(PC) Torres v. Gipson

Opinion

JUAN MATIAS TORRES, CASE NO. 1:16-cv-1525-NONE-JLT (PC) Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL v. (Doc. 92) CONNIE GIPSON, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff moves for an order compelling Defendants to submit further responses to one interrogatory and two requests for production of documents. (Doc. 92.) Defendants oppose the motion. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion to compel will be denied. I. Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff is a pro se state inmate proceeding in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the operative pleading, Plaintiff complains of events that occurred at Corcoran State Prison in Corcoran, California (“CSP-COR”). His allegations may be summarized essentially as follows: On or around July 7, 2013, while housed at CSP-COR in a Security Housing Unit (“SHU”), Plaintiff participated in a hunger strike. On July 15, 2013, Plaintiff was issued a Rules Violation Report, which he alleges was fabricated, for his participation in the hunger strike. He was found g uilty of participation in the hunger strike and lost c redit and certain privileges. On July 25, Plaintiff appeared before the Institutional Classification Committee (“ICC”) for an annual review. There,

the ICC members determined that Plaintiff should be transferred to Pelican Bay SHU, the furthest

SHU from Plaintiff’s home and family.

On August 11, 2013, Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance regarding the allegedly fabricated

disciplinary action. After Plaintiff had completed his punishments for the disciplinary violation,

Plaintiff’s grievance was granted, and the Rules Violation Report was dismissed.

On August 23, 2013, Plaintiff’s transfer to the Pelican Bay SHU was approved with a

transfer expiration date of December 21, 2013. Plaintiff was still housed in the CSP-COR SHU

when that date passed.

On December 24, 2013, Defendants Smith, Prince, Henderson, Mayo, Galaviz, and

Weaver held a 180-day review ICC hearing, although 180 days had not yet passed since the last

ICC hearing. The panel put Plaintiff back up for transfer to Pelican Bay despite his hardship request

for a move to the SHU at CSP-Sacramento. Plaintiff claims that the Defendants’ decision to transfer

him to Pelican Bay was in retaliation for Plaintiff’s protected First Amendment activity of filing a

prison grievance regarding the fabricated July disciplinary action.

B. Discovery Procedural Background

On or around November 2019, Plaintiff served Interrogatories on Defendants, which

included Interrogatory No. 5 asking, “During December 2013 how many inmates were validated

prison gang members with indeterminate S.H.U. terms and housed accordingly at Corcoran S.H.U.

Please give a number.” (Doc. 92 at 1.)

Defendants objected to the interrogatory “as vague and ambiguous as to the terms ‘During

December 2013’ and ‘housed accordingly.’” See Defs.’ Obj. Ex. C. They also objected that “the

request [is] unduly burdensome and not proportional to the needs of the case. Defendant[s] object

that the burden and expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. To the extent

Plaintiff is seeking access to other inmates’ files with this interrogatory, Defendants object to the

request as seeking documents that include the privation information of third parties.” Id. Subject to

that objection, Defendants’ response was, “Defendants lack information sufficient to state the

number of inmates in December 2013 in Corcoran S.H.U. that were validated prison gang members

with indeterminate S.H.U. terms.” Id.

Plaintiff also served requests for production of documents, two of which are at issue here:

Request for Production No. 1

Documents in CDCR possession that contains the S.H.U. population

at Corcoran S.H.U. 4B and 4A yards in December 2013. Please have actual number amount.

Request for Production No. 2 Out of the documents that contacts the S.H.U. population at Corcoran S.H.U. 4B and 4A yards, how many prisoners were serving a S.H.U. term due to prison gang validation as a validated prison gang member during December 2013. Please give actual number amount.

(Doc. 92 at 2.) Defendants objected generally to Requests for Production Nos. 1 and 2 as follows:

Defendants object that this request does not describe a category of

documents with reasonable particularity, and does not seek production under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, but rather seeks

specific information, which is properly requested under rule 33.

Defendants object to the request as unduly burdensome and not proportional to the needs of the case. Defendants object that the

burden and expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. To the extent Plaintiff is seeking access to other inmates’

files with this request, Defendants object to the request as seeking private information of third parties.

