Paul Rodriguez and Rebecca L Watts v. James Frederic Ebdon, III and the City of Houston

Opinion

Opinion issued July 23, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00401-CV ——————————— PAUL RODRIGUEZ, JR. AND REBECCA L. WATTS, Appellants V. CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellee

On Appeal from the 113th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2022-06173

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This appeal arises out of a confrontation among neighbors. Appellant Paul

Rodriguez, Jr. pointed a gun at a neighborhood resident who had harassed and

confronted his wife, appellant Rebecca Watts, while she was watering plants. The

resident, James Frederick Ebdon, III, then identified himself as a police officer and contacted Houston Police Department (HPD). Officers arrived and arrested

Rodriguez. Rodriguez was initially charged with aggravated assault with a firearm,

a charge that was eventually dismissed.

Rodriguez and Watts sued the City, claiming false arrest, malicious

prosecution, and violations of their federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C.

sections 1983. The City moved for summary judgment on traditional and no

evidence grounds, arguing, among other things, that it was immune from suit and

the appellants did not raise a fact issue to support their federal claims. The trial court

granted the City’s motion.

In their sole issue on appeal, Rodriguez and Watt contend that the trial court

erred in granting the City’s summary judgment motion.

We affirm.

Background

According to the appellants’ allegations, on May 8, 2021, the water to the hose

turned off while Watts was watering her plants on the front patio of her townhome.

She ran out to see what happened and saw an SUV driving away. A week later, her

water was turned off again. She ran out to see what happened and saw a man, later

identified as Ebdon, running toward a sports utility vehicle (SUV). He yelled that

Watts was wasting water.

2 The appellants found their hose disconnected from the outdoor faucet several

times that summer. Near midnight on August 25, 2021, Watts was watering her

plants when Ebdon pulled up in his SUV near where she was standing and began

yelling at her to stop watering her plants. Rodriguez, who was inside, heard Watts

outside screaming for help. He got his gun and went into the garage. Rodriguez

walked toward the open garage entrance and asked Ebdon to leave. Ebdon laughed,

and Rodriguez pointed his gun at him. Ebdon then pulled out his badge and gun and

informed Rodriguez he was a police officer, and Rodriguez lowered his gun. Ebdon

called the Houston Police Department. Officers arrived and arrested Rodriguez.

Rodriguez was arrested, spent forty hours in jail, and was released on bond.

He was indicted by a grand jury for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Rodriguez was pressured to take a plea deal before the criminal case was dismissed

on November 9, 2022 for insufficient evidence of guilt.

The appellants alleged that Ebdon engaged in harassment and violated the

Texas Penal Code provisions criminalizing stalking, trespassing, and assault.1 They

brought claims against the City for false arrest and malicious prosecution. They also

brought claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for violations of Rodriguez’s rights

under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution, alleging

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 22.01, 42.072, 30.05.

3 that the City has a custom, policy, practice, and procedure of not disciplining or

training officers adequately.

The City moved for summary judgment on traditional and no-evidence

grounds, asserting that it was immune from suit and the appellants failed to show a

waiver of immunity applied to their claims. The City also maintained that the

appellants had no evidence to support their claims for false arrest and malicious

prosecution. Alternatively, the City argued that those claims were barred by the

independent intermediary doctrine because in issuing an indictment, the grand jury

implicitly found that probable cause supported Rodriguez’s arrest.

Further, the City asserted that the appellants failed to show any evidence of a

violation of the appellants’ constitutional rights that would overcome the officers’

qualified immunity.

In opposing the City’s motion, the appellants focused on Ebdon’s alleged

harassment that led up to the confrontation and claimed that Ebdon continued to be

a threat. They also asserted that the City aided and abetted in police misconduct and

violated Rodriguez’s civil rights by falsely arresting and prosecuting Rodriguez.

Summary Judgment

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc. v. Xerox State & Loc. Sols., Inc., 663 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Tex. 2023).

4 A party moving for traditional summary judgment must prove that no genuine

issues of material fact exist and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; TEX.

R. CIV. P. 166a(c). When a governmental defendant moves for traditional summary

judgment based on immunity, it bears the burden to show that the trial court lacks

jurisdiction. City of Austin v. Powell, 704 S.W.3d 437, 448 (Tex. 2024). If the

governmental defendant satisfies this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to

present evidence raising a fact issue that immunity was waived. See Powell, 704

S.W.3d at 448; Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 637

(Tex. 2012) (“While a plaintiff must plead the elements of her statutory cause of

action . . . she will only be required to submit evidence if the defendant presents

evidence negating one of those basic facts.”). If the movant’s evidence conclusively

negates jurisdiction, the trial court must grant summary judgment dismissing the

case against the governmental entity, unless the nonmovant produces enough

evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 448. “An

issue is conclusively established if reasonable minds could not differ about the

conclusion to be drawn from the facts in the record.” Cmty. Health Sys. Prof'l

Services Corp. v. Hansen, 525 S.W.3d 671, 681 (Tex. 2017) (internal quotations

omitted).

5 If a movant files a proper no-evidence summary judgment motion, the burden

shifts to the nonmovant to present evidence raising a fact issue on each element

challenged in the motion. Wal-Mart Stores, 663 S.W.3d at 576; TEX. R. CIV. P.

166a(i).

In reviewing a summary judgment ruling, we take as true all evidence

favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve

any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Id.at 680. We may not, however, disregard

necessary contextual evidence or “evidence and inferences unfavorable to the

[nonmovants] if reasonable jurors could not.” City of Houston v. Rodriguez, 704

S.W.3d 462, 470 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544

S.W.3d 755, 771 (Tex. 2018).

Because the trial court did not specify the grounds on which it granted the

summary judgment motion, we must affirm if any of the grounds alleged in the

motion are meritorious. Hansen, 525 S.W.3d at 680.

B. Governmental Immunity

Governmental immunity implicates a trial court’s jurisdiction and derives

from the State’s sovereign immunity. City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128,

134 (Tex. 2011). Governmental immunity precludes suit and legal liability against

the State’s political subdivisions, including cities, when performing governmental

functions. City of Houston v. Houston Firefighters’ Relief & Ret. Fund, 667 S.W.3d

6 383, 395 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. denied). Unless the State has

consented to suit through legislative waiver of governmental immunity, such

immunity deprives courts of subject matter jurisdiction. Fallon v. Univ. of Tex. MD

Anderson Cancer Ctr., 586 S.W.3d 37, 56 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no

pet.).

“A plaintiff has the burden to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s

jurisdiction.” Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019).

That burden includes the burden of establishing a waiver of immunity in suits against

the government. Id. “Because a governmental unit is protected from suit by

governmental immunity, pleadings in a suit against a governmental unit must

affirmatively demonstrate, either by reference to a statute or express legislative

permission, that the Legislature consented to the suit.” City of Houston v. Swinerton

Builders, Inc., 233 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

In the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA), the legislature created a limited waiver

of governmental immunity for Texas municipalities like the City. TEX. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. CODE §§ 101.001–.109. The TTCA “expressly waives immunity in three

general categories: (1) use of publicly owned automobiles, (2) premises defects, and

(3) injuries or death arising out of the condition or use of property.” City of Denton

v. Rodriguez-Rivera, 714 S.W.3d 706, 715–16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2025, pet.

denied); Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225 (Tex.

7 2004). Pertinent here, the TTCA does not waive governmental immunity for claims

“arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, or any other intentional tort.”

See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.057(2); see Franka v. Velasquez, 332

S.W.3d 367, 376 & n.35. (Tex. 2011).

The false arrest and malicious prosecution claims alleged by the appellants

against the City are intentional torts for which there is no waiver of immunity. See

Henderson v. Iowa Colony, No. 01–15–00599–CV, 2016 WL 2586715, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Houston [lst Dist.] May 15, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Harris Cnty.

v. Deary, 695 S.W.3d 566, 572 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, no pet.)

