(PC) Dillingham v. Emerson

District Court, E.D. California·Decided April 27, 2021·No. 1:18-cv-00507·Unknown

Opinion

JERRY DILLINGHAM, Case No. 1:18-cv-00507-AWI-SAB (PC) Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL, AND DIRECTING ANY v. OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ PENDING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE N. EMERSON, et al., FILED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS Defendants. (ECF No. 102) Plaintiff Jerry Dillingham is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to compel, filed on March 4, 2021. I. This action is proceeding on Plaintiff’s second amended complaint against Defendants Emerson, Wilson, Wescoat, Velasco, Loftin, Martinez, Marsh and Doe 1 for conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and against Defendant Wescoat for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. (ECF No. 50.) On March 24, 2020, Defendants filed an answer to the complaint on March 24, 2020. (ECF No. 68.) On November 25, 2020, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust the administrative remedies. (ECF No. 94.) On November 30, 2020, Defendants filed a motion to stay discovery and modify the scheduling order. (ECF No. 95.) On January 5, 2021, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to stay merits-based discovery and vacated the discovery and dispositive motions deadlines. (ECF No. 99.) On December 21, 2020, and January 29, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff an extension of time to file an opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 98, 101 On March 4, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel. (ECF No. 102.) Defendants filed an opposition on March 25, 2021. (ECF No. 103.) Plaintiff did not file a reply and the time to do so has now passed. Local Rule 230(l). II. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and he is a state prisoner challenging his conditions of confinement. As a result, the parties were relieved of some of the requirements which would otherwise apply, including initial disclosure and the need to meet and confer in good faith prior to involving the Court in a discovery dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1); Local Rules 240, 251; ECF No. 87. Further, where otherwise discoverable information would pose a threat to the safety and security of the prison or infringe upon a protected privacy interest, a need may arise for the Court to balance interests in determining whether disclosure should occur. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 n.21 (1984) (privacy rights or interests implicit in broad purpose and language of Rule 26(c)); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Montana, 408 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing assertion of privilege); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (recognizing a constitutionally-based right of privacy that can be raised in discovery); see also Garcia v. Clark, No. 1:10-CV-00447-LJO-DLB PC, 2012 WL 1232315, at *6 n.5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2012) (noting inmate’s entitlement to inspect discoverable information may be accommodated in ways which mitigate institutional safety concerns); Robinson v. Adams, No. 1:08-cv-01380-AWI-BAM PC, 2012 WL 912746, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2012) (issuing protective order regarding documents containing information which implicated the safety and security of the prison); Orr v. Hernandez, No. CV- 08-0472-JLQ, 2012 WL 761355, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2012) (addressing requests for protective order and for redaction of information asserted to risk jeopardizing safety and security of inmates or the institution if released); Womack v. Virga, No. CIV S-11-1030 MCE EFB P, 2011 WL 6703958, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2011) (requiring defendants to submit withheld documents for in camera review or move for a protective order). However, this is a civil action to which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply. The discovery process is subject to the overriding limitation of good faith, and callous disregard of discovery responsibilities cannot be condoned. Asea, Inc. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1246 (9th Cir. 1981) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Generally, if the responding party objects to a discovery request, the party moving to compel bears the burden of demonstrating why the objections are not justified. Grabek v. Dickinson, No. CIV S-10-2892 GGH P, 2012 WL 113799, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2012); Womack, 2011 WL 6703958, at *3; Mitchell v. Felker, No. CV 08-119RAJ, 2010 WL 3835765, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 29, 2010); Ellis v. Cambra, No. 1:02-cv-05646-AWI-SMS PC, 2008 WL 860523, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2008). This requires the moving party to inform the Court which discovery requests are the subject of the motion to compel, and, for each disputed response, why the information sought is relevant and why the responding party’s objections are not meritorious. Grabek, 2012 WL 113799, at *1; Womack, 2011 WL 6703958, at *3; Mitchell, 2010 WL 3835765, at *2; Ellis, 2008 WL 860523, at *4. However, the Court is vested with broad discretion to manage discovery and notwithstanding these procedures, Plaintiff is entitled to leniency as a pro se litigant; therefore, to the extent possible, the Court endeavors to resolve his motion to compel on its merits. Hunt v. County of Orange, 672 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2012); Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Productions, 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) permits a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to request an order deferring the time to respond to the motion and permitting that party to conduct additional discovery upon an adequate factual showing. Rule 56(d) provides that the party must “show[ ] by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). “A party requesting a continuance pursuant to [Rule 56(d) ] must identify by affidavit the specific facts that further discovery would reveal, and explain why those facts would preclude summary judgment.” Tatum v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). “Though the conduct of discovery is generally left to a district court's discretion, summary judgment is disfavored where relevant evidence remains to be discovered, particularly in cases involving confined pro se plaintiffs.” Klingele v. Eikenberry,

(PC) Dillingham v. Emerson, (E.D. Cal. 2021).

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