(PC) Bodnar v. Clendenin

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: April 11, 2024
• Docket: 2:22-cv-01533
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THOMAS BODNAR, No. 2:22-cv-1533 AC P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 STEPHANIE CLENDENIN, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a civilly committed individual proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. The 18 undersigned screened the second amended complaint and gave plaintiff the option to proceed on 19 the complaint as screened or to amend the complaint. ECF No. 8. Plaintiff chose to amend the 20 complaint (ECF No. 9) and proceeded to file a third amended complaint (ECF No. 11). Plaintiff 21 has also moved to transfer or reassign this case. ECF Nos. 15, 17. 22 I. Third Amended Complaint 23 A. Statutory Screening 24 The federal in forma pauperis statute authorizes federal courts to dismiss a case if the 25 action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 26 (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 27 § 1915(e)(2). 28 A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 1 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 2 Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss IFP claims which are ‘based on indisputably meritless legal 3 theories’ or whose ‘factual contentions are clearly baseless.’” Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 4 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327), superseded by statute on other grounds as 5 stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The critical inquiry is whether a 6 constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. 7 Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227-28 (citations omitted). 8 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the 9 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of 10 what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 11 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 12 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 13 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 14 sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 15 (citations omitted). “[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of 16 facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (alteration in 17 original) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 18 1216 (3d ed. 2004)). 19 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 20 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 21 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 22 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 23 misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint under this 24 standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp. Bldg. 25 Co. v. Trs. of the Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976) (citation omitted), as well as construe the 26 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, 27 Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citations omitted). 28 //// 1 B. Allegations 2 The third amended complaint once again alleges that defendants Clendenin, Director of 3 the Department of State Hospitals (DSH); Price, Executive Director of Coalinga State Hospital 4 (Coalinga); and Newsom, Governor of California, have been violating plaintiff’s rights under the 5 First and Fourteenth Amendments since 2018, when he began his confinement at Coalinga as a 6 civil detainee under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). ECF No. 11. Specifically, 7 plaintiff claims that Price violated his First Amendment rights when he suspended Protestant 8 church services in March 2020, that Clendenin and Price have violated his Fourteenth 9 Amendment rights by denying him property and services within Coalinga and failing to provide 10 curative treatment, and that Newsom has violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to 11 provide adequate oversight over DSH and Coalinga and by failing to implement the same 12 rehabilitative programs for civil detainees as those implemented for prisoners. Id. at 3-18. 13 Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief. Id. at 18-19. 14 C. Claims for Which a Response Will Be Required 15 i. Conditions of Confinement 16 “Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an individual detained 17 under civil process . . . cannot be subjected to conditions that amount to punishment.” King v. 18 County of Los Angeles, 885 F.3d 548, 556-57 (9th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (internal 19 quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004)). “Because 20 he is detained under civil—rather than criminal—process, an SVPA detainee is entitled to ‘more 21 considerate treatment’ than his criminally detained counterparts.” Jones, 393 F.3d at 932 22 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982)). “Therefore when a SVPA detainee 23 is confined in conditions identical to, similar to, or more restrictive than, those in which his 24 criminal counterparts are held, we presume that the detainee is being subjected to ‘punishment.’” 25 Id. (citation omitted). 26 While confined at Coalinga, plaintiff has allegedly been denied internet access, internet 27 capable electronic devices, personal clothing, vocational and educational training, and nutritional 28 supplements. ECF No. 11 at 4-7, 14. He asserts that these conditions are punitive because they 1 are not based upon individualized determinations, and that prisoners in the custody of the 2 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) are allowed these items and 3 programs, including internet access. Id. Plaintiff has also been subjected to an increasingly 4 restrictive package program that is now like the CDCR’s program, and Coalinga’s phone system 5 charges for calls—unlike the CDCR’s phone system—and does not provide plaintiff with 6 sufficient ability to make and receive confidential calls. Id. at 7-8, 14. Defendants are 7 responsible for these conditions because they are the individuals who cut the vocational and 8 educational programs that Coalinga used to offer, have not implemented programs or policies 9 permitting internet access, create and approve the list of contraband property, and are responsible 10 for creating and implementing policies within the DSH and Coalinga. Id. at 3-8, 14-18. 