Pearson v. Wellpath Health Services

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided June 21, 2024·No. 7:24-cv-01657·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ROBERT PEARSON, Plaintiff, -against- 24-CV-1657 (KMK) WELLPATH HEALTH SERVICES; CRYSTAL, ORDER OF SERVICE CLINICIAN; ORANGE COUNTY JAIL; THE C.O.S OFFICERS THAT ORDER THE DRY CELL Defendants. KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who was detained at the Orange County Jail, brings this action, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights.1 By Order dated April 22, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.2 For the reasons set forth below, the Court directs: (1) the Clerk of Court, pursuant to Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to replace Defendant Orange County Jail with Orange County, and replace Defendant “the C.O.s Officers that order the dry cell,” with John Doe officers 1–5; (2) Orange County, under Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997), to assist Plaintiff in identifying Crystal and John Doe officers 1–5; and (3) service on Defendants Wellpath Health Services and Orange County. 1 It appears from the records of the New York State Unified Court System that on June 10, 2024, Plaintiff was released on his own recognizance. See https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/ webcrim_attorney/DefendantSearch[https://perma.cc/JYK7-J7GM]. Plaintiff as not yet updated the court with a new address. 2 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits—to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 2 action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible—not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

DISCUSSION A. Claims against Orange County Jail Because Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights, his federal claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, Plaintiff may not assert claims under Section 1983 against Orange County Jail. Section 1983 provides that an action may be maintained against a “person” who has deprived another of rights secured by the “Constitution and Laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Orange County Jail is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983. Whitley v. Westchester Cnty. Corr. Fac. Admin., No. 97-CV-420, 1997 WL 659100, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1997) (correctional facility or jail not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983); Marsden v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 856 F. Supp. 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 1994) (Orange County Jail is not suable under Section 1983). The Court

therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the Orange County Jail for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status and likely intention to assert claims against Orange County, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims against Orange County and directs the Clerk of Court to amend the caption of this action to replace Orange County Jail with Orange County. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. This amendment is without prejudice to any defenses Orange County may wish to assert.

3 B. Claims against “The C.O.s officers that order the dry cell” Throughout the Complaint, Plaintiff references several John Doe corrections officers whom he alleges were personally involved in the deprivation of his rights on January 25, 2024. Under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court, on its own motion, “may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” Fed R. Civ. P. 21; see Anwar v. Fairfield

Greenwich, Ltd., 118 F. Supp. 3d 591, 618–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (Rule 21 “afford[s] courts discretion to shape litigation in the interests of efficiency and justice”).

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