The appellants did not allege any basis for waiver or any state law claim for

which governmental immunity is waived. Thus, the trial court did not err in granting

summary judgment in favor of the City as to the appellants’ state law claims.

C. Section 1983 claim

The appellants’ remaining claims seek relief under 42 U.S.C. section 1983

based on allegations that the City violated Rodriguez’s federal constitutional rights

under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 42 U.S.C. section 1983 provides a

private right of action against persons acting under color of state law who violate

rights secured by the United States Constitution or other federal law.2 Ortega v.

2 The statute provides: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 8 Pean, No. 01-18-00249-CV, 2019 WL 1560859, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] Apr. 11, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege a deprivation of a

federally secured right and show that a person acting under color of state law caused

the deprivation. Hicks v. LeBlanc, 81 F.4th 497, 503 n.14 (5th Cir. 2023). The United

States Supreme Court has held that a municipality is a “person” that can be liable for

a constitutional deprivation under section 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 690–91(1978). But the municipality cannot be liable just for employing a

tortfeasor; it must have caused the constitutional deprivation itself. Id. at 691, 698;

Deary, 695 S.W.3d at 575. To prove municipal liability under section 1983, a

plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a policymaker; (2) an official policy; and (3) a

violation of constitutional rights whose “moving force” is the policy or custom.

Shumpert v. City of Tupelo, 905 F.3d 310, 316 (5th Cir. 2018). “An official policy

must be either unconstitutional or have been adopted ‘with deliberate indifference to

the known or obvious fact that such constitutional violations would result.’” Id.

“Deliberate indifference” is not just an unintentionally negligent oversight; it must

the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

9 requires an intentional choice. See James v. Harris Cnty., 577 F.3d 612, 617–18 (5th

Cir. 2009).

The appellants allege that the City violated Rodriguez’s civil rights by

• falsely arresting and pursuing a malicious prosecution against Rodriguez; • placing Rodriguez in danger by informing authorities at the jail where he was being held that he had pointed a gun at a police officer; • failing to investigate Watts’s written complaints about Ebdon stalking and harassing her and aiding and abetting Ebdon’s misconduct; • securing an indictment against Rodriguez through employees and agents who intentionally and maliciously concealed exculpatory evidence from the grand jury; • prosecuting Rodriguez after his indictment; and • attempting to negotiate a plea deal with Rodriguez.

They also alleged that the City “has a custom, policy, practice, and procedure of not

disciplining or training officers adequately.”

In its summary judgment motion, the City asserted there was no evidence of

any constitutional violation. According to the undisputed facts, the officers

responded to an incident where Rodriguez pointed a gun at Ebdon after Ebdon

laughed at him. The officers arrested Rodriguez, and a grand jury later indicted

Rodriguez. The indictment alleges that Rodriguez, “on or about August 25, 2021,

did then and there unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly threaten [Ebdon] with

imminent bodily injury by using and exhibiting a deadly weapon, namely, a

10 firearm.” This indictment is consistent with the Texas Penal Code’s definition of

aggravated assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 22.01(a)(2), 22.02(a)(2).

The facts as admitted by the appellants support Rodriguez’s arrest and

prosecution. The State’s eventual, discretionary decision to discontinue prosecution

because of insufficient evidence of guilt is not evidence that there was a lack of

probable cause to arrest and prosecute Rodriguez in the first place. Further, the

appellants adduced no evidence raising an issue of fact as to any act or conduct in

violation of the federal constitution or federal law that was the result of inadequate

training or discipline. See Shumpert, 905 F.3d at 316. Thus, we hold that the trial

court did not err in granting the City’s no-evidence summary judgment motion on

this ground.

We overrule the appellants’ sole issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Clint Morgan Justice

Panel consists of Justices Gunn, Caughey, and Morgan.