See, e.g., Defs.’ Obj. Ex. A. Subject to those objections, Defendants’ response to Request for Production No. 1 was “The information sought is contained in Defendants’ responses to interrogatory number [6].”1 Id. Interrogatory No. 6 asked, “During December 2013 what was the number amount of cells at

Corcoran S.H.U. 4A and 4B yards both yards that held S.H.U. inmates please give a number amount.” Defs.’ Obj. Ex. C. Defendants objected to this interrogatory on various grounds and then responded, “The capacity for yard 4A at Corcoran is 1,024. The capacity for yard 4B at Corcoran

is 1,024.” Id.

1 Defendants’ initial response misidentified the referenced interrogatory. See Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl’s Mot. Compel at 4- 5. They have since served an amended response to Plaintiff identifying Interrogatory No. 6. See id. Defendants’ response to Request for Production No. 2 was, “After a reasonable search,

Defendants have not located a document stating the number of inmates in Corcoran S.H.U. 4B and

4A yards that were serving a S.H.U. term due to prison gang validation in December 2013.” Id.

II. Legal Standards

Under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[p]arties may obtain discovery

regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional

to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount

in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the

importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the

proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need

not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

“Relevance for purposes of discovery is defined very broadly.” Garneau v. City of Seattle,

147 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 1998). In response to a request for production of documents under Rule

34, a party is to produce all relevant documents in its “possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 34(a)(1). The purpose of discovery is to “remove surprise from trial preparation so the

parties can obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.” United States v.

Chapman Univ., 245 F.R.D. 646, 648 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (quotation and citation omitted).

Under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “a party seeking discovery may

move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(a)(3)(B). The court may order a party to provide further responses to an “evasive or incomplete

disclosure, answer, or response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). “District courts have ‘broad discretion

to manage discovery and to control the course of litigation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

16.’” Hunt v. County of Orange, 672 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Avila v. Willits Envtl.

Remediation Trust, 633 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 2011)).

“The party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of establishing that its request

satisfies the relevancy requirements of Rule 26(b)(1). Thereafter, the party opposing discovery has

the burden of showing that the discovery should be prohibited, and the burden of clarifying,

explaining or supporting its objections.” Bryant v. Ochoa, 2009 WL 1390794, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May

14, 2009) (citations omitted).

Specifically, the party moving to compel bears the burden of informing the court (1) which

discovery requests are the subject of the motion to compel, (2) which of the responses are disputed,

(3) why the party believes the response is deficient, (4) why any objections are not justified, and

(5) why the information sought through discovery is relevant to the prosecution of this action.

McCoy v. Ramirez, 2016 WL 3196738, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2016); Ellis v. Cambra, 2008 WL

860523, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2008).

III. Discussion

By way of his discovery requests, Plaintiff seeks information regarding the total number of

inmates and/or the total number of validated gang members housed in the SHU at CSP-COR during

December 2013. Plaintiff claims this information “has a major significance to his case because it

makes a showing of how many validated prison gang members were properly housed at Corcoran-

S.H.U.” Pl.’s Mot. Compel at 1. Plaintiff argues that this information should be provided to him

because it is in the Defendants’ custody, possession, or control.

Defendants counter that they do not have any further information responsive to

Interrogatory No. 5 and that they do not have documents responsive to Requests for Production

Nos. 1 and 2 because the institution does not keep track of this type of information. Concerning the

document requests, Defendants contend that they are improper because they are not seeking the

production of documents so much as the creation of documents. In support, Defendants submit the

declaration of CSP-COR’s Litigation Coordinator, D. Goree, who states that “CSP-Corcoran does

not keep a database where that specific information is readily available. To attempt to acquire the

information requested, CDCR would first have to determine which inmates were housed in the

CSP-Corcoran SHU in December 2013, then manually go through each individual inmate’s file to

attempt to determine what the reason was for the SHU housing. Considering that the SHU capacity

is over 2,000 inmates, that would be an enormous task.” Decl. of G. Goree in Supp. of Defs.’ Opp’n

to Pl.’s Mot. Compel ⁋ 5 (Doc. 93-1). “In addition, even undertaking the procedure outlined above

would not be likely to lead to accurate results because it is not always clear when looking back at individual inmate files why that inmate was in SHU at a specific time. There is also a possibility of

an inmate being in SHU for multiple reasons.” Id. ⁋ 6. Relatedly, Defendants have submitted

verified responses to Interrogatory No. 5 stating that they do not have the information sought.

In his reply, Plaintiff insists that the information he seeks is electronically stored within

CDCR’s systems. (Doc. 103.) He contends that “when a prisoner is given a S.H.U. term it is like

being sent to a prison within a prison. CDCR documents and keeps data of what his S.H.U. offense

was and why the prisoner was given a S.H.U. term. It is electronically stored data held within the

California prison and CDCR obtains it.” Id. 2. As for the information’s relevance, Plaintiff claims

that it “is because Defendants are claiming that California State Prison – Corcoran S.H.U. was

primarily being used for patients in the mental health services delivery system. However, although

Corcoran S.H.U. did house mental health patients, that was not the majority housed at Corcoran

S.H.U. and the majority housed there was prison gang validated members/associates and that is

important because Defendants are claiming that Pelican Bay State Prison was the only prison that

housed validated prison gang members / associates. However, this statement by Defendants is false,

which is why Plaintiff is requesting documents that support and show the actual number of

prisoners serving a S.H.U. term due to prison gang validation.” Id. 3.

The Court has carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs and arguments in support of and in

opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to compel. Though the Court is satisfied that the documents and

information sought by Plaintiff are at least marginally relevant to show that the Defendants’

purported reason for his transfer from the CSP-COR SHU (i.e., that the SHU was only permitted

to house mentally ill inmates) was pretextual, the Defendants have properly asserted that the

specific information sought by Plaintiff in Interrogatory No. 5 and Requests for Production Nos. 1 and 2 are not reasonably available to them.2 This is not to say that the information, in some raw

form, is not in CDCR’s custody, possession, or control—for example, in individual inmates’ files.

Defendants concede this fact. See Goree Decl. ⁋⁋ 5-6. But the relevant inquiry is whether that

2 Insofar as Defendants intend to rely on the contention that Plaintiff’s transfer was approved because the CSP-COR SHU was primarily intended to house mentally ill inmates, they would of course be required to support that contention with evidence. Because they demonstrate that the evidence is not readily available, they too would be precluded from presenting this evidence. information is readily available through reasonable efforts or whether Defendants must undergo

unreasonable efforts to compile information to adequately respond to the requests. Defendants

argue that the information sought is not readily available since CDCR does not maintain lists of

individuals housed in the SHU at any given time and it does not maintain records identifying the

reason(s) for inmates’ placement in the SHU. Moreover, because multiple preliminary and time-

consuming steps are required to compile the relevant information, Defendants argue that any further

responses would be unduly burdensome.

Defendants’ objections are well-taken. Defendants submit that there is no CDCR document

or report that would be responsive to Plaintiff’s discovery requests or that would allow them to

provide further responses to the requests. “As a general matter, a party cannot invoke Rule 34(a) to

require another party to create or prepare a new or previously non-existent document solely for its

production.” Mir v. L-3 Communications Integrated Sys., L.P., 319 F.R.D. 220, 227 (N.D. Tex.

2016) (quotations and citations omitted). Additionally, Defendants have shown that any further

effort to respond to Interrogatory No. 5 and/or Requests for Production Nos. 1-2 would be

disproportionately burdensome due to the lack of pre-existing records and the number of inmates

who may have been housed in the CSP-COR SHU in December 2013, which has a capacity of over

2000 inmates on any given day. See Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292, 296–97

(E.D. Pa. 1980) (The responding party “must show specifically how, despite the broad and liberal

construction afforded the federal discovery rules, each interrogatory is not relevant or how each

question is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive by submitting affidavits or offering evidence

revealing the nature of the burden.”). Because Defendants have met their burden in opposing

Plaintiff’s motion to compel, said motion will be denied.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to compel (Doc. 92).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 25, 2020 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE