Payne v. City of New York Administration for Children's Services

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 19, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-03860
StatusUnknown

This text of Payne v. City of New York Administration for Children's Services (Payne v. City of New York Administration for Children's Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Payne v. City of New York Administration for Children's Services, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK TAREN PAYNE, Plaintiff, -against- 24-CV-3860 (LTS) CITY OF NEW YORK, ADMINSTRATION ORDER TO AMEND FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES; D.C. 37 (UNION), Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117; the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 to 2654; the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 to 297; and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-101 to 131, alleging that her employer discriminated and retaliated against her based on her disability. By order dated May 28, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. BACKGROUND Plaintiff initiated this action by filing the Court’s Employment Discrimination Complaint form, naming as Defendants the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (“ACS”), her former employer, and D.C. 37, a labor union. When prompted on the form to provide the facts underlying this matter, Plaintiff wrote “please see attached.” (ECF 1 ¶ IVB.) Attachments to the pleading include a complaint that Plaintiff filed in the New York State Supreme Court, New York County, against ACS and the New York State Division of Human Rights (“NYSDHR”), a

NYSDHR Determination and Order After Investigation, and a Notice of Right to Sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (ECF 1 at 9-42.) The following facts are drawn from the complaint and attachments. Plaintiff, who suffers from unspecified “physical & neurological” disabilities, was wrongfully classified as a “nonpermanent” ACS employee. (Id. at 4, 13, 20.) Thereafter, ACS denied Plaintiff “overtime payments” and other benefits available to permanent employees, and then “wrongfully” fired her. (Id. at ¶ V.) Plaintiff also checks the boxes on the form complaint indicating that ACS retaliated against her, failed to accommodate her disability, and either harassed her or created a hostile work environment. (Id. ¶ IV.) Plaintiff seeks money damages. (Id. ¶ VI.) There are no facts alleged in the complaint regarding acts or omissions of D.C. 37 in connection with these events. DISCUSSION A. Short and plain statement of claim Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief

if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court need not accept, however, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. Plaintiff’s complaint does not comply with Rule 8. The complaint consists largely of

attachments arising from a charge that Plaintiff filed with the NYSDHR and a state-court action that Plaintiff filed against ACS and the NYSDHR. These documents do not explain what occurred and how Defendants allegedly violated her rights while she was an ACS employee. In other words, the complaint does not include a short and plain statement showing that Plaintiff is entitled to relief under any of the statutes she cites. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to replead her claims in an amended complaint that complies with Rule 8 and the standards set forth below. B. Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) “The ADA prohibits discrimination against a ‘qualified individual on the basis of disability’ in the ‘terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.’” Kinneary v. City of New York, 601 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). A person is disabled under the ADA if the person has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or

more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). This antidiscrimination statute prohibits an employer from mistreating an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions).

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Bluebook (online)
Payne v. City of New York Administration for Children's Services, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/payne-v-city-of-new-york-administration-for-childrens-services-nysd-2024.