11 Plaintiff’s allegations that defendants have subjected him to conditions of confinement 12 that are similar to or more restrictive than those of CDCR prisoners are sufficient to state a claim 13 for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 14 ii. Curative Treatment 15 “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires states to provide civilly- 16 committed persons with access to mental health treatment that gives them a realistic opportunity 17 to be cured and released.” Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Ohlinger 18 v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1980)). However, the decisions of qualified professionals 19 regarding treatment are presumed valid and a professional will only be civilly liable when their 20 decision “is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or 21 standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such 22 a judgment.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982). 23 Alleging a slew of shortcomings in his treatment at Coalinga, plaintiff asserts that 24 defendants have failed to provide him with adequate treatment to address his mental disorder,

25 1 Although the court previously found that plaintiff did not state a claim for relief based upon the 26 denial of internet access and internet capable devices (ECF No. 8 at 6), plaintiff has pled additional facts demonstrating that prisoners in CDCR custody are permitted such access as a 27 result of recent policy changes (ECF No. 11 at 4-6). Based on these allegations, plaintiff has now stated a cognizable claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement based on the denial of 28 internet access and internet capable devices. 1 hindering his reasonable expectation to regain his freedom. ECF No. 7 at 8-13, 16-18. 2 To the extent that plaintiff alleges that his curative treatment has been stalled due to the 3 discrete actions of individual facilitators at Coalinga, this does not state a cognizable claim 4 against any of the named defendants because “there is no respondeat superior liability under 5 section 1983.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 6 However, to the extent that plaintiff challenges the mental health treatment program at Coalinga 7 as a whole and the policies created by the named defendants, or lack thereof, this states a 8 cognizable claim. Plaintiff describes Coalinga as a chronically understaffed hospital where 9 facilitators do as they wish with no formal guidelines while plaintiff is constantly held back and 10 prevented from advancing. The deficiencies in the mental health treatment, which plaintiff has 11 described at length, adversely impact plaintiff’s opportunity to be cured, and his allegations 12 sufficiently demonstrate that the programming offered constitutes a substantial departure from the 13 accepted professional standards. 14 iii. Free Exercise 15 “A person asserting a free exercise claim must show that the government action in 16 question substantially burdens the person’s practice of [his] religion. A substantial burden . . . 17 place[s] more than an inconvenience on religious exercise; it must have a tendency to coerce 18 individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs or exert substantial pressure on an 19 adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 20 1031-32 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Free Exercise claims 21 brought by SVPA detainees are properly analyzed under the standard set forth in Turner v. Safley, 22 482 U.S. 78 (1987). See Kindred v. Bigot, 821 F. App’x 842, 843 (9th Cir. 2020) (district court 23 did not err in applying Turner factors to civil detainee’s free exercise claim). 24 Plaintiff alleges that Price suspended Protestant church services in March 2020 and has 25 not reinstated those services, even though services for other religions have been reinstated. ECF 26 No. 11 at 13, 17. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for relief. 27 D. Failure to State a Claim 28 Plaintiff alleges that defendants have overstated the treatment he is receiving and failed to 1 update his treatment plan, causing the DSH evaluators to form unfavorable opinions and 2 preventing him from receiving fair evaluations. ECF No. 11 at 9, 12. 3 To the extent that plaintiff is attempting to challenge his continued confinement, he does 4 not state a cognizable claim. Such claims must be brought through a petition for a writ of habeas 5 corpus. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (“[A] prisoner in state custody cannot 6 use a § 1983 action to challenge ‘the fact or duration of his confinement.’ He must seek federal 7 habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief) instead.” (citations omitted)). A section 1983 8 claim is barred if success in the action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of 9 confinement or its duration. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994) (unless and until 10 favorable termination of the conviction or sentence, no cause of action under section 1983 exists); 11 Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying Heck to challenges 12 to SVPA commitment proceedings). If plaintiff successfully proves that the evaluations required 13 to commence commitment proceedings were faulty, success will necessarily demonstrate the 14 invalidity of his confinement and the claim is thus barred by Heck. See Huftile, 410 F.3d at 1141 15 (without two evaluations concluding plaintiff had a mental disorder within the meaning of the 16 SVPA, there would have been no basis for commitment proceedings). 17 To the extent plaintiff seeks relief with respect to future evaluations, he also fails to state a 18 claim. As the court outlined in screening the second amended complaint, California law provides 19 procedural protections in light of which claims of deficient post-commitment evaluations have 20 been determined not to rise to the level of a due process violation, because a plaintiff may obtain 21 release from confinement even without the evaluations provided by the DSH. See Sullivan v. 22 Shein, No. 1:12-cv-0306 GSA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80492, at *6-9, 2014 WL 11774829, at *3 23 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2014) (no due process violation for deficient post-commitment evaluations in 24 light of procedures outlined in § 6608), aff’d, 606 F. App’x 410 (9th Cir. 2015); Mouzon v. 25 Ahlin, No. 1:13-cv-0143 GSA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81264, at *4-8, 2014 WL 2700671, at *2- 26 3 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 2014) (same), aff’d, 599 F. App’x 772 (9th Cir. 2015); Jennings v. King, 27 No. 1:15-cv-0840 SAB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6667, at *4-10, 2016 WL 235216, at *2-3 (E.D. 28 Cal. Jan. 20, 2016) (same), aff’d, 672 F. App’x 719 (9th Cir. 2016). 1 E. No Leave to Amend 2 You have stated claims for relief against defendants Clendenin, Price, and Newsom based 3 on unconstitutional conditions of confinement, lack of curative treatment, and denial of religious 4 services. However, you have not stated a claim for relief based on the fairness of your past or 5 future evaluations. Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the defects in the 6 complaint could be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 7 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear that a 8 complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the court may dismiss without leave to amend. Cato v. 9 United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1995). 10 The undersigned finds that, as set forth above, the complaint fails to state a claim for relief 11 based upon plaintiff’s SVPA evaluations. Plaintiff has already been given an opportunity to 12 amend the complaint and advised what kind of information he needed to provide. Given that 13 plaintiff has added no new facts regarding this claim, it does not appear that further amendment 14 would result in a cognizable claim. As a result, leave to amend this claim further would be futile 15 and it should be dismissed without leave to amend. 16 II. Motions to Transfer or Reassign Case 17 Plaintiff has filed two nearly identical motions to transfer or reassign this case on the 18 ground that two other similar cases filed by other detainees around the same time as plaintiff’s 19 have already progressed to discovery. ECF No. 15, 17. He seeks transfer or reassignment of this 20 case so that this case can move forward. Id. Since the aim of plaintiff’s motions appears to be 21 the advancement of his case, the instant order serves that purpose as the complaint has been found 22 to contain cognizable claims and is being ordered served on defendants. The motions will 23 therefore be denied. 24 III. Plain Language Summary of this Order for a Pro Se Litigant 25 To the extent you are attempting to challenge your continued confinement or any future 26 evaluations, you have not stated a claim for relief and it will be recommended that those claims 27 be dismissed. However, the remainder of your allegations against defendant Clendenin, Price, 28 and Newsom are sufficient to state claims for relief and you will be provided with service 1 documents to complete and return to the court. Once the completed service documents are 2 returned to the court, the United States Marshal will be directed to serve defendants Clendenin, 3 Price, and Newsom. You should not try to serve the defendants yourself. 4 CONCLUSION 5 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 6 1. Plaintiff’s motions to transfer or reassign the case (ECF Nos. 15, 17) are DENIED. 7 2. Service is appropriate for defendants Clendenin, Price, and Newsom. 8 3. The Clerk of the Court shall send plaintiff three USM-285 forms, one summons, an 9 instruction sheet, and a copy of the third amended complaint (ECF No. 11). 10 4. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached 11 Notice of Submission of Documents and submit the following documents to the court: 12 a. The completed Notice of Submission of Documents; 13 b. One completed summons; 14 c. One completed USM-285 form for each of the following defendants: 15 Clendenin, Price, and Newsom; and 16 d. Four copies of the endorsed third amended complaint. 17 5. Plaintiff need not attempt service on defendants and need not request waiver of 18 service. Upon receipt of the above-described documents, the court will direct the United States 19 Marshal to serve the above-named defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 20 without payment of costs. 21 6. The Clerk of the Court shall randomly assign a United States District Judge to this 22 action. 23 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s due process claims based on his past 24 and future SVPA evaluations be DISMISSED without leave to amend. 25 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 26 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days 27 after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 28 with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judges Findings 1 | and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified 2 | time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 3 | (th Cir. 1991). . ~ 4 | DATED: April 10, 2024 tit a (A /, 5 ALLISON CLAIRE ‘ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THOMAS BODNAR, No. 2:22-cv-1533 AC P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. NOTICE OF SUBMISSION OF DOCUMENTS 14 STEPHANIE CLENDENIN, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff submits the following documents in compliance with the court’s order filed 18 _____________________: 19 1 completed summons form 20 3 completed forms USM-285 21 4 copies of the complaint 22

23 DATED:

24 ________________________________ 25 Plaintiff 26 27 28