Peo in Interest of EG

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 24, 2025
• Docket: 24CA1010
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA1010 Peo In Interest of EG 04-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1010 Weld County District Court No. 19JV913 Honorable W. Troy Hause, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of E.G., a Child,

and Concerning Jen.G. and Jes.G.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Schock and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 24, 2025

Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee

Josie Burt, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant Jen.G.

Beth Padilla, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Durango, Colorado, for Appellant Jes.G. ¶1 Jes.G. (father) and Jen.G. (mother) appeal the judgment

terminating their parent-child legal relationships with E.G. (the

child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In December 2019, the Weld County Department of Human

Services received a report of domestic violence between mother and

father in the child’s presence. Based on this information, as well as

concerns about the parents’ substance abuse, the Department filed

a petition in dependency or neglect.

¶3 The parents agreed to deferred adjudications under section

19-3-505(5), C.R.S. 2024, and the juvenile court adopted treatment

plans for them. A year later, the juvenile court revoked the deferred

adjudications and formally adjudicated the child dependent or

neglected.

¶4 The Department then moved to terminate the parents’ parental

rights. After an evidentiary hearing in December 2021, the court

denied the Department’s motion, finding that (1) the Department

had failed to provide father with reasonable efforts and (2)

termination of mother’s parental rights was not in the child’s best

interests.

1 ¶5 Almost two years later, the Department again moved to

terminate the parents’ parental rights. The juvenile court held

another termination hearing in March 2024, and at the end of this

hearing, the court granted the motion and terminated the parents’

parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

II. Continuance and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶6 Father argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by

denying his continuance motion. He also asserts that his attorney

provided ineffective assistance.1 We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 The Colorado Children’s Code directs courts to “proceed with

all possible speed to a legal determination that will serve the best

interests of the child.” § 19-1-102(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024. Thus, when

ruling on a motion to continue, the juvenile court “should balance

the need for orderly and expeditious administration of justice

against the facts underlying the motion and the child’s need for

permanency.” People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 11. In

expedited permanency planning cases, such as this one, a court

1 The Department’s and guardian ad litem’s answer briefs do not

address father’s assertion that his counsel was ineffective.

2 cannot grant a continuance unless the moving party establishes

(1) good cause for the continuance and (2) that the continuance will

serve the child’s best interests. § 19-3-104, C.R.S. 2024.

¶8 We review the denial of a continuance motion for an abuse of

discretion. See C.S. v. People in Interest of I.S., 83 P.3d 627, 638

(Colo. 2004). Under this standard, we will not disturb the juvenile

court’s decision absent a showing that it was manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or was based on a misunderstanding or

misapplication of law. People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13,

¶ 41; People in Interest of T.M.S., 2019 COA 136, ¶ 10.

¶9 To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, the parent must

establish that (1) counsel’s performance was outside the wide range

of professionally competent assistance and (2) the parent was

prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance — that is, there is a

reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. See A.R.

v. D.R., 2020 CO 10, ¶¶ 48, 60. “If the parent fails to establish

either prong of this test, the claim fails.” People in Interest of C.B.,

2019 COA 168, ¶ 26.

3 B. Relevant Facts and Analysis

¶ 10 As pertinent to this appeal, father initially provided two

reasons for seeking a continuance. First, he asserted that his

counsel did not have adequate time to review “all relevant

information related to this case.” Second, father maintained that

his investigator had not obtained information about visits that

occurred while he was in the Department of Corrections (DOC).

¶ 11 On the first day of the termination hearing, father’s counsel

updated the juvenile court on these issues, stating that she still

needed to review a “couple hundred pages worth of information”

and interview father’s DOC case manager. The court declined to

continue the hearing, noting that

• counsel would have sufficient time to review the

additional information before the end of the three-day

trial; and

• if counsel obtained new information through the

investigator, it would add another day to the hearing.

