Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry. Co.

176 F. 471, 1 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 171, 1910 U.S. App. LEXIS 5265
U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York·Decided February 18, 1910·No. Nos. 2-9, 2-33, 2 149, 3-37·Published·Cited by 6 cases

Opinion

LACOMBE, Circuit Judge.

The questions presented on this hearing will be considered separately, although not necessarily always in the order of their presentation.

Petition of Harlem Railroad Company.

'fhis company is the owner of what, without going into details, is known as the Fourth Avenue & Madison Avenue Line, including Eighty-Sixth Street Crosstown Line. The property was leased to the Metropolitan Street Railway Company for 999 years on June 11, 1.896, and has since been operated by that company, by its lessee, the New York City Railway Company, and by the receivers of the two last-named companies. The petition prays that receivers “be instructed and directed to elect whether or not they will assume and adopt the [said] lease, or that it be determined that the petitioner may re-enter and repossess its properties therein described,” and for general relief.

As to the election whether or not to assume and adopt the lease, it is sufficient to say that as to all leases held by the Metropolitan Street Railway Company this court in the decree of foreclosure inserted provisions which instructed the receivers to take no action, which might be construed as an election, prior to sale. Appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals, has been argued, and is now under consideration by the appellate court. Under these circumstances, it would be highly indecorous for this court to instruct receivers further on this subject, while that tribunal is considering the propriety of the instructions already issued — unless some most extraordinary and unforeseen contingency should arise, of which there is no suggestion here. This election, however, is of no especial importance now. The gist of the petition is that the covenants of the lease have been already broken, and that lessor is entitled to re-enter. If that is so, mere election to “assume and adopt” would not change the situation..

The alleged breaches of the leases on which petitioner relies are these:

(A) The lease provides that the lessee shall during the term of the lease “pay and discharge all taxes, assessments, license fees and percentages of receipts which may be lawfully laid or imposed upon the property or franchises hereby demised, or any part thereof, or upon or exacted from the lessor in respect thereof, or by reason of the payment of the rent hereby reserved or upon the stock of the lessor by reason of its receipt of the rent hereby reserved.” Subsequent to the making of the lease, the state of New York devised and put in force a new form of taxation on public service corporations, referred to in the record as the “special franchise tax.” This tax was imposed directly on the lessor road. The lessee at once challenged the constitutionality of this tax, carried the question to the Supreme Court of the United States, was defeated, and paid the tax for the year which it thus brought up. It also questioned the amount of the tax as assessed by the state officials, and for each and every year undertook to review it by certiorari. The multitudinous proceedings thus resulting — for there are 'many other lessors — were instituted by the lessee (after-wards by receivers) are pending in court and have been carefully at[474]*474tended to. Each certiorari is in the name of the lessor; _ the lessee and subsequently the receivers retaining counsel and paying all the expenses of litigation. On November 10, 1909, receivers sent to the secretary of petitioner the following letter:

“Dear Sir: As you doubtless know, the special franchise taxes of your company have not been paid, in full. Proceedings by certiorari to review the assessment for the years 1901 to 1909 inclusive were begun in the name of your company and are still pending. In view of the recent decision of the. Court of Appeals in the Jamaica Water Company Case [196 N. Y. 39, 89 N. E. 581] it is probable that an attempt will be made to collect the unpaid taxes by a sale of the franchises. The receivers have not sufficient funds to make the payments demanded by the comptroller’s office or even the. amounts which are not in dispute. It is possible that conditions may arise which -will involve some conflict of interest between your company and the company of whose property we were receivers. We, therefore, deem it advisable and proper to give you notice to take immediate charge of the proceedings on behalf of your company. Our counsel, Messrs. Hasten & Nichols, will facilitate you in so-doing.”

It is argued that this was a notification that receivers would decline to continue the prosecution of the certiorari proceedings. The receivers contend that no such construction should be put upon their letter. The decision referred to therein settled some of the questions involved in all these certiorari proceedings, making it manifest that the amount of each tax was greatly in excess of what it should have been. This made it probable that the remaining questions might be settled by adjustment with the state and city officials, by mutual stipulations as to the amount of certain items entering into each calculation. Inasmuch as the. tax was laid on the lessor, and counsel in charge had not been selected by the lessor, it was thought best to give notice of the situation and afford the latter opportunity to put its own counsel in charge, if it saw fit so to do; the expense of litigation, however, being borne by receivers. The letter is susceptible of this construction, but, even if it were not, the mere sending of it was not a breach of any covenant, so long as receivers actually continued to press the litigation at their expense for the benefit of the lessor.

(B) The special franchise taxes for the years 1901-1909 are unpaid, and it is contended that this circumstance constitutes a breach of the lease. But the record shows that the lessee and subsequently the receivers have instituted and prosecuted proceedings in the state courts to secure a review of the action of the taxing officers and effect such a reduction of the tax as would bring it within what the statute allowed.

These proceedings were not mere devices to delay the payment of just obligations; they were prosecuted in good faith and the recent decision of the Court of Appeals demonstrates their propriety. The lease required the payment of taxes “lawfully laid and imposed” and provided' for the payment of such taxes “during the term of the lease.” It is thought that a delay merely sufficient to secure relief from the imposition of exorbitant burdens not lawfully imposed does not constitute a breach of the lease. It seems unnecessary to review at greater length the elaborate discussion of this question which is [475]*475found in the briefs, in view of what is said infra in disposing of the petition of receivers.

(C) The city having advertised the sale of its lien for unpaid franchise taxes, petitioner voluntarily paid $400,000 to the collector of assessments and. arrears to secure a postponement of such sale, and asks that it be forthwith repaid such sum. It is thought this payment was unnecessary. The sale of the liens on property of other lessors was postponed, without payment being made. But further elaboration of this point is unnecessary, in view of instructions to receivers infra.

(D) The lease contains a covenant to keep the demised property in good working order, condition, and repair. The petition does not expressly allege a breach of this covenant; but on the argument it was conceded by all that the property is not now in a proper condition of repair.

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Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry. Co., 176 F. 471, 1 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 171, 1910 U.S. App. LEXIS 5265 (circtsdny 1910).

176 F. 471 (Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry. Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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