1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LORRAINE RIPPLE, Case No. 1:22-cv-01102-HBK (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 13 v. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION1
14 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF ORDER TO CLERK OF COURT TO ASSIGN CORRECTIONS AND TO A DISTRICT JUDGE 15 REHABILITATION, ET. AL., 14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD 16 Defendants. (Doc. No. 7) 17 18 I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS 19 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction filed on 20 October 18, 2022. (Doc. No. 7). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends 21 the district court deny the motion. 22 A. Allegations in Complaint 23 Plaintiff Lorraine Ripple, a state prisoner incarcerated in the California Department of 24 Corrections (“CDCR”) at the Central California Women’s Facility (“CCWF”), initiated this 25 action pro se by filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1). The 26 Complaint identifies five Defendants: CDCR, Kathleen Allison, the Secretary of CDCR, Howard 27 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 28 (E.D. Cal. 2022). 1 Moseley, Association Director, M.E. Spearman, Associate Director, and Mike Pallares, Warden. 2 Liberally construed, the Complaint alleges three unrelated claims for relief. First, Plaintiff 3 complains since 2021 through present, she has been denied access to any self-help programs due 4 to the Covid-19 pandemic. (Doc. No. 1 at 3). These self-help programs, lead to milestones 5 awarded, and go toward early release dates. (Id.). In her second claim, Plaintiff complains that 6 CDCR is implementing policy changes regarding J-Pay tablets wherein inmates cannot transfer 7 downloaded material from the J-Pay tablet to the new Via Path tablet. (Id. at 4). Under the 8 policy, J-Pay tablets will be deemed “contraband.” (Id.). Liberally construed, Plaintiff argues the 9 policy violates her Fifth Amendment Due Process rights. Finally, Plaintiff appears to allege an 10 Equal Protection Claim in her third claim on the basis that all male prisoners within CDCR are 11 provided with cable in their cells for CDCR announcement and weekly movie rentals. (Id. at 6). 12 B. Preliminary Injunction Motion 13 Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction consists of one sentence. (Doc. No. 7). 14 Plaintiff requests an injunction directed at correctional officials “barring confiscation” of J-Pay 15 Tablets “personally purchased by inmates” until the Court issues an order in this case or the 16 California Superior Court issues a decision in case no. 34-2021-80003594. Thus, the injunctive 17 relief Plaintiff seeks is directed only at her second claim in her Complaint. 18 II. APPLICABLE LAW 19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs injunctions and restraining orders. A 20 preliminary injunctive requires “notice to the adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). A 21 temporary restraining order may be issued “without notice” only if “specific facts in an affidavit 22 or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate, and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will 23 result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition,” as well as written 24 certification from the movant’s attorney stating, “any efforts made to give notice and the reasons 25 why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). 26 Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are governed by the same 27 standard, with the exception that preliminary injunctions require notice to the adverse party. See 28 Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 181 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1126 (E.D. 1 Ca. 2001); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a). Eastern District of California Local Rule 231, however, 2 requires notice for temporary restraining orders as well, “[e]xcept in the most extraordinary of 3 circumstances,” and the court considers whether the applicant could have sought relief by motion 4 for preliminary injunction at an earlier date. Local Rule 231(a)-(b) (E.D. Cal. 2019). A 5 temporary restraining order “should be restricted to serving [its] underlying purpose of preserving 6 the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and 7 no longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, 8 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). Both preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders require 9 briefs on the relevant issues, affidavits, and proposed order for a bond. L.R. 230. 10 Because a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary 11 remedy,” it may be issued only if the moving party establishes: (1) likelihood of success on the 12 merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance 13 of equities tips in his/her favor; (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. 14 Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The moving party bears the burden of clearly satisfying 15 all four prongs. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). A 16 TRO will not issue if the moving party merely shows irreparable harm is possible – a showing of 17 likelihood is required. Id. at 1131. The Ninth Circuit also has a second test, holding that a party 18 requesting relief is entitled to a preliminary injunction if it demonstrates: (1) a combination of 19 probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or (2) that serious 20 questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor. Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. 21 & Naturalization Serv, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985); see also McKinney v. Hill, 925 F.2d at 22 1470 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting same). 23 The injunctive relief an applicant requests must relate to the claims brought in the 24 complaint. See Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 25 2015) (“When a Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief based on claims not pled in the complaint, the 26 court does not have the authority to issue an injunction.”). Absent a nexus between the injury 27 claimed in the motion and the underlying complaint, the court lacks the authority to grant Plaintiff 28 any relief. Id. at 636. 1 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) imposes additional requirements on prisoner 2 litigants seeking preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials. In such cases, 3 “[p]reliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to 4 correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means 5 necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LORRAINE RIPPLE, Case No. 1:22-cv-01102-HBK (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 13 v. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION1