¶ 12 Father renewed his request for a continuance before his

case-in-chief on day two of the hearing. This time, father’s counsel

said nothing about the “couple hundred pages of information” but

4 continued to claim that the investigator was still trying to contact

the DOC case manager. As an offer of proof, counsel said that she

thought that father may have missed some visits because “the child

was not made available.” In denying the request, the court

determined that counsel could have obtained this information from

the Department or from father.

¶ 13 On the hearing’s final day, father did not renew his motion to

continue, nor did he mention any further issues with discovery or

problems contacting the DOC case manager. Likewise, he did not

ask to reopen the evidence to recall witnesses or call new witnesses

— such as the DOC case manager or his investigator. Nor did

father request another day to present more evidence.

¶ 14 Based on this record, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the

juvenile court’s ruling because the court properly weighed the need

for orderly and expeditious administration of justice against the

facts underlying the motion and the child’s need for permanency.

See C.S., 83 P.3d at 638; R.J.B., ¶ 11. Considering that the case

had been pending for over four years, which was most of the child’s

life, father did not establish that a continuance was in the child’s

best interests. See § 19-3-104. Likewise, father did not establish

5 good cause for a continuance because (1) counsel had adequate

time to review all the discovery by the end of trial and (2) counsel

could have gotten information about father’s missed visits from

other sources. See id.

¶ 15 We also reject father’s contention that his counsel provided

ineffective assistance. Given that the termination hearing was a

multi-day hearing, counsel had the opportunity to review all the

discovery and contact all relevant witnesses before the hearing

concluded. Notably, counsel on the final day of the hearing, did not

renew her request for a continuance or mention further issues with

discovery or contacting the DOC case manager. Therefore, father

has not established that his attorney provided deficient

performance. See C.B., ¶ 26.

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 16 The parents assert that the juvenile court erred by finding that

the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate them and

reunify them with the child. We disagree.

¶ 17 Before a juvenile court may find a parent unfit under section

19-3-604(1)(c), the department must make reasonable efforts to

6 rehabilitate the parent and reunify the family. §§ 19-1-103(114),

19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024. Reasonable efforts means

the “exercise of diligence and care” to reunify parents with their

children, and services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208

satisfy the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114). As

relevant here, section 19-3-208 requires the department to provide

(1) information and referral services to available public and private

assistance resources and (2) family time services.

§ 19-3-208(2)(b)(III)-(IV).

¶ 18 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in

Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the juvenile

court’s factual findings for clear error and review de novo its legal

determination based on those findings. Id.

B. Analysis

¶ 19 The parents had similar treatment plans requiring, among

other things, that they address substance abuse, parenting skills,

and domestic violence. Because of father’s incarceration, the

services available to each parent differed greatly. For example, the

Department referred mother to multiple treatment programs,

7 in-person family time, parenting education, and a domestic violence

impact class. As for father, the Department made referrals while

father was in the community, but he did not participate. The

caseworker met with father in person during his incarceration and

arranged family time for him. The record otherwise indicates that

father had access to several programs in the DOC.

¶ 20 Father asserts that, although the Department provided him

with family time, it did not furnish him with any other services

during his incarceration. To be sure, although there were limited

services available to father in prison, the record shows that he

engaged in the ones that he could. But nothing in the record

suggests that the Department could have provided him additional

services. In other words, the Department provided information and

referral services to available public and private assistance as

required by section 19-3-208(2)(b)(III). We therefore discern no

error.

¶ 21 Mother argues that the Department did not (1) expand or

liberalize her family time; (2) provide her with parent-child

interactional therapy (PCIT); or (3) facilitate visits between the child

and his older siblings. We disagree with the first contention

8 because the record shows that mother was not ready for expanded

family time due to her lack of progress with her plan and the

anxiety the child felt. See People in Interest of A.A., 2020 COA 154,

¶ 17 (the department must provide family time services “in

accordance with individual case plans”). As to the second, the

Department referred mother to PCIT, but the provider determined

that PCIT was not appropriate for her due to concerns with her

sobriety. Cf. People in Interest of E.D., 2025 COA 11, ¶ 40 (a

department can satisfy reasonable efforts by simply “making

available” therapeutic family time services). Finally, mother does

not explain how sibling visits would have rehabilitated her or

reunified her with the child.

