(PC) Bernal v. Beard

District Court, E.D. California·Decided October 25, 2019·No. 2:16-cv-02511·Unknown

Opinion

RUBEN RODRIGUEZ BERNAL, No. 2:16-cv-2511 AC P Plaintiff, v. ORDER JEFFREY BEARD, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court are plaintiff’s motions to compel discovery from defendant Weeks (ECF Nos. 19, 23), which defendant has opposed (ECF Nos. 20, 25). I. Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff alleges that defendants Weeks and Arana conspired to retaliate and actually retaliated against him for filing complaints against Weeks, by searching his cell, seizing property and paperwork, and writing him up on fictious grounds. ECF No. 1 at 6-8. II. Motions to Compel Plaintiff has filed two motions to compel discovery from defendant Weeks: one to compel further production of documents (ECF No. 19) and one to compel further responses to interrogatories (ECF No. 23). Defendant Weeks opposes the motion to compel further production on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to indicate how defendant’s responses are deficient and that the responses were appropriate and the objections well founded. ECF No. 20. He opposes the motion to compel further responses to interrogatories on similar grounds. ECF No. 25. A. Standards Governing Discovery The scope of discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) is broad. Discovery may be obtained as to “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. The court, however, may limit discovery if it is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;” or if the party who seeks discovery “has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery;” or if “the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). The purpose of discovery is to “make a trial less a game of blind man’s bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent,” United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (citation omitted), and “to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties,” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). Where a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 or fails to produce documents requested under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, the party seeking discovery may move for compelled disclosure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). “The party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of establishing that its request satisfies the relevancy requirements of Rule 26(b)(1). Thereafter, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that the discovery should be prohibited, and the burden of clarifying, explaining or supporting its objections.” Bryant v. Ochoa, 2009 WL 1390794 at * 1 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2009) (citations omitted); see also Nugget v. Hydroelectric, L.P. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 981 F.2d 429, 438-39 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding denial of motion to compel because moving party did not show the request fell within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1)). The opposing party is “required to carry a heavy burden of showing why discovery was denied.” Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). B. Requests for Production On January 5, 2019,1 plaintiff filed a motion to compel the production of documents from defendant Weeks. ECF No. 19. While neither party has provided a copy of the original requests, plaintiff asserts that they were served on November 15, 2018 (ECF No. 24 at 1), while defendant claims they were mailed on November 19, 2018 (ECF No. 20 at 1). Weeks served his responses to the requests on January 8, 2019. ECF No. 20 at 43. Plaintiff’s motion simply lists his requests for production without addressing how Weeks’ responses to the requests were deficient. ECF No. 19. Based on plaintiff’s reply and the dates provided by the parties during briefing, it is clear that plaintiff had not yet received defendant’s responses at the time he filed the motion. Defendant opposes the motion to compel on the ground that it fails to identify how his responses are deficient (ECF No. 20), and in reply, plaintiff once again fails to identify any deficiencies other than to claim that the responses were untimely (ECF No. 24). Responses to discovery requests were due forty-five days after the date of service (ECF No. 17 at 4, ¶ 2), and defendant was entitled to an additional three days after the forty-five-day deadline expired because plaintiff’s requests were served by mail, Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). Accordingly, contrary to defendant’s assertion, his responses to plaintiff’s requests for production were untimely because regardless of whether the requests were served on November 15 or November 19, 2018, responses were due by January 7, 2019.2 1 Since plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding pro se, he is afforded the benefit of the prison mailbox rule. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (establishing rule that a prisoner’s court document is deemed filed on the date the prisoner delivered the document to prison officials for mailing). 2 Rule 6(d) extends a deadline three days from “after the period would otherwise expire under Rule 6(a).” When a deadline expires on a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or day when the Clerk’s Office is inaccessible, it is extended until the first accessible day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C), (a)(3)(A). The forty-fifth day after November 15, 2018, fell on Sunday, December 30, 2018. Because the Clerk’s Office was closed on December 31, 2018, rendering it inaccessible, Keyser v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., 265 F.3d 741, 747 (9th Cir. 2001) (clerk’s office inaccessible when officially closed despite availability of after-hours drop box), and January 1, 2019, was a legal holiday, the deadline for submitting responses expired on Wednesday, January 2, 2019. The additional three days (continued) “It is well established that a failure to object to discovery requests within the time required constitutes a waiver of any objection.” Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981)). However, because defendant’s responses and objections were only one day late, and the lateness appears to hav

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