Peerless Eagle Coal Co. v. Brown

65 F.3d 166, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 30522, 1995 WL 520787
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 5, 1995
Docket94-1801
StatusUnpublished

This text of 65 F.3d 166 (Peerless Eagle Coal Co. v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Peerless Eagle Coal Co. v. Brown, 65 F.3d 166, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 30522, 1995 WL 520787 (4th Cir. 1995).

Opinion

65 F.3d 166

NOTICE: Fourth Circuit Local Rule 36(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit.
PEERLESS EAGLE COAL COMPANY, Petitioner,
v.
Darlene BROWN, Widow of Ray E. Brown; Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs, United States
Department of Labor, Respondents.

No. 94-1801.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: July 11, 1995.
Decided: Sept. 5, 1995.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board. (92-2377-BLA)

ARGUED: John Payne Scherer, Sr., FILE, PAYNE, SCHERER & FILE, Beckley, WV, for Petitioner. S.F. Raymond Smith, RUNDLE & RUNDLE, L.C., Pineville, WV, for Respondent Brown; Christian P. Barber, Counsel for Appellate Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, DC, for Respondent Director. ON BRIEF: Kenneth J. Barnett, Summersville, WV, for Respondent Brown. Thomas S. Williamson, Jr., Solicitor of Labor, Donald S. Shire, Associate Solicitor, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, DC, for Respondent Director.

Before HAMILTON, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Peerless Eagle Coal Company (Peerless Eagle) petitions for the review of a decision of the Benefits Review Board (Board) affirming an administrative law judge's decision to award black lung benefits to respondent Darlene Brown, widow of coal miner Ray E. Brown. Peerless Eagle challenges two rulings by the ALJ: (1) that Ray Brown was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis and (2) that pneumoconiosis was a substantial contributing cause of his death. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings on one issue.

* Ray Brown worked as a coal miner for 39 1/2 years. He filed a claim for black lung benefits on October 10, 1984. He died while the claim was pending before the ALJ. His widow, Darlene Brown, filed a survivor's claim for benefits on June 4, 1987. The two claims were consolidated, and an ALJ issued a decision awarding benefits on July 13, 1992.

The ALJ received opinions from five doctors. Dr. Diaz, the only doctor to examine Brown before his death, found that Brown suffered from pneumoconiosis and was totally disabled. Several other doctors performed autopsies. They reached conflicting conclusions. Dr. Rasheed found that Brown had pneumoconiosis with right sided congestive heart failure and concluded that pneumoconiosis was a major contributing factor in Brown's death. Dr. Ladewig concluded that Brown did not suffer pneumoconiosis. Dr. Hansbarger initially concluded that Brown did not suffer pneumoconiosis, but he later opined that Brown suffered mild pneumoconiosis. Dr. Naeye agreed that Brown had mild pneumoconiosis, but this doctor thought that the pneumoconiosis probably played no role in Brown's death.

The ALJ decided that each of the elements required for an award of disability benefits were present: (1) pneumoconiosis, (2) total disability, and (3) causation. See Jewell Smokeless Coal Corp. v. Street, 42 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir.1994).

First, the ALJ found that Brown suffered pneumoconiosis. He found pneumoconiosis established by x-ray evidence. See 20 C.F.R. Sec. 718.202(a)(1) (1995). Because Drs. Rasheed, Hansbarger, and Naeye all agreed that Brown had the disease, the ALJ found pneumoconiosis established by autopsy evidence as well. See id. at (a)(2). Finally, the ALJ found that Dr. Diaz's opinion (based on an evaluation two years before Brown died) established pneumoconiosis. See id. at (a)(4).

The ALJ next found that Brown was totally disabled. He first found that pulmonary function studies established total disability. See 20 C.F.R. Sec. 718.204(c)(1). Of the two pulmonary studies performed on Brown, only the second demonstrated qualifying values. According greater weight to this more recent study, the ALJ found Brown totally disabled. The ALJ also found that the doctors' examinations established total disability. See id. at (c)(3). Of the various reports, the ALJ found those of Drs. Hansbarger and Rasheed most persuasive. The two doctors had conflicting opinions on the presence of cor pulmonale. The ALJ applied the "true doubt rule" to resolve the conflict in Brown's favor.

The ALJ concluded generally that Brown had "established total disability due to pneumoconiosis." The ALJ did not, however, set out the factual basis for this conclusion.

The ALJ also concluded that Brown's widow was entitled to death benefits. The ALJ found that pneumoconiosis was a substantially contributing cause of Brown's death. See 20 C.F.R. Sec. 718.205(c)(2). He again concluded that the conflicting opinions of Drs. Rasheed and Hansbarger were the most persuasive opinions. However, he found Dr. Rasheed's opinion more persuasive than Dr. Hansbarger's and therefore found that Brown's death was due to pneumoconiosis. The ALJ noted that even if Dr. Rasheed's opinion were not more persuasive, the true doubt rule would nonetheless resolve the evidentiary conflict in Brown's favor.

The Board affirmed the award of benefits by following the ALJ's reasoning. However, in response to Peerless Eagle's contention that the ALJ failed to determine that Brown's pneumoconiosis caused total disability, the Board reasoned that the ALJ's finding of cor pulmonale with right sided congestive heart failure was substantial evidence that pneumoconiosis was a contributing cause of Brown's total disability. Peerless Eagle petitions for review.

II

We must affirm the factual findings of the ALJ if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole. Director, OWCP v. Consolidation Coal Co., 923 F.2d 38, 40-41 (4th Cir.1991). Subject to the substantial evidence requirement, the ALJ is entitled to make credibility determinations and resolve evidentiary inconsistencies. Grizzle v. Pickands Mather and Co., 994 F.2d 1093, 1096 (4th Cir.1993).

Peerless Eagle first challenges the ALJ's finding that Ray Brown suffered from pneumoconiosis. The ALJ found pneumoconiosis established by (1) x-ray reports, (2) autopsy reports, and (3) the opinion of Dr. Diaz. Peerless Eagle argues that the ALJ erred by attaching less weight to Dr. Ladewig's autopsy report than to the reports of other doctors. We disagree. First, ALJs, not appellate courts, weigh evidence. Grizzle, 994 F.2d at 1096; Zbosnick v. Badger Coal Co., 759 F.2d 1187, 1190 (4th Cir.1985). Second, after considering all relevant evidence, the ALJ found pneumoconiosis demonstrated independently by x-ray reports and Dr. Diaz's opinion. Thus, the ALJ's finding of pneumoconiosis is supported by substantial evidence, and we will not disturb it on appeal. Grizzle, 994 F.2d at 1096.

Peerless Eagle also contests the finding of total disability.

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