(PC) Brummett v. Martinez

District Court, E.D. California·Decided August 14, 2024·No. 1:21-cv-00086·Unknown

Opinion

MELVIN RAY BRUMMETT, JR., Case No. 1:21-cv-00086-BAM (PC) Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION v. FOR ATTENDANCE OF INCARCERATED WITNESSES MARTINEZ, (ECF No. 111)

Defendants. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ATTENDANCE OF (ECF No. 113) ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR WITNESSES MOORE AND GARCIA TO TESTIFY BY VIDEO (ECF No. 117) I. Introduction Plaintiff Melvin Ray Brummett, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. All parties have consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 105.) This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Martinez (“Defendant”) for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment and deliberate indifference to risk of harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The case is set for a jury trial commencing October 16, 2024, before the undersigned. /// Pursuant to the Court’s March 26, 2024 Second Scheduling Order, (ECF No. 107), Plaintiff submitted a pretrial statement on May 30, 2024, including a request for attendance of incarcerated witnesses. (ECF No. 111.) Defendant filed a motion for attendance of incarcerated witnesses on June 18, 2024. (ECF No. 113.) In his pretrial statement, filed July 18, 2024, Defendant also objects to one of Plaintiff’s requested incarcerated witnesses, and requests that two witnesses be permitted to testify by video. (ECF No. 117.) The parties also submitted further argument during the pretrial conference held via videoconference on August 13, 2024. The various motions and requests are deemed submitted. Local Rule 230(l). II. Incarcerated Witnesses In determining whether to grant the motions for the attendance of incarcerated witnesses, the Court considers the following factors: (1) whether the inmate’s presence will substantially further the resolution of the case, (2) the security risks presented by the inmate’s presence, (3) the expense of transportation and security, and (4) whether the suit can be stayed until the inmate is released without prejudice to the cause asserted. Wiggins v. County of Alameda, 717 F.2d 466, 468 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994) (district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded the inconvenience and expense of transporting inmate witness outweighed any benefit he could provide where the importance of the witness’s testimony could not be determined), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). A. Inmates Steven Moore and Walter Slone Both parties request the attendance of Inmates Steven Moore (CDCR #AK-2727) and Walter Slone (CDCR #F-32882). (ECF Nos. 111, 113.) Although the parties present differing versions of the testimony to be given by these witnesses, it appears both have relevant testimony that will not result in undue delay, a waste of time, or the needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The parties requests for attendance of Inmates Moore and Slone are granted. The Court will address the request for Inmate Moore to testify by video below and will issue the necessary transportation orders for these witnesses’ appearances at trial in due course. /// B. Inmate Johnathan Lee Smith Plaintiff does not know if Inmate Johnathan Lee Smith (CDCR #V32367) would be willing to testify, but if called, Inmate Smith could testify to the allegations in the declaration, signed under penalty of perjury, filed in support of Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 68, p. 34.) The declaration provides that, on or about May 27, 2020, Smith witnessed Plaintiff arguing with other unidentified inmates, wherein the other inmates were accusing Plaintiff of snitching on Inmate Slone for stealing laundry and for then fighting with Slone. Plaintiff told the other inmates not to believe a free staff over an inmate, and Defendant was lying. The other inmates told Plaintiff that if they found out that he snitched on Slone that they were going to deal with it. (Id.) Defendant objects to the attendance of Inmate Smith. (ECF No. 117, p. 11.) Defendant argues that the proffered testimony constitutes an out of court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted, is inadmissible hearsay, and Inmate Smith should be prohibited from testifying. (Id.) Plaintiff did not file a response. At the pretrial conference, Plaintiff confirmed the Inmate Smith would testify as to the substance of the declaration. Plaintiff’s motion for attendance of Inmate Smith is denied. According to the declaration provided, Inmate Smith’s testimony comprises out of court statements by other unidentified inmates, offered to prove that Defendant advertised Plaintiff as a snitch to Inmate Slone. The substance of the testimony is that Inmate Smith heard unidentified inmates say that they heard Plaintiff had snitched on Inmate Sloan. This testimony is hearsay, as well as duplicative of the testimony that Plaintiff intends to elicit from Inmates Moore and Slone regarding Defendant’s actions. To the extent Inmate Smith’s testimony is intended to demonstrate that Plaintiff was placed in danger from other unidentified inmates due to Defendant’s alleged actions, the testimony as outlined in the declaration is also duplicative of any testimony Plaintiff may offer himself regarding the confrontation allegedly witnessed by Inmate Smith. Plaintiff has failed to make an offer of proof that this inmate witness would “substantially further the resolution of the case.” Wiggins, 717 F.2d at 468 n.1. Plaintiff’s motion for the attendance of Inmate Smith is therefore denied. III. Testimony by Video Defendant states that two witnesses have indicated a willingness to testify by video. (ECF No. 117, pp. 8–9.) Plaintiff did not file a response, but indicated during the pretrial conference that Inmate Moore should be required to testify in person. Plaintiff agreed to the request for Mr. Garcia to testify by video. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit testimony in open court from a different location “[f]or good cause in compelling circumstances and with appropriate safeguards…” Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a). Good cause and compelling circumstances may exist where a significant geographic distance separates the witness from the location of the court proceedings. See e.g., Lyons v. Leonhardt, 2013 WL 3807996, at *11 (D. Nev. July 19, 2013) (video conference testimony appropriate when witness was located more than 100 miles from the courthouse). “Good cause and compelling circumstances may be established with relative ease if all parties agree that testimony should be presented by transmission.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a) advisory committee notes (1996 Amendments). In addition, “[a]ppropriate safeguards exist where the opposing party’s ability to conduct cross-examination is not impaired, the witness testifies under oath in open court, and the witness’s credibility can be assessed adequately.” Warner v. Cate, No. 1:12-cv-1146-LJO-MJS, 2015 WL 4645019, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2015). A. Steven Garcia Steven Garcia, who was in custody during the events at issue in this action, has since been released from prison and now lives in the Los Angeles area. Mr. Garcia is therefore not subject to a subpoena because he l

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