(PC) Pinson v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

District Court, E.D. California·Decided April 10, 2023·No. 2:23-cv-00006·Unknown

Opinion

JEREMY PINSON, No. 2:23-cv-00006-EFB (PC) Plaintiff, v. ORDER FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff is a federal prisoner proceeding without counsel in this civil action. In addition to filing a complaint (ECF No. 1), she has filed an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 4). The court will grant the application and screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Plaintiff’s application makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). However, court records reflect that plaintiff was previously determined to have filed at least three cases that were dismissed for failure to state a claim or as frivolous, meaning that plaintiff is a three-strikes litigant for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Pinson c. CDCR, No. 3:13-cv- 05502-VC (N.D. Cal. Feb, 20, 2015); Pinson v. FBI, No. 3:14-cv-04319-VC (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2015). ///// An exception to the three-strikes rule exists “if the complaint makes a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, plaintiff’s complaint satisfies the imminent danger exception. See ECF No. 1 (alleging that plaintiff, a transgender inmate, is routinely subject to sexual and physical abuse and that her long-term segregated housing causes her to feel suicidal). Accordingly, plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. By separate order, the court directs the agency having custody of plaintiff to collect and forward the appropriate monthly payments for the filing fee as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) and (2). Screening Standards Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of Rule 8, its allegations must also include the specificity required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-557. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of ///// a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Screening Order The only claims that may proceed in this action must relate to the alleged imminent danger. See Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 700 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, the alleged imminent danger concerns the risk to plaintiff of sexual and physical abuse and the mental toll she suffers from long-term segregated housing. Plaintiff alleges she has experienced abuse while housed in both California and Arizona, but she is currently confined to USP-Tucson in Arizona.1 ECF No. 1 at 1, 3. Plaintiff alleges she is currently exposed to an inmate who threatens to rape her daily. Id. at 3. She further alleges that she is mentally ill and has been housed in segregation for years with only minor breaks, causing her to feel suicidal. Id. at 4. None of the defendants named are staff at USP-Tucson. Instead, plaintiff has named Rios and Hinckle as defendants, both of whom are alleged to be Regional Directors of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, located in Stockton, California. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff alleges that these defendants are responsible for supervising, training, and disciplining staff. Id. at 3. She further contends that they have ignored her allegations of staff misconduct and her pleas for help. Id. at 3-4. As a result, she claims she has suffered more than five serious assaults requiring hospitalization. Id. at 3.

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Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Scheuer v. Rhodes
416 U.S. 232 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Andrews v. Cervantes
493 F.3d 1047 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Starr v. Baca
652 F.3d 1202 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Johnson v. Duffy
588 F.2d 740 (Ninth Circuit, 1978)