¶ 22 In sum, the record shows that the Department provided the

necessary services to support the parents’ treatment plans, People

in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), but the

parents either did not utilize those services or position themselves

to be able to use those services to become fit parents, see People in

Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011). We

therefore discern no error in the juvenile court’s determination that

the Department made reasonable efforts. See E.D., ¶ 11 (whether

9 the department made reasonable efforts must be measured

holistically rather than in isolation with respect to each treatment

plan objective).

IV. Less Drastic Alternative

¶ 23 The parents contend that the juvenile court erred by rejecting

a less drastic alternative to termination. We disagree.

¶ 24 Before terminating parental rights under section

19-3-604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122

(Colo. 1986). When considering less drastic alternatives, the court

must give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3). An allocation of

parental responsibilities (APR) to a relative is not a less drastic

alternative if it does not provide adequate permanence and stability

for the child. People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 910-11

(Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 25 A viable less drastic alternative must do more than adequately

meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s best interests.

People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 27. If the juvenile

10 court considers a less drastic alternative but finds instead that

termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject the less

drastic alternative and order termination. Id. at ¶ 32. Under those

circumstances, we must affirm the court’s decision if the record

supports its findings. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 81.

¶ 26 The juvenile court found that there was no less drastic

alternative to termination. It determined that an APR was not in

the child’s best interests because she had “suffered so many

disruptions throughout this case with the numerous placements.”

The court found that the child needed “a permanent and forever

home” to allow her to “heal from all the trauma” of the “failed

placements.” Thus, it concluded that “only termination and

adoption [could] provide the necessary stability for the [c]hild in

overcoming these emotional obstacles.”

¶ 27 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The

caseworker testified that the child had been in eight different

placements during the case but now resided in a permanent home

with a foster family. She opined that, based on the case’s history,

the child needed “stability and consistency,” which could only be

11 achieved through termination and adoption. The caseworker said

that the child could not get this stability through an APR because of

potential “disruptions” going forward.

¶ 28 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred by eliminating an

APR to paternal great-grandmother as a less drastic alternative to

termination. Specifically, he asserts that, when the court declined

placement with paternal great-grandmother almost a year before

the termination hearing, it relied on the child’s attachment to the

foster parents, which the current version of the placement statute

does not allow. See § 19-3-702(6)(h), C.R.S. 2024 (placement with a

child’s relative “should not be denied based solely upon the

ordinary bonding and attachment to a foster parent”). Father

maintains that, because the court reiterated this finding at the

termination hearing, it improperly eliminated an APR to paternal

great-grandmother as a less drastic alternative.

¶ 29 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by declining an

APR to the child’s sibling’s father and his wife as a less drastic

alternative. In support, she asserts, among other things, that the

child had a bond with mother and her sibling, and an APR to the

sibling’s father and his wife was therefore in the child’s best

12 interests. See, e.g., People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408-09

(Colo. App. 2008) (allowing a court to consider whether the parent

and child have a bond); § 19-3-507(1)(b), C.R.S. 2024 (creating a

rebuttable presumption that sibling groups be placed together).

¶ 30 We reject both parents’ arguments for the same reason. The

court found that an APR was not in the child’s best interests

because she needed the permanency that only termination and

adoption could provide. See T.E.M., 124 P.3d at 910-11. As a

result, the court did not deny an APR based “solely” on the child’s

bonding and attachment to the foster parents. § 19-3-702(6)(h).

And even if the court had placed the child with someone else, its

findings reflect that it would have still rejected an APR. In other

words, an APR, regardless of the placement, was not a less drastic

alternative to termination.

V. Disposition

¶ 31 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE SCHOCK and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.