14 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF ORDER TO CLERK OF COURT TO ASSIGN CORRECTIONS AND TO A DISTRICT JUDGE 15 REHABILITATION, ET. AL., 14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD 16 Defendants. (Doc. No. 7) 17 18 I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS 19 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction filed on 20 October 18, 2022. (Doc. No. 7). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends 21 the district court deny the motion. 22 A. Allegations in Complaint 23 Plaintiff Lorraine Ripple, a state prisoner incarcerated in the California Department of 24 Corrections (“CDCR”) at the Central California Women’s Facility (“CCWF”), initiated this 25 action pro se by filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1). The 26 Complaint identifies five Defendants: CDCR, Kathleen Allison, the Secretary of CDCR, Howard 27 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 28 (E.D. Cal. 2022). 1 Moseley, Association Director, M.E. Spearman, Associate Director, and Mike Pallares, Warden. 2 Liberally construed, the Complaint alleges three unrelated claims for relief. First, Plaintiff 3 complains since 2021 through present, she has been denied access to any self-help programs due 4 to the Covid-19 pandemic. (Doc. No. 1 at 3). These self-help programs, lead to milestones 5 awarded, and go toward early release dates. (Id.). In her second claim, Plaintiff complains that 6 CDCR is implementing policy changes regarding J-Pay tablets wherein inmates cannot transfer 7 downloaded material from the J-Pay tablet to the new Via Path tablet. (Id. at 4). Under the 8 policy, J-Pay tablets will be deemed “contraband.” (Id.). Liberally construed, Plaintiff argues the 9 policy violates her Fifth Amendment Due Process rights. Finally, Plaintiff appears to allege an 10 Equal Protection Claim in her third claim on the basis that all male prisoners within CDCR are 11 provided with cable in their cells for CDCR announcement and weekly movie rentals. (Id. at 6). 12 B. Preliminary Injunction Motion 13 Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction consists of one sentence. (Doc. No. 7). 14 Plaintiff requests an injunction directed at correctional officials “barring confiscation” of J-Pay 15 Tablets “personally purchased by inmates” until the Court issues an order in this case or the 16 California Superior Court issues a decision in case no. 34-2021-80003594. Thus, the injunctive 17 relief Plaintiff seeks is directed only at her second claim in her Complaint. 18 II. APPLICABLE LAW 19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs injunctions and restraining orders. A 20 preliminary injunctive requires “notice to the adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). A 21 temporary restraining order may be issued “without notice” only if “specific facts in an affidavit 22 or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate, and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will 23 result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition,” as well as written 24 certification from the movant’s attorney stating, “any efforts made to give notice and the reasons 25 why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). 26 Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are governed by the same 27 standard, with the exception that preliminary injunctions require notice to the adverse party. See 28 Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 181 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1126 (E.D. 1 Ca. 2001); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a). Eastern District of California Local Rule 231, however, 2 requires notice for temporary restraining orders as well, “[e]xcept in the most extraordinary of 3 circumstances,” and the court considers whether the applicant could have sought relief by motion 4 for preliminary injunction at an earlier date. Local Rule 231(a)-(b) (E.D. Cal. 2019). A 5 temporary restraining order “should be restricted to serving [its] underlying purpose of preserving 6 the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and 7 no longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, 8 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). Both preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders require 9 briefs on the relevant issues, affidavits, and proposed order for a bond. L.R. 230. 10 Because a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary 11 remedy,” it may be issued only if the moving party establishes: (1) likelihood of success on the 12 merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance 13 of equities tips in his/her favor; (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. 14 Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The moving party bears the burden of clearly satisfying 15 all four prongs. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). A 16 TRO will not issue if the moving party merely shows irreparable harm is possible – a showing of 17 likelihood is required. Id. at 1131. The Ninth Circuit also has a second test, holding that a party 18 requesting relief is entitled to a preliminary injunction if it demonstrates: (1) a combination of 19 probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or (2) that serious 20 questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor. Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. 21 & Naturalization Serv, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985); see also McKinney v. Hill, 925 F.2d at 22 1470 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting same). 23 The injunctive relief an applicant requests must relate to the claims brought in the 24 complaint. See Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 25 2015) (“When a Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief based on claims not pled in the complaint, the 26 court does not have the authority to issue an injunction.”). Absent a nexus between the injury 27 claimed in the motion and the underlying complaint, the court lacks the authority to grant Plaintiff 28 any relief. Id. at 636. 1 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) imposes additional requirements on prisoner 2 litigants seeking preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials. In such cases, 3 “[p]reliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to 4 correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means 5 necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); Villery v. California Dep't of Corr., 6 2016 WL 70326, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2016). As the Ninth Circuit has observed, the PLRA 7 places significant limits upon a court’s power to grant preliminary injunctive relief to inmates, 8 and “operates simultaneously to restrict the equity jurisdiction of federal courts and to protect the 9 bargaining power of prison administrators—no longer may courts grant or approve relief that 10 binds prison administrators to do more than the constitutional minimum.” Gilmore v. People of 11 the State of California, 220 F.3d 987, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2000). The court’s jurisdiction is “limited 12 to the parties in this action” and the pendency of an action “does not give the Court jurisdiction 13 over prison officials in general or over the conditions of an inmate's confinement unrelated to the 14 claims before it.” Beaton v. Miller, 2020 WL 5847014, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2020). Further, 15 state governments have “traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the dispatch of [their] 16 own internal affairs.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423, U.S. 362, 378 (1976) (citations omitted). This 17 deference applies even more strongly when the court is asked to involve itself in the 18 administrative decisions of a prison. See Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987); Sandin v. 19 Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482-83 (1995). 20 III. DISCUSSION 21 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds Plaintiff’s motion facially deficient and 22 otherwise lacking merit to warrant issuance of injunctive relief. At the outset, although Plaintiff 23 moves for a preliminary injunction, she does not certify that notice was given to Defendants. 24 Nor, to the extent she seeks a temporary restraining order, does she certify in writing the efforts, 25 if any, which he made to give notice and reasons supporting why notice should not be required. 26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Further, Plaintiff fails to address any of the four factors necessary to 27 warrant an issuance of a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. 28 Nonetheless, in applying the four factors, significant here is Plaintiff’s inability to show 1 that she is likely to suffer irreparable harm or is likely to prevail on the merits of her claim for 2 relief concerning the J-Pay tablets. Although Plaintiff wants to retain her J-Pay tablet or be 3 financially compensated for the tablet, she has not demonstrated any irreparable harm if the Court 4 does grant her injunctive relief. (See Doc. No. 1 at 4-5). “An irreparable harm is one that cannot 5 be redressed by a legal or equitable remedy following trial. AAA Alarm & Sec. v. A3 Smart Home 6 LP, 2021 WL 3857417, *8 (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2021) (citing Public Util. Comm’n v. FERC, 814 7 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1987)). “Mere financial injury does not constitute irreparable harm if 8 adequate compensatory relief will be available in the course of litigation.” Id. (citing Sampson v. 9 Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974)). There are equitable legal remedies available to Plaintiff if she 10 is successful in litigating her Complaint including adequate compensatory relief. As a result, 11 Plaintiff will not suffer irreparable harm if her request for a preliminary injunction and temporary 12 restraining order are denied. 13 Further, Plaintiff is unlikely to prevail on her construed Fifth Amendment claim. “[A] 14 negligent or intentional deprivation of a prisoner’s property fails to state a claim under section 15 1983 if the state has an adequate post deprivation remedy.” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 16 (9th Cir. 1994). California has an adequate post-deprivation remedy, see Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810, 17 et seq., so no claim under §1983 exists. 18 Moreover, Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order 19 runs afoul of the PLRA. Plaintiff is requesting the Court restrain correctional officials from 20 seizing J-Pay tablets from all inmates. Such a request is not narrowly drawn but is broad relief 21 the PLRA and courts have eliminated. See 18 U.S.C. § 36265(a)(2); Villery, 2016 WL 70326 at 22 *3; Gilmore, 220 F.3d 987 at 998-99. 23 Finally, this Court must have personal jurisdiction over the parties to be enjoined. The 24 Court may not enjoin Defendants not yet served or before the Court. Zepeda, 753 F.2d 719, 727 25 (9th Cir. 1983). Here, the Court has not screened the operative complaint so Defendants have not 26 received service of process. Thus, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. 27 Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 28 The Clerk of Court shall assign a district judge to the case. 1 It is further RECOMMENDED: 2 Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 7) be DENIED. 3 NOTICE TO PARTIES 4 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 5 || assigned to the case under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) days 6 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, a party may file written objections 7 | with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 8 | and Recommendations.” Parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified 9 | time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 10 | (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 11 | Dated: _ November 1, 2022 Wile. Th fareh Zack 13 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA 4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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