(PC) Dillingham v. Emerson

District Court, E.D. California·Decided July 27, 2021·No. 1:18-cv-00507·Unknown

Opinion

JERRY DILLINGHAM, Case No. 1:18-cv-00507-AWI-SAB (PC) Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION v. FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT N. EMERSON, et al., (ECF No. 94) Defendants. Plaintiff Jerry Dillingham is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, filed on November 25, 2020. I. This action is proceeding on Plaintiff’s second amended complaint against Defendants Emerson, Wilson, Wescoat, Velasco, Loftin, Martinez, Marsh and Doe 1 for conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and against Defendant Wescoat for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.1 (ECF No. 50.) 1 Plaintiff identified Defendant Martinez as “Martines”, and the Court’s docket reflects that spelling. However, papers filed by Defendants state that his/her name is correctly spelled “Martinez.” The docket will be updated accordingly. On August 19, 2019, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 54.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on November 12, 2019, and Defendants filed a reply on November 20, 2019. (ECF Nos. 59, 60.) On December 19, 2019, the undersigned issued Findings and Recommendations recommending that Defendants’ motion to dismiss be denied. (ECF No. 61.) The Findings and Recommendations were adopted in full on February 20, 2020. (ECF No. 66.) On March 24, 2020, Defendants filed an answer to the complaint on March 24, 2020. (ECF No. 68.) Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment on November 25, 2020. (ECF No. 94.) On November 30, 2020, Defendants filed a motion to stay discovery and modify the scheduling order. (ECF No. 95.) On January 5, 2021, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to stay merits-based discovery and vacated the discovery and dispositive motions deadlines. (ECF No. 99.) Although Plaintiff requested and received three extensions of time to file an opposition, he has not filed an opposition to the instant motion for summary judgment and the time to do so has expired. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is submitted for review without oral argument. Local Rule 230(l). II. A. Statutory Exhaustion Requirement Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory unless unavailable. Exhaustion is required regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001), and the exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Section 1997e(a) also requires “proper exhaustion of administrative remedies, which ‘means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).’” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (citation omitted). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effective without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Id. at 90-91. “[I]t is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). “The obligation to exhaust ‘available’ remedies persists as long as some remedy remains ‘available.’ Once that is no longer the case, then there are no ‘remedies … available,’ and the prisoner need not further pursue the grievance.” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). The failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and the defendant or defendants bear the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 216; Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). “In the rare event that a failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, a defendant may move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. Otherwise, the defendant or defendants must produce evidence proving the failure to exhaust, and they are entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56 only if the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, shows the plaintiff failed to exhaust. Id. B. Summary Judgment Standard Any party may move for summary judgment, and the Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (quotation marks omitted); Albino, 747 F.3d at c1166; Wash. Mut. Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Each party’s position, whether it be that a fact is disputed or undisputed, must be supported by (1) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The Court may consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, although it is not required to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); accord Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). “The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2014). Initially, “the defendant’s burden is to prove that there was an available administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. If the defendant meets that burden, the burden of production then shifts to the plaintiff to “come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. However, the ultimate burden of proof on the issue of administrative exhaustion remains with the defendant. Id. “If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner shows a failure to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56.” Id. at 1166. However, “[i]f material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be deni

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