evident intention to resume custody of

the child.” In any event, neither a parent’s full participation in a

dependency and neglect case nor a parent’s “desire to visit the child

and perhaps someday assume custody” is sufficient to demonstrate

a firm intention to resume custody. Id.

¶8 Instead, whether a parent has an intent to abandon “is more

often determined by what [the parent] does rather than by what [the

parent] says.” D.P.H. v. J.L.B., 260 P.3d 320, 324 (Colo. 2011). It is

undisputed that mother never participated in family time with the

child while this dependency and neglect case was pending, and she

did not engage in any other part of her treatment plan. Mother’s

last and seemingly only contact with the child was in October 2022,

when the child was three months old. She had no contact with the

child during the pendency of this case.

¶9 Furthermore, the juvenile court properly considered the child’s

best interests. The court found that “given this child’s age, needs,

4 and the history of this case and these parents’ lack of

involvement, . . . termination is in the child’s best interests.” While

mother challenges the court’s best interest findings on appeal, her

arguments solely relate to herself and do not address the child’s

best interests. We therefore determine that the juvenile court did

not err by finding that mother abandoned the child and thus

terminating mother’s parental rights pursuant to section

19-3-604(1)(a).

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 10 Second, mother contends that the juvenile court erred by

finding that the Division made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her

when it terminated her parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c).

But the court’s findings under section 19-3-604(1)(a) are “an

independent basis for termination,” which we examined above and

determined have record support. People in Interest of D.C-M.S., 111

P.3d 559, 562 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 11 Because a juvenile court need not consider, or make findings

on, whether reasonable efforts were made when it terminates

parental rights due to abandonment, we decline to address mother’s

argument relating to the services the Division provided during the

5 pendency of the case. See § 19-3-604(1)(a); People in Interest of

S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 37, 524 P.3d 1209, 1218 (holding that a

juvenile “court can make an abandonment finding under

subsection (1)(a) regardless of whether a treatment plan was

adopted or services were provided”).

IV. Disposition

¶ 12 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur.