Winborne, J.
The errors assigned by defendant, and set forth in the record as required by the rules of this Court are nine in number. And while prejudicial error is not made to appear, we consider them in proper groups.
I. Assignments of error Nos. 1, 2 and 4, relating to exceptions 1, 2 and 4, as stated by appellant, may be combined in this manner: That the court committed error (1) “in permitting the introduction of oral testimony to prove the terms of the contract, in variance with that set up in the complaint, — the statute of frauds having been specially pleaded”; (2) “in admiting testimony of a conversation with G-. W Hill completely at variance with the allegations of the complaint”; and (4) “in denying the motion of the defendant to strike out the oral testimony of the plaintiff as to the terms of the contract.”
Patently, these assignments of error are based upon misapprehension that plaintiff is seeking to recover upon a “special promise to answer the
debt, default or miscarriage of another,” which is required by statute to be in writing and signed. G.S. 22-1. Such is not the case. The cause of action alleged in the complaint is based upon an original promise of defendant to pay for materials to be, and which were later furnished by plaintiff for use in completing the construction of a building on the land of Elwood Dixon, which, if true, does not come within the provisions of the statute, G.S. 22-1, and is not required
to be in writing
and signed. See
Peele v. Powell,
156 N.C. 553, 73 S.E. 234, on rehearing 161 N.C. 50, 76 S.E. 398
Hence the testimony to which exceptions under consideration relate is pertinent to such alleged original promise of defendant. True it is, defendant denies making any such promise, and avers, and on the trial offered testimony tending to show its contention as to what was the agreement with plaintiff in respect to furnishing the materials. Thus an issue of fact arose to be determined by the jury. See
Farmers Federation, Inc., v. Morris,
223 N.C. 467, 27 S.E. 2d 80. And evidence in support of the respective allegations of the parties, and pertinent to the issue, was admissible.
II. Assignments of error Nos. 3 and 7, unsupported by exceptions, but nevertheless considered, are these: That the court committed prejudicial error (1) “by suggesting of its own motion that counsel for plaintiff offer some letters in evidence and directing him to read them to the jury,” and (2) “by entering into cross-examination of defendant's witness of his own motion.”
As to the first, the record shows that in the course of the examination of a plaintiff’s witness, two letters from defendant to plaintiff were identified, and, upon counsel for plaintiff
offering the letters in
evidence, the court merely stated “Suppose you read them to the jury.” And as to the second, the court interrogated defendant’s witness, its President, George
W.
Hill, as to whether the proceeds of the $3000 loan referred to was delivered to Dixon, or kept by defendant and disbursed by it on Dixon’s credit. And the interrogation ended when the witness finally stated that the company kept the money and paid Dixon’s bills, — a fact which the testimony theretofore given had not made clear.
Such matters are addressed to the discretion of the presiding judge, and, in the absence of abuse of discretion, his rulings will not be disturbed on appeal. Here abuse of discretion does not appear.
III. Assignments of error Nos. 5 and 8, purporting to cover exceptions 5 and 8, are these: “That the court committed prejudicial error” (1) “in refusing to hear the defendant’s argument and citations of law in support of its motion to dismiss as of nonsuit at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence and bluntly stating to counsel for defendant, ‘I don’t care to hear them, I am familiar with the law’”; and (2) “in refusing to
allow counsel for the defendant to make and/or argue his motions at the close of all the evidence, but briskly made such motions as he saw fit and promptly overruled his own motions.”
As to the first, the record shows that when plaintiff rested its ease, the court inquired “Any evidence for the defendant?”, whereupon counsel for defendant stated “We wish to make a motion, your Honor, in the case at this time.” And upon inquiry by the court as to “What is your motion ?”, counsel for defendant stated: “Our motion is to dismiss this action as of nonsuit, because . . .,” — followed by statement of counsel for defendant at some length. Whereupon the court inquired, “Is that all?”, to which counsel for defendant replied: “I have some citations here if your Honor cares to hear them.” Thereupon the court said: “I don’t care to hear them. I am familiar with the law. Overruled. Exception.” No doubt the citation of authorities is often helpful to the presiding judge, but we know of no rule of practice that requires the judge to read them.
And as to the second, at the close of all the evidence, counsel for defendant stated, “I want to make a motion.” Whereupon the court stated: “Yes, sir, at the close of all the evidence defendant renews its motion for judgment of nonsuit and renews other motion made at the close of plaintiff’s evidence. Motions overruled. Exceptions.”
The motion usually made at the close of the evidence is for judgment as of nonsuit, and there is nothing out of the ordinary for the judge to dictate the motion and the ruling on the motion. And the record fails to show that counsel for defendant asked to make any other motion.
So, as we read the record, while it shows exceptions to the denial of motions for nonsuit, the assignments of error are restricted to matters beside the point.
Nevertheless, if the assignments of error were to the actual rulings of the court on the motions for judgment as of nonsuit, the evidence as to the alleged transaction, and its attendant circumstances, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff is abundantly sufficient to take the case to the jury on the issues raised by the pleadings.
The defendant, a corporation authorized to make loans on real estate in Guilford County, North Carolina, had already advanced some funds that went into the construction of the building being erected on the land of Elwood Dixon located in said county, and had a deed of trust on the land to secure the loan, and wanted the building completed, so that, as its president testified, it would have a good loan on a good piece of property. More materials were required. Plaintiff had the materials, but would not let Dixon have them. Under these circumstances plaintiff alleges and offered evidence tending to show that the president of defendant corporation agreed that defendant would pay plaintiff for such materials as were furnished for use in the building being constructed on the Dixon land.
The president of a corporation is
ex vi termini
its bead and general agent, and, nothing else appearing, may act for it in the business in which it is authorized to engage. See
Phillips v. Land Co.,
176 N.C. 514, 97 S.E. 417;
Trust Co. v. Transit Lines,
198 N.C. 675, 153 S.E. 158;
Warren v. Bottling Co.,
204 N.C. 288, 168 S.E. 226;
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Winborne, J.
The errors assigned by defendant, and set forth in the record as required by the rules of this Court are nine in number. And while prejudicial error is not made to appear, we consider them in proper groups.
I. Assignments of error Nos. 1, 2 and 4, relating to exceptions 1, 2 and 4, as stated by appellant, may be combined in this manner: That the court committed error (1) “in permitting the introduction of oral testimony to prove the terms of the contract, in variance with that set up in the complaint, — the statute of frauds having been specially pleaded”; (2) “in admiting testimony of a conversation with G-. W Hill completely at variance with the allegations of the complaint”; and (4) “in denying the motion of the defendant to strike out the oral testimony of the plaintiff as to the terms of the contract.”
Patently, these assignments of error are based upon misapprehension that plaintiff is seeking to recover upon a “special promise to answer the
debt, default or miscarriage of another,” which is required by statute to be in writing and signed. G.S. 22-1. Such is not the case. The cause of action alleged in the complaint is based upon an original promise of defendant to pay for materials to be, and which were later furnished by plaintiff for use in completing the construction of a building on the land of Elwood Dixon, which, if true, does not come within the provisions of the statute, G.S. 22-1, and is not required
to be in writing
and signed. See
Peele v. Powell,
156 N.C. 553, 73 S.E. 234, on rehearing 161 N.C. 50, 76 S.E. 398
Hence the testimony to which exceptions under consideration relate is pertinent to such alleged original promise of defendant. True it is, defendant denies making any such promise, and avers, and on the trial offered testimony tending to show its contention as to what was the agreement with plaintiff in respect to furnishing the materials. Thus an issue of fact arose to be determined by the jury. See
Farmers Federation, Inc., v. Morris,
223 N.C. 467, 27 S.E. 2d 80. And evidence in support of the respective allegations of the parties, and pertinent to the issue, was admissible.
II. Assignments of error Nos. 3 and 7, unsupported by exceptions, but nevertheless considered, are these: That the court committed prejudicial error (1) “by suggesting of its own motion that counsel for plaintiff offer some letters in evidence and directing him to read them to the jury,” and (2) “by entering into cross-examination of defendant's witness of his own motion.”
As to the first, the record shows that in the course of the examination of a plaintiff’s witness, two letters from defendant to plaintiff were identified, and, upon counsel for plaintiff
offering the letters in
evidence, the court merely stated “Suppose you read them to the jury.” And as to the second, the court interrogated defendant’s witness, its President, George
W.
Hill, as to whether the proceeds of the $3000 loan referred to was delivered to Dixon, or kept by defendant and disbursed by it on Dixon’s credit. And the interrogation ended when the witness finally stated that the company kept the money and paid Dixon’s bills, — a fact which the testimony theretofore given had not made clear.
Such matters are addressed to the discretion of the presiding judge, and, in the absence of abuse of discretion, his rulings will not be disturbed on appeal. Here abuse of discretion does not appear.
III. Assignments of error Nos. 5 and 8, purporting to cover exceptions 5 and 8, are these: “That the court committed prejudicial error” (1) “in refusing to hear the defendant’s argument and citations of law in support of its motion to dismiss as of nonsuit at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence and bluntly stating to counsel for defendant, ‘I don’t care to hear them, I am familiar with the law’”; and (2) “in refusing to
allow counsel for the defendant to make and/or argue his motions at the close of all the evidence, but briskly made such motions as he saw fit and promptly overruled his own motions.”
As to the first, the record shows that when plaintiff rested its ease, the court inquired “Any evidence for the defendant?”, whereupon counsel for defendant stated “We wish to make a motion, your Honor, in the case at this time.” And upon inquiry by the court as to “What is your motion ?”, counsel for defendant stated: “Our motion is to dismiss this action as of nonsuit, because . . .,” — followed by statement of counsel for defendant at some length. Whereupon the court inquired, “Is that all?”, to which counsel for defendant replied: “I have some citations here if your Honor cares to hear them.” Thereupon the court said: “I don’t care to hear them. I am familiar with the law. Overruled. Exception.” No doubt the citation of authorities is often helpful to the presiding judge, but we know of no rule of practice that requires the judge to read them.
And as to the second, at the close of all the evidence, counsel for defendant stated, “I want to make a motion.” Whereupon the court stated: “Yes, sir, at the close of all the evidence defendant renews its motion for judgment of nonsuit and renews other motion made at the close of plaintiff’s evidence. Motions overruled. Exceptions.”
The motion usually made at the close of the evidence is for judgment as of nonsuit, and there is nothing out of the ordinary for the judge to dictate the motion and the ruling on the motion. And the record fails to show that counsel for defendant asked to make any other motion.
So, as we read the record, while it shows exceptions to the denial of motions for nonsuit, the assignments of error are restricted to matters beside the point.
Nevertheless, if the assignments of error were to the actual rulings of the court on the motions for judgment as of nonsuit, the evidence as to the alleged transaction, and its attendant circumstances, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff is abundantly sufficient to take the case to the jury on the issues raised by the pleadings.
The defendant, a corporation authorized to make loans on real estate in Guilford County, North Carolina, had already advanced some funds that went into the construction of the building being erected on the land of Elwood Dixon located in said county, and had a deed of trust on the land to secure the loan, and wanted the building completed, so that, as its president testified, it would have a good loan on a good piece of property. More materials were required. Plaintiff had the materials, but would not let Dixon have them. Under these circumstances plaintiff alleges and offered evidence tending to show that the president of defendant corporation agreed that defendant would pay plaintiff for such materials as were furnished for use in the building being constructed on the Dixon land.
The president of a corporation is
ex vi termini
its bead and general agent, and, nothing else appearing, may act for it in the business in which it is authorized to engage. See
Phillips v. Land Co.,
176 N.C. 514, 97 S.E. 417;
Trust Co. v. Transit Lines,
198 N.C. 675, 153 S.E. 158;
Warren v. Bottling Co.,
204 N.C. 288, 168 S.E. 226;
Mills v. Mills,
230 N.C. 286, 52 S.E. 2d 915. See also
Berry v. R. R.,
155 N.C. 287, 71 S.E. 322.
Moreover it is manifest from the evidence that the transaction under consideration was a loan made by the defendant within the scope of its authorized business. The security for a loan is incidental to, and forms a part of it.
And “it is a recognized rule that a corporation is not restricted to the exercise of the powers expressly conferred upon it by its charter, but has the implied or incidental power to do whatever is reasonably necessary to effectuate the powers expressly granted and to accomplish the purposes for which it was formed, unless the particular act sought to be done is prohibited by law or by its charter,” 13 Am. Jur. 772, Corporations 740.
Hence plaintiff, having offered evidence tending to show that defendant, through its president, made the original promise in suit, under the circumstances the evidence tends to show, and defendant having denied the promise alleged by plaintiff, the issue of fact was properly submitted to the jury.
Farmers Federation, Inc., v. Morris, supra.
IV. Assignment of error No. 6, based on exception No. 6, is stated as follows: “That the court committed error in excluding the testimony of
G.
W. Hill as to his authority or lack of authority to bind his company under a contract to buy materials for use and benefit of a third person.” In respect of this exception, it is sufficient to say that some affirmative declaration in the charter or by-laws of the corporation, or affirmative action by the stockholders or directors of the corporation in meetings duly called and held, would be required to restrict the general authority vested in the president to act for the corporation. And the charter and by-laws, and minutes of stockholders and directors meetings are the best evidence as to what they contain. Their contents may not be proved by parol evidence.
V. Assignment of error No. 9 is “that the court committed prejudicial error in charging the jury 'that the plaintiff knew this man Dixon and knew that Dixon was not a good risk; that the plaintiff through its agents refused the credit to Dixon knowing that he was not a good risk,’ and refusing to correct the same when called to its attention.” The record shows that the portions embraced within the inside quotations are separate parts of a paragraph in which the court was stating a contention of plaintiff. It is also noted that when attention was called to the evidence of plaintiff as to its reason for not extending credit to Dixon, the court
said to the jury: “Well, they said that, too. The witness testified that his company was not able to carry open accounts, especially one with Dixon, and that he also did not consider him a good risk. You will remember what they said about that.” If it be conceded that the statement of the contention did not coincide exactly with the testimony, there is no contention that the witness did not testify that plaintiff declined to extend credit to Dixon. The reason plaintiff assigned for its action is immaterial. Hence, if there be error in the ruling of the court, it is harmless.
After due consideration to all assignments of error set out in the record on this appeal, we